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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Availability as distribution channel output 
Creation of availability constitutes the core of marketing. Every marketing 
practitioner is involved in making goods and/or services available to customers. 
Availability refers to the possibility for buyers to obtain products that possess 
desired characteristics at an acceptable cost. In a broad sense creation of availability 
involves virtually all activities that a firm could possibly undertake, including 
technical product development, production, distribution, and communication. 
Manufacturers add value particularly through product transformations, wholesale 
and retail traders are almost exclusively concerned with service delivery through 
their distribution and selling efforts. 
This book considers the availability of finished products, given their intrinsic 
characteristics resulting from successful production according to specifications and 
given consumer perceptions of these characteristics resulting from advertising and 
other mass-media information. The goods considered could be semifinal or final 
provided their production process has been completed1. Creation of availability of 
finished products comprises adjustment of differences between the quantity and 
quality of the product(s) at the point and time of production and the time and place 
Products exist with intrinsic characteristics that undergo intended changes during physical 
distribution, e.g. cheese and wine. For these products physical distribution activities, such as 
storage, are an integral part of the production process and will therefore not be considered. 
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at which the final consumer buys the product(s), the quantity in which she or he 
buys it (them), and the quality of the product(s) at the time and point of usage or 
consumption. This is done largely through distribution channels or marketing 
channels. Stern, El-Ansary and Coughlan (1996, p.l) describe marketing channels 
as "... sets of interdependent organizations involved in the process of making a 
product or service available for consumption or use" and as encompassing "... the 
value-added benefits that members of the commercial, or selling, channel provide to 
end-users in the form of time, place, possession, and form utilities for end-users"2. 
Distribution services are the outputs of the distribution functions, performed 
by vertically and/or horizontally related distribution channel members, that are 
instrumental in creating availability. Chapter 2 illustrates and discusses many 
possible interpretations of the role of distribution organizations in the creation of 
availability. The focal point is that through facilitation of a customer's shopping or 
procurement process and product use, whether by lowering implicit shopping cost, 
contributing to the pleasure of shopping, or assisting consumers in making better 
decisions, a distributive organization can attract buyers and consequently increase 
its profits3. Important distribution service elements include offering a product 
assortment, information provision, accessibility of the supplier's organization, 
product delivery, quality maintenance, and ambience4. 
2 
The terms "marketing channel" and "distribution channel" are often used interchangeably, 
although Stern, El-Ansary, and Coughlan (1996) do recognize the differential meaning of the two 
channels. One key distinction, implicifly suggested by Stern et al., is that distribution channels 
satisfy consumer demand through product delivery, while marketing channels in addition stimulate 
demand, for example through promotional activities. In this view marketing channels perform more 
functions than distribution channels. Corey, Céspedes, and Rangan (1989) avoid this distinction 
and define a distribution channel from the perspective of the organizations involved as "The 
product distribution system, including the producer's salesforce, independent distributors, agents, 
broker, and captive distributors". Both channel types exclude production. For the purpose of 
conceptual clarity this book uses the term distribution channels as systems designed to create 
availability through physical distribution processes. 
The term distribution services will be used throughout this book. Other related expressions, such 
as customer services, product services, logistic services, value-added services, or (marketing) 
channel services, are widely used in literature. Although these terms often are, at least to a certain 
extent applicable to, or even encompassing distribution services, the term distribution services 
remains central and will be used throughout the text. 
4 Although so-called pure services are not the focus of this book, a large part of its discussion 
applies not only to goods but to pure services as well. With respect to many services however no 
clear distinction exists between production and distribution processes, mainly because service 
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Every individual experiences a need for availability and consequently values a 
seller's efforts with respect to creation thereof, i.e., the provision of distribution 
service. Availability is a subjective concept; consumers differ in their demand for 
distribution service, i.e., their needs, wants, and desires with respect to where and 
when a certain (combination of) product(s) can be obtained, and the quantity and 
quality of these products. Consequently, consumers will have differential 
perceptions of a distribution channel's performance and the value created through it. 
Consumer demand for distribution service is driven by several factors, both 
economic, psychological, and social, enduring as well as situational. Arbitrary 
examples include the intrinsic need for variety (cf. McAllister and Pessemier 1982) 
by which individuals cannot but adopt a varied consumption pattern, time 
constraints with respect to shopping, and the purpose for which shopping is done. 
The assortment is an important, if not the most important, distribution service 
element that is related to many other distribution service elements and enables 
delivery of many potential customer benefits resulting from supplier distribution 
service provision. Distribution service elements such as product quality and 
ambience are inextricably linked to customers' assortment perceptions, whereas 
service elements related to product delivery follow largely from assortment size and 
composition, at least in a retail environment. Assortments can be considered as 
collections from which one or more items can be chosen, either simultaneously or 
consecutively, in order to satisfy certain needs, wants, and/or desires. Assortments 
exist at different levels of aggregation and hierarchy. At a low level of aggregation 
assortments are collections of goods consumers keep at home. Every day a 
consumer makes multiple choices from in-home assortments, including the clothes 
he or she will wear during daytime, food that will be prepared for meals, and 
television programs that will be watched. At a higher level of aggregation an 
assortment is the joint offering of goods and/or services by a retail outlet. A 
collection of multiple retail outlets in a shopping centre constitutes an assortment of 
stores. When shopping for groceries a consumer chooses whether to visit a 
large-scale supermarket or a number of smaller specialized stores. Once a store has 
been selected the consumer chooses from multiple product categories and multiple 
production and distribution require supplier-customer interactions, production and consumption 
occur simultaneously, and consequentiy production and distribution may coincide. 
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brands within each category. On an even higher level a consumer considers a 
collection of different shopping centres in a geographical region as an assortment, 
and so on. A similar reasoning applies to wholesale and manufacturer assortments. 
A retailer selects her supplier(s) from multiple wholesalers who in turn face 
decision making from product offerings by assortments consisting of multiple 
intermediaries and/or manufacturers, each carrying their own assortment of goods 
and services. 
Creation of availability through offering an interrelated collection of items 
adds surplus value, exceeding the sum of individual items' values, for a decision 
maker. Consumers' preference for basket shopping constitutes a strong force that 
justifies and explains among other things the existence of middlemen in marketing 
channels and the emergence of retail conglomerates. Together with distribution cost 
efficiency, in particular with respect to time, inventory, and transportation, 
consumer preference for assortments is a force that supports the existence of 
multiple retail outlets that carry to a large extent overlapping merchandise. The 
assortment carried by a trading organization is strongly connected with other 
distribution service elements, such as information provision, and delivery at the 
right time and place. In addition, assortments are a marketing instrument that can be 
used to influence purchase behavior through the particular combination of items 
carried. Because of their central and influential role in distribution service provision 
and creation of consumer demand, assortments - in particular assortments carried by 
retail outlets - form an important topic in a number of chapters of this book. In spite 
of the specific attention for assortments in certain chapters, these chapters also 
investigate other distribution service elements, depending on the research question 
discussed. 
1.2 Evolution of distribution service 
During the last decades much attention has been devoted to customer behavior with 
respect to goods and services. The last two or three decades, more specifically since 
Bucklin's (1965, 1966) theory and analysis, distribution services have been more or 
less overlooked as a concept by economic theory and marketing scientists, despite 
their impact on consumer behavior and their important role in the innovation of 
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trade institutions. This section briefly introduces a number of developments that 
justify the increasing focus on distribution service in theory and in management 
practice. 
In the old days, when agricultural domestic production and non-monetary 
exchange of goods dominated the economy, producers created availability by 
getting together and forming marketplaces in order to facilitate comparison and 
trade with other producers who were also potential buyers. Nowadays, a huge 
variety of products exists and due to multiple reasons a large and complex variety of 
marketing channels has emerged. Technological developments with respect to 
(agricultural) production and distribution have led to the emergence and growth of 
organizations that specialized in one or more distributive functions. In 1900, 62.0% 
of total US labor force was employed in goods-producing industries (including 
agriculture, mining, construction, and manufacturing), and only 8.2% were engaged 
in goods distribution (including wholesale and retail trade, transportation, and 
storage). By 1980 these percentages were 26.5 and 25.5, respectively (Oi 1992). In 
The Netherlands about 18% of total labor force was employed in goods-producing 
industries in 1997, and approximately 25% was employed in goods distribution 
(CBS 1999). In 1960 these percentages were approximately 42 and 22, respectively 
(CBS 1971). Wholesale and retail trade generally perform many distributive 
functions and exist by virtue of their role in creating availability through 
establishing successful transactions with their customers. They allocate then-
resources in such a way as to effectively and efficiently assist (potential) customers 
in searching the right product at a fair price, arranging delivery and receipt, etc. 
Several distributive functions, such as transportation and storage, are performed by 
specialized middlemen that service manufacturers, retail or wholesale traders, and 
their respective customers with respect to for example delivery. 
The evolution of distribution services relates to developments in both the 
demand and the supply-side of markets. From the 1960's on attention for 
distribution service focused on practical problems with respect to the delivery of 
goods, including inventory management, transportation, routing, etc. Until the late 
1970's cost minimization under service constraints was the objective of most 
scientific research and management efforts. Now that individual organizations' 
physical distribution cost reductions have reached their lower limits, the 
significance of demand side factors has been increasingly recognized. Continuously 
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changing market factors, including technological innovations, prices of inputs, and 
demographics, interact and urge trade organizations towards more or less drastic 
adjustments of their service outputs in order to survive in the long run. In the near 
future new and fast growing service sectors, in particular information technology 
services, will offer technologically advanced products that extend the possibilities 
with respect to the provision of distribution services. Consider, for example, the 
potentially enormous impact of widespread internet shopping (cf. Alba et al. 1997). 
In most developed real-world markets the number of goods and services that 
are available for consumers to satisfy similar needs, wants, and desires is growing 
steadily, making it increasingly difficult for producers and trade to differentiate 
their offerings in the consumer's mind. Since the possibilities for product 
differentiation on the basis of intrinsic product characteristics are limited, offering 
excellent distribution services has become an increasingly important source of 
product and organization differentiation. Price competition requires retailers carry 
carefully designed assortments and offer matching services, such as has been done 
by several discounters. Many organizations sell identical products to different 
consumer segments at different prices using different, customized, distribution 
service packages. For example, supermarkets may offer differential personal service 
on different time-periods during the day. 
Changes in economic and demographic characteristics of households have 
changed demand for distribution service (Betancourt 1991; Oi 1992). In developed 
economies in today's society most consumers' have the means to fulfill their basic 
needs and desires. This encourages the tendency to seek variety (cf. McAllister and 
Pessemier 1982) and stimulates consumers' desire to obtain products with higher 
added value, such as quality and convenience, for which they are willing to pay 
extra. Also, in economically advanced countries the total number of households 
increases, while the average size of households o^minishes. This implies an increase 
in demand for goods and services that are associated with the mere existence of 
households, imposing higher demands on distribution system output. Higher car 
ownership - which has lowered the cost of visiting a distant store - and a decrease in 
home inventory costs - mainly through affordable refrigerators - have lead to an 
increase in the size of shopping baskets and to an increase in consumers' willingness 
to visit relatively distant stores, albeit less frequently. An important demographic 
development concerns the rapid growth of the proportion of the population 
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consisting of elderly consumers in certain Western European and US regions. This 
will positively influence the demand for effort-saving distribution service, offering 
new possibilities for market segmentation and subsequent retail and product 
positioning. 
Long-term wage increase has not only increased cost of labor to retailers but 
has also increased the opportunity cost of time - or value of time - of nonmarket 
labor activities, including purchasing, to consumers. This in turn has increased 
demand for certain distribution service elements, such as large assortments, and has 
reduced demand for other distribution service elements, such as personal service. In 
addition, the growth in the number of multiple earner households has increased 
households' free income. The higher labor force participation rate of women and the 
resulting higher opportunity cost of female time has lead among other things to an 
increase in consumer demand for longer store hours and a rise in male shopping 
(Pashigian and Bowen 1994). Pashigian and Bowen explain the observed increase 
in demand for brand names from the combined facts that shoppers economize on 
time while the number and frequency of male shoppers, who generally still have a 
higher income than women, increases. They use the same rationale to explain the 
observed increase in advertising by consumer goods manufacturers and the 
observed decrease in personal services at retail stores, which they view as 
substitution of information supplied at the point of sale by retailers with information 
supplied by manufacturers through brand names. 
The increasing cost of consumers' time has put a pressure on traditional 
retailing formats, such as service-intensive department stores, and has led to the 
emergence of supermarkets and convenience stores. Demand-side developments 
drive retail stores, for example grocery stores, towards larger assortments through 
expansion of the breadth of product lines carried as well as the number of product 
lines carried, and increasing scale of operations. Broader assortments and lower 
home inventory costs allow larger shopping basket sizes and less frequent shopping 
trips, consequently reducing monetary as well as nonmonetary shopping cost. Not 
only does a larger store attract more demand than a smaller store through offering 
the possibility for one-stop shopping, it also allows more efficient utilization of 
equipment and a higher labor productivity of in-store personnel (cf. Oi 1992)5. 
5 Oi (1992) explains retail firms' cost functions with increasing returns through the economies of 
massed reserves. This can be seen when considering a store's operations as the repaiman's problem 
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Together with the emergence of new technological possibilities demand-side 
developments will favor new, less service-intensive formulas, including discount 
stores, mail-order firms, and e-commerce. 
Although many retailers are driven towards larger assortments that allow 
one-stop shopping, other retailers may find it profitable to specialize, i.e., narrow 
their product line. Oi (1992) mentions gasoline service stations as an example of 
stores that used to offer additional services, including repair service, and later on 
narrowed their product line while their sizes increased. Apparently, consumer 
savings in shopping time resulting from one-stop shopping of gasoline and repairs 
did not lead to a sufficient increase in demand, i.e., larger baskets and economies of 
massed reserves, to outweigh the extra costs associated with a product line 
expansion that were incurred by the retailer. Consequently, specialized gasoline 
stores on one hand and specialized repair and other service stores on the other hand 
emerged that imply higher value for both consumers and retailers. The combination 
of gasoline and groceries on the other hand appears to be very successful. Several 
gasoline outlets in The Netherlands have teamed up with supermarket chains and 
sell a variety of food items and other fast-moving products that are complementary 
to consumers' gasoline purchase trips. 
1.3 Aim of the research 
The distribution decisions that each firm must make concern strategy, location, 
logistics, and management (cf. Stern, El-Ansary, and Coughlan 1996). Strategic 
distribution decisions, such as choice of channel structure and location decisions, 
depend on but also determine the service levels an organization chooses to offer in 
the future. Because of the complex interrelationships between the components of 
distribution decisions the issues of distribution service provision and consumption 
touch upon many fields of interest, including logistics, consumer behavior, and 
organizational behavior, as well as different research perspectives. The focus of the 
(cf. Oi 1992): a firm has M machines (checkout counters), with breakdown probability p, R 
repairmen (employees) with mean service time fi, and customer arrival rate A. If M and R increase, 
the mean length of the customer queue falls and the sum of idle checkout counters and waiting 
employees decreases. 
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book is on behavioral antecedents and consequences of the creation of availability 
through distribution service provision. It puts the decision maker, particularly 
consumer and retailer, in a central place instead of the distribution or logistics 
system that facilitates distribution service provision. Given the many research topics 
with respect to distribution services that deserve to be studied from this perspective, 
only a few of them have been selected within the context of this book. 
The central focus of the book is discussion of distribution services as 
instruments for non-price competition. It analyzes forces that influence distribution 
service provision by firms - predominantly retailers - in distribution channels, as 
well as the effects of distribution service provision on consumer behavior. This is 
expressed in the three central parts of the book. Two of these parts (parts II and IH) 
concern consumer behavior, in particular analysis of the role of distribution service 
in consumer choice behavior, and the role of distribution service provision and its 
determinants in consumer post-purchase evaluation, respectively. Part IV addresses 
the determinants of retailer distribution service provision and its relationship with 
distribution channel structure. Since channel member competition is an important 
determinant of distribution service provision, strategic interactions between channel 
members are the focal point. Knowledge of the role of distribution service is an 
important prerequisite with respect to implementation of programs for distribution 
channel optimization. The research discussed in this and the following chapters is 
aimed at contributing insight into the role of service in channel competition and 
provides approaches that can be used to quantify, explain, and ultimately control 
distribution channel service provision. 
Research on distribution services has suffered from a lack of theoretical 
conceptualization. In order to gain full insight into the potential of distribution 
services as a marketing instrument sound conceptual definition as well as 
assessment of its relationships with other behavior concepts is required. Chapter 2 
addresses this issue. From the perspective of consumer behavior there are several 
challenging areas for research. The previous section already indicated that the 
assortment is an important distribution service element due to its huge significance 
for consumers and suppliers, as well as its impact on the organization of distribution 
channels. Chapters 3 and 4 consider retail assortments. Theoretical development 
with respect to relationships between distribution service and consumer choice 
involves analysis of the factors driving consumer need for assortment, preference 
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formation, and ultimately choice between and within assortments. Little work has 
been done sofar with respect to the effects of assortment composition on consumer 
perceptions of product substitutabihty and complementarity, and the role of 
distribution services other than assortment in consumer assortment evaluation and 
choice. Also, several methodological issues arise, for example with respect to 
modeling consumer choice processes. Consumer post-purchase evaluation of an 
entire purchase and shopping experience, involving a retailer's total distribution 
service package is discussed in chapter 5. 
The role of distribution services in channel structure and coordination has 
deserved special attention since the early days of marketing. Early theories on the 
relationship between distribution services and channel structure include for example 
Alderson's (1954) concept of sorting, and Bucklin's (1966) postponement-
speculation theory, which have proven to be of value ever since. Because of its 
relevance in non-price competition distribution service constitutes an important 
factor in channel members 'strategic interactions and is therefore an important 
determinant of store competition and of the emergence of new retail formulas. Also, 
the role of distribution service in channel coordination has remained underexposed. 
Since distribution channel service output at the final consumer stage involves every 
channel member's efforts, provision of optimal service levels requires some form of 
channel coordination. Chapter 6 discusses these issues, while chapter 7 models a 
particular example of retail competition and its effects on distribution service 
provision as well as market structure. 
1.4 Outline of the book 
This book's research on distribution service consists of four major parts that are 
based on the theoretical framework presented in chapter 2. The first part discusses 
and defines distribution services. The second part analyzes the effect of distribution 
services, in particular assortment and ambience, on consumer store and item choice, 
hi the third part retailer distribution service provision and its determinants are 
modeled as antecedents of consumer post-purchase evaluation processes. The fourth 
part of the book analyzes the effects of retailer strategic interactions, in particular 
with respect to price and service competition, on the coexistence of different retail 
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formats in markets for fast-moving consumer goods. Each part is introduced briefly 
hereafter. 
Part I: Distribution service as a concept 
Based on a review of the literature in marketing and related fields, such as 
organizational behavior, operations research, and economics, distribution services 
are defined and conceptualized from a marketing perspective in chapter 2. The 
chapter concludes with a research framework that puts into perspective the research 
discussed in parts II to IV. 
Part II: Consumer choice within and among retail assortments 
The second part of this book analyzes the joint effects of price and distribution 
service competition on consumer purchase behavior. Chapter 3 discusses consumer 
demand for assortment and models consumer assortment evaluation and choice. It 
gives an overview of the theory on consumer decision processes and presents 
formal models of choice processes that explain substitutabihty and 
complementarity. Several propositions on the effects of distribution services with 
respect to assortment evaluation and choice are formulated, a number of which are 
rendered into testable hypotheses in chapter 4. An empirical study has been done in 
order to investigate and quantify the role of distribution service, in particular 
assortment and store ambience, in consumer choice from and among retail 
assortments. The study consisted of a large-scale multiple choice consumer 
experiment. Chapter 4 reports the methodology and results of the analyses of the 
experimental data, tests the relevant hypotheses, and simulates the consequences of 
different merchandise strategies with respect to consumer demand. 
Part III: Retailer distribution service provision and consumer satisfaction/ 
dissatisfaction formation 
Chapter 5 analyzes the role of distribution services in consumer postpurchase 
evaluation and satisfaction/dissatisfaction formation, with an emphasis on the 
significance of determinants of distribution provision by retailers and actual 
distribution service performance by retailers. The influence of retailer and 
consumer-level variables on consumer satisfaction/dissatisfaction are modeled and 
subsequently analyzed using data collected from multiple consumer-retailer dyads. 
Part IV: Strategic channel service interactions and retail format competition 
Distribution services are produced by multiple actors, predominantly traders, in the 
distribution channel. At each channel stage distribution activities are produced that 
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add value to the product. It seems evident that demand for distribution services will 
affect channel structure through the emergence of actors at different channel stages 
and that, given channel structure, competition between channel members will affect 
distribution service provision. The fourth part of the book focuses in particular on 
the role of distribution services in competitive distribution channels. In chapter 6 
theory on distribution channel structure and coordination is discussed from the 
perspective of both price and distribution service competition. Chapter 7 develops a 
game-theoretic model of strategic competitive interactions at the retail level and 
their effect on retailers' decisions regarding distribution service and price and the 
emergence of differentiated retail formats. 
Part V: Conclusions and discussion 
Chapter 8 discusses conclusions and findings resulting from conceptual and 
methodological issues related to the research. Finally, the chapter suggests 
directions for future research and implications for management. 
Parti 
Distribution Service as a Concept 

Chapter 2 
Distribution Service 
2.1 Introduction 
The introduction to this book argued that channel distribution processes create 
availability through adjustment of differences that exist with respect to time, place, 
quantity and quality of goods between their point of origin and the final consumer. 
In bridging these gaps between production and final consumption physical 
distribution processes create utility for consumers. Early marketing theories focused 
on the role of distribution channels as instruments for making goods available to 
geographically distant consumer markets and explained the existence of differently 
structured distribution channels. Despite recognition of distribution service as 
channel output marketing theory has generally left distribution service unconsidered 
as a concept. Until recently, the role of distribution services in channel 
relationships, channel structure, and channel coordination has remained largely 
ignored. On the other hand, marketing has developed comprehensive service 
concepts and marketing research generally focuses on individual customers' 
behavioral consequences of service provision, in particular quality perceptions and 
feelings of satisfaction/dissatisfaction. Operationalization of a service concept often 
reveals distribution service elements, but does not refer to the particular origin and 
characteristics of these services. Consequently solid conceptualization of 
distribution service is lacking. 
The previous chapter already mentioned other fields than marketing that have 
contributed to understanding distribution service, among the most important of 
which are logistics management, management science, economics, and behavioral 
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science. This chapter investigates different, sometimes preliminary, definitions and 
conceptualizations of distribution services resulting from research published in 
different fields. Elaboration of these findings results in a definition of distribution 
service and formation of an integrated framework of the antecedents and 
consequences of distribution service provision that serves as a general model for the 
research discussed in subsequent chapters. The last section places the research 
questions that are subject of this book in the perspective of the framework. 
2.2 Views on distribution service 
Distribution service touches upon many fields of interest and has consequently been 
discussed and analyzed from different perspectives. This section identifies three 
dominant approaches to distribution service that represent distinct interpretations 
and conceptualizations. They have been conveniently named as logistics, economic, 
and behavioral approach, respectively. These approaches differ with respect to the 
scientific field(s) from which they originate, their research object, and their strategic 
or operational focus. Since this book adopts a marketing perspective on distribution 
service the characteristics of the three approaches to distribution service will be 
classified according to the marketing schools of thought that have been 
distinguished by Sheth, Gardner, and Garrett (1988). 
The logistics approach considers outbound logistics system performance and 
aims at system optimization either from a strategic or a tactical point of view. 
Consequently this approach has been based on techniques developed in 
management science. From the perspective of logistics the order cycle forms the 
interface between an organization's logistics system and its customers and thus 
seems a natural starting point for analysis of distribution service. Logistics service 
output is represented through the individual components of the order cycle and their 
performance levels. Economic theory focuses on the relationship between 
distribution service provision by a trader, usually a retailer, and (aggregate) 
consumer demand, and considers its implications for retailer strategic decision 
making and associated retail productivity and profitability. The interaction between 
the efforts distributive traders undertake in providing distribution service and 
customers' implicit costs associated with product acquisition and use yields insight 
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into structural developments in the distributive trades. Services marketing and 
consumer behavior theory generally consider distribution service as part of the total 
service package offered by a supplier to her customers and analyze the 
psychological and behavioral consequences of service provision to individual 
customers. The interrelationships between the three approaches to distribution 
service lead to a new definition of distribution service and an integrative framework 
for analysis of distribution service. 
2.2.1 Order cycle activities and logistics system performance 
Each channel member involved in making goods available to consumers, 
manufacturers as well as distributive traders, performs one or more physical 
distribution functions, such as transportation, storage, and delivery. Since physical 
distribution functions are carried out using a logistics system and many 
organizations employ separately designated logistics managers that are responsible 
for logistics system costs and performance, the (extended) order cycle seems a 
natural basis for analysis of distribution service. 
The definitions by Perreault and Russ (1976) and Wagner and LaGarce (1981) 
as shown in table 2.1 are exemplary for the focus on order cycle activities. Physical 
distribution activities create availability (cf. Bowersox, Closs, and Helfferich 1986), 
for example through order cycle related activities, i.e., customer order transmittal, 
credit approval and order processing, inventory availability or order fulfillment, 
transportation, and invoicing and delivery, as well as distribution system flexibility, 
such as responsiveness to special shipping requests, distribution system information 
support, for example through fast provision of order status information or inventory 
levels, the ability for distribution system malfunction recovery, and post-sale 
product support, including complaint handling. The interested reader is referred to 
LaLonde, Cooper, and Noordewier (1988), who wrote a comprehensive overview of 
customer service from a logistics management perspective, which includes many 
more references to early publications that mention customer service as physical 
distribution related activities. 
Recognition that the organization-customer interface extends beyond single 
logistics order cycle activities has led several authors to consider logistics service 
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processes and non-logistics service processes that may affect buyer-seller 
relationships and long-term sales. For example, LaLonde and Zinszer (1976, table 
2.1) define customer service as generic customer contact. Other authors distinguish 
between customer service and generic customer contact, where the former 
emphasizes physical distribution processes with respect to the creation of 
availability, and the latter includes any interaction between a customer and the 
organization (e.g. Hutchison and Stolle 1968). Mentzer, Gomez, and Krapfel (1989) 
recognize the interactive nature of service provision and distinguish between 
"marketing customer service" and "physical distribution service". Ballou (1978), 
LaLonde and Zinszer (1976), and LaLonde, Cooper and Noordewier (1988) adopt a 
both generic and strategic perspective on distribution service provision. They 
discuss managerial issues related to long-term tradeoffs between distribution 
channel costs and revenues associated with service provision. 
LaLonde and Zinszer (1976, table 2.2) classify service elements into three 
categories based on their process view on distribution service provision: 
pretransaction, transaction, and posttransaction service elements. Pretransaction 
elements serve to establish a good atmosphere for service delivery, and include a 
written statement of policy, handing the statement to customers, a suitable 
organizational structure, physical distribution system flexibility, and technical 
services. Transaction service elements relate directly to the order cycle and thus 
include the individual elements of the order cycle, stockout level, the ability to 
backorder, order convenience, time, transshipment, system accuracy, and product 
substitution. Posttransaction elements concern after-sales product support and 
customer protection against defected products, including installation, warranty 
alterations, repairs and spare parts, product tracking, handling of customer claims 
and complaints, product packaging, and temporary replacement of product during 
repairs. 
Among other physical distribution related classifications of elements of 
distribution services that are more generic in nature, shown in table 2.2, are the 
distinction between (a) "customer service action functions" that are designed and 
offered by an organization in order to complement the existing product offering, and 
(b) "reaction functions" that are provided at the customer's request (Wagner 1977); 
convenience services that reduce buyer's workload with respect to purchasing and 
improve the fit of supplier's offerings to customer needs (Cunningham and Roberts 
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1974); and an empirically-based classification of distribution service according to 
the marketing functions physical possession, ownership, promotion, negotiation, 
financing, risk taking, ordering, and payment (Levy 1981a). Other publications that 
mention often large numbers of service activities, not all of them order-cycle 
related, include Gilmour (1977), who mentions 35 service elements and Levy 
(1981a), who found 71 service elements, and also Jackson, Keith, and Burdick 
(1984), Levy (1981b,c), Sharma and Lambert (1990), Uhr, Houck, and Rogers 
(1981), and Willett and Stephenson (1969). 
The goal underlying most logistics research involving distribution service 
elements is optimal allocation of physical distribution efforts so as to create 
(maximum) product availability, i.e., to generate specific service outputs for 
specific markets and market segments, at mimmum cost. Identification of the role of 
individual order cycle activities in creation of availability is clearly not sufficient to 
assure efficient and effective service delivery. For the purpose of determination of 
the service level that should be offered, as well as measurement and control of the 
service level provided, distribution service has been defined from the perspective of 
logistics system performance (see table 2.1, e.g., Lambert and Zemke 1982; Heskett 
19941). Measures of performance of a physical distribution system all intend to 
capture the extent to which the system succeeds in creating availability. Objective 
measures of physical distribution performance levels that are indicators of logistics 
system performance, so-called logistics performance indicators can apply to 
different levels of aggregation both with respect to the number of customers 
involved, and time. They may refer to service offered with respect to a single 
transaction with a single customer, on a single day with respect to all customers, as 
well as over a one-year period with respect to one or more customers. Logistics 
performance indicators provide feedback on the order cycle or, more broadly, 
performance of the organization's physical distribution system with respect to the 
creation of availabihty. Logistics performance indicators that are generally 
considered in operations research models of physical distribution concern mainly 
time and place utility, e.g., fillrate, backorders, leadtime, and frequency of delivery. 
A specific line of research considers inventory management for perishable products 
1 Other definitions of distribution service have been developed from a logistics perspective. Recent 
publications in the field still refer to most of the definitions mentioned in table 2.1. 
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(cf. Cohen, Pierskalla, and Yen 1981; Nahmias 1982; Schmidt and Nahmias 1985; 
Weiss 1980), and incorporates service elements with respect to quality maintenance, 
such as durability. The relationship between logistics service service performance 
and costs is not always obvious. For example storage levels do not only affect 
storage costs, but also affect costs of lost sales. 
Occasional publications have analyzed the direct relationship between 
logistics performance indicators and customer demand. For early research on the 
relationship between distribution service provision and demand, using logistics 
service elements, see Stephenson and Willett (1974) who estimated an S-curve with 
the effect of leadtime relative to industry average, Schary and Becker (1973) who 
estimated the Vidale and Wolfe model with advertising expenditures replaced by 
logistics expenditures, and Ozment and Chard (1986) who regressed price, 
promotion expenditures, average leadtime, leadtime variation, average backorder 
leadtime, percentage out-of-stock, and the monthly value of incorrect shipments on 
monthly sales. More recently, the relationship between logistics service and sales 
has been assessed by Pisharodi and Langley (1991). Customer utility associated 
with different lead times and fill rates has been modeled by Bookbinder and Lynch 
(1997). See Chow, Heaver, and Henriksson (1994) for an overview of logistics 
performance indicators and their measurement. 
A number of studies report assessment of individual channel member demand 
as a function of logistics service elements, using trade-off analysis. Levy, Webster, 
and Kerin (1983) investigated the relationship between (distribution) service 
provision and individual industrial customer's purchases using conjoint analysis 
(Green and Srinivasan 1978, 1990). Frequency and cost of manufacturer-supported 
advertising, frequency of couponing in local newspapers, financial terms of trade, 
and the percentage of items ordered that was shipped were varied systematically 
and combined to form hypothetical service packages. Purchase managers indicated 
for each package their purchases relative to the volume purchased by them 
currently. Other applications of conjoint analysis include Christopher, Schary, and 
Skjott-Larsen (1979), Perreault, Jr. and Russ (1976, 1977), Levy (1981b), and 
Wetzels et al. (1995). Levy included services such as average leadtime, leadtime 
variation, filtrate, and credit terms, and found diminishing returns for the first 
variable. Overall, the importance of individual distribution service elements differs 
across industries, products, channel stages, and purchase situations. Trade-off 
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analysis has in addition been used to determine the optimal service package by e.g., 
Tyagi (1997), and Rangan (1987). 
Attempts have been made to arrive at a conceptualization of distribution 
service that extend beyond the identification of distribution service elements, such 
as order cycle activities, more generic customer contact services, and logistics 
system performance indicators. Leading authors in the field of logistics agree that 
physical distribution processes create time and place utility, and maintenance of 
form utility. The predominant conceptualization of distribution service generating 
time, place and form utility has led to various classifications of distribution service 
elements as shown in table 2.2. Note that the literature mentioned in tables 2.2 and 
2.3 is still much referred to in more recent publications on logistics service (e.g., 
Manrodt and Davis, Jr. 1994; Mentzer, Rutner, and Matsuno 1997). 
Bowersox (1978) distinguishes between physical distribution system 
availability, capability, and quality, and refined measurement of these distribution 
service dimensions in Bowersox, Closs, and Helfferich (1986, table 2.2). 
Availability refers to a physical distribution system's ability to predictably provide 
goods, as a result of safety stock policy. It is measured for example as the 
percentage of items out of stock to total items carried in stock, average number of 
items out of stock per order, back-order frequency, or back-order recovery rate. 
Capability refers to delivery speed and consistency, resulting from design and 
dependabihty of each of the order cycle components, including system flexibility. It 
is measured as the time distribution of each of the order cycle elements, resulting in 
performance indicators such as average delivery time, standard deviation of delivery 
time, the distribution of orders or sales within time intervals, and the percentage of 
orders or sales value delivered within predetermined time intervals. Quality relates 
to the efficiency of the logistics operation. It includes mainly information and 
product support related service elements, such as repair, and handling of mistakes 
and damage caused by distribution. Performance indicators of quality are for 
example the frequency of incorrect items on an order, percentage of products 
damaged, damage incidence, average number of damage claims per shipment, and 
frequency of shipments to improper locations. A related classification of service 
dimensions is Mentzer, Gomez and Krapfel's (1989) timeliness, availability, and 
quality, with quality referring to the condition, or extent of quality maintenance, of 
the products delivered. For an empirical test of this dimensionality see Emerson and 
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Grimm (1996). Both Bowersox and Mentzer, Gomez, and Krapfel build their 
classification on the three utilities affected by physical distribution: time, place, and 
form, where availability refers to place utility, capability and timeliness refer to 
time utility, and quality refers to form utility. Not all researchers explicitly 
acknowledge maintenance of form utility as a benefit that can be created by 
distribution channels. Maintenance of form applies to virtually all goods since 
physical distribution processes can affect product quality in a variety of ways. Many 
products are sensitive to deterioration due to long storage and/or harmful 
circumstances with respect to temperature, humidity, and pressure. In addition, 
handling and transportation may cause damage to products. 
The practical and managerial orientation of the field of logistics has 
emphasized strategic and operational problems with respect to service delivery. 
Consequently, distribution service has played an important role, both as a variable 
in mathematical models for distribution system optimization, and as a marketing 
instrument. Research questions that have been asked with respect to distribution 
system design have been formulated as optimization problems that involve 
cost-service tradeoffs for which operations research models are developed. For 
example, which ordering system minimizes inventory cost subject to out-of-stock 
constraints, or what routing minimizes transportation cost given maximum leadtime 
requirements. Many studies provide solutions that support operational decisions, 
such as transportation routing (e.g., Burns et al. 1985), whereas others focus on 
more strategic problems, such as warehouse location or allocation of inventories 
across different channel stages. The latter issue requires so-called multi-echelon 
models (e.g., Cohen and Lee 1988; Deuermeyer and Schwartz 1981; Federgruen 
and Zipkin 1984; Lee and Whang 1999; Rosenbaum 1981; Schwartz, Deuermeyer 
and Badinelli 1985; Vorst, Beulens, and Van Beek 2000). The systems perspective 
on logistics has incorporated distribution service in advanced modeling and analysis 
of distribution problems using management science techniques, resulting in 
implementable decision support systems. 
Logistics models of allocation of physical distribution efforts generally do not 
consider strategic interactions between channel members' decisions, nor do they 
explicitly recognize the effect of distribution services on final demand. From a 
marketing perspective understanding of the effect of distribution services on 
consumer demand is a prerequisite for distribution system design. Since it is the 
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trade-off between distribution costs and service revenues that matters in this respect, 
the effect of distribution service provision on consumer behavior should be 
analyzed and used as input for distribution channel models. 
The logistics approach to distribution services discussed in this subsection 
argues that through performance of different channel functions every channel 
organization generates service outputs that provide its customers, and ultimately 
end-users, with time, place, and possession utilities, as well as maintenance of form 
utility. This classification of utility and its emphasis on economic interactivity with 
respect to the role of individual distribution channel members in performing 
distribution-related functions is characteristic of the institutional school that 
dominated the early days of marketing theory (cf. Sheth, Gardner, and Garrett 
1988). 
Many studies have been done that recognize the relevance of logistics service 
performance for consumer behavior. These studies generally asses customer 
perceptions of distribution service quality as a measure of logistics system 
effectivity in building customer relationships and generating customer demand, 
using subjective measures of distribution service performance (e.g., Bienstock, 
Mentzer, and Bird 1997). The research still suffers from lack of conceptual clarity 
and often blends service resulting from the physical distribution system with 
services from other origins. The field of logistics has not succeeded in developing a 
strong theoretical model of distribution services as the purely economic approach to 
distribution services that will be discussed next. Consequently much research on 
customer behavior with respect to distribution service has limited practical and 
scientific value. Linking supply side variables (i.e., logistics performance 
indicators) to customer response in mathematical models of distribution systems 
remains a challenge for the future. 
Table 2.1 Distribution service conceptualizations in logistics. 
No. Author(s): Distribution service definition: 
(Extended) order cycle activities: 
1. LaLonde & Zinszer (1976) - Customer service is "... those activities that occur at the interface between the customer and 
the corporation which enhance or facilitate the sale and use of the corporations products or 
services." 
2. Perreault & Russ (1976) - "Physical distribution service is the interrelated package of activities provided by a supplier 
which creates utility of time and place for a buyer, and insures form maintenance." 
3. Wagner & LaGarce (1981) - "Customer service in distribution encompasses all activities involved in organization and 
administration of order fulfillment so customer orders are delivered completely, accurately, 
in good condition, in the optimal characteristic unit of use for distribution purposes, within 
cost constraints in the time frame required." 
Physical distribution system effectiveness: 
4. Christopher, Senary & Skjott-Larsen (1979) - Customer service is "... a system, organized to assure a continuing link in time between 
ordering and goods receipt, with the goal of meeting 
long-term customer needs." 
5. Lambert & Zemke (1982) - "Customer service is a measure of the effectiveness with which the physical distribution 
system creates time and place utility." 
Strategic channel value: 
6. LaLonde & Zinszer (1976) - Customer service is "...a customer oriented philosophy which integrates all elements of the 
customer interface with a predetermined optimum cost-service mix." 
7. Ballou (1978) - Customer service is "... the net result of all logistical efforts engaged in by the firm." 
8. LaLonde, Cooper & Noordewier (1988) - "Customer service is a process for providing significant value-added benefits to the supply 
chain in a cost-effective way." 
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Table 2.2 Physical distribution-based classifications of distribution service 
elements. 
No. AuthorÇs): View: Service elements: 
1. LaLonde and Zinszer (1976) Exchange functions Pretransaction 
Transaction 
Posttransaction 
2. Wagner (1977) Exchange functions action 
reaction 
3. Levy (1981a) Marketing flows physical possession, 
ownership, promotion, 
negotiation, financing, risk 
taking, ordering, payment 
4. Bowersox (1978), 
Bowersox et al. (1986) 
Order cycle performance Availability 
Capability 
Quality 
5. Mentzer et al. (1989) Order cycle performance Availability 
Timeliness 
Quality 
2.2.2 Economic theory on distribution service 
Economic theory argues that distributive traders exist because they have an 
advantage over manufacturers, and possibly other traders, in the performance of 
channel functions related to the effectuation of, preferably recurrent, transactions. 
The effectiveness and efficiency with which distribution functions are performed 
determine the value added by the channel to its end-users. In this view all channel 
functions contribute to a channel's service output and the cost of providing it, and 
consequently to end-user value. Sliifting of functions between different members of 
the distribution channel differentially influences costs and benefits for channel 
members and ultimately a channel structure will emerge in which only channel 
members who are relatively efficient and effective will perform specific channel 
functions. 
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Bucklin (1966) was among the first to argue that in order to survive in the long 
run channel members must meet demand for service outputs through adequate 
organization and performance of channel functions. Channel functions can be 
shifted between channel members, and new intermediaries can enter a channel in 
order to increase the effectiveness of service output and/or to lower channel cost 
associated with service provision. Consequently, consumer demand for distribution 
services influences channel structure. For example, cost-arguments can favor a short 
channel with few intermediaries, but an improved competitive position and an 
associated increase in revenues through excellent service provision may favor 
addition of intermediaries that are specialized in performing specific channel 
functions. Illustrative in this respect is Bucklin's (1965) postponement-speculation 
paradigm, which argues that the cost associated with certain distribution service, 
i.e., leadtime, should be balanced against the cost of speculative inventory, and 
consequently leads to a specific channel structure. 
Economic conceptualizations of distribution service all argue that channel 
members enhance customer value through reduction of costs associated with 
product purchase and possibly use. Time costs are one of the most often referred to 
cost categories with respect to distribution services. Becker (1965) already 
mentioned that implicit time cost is related to all kinds of consumer behavior and 
argued that "Thus, not only would a rise in earnings induce a substitution away 
from earnings-intensive commodities but also a substitution away from time and 
towards goods in the production of each commodity''' (italics added). He illustrates 
this by a comparison of store-bought and home-delivered milk, "...the cost of inputs 
into the commodity "milk consumption at home" is either the sum of the price of 
milk in the store and the foregone value of the time used to carry it home or simply 
the price of delivered milk." A central assumption in Becker's theory is that 
households not only consume but also produce commodities through combining 
goods and time inputs according to cost-minimization rules, while maximizing a 
utility function associated with these commodities, subject to prices and constraints 
on resources, such as time and income. Becker's notion was captured and 
elaborated upon by many economic researchers who defined the implicit shopper 
cost as the effort undertaken by customers in estebhshing a successful transaction 
(Ehrlich and Fisher 1982; Ratchford and Stoops 1988, 1992). The implicit shopper 
cost consists of time and other costs associated with shopping at a particular retail 
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or wholesale trader, and can be extended to include all sorts of costs associated with 
acquisition, use, and disposal of goods. The so-called full price of a shopping basket 
is set to equal the sum of retail prices of the goods purchased plus an implicit 
shopper cost. 
The role of retail services with respect to reduction of implicit shopping costs 
explains several drastic developments with respect to buying behavior and market 
structure. For example, the introduction of affordable refrigerators and the 
widespread use of cars for shopping have caused an increase in both purchase 
volume and the number of different products bought in one shopping trip, and a 
decrease in shopping frequency (cf. Betancourt and Gautschi 1990; Oi 1992; 
Pashigian and Bowen 1994, see also chapter 1). Pashigian and Bowen (1994) 
analyze the effect of time cost on information acquisition behavior as expressed 
through product choice (branded versus unbranded products) and advertising versus 
in-store labor. Increasing store assortment size and the emergence of new retail 
formulas are perhaps the most notable consequences of structural changes in 
implicit shopping costs. Assortments offer the possibility for one-stop hassle-free 
shopping, while creating economic benefits and reducing consumers' psychological 
strain. Although prices are relatively high in specialty stores, for specific 
infrequently purchased goods that require particular service efforts, such as quality 
maintenance, the sum of retail price and shopping trip costs incurred by a consumer 
may be lowest for a purchase at a specialty store. For purchase of a large basket of 
frequently purchased goods a consumer's full price will be lowest when shopping at 
a supermarket. Messinger and Narasimhan (1997) find that the growth in one-stop 
shopping in the period 1961-1986 cannot or only insufficiently be explained by 
economies of scale, technological improvements that make store operations more 
effective, store monopoly power, or addition of higher margin items to the 
assortment. Instead, consumer demand for time-saving shopping convenience has 
increased because of reduced cost of travel and reduced inventory cost in addition to 
increased opportunity cost of time. 
From a purely economic perspective distribution services are services offered 
by suppliers, mainly traders, that reduce customers' costs associated with 
acquisition and use of (a basket of) products. This leads to broad definitions of 
distribution service that include all economically relevant channel outputs, 
including logistics as well as other channel service outputs. Several researchers 
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have elaborated on the conceptualization of distribution service and developed 
classifications for service elements. Table 2.3 presents a number of significant 
economic conceptualizations of distribution service that will be discussed in the 
following and table 2.4 shows related classifications of distribution service 
elements. Most researchers consider retailer-consumer service provision and use the 
household production model to incorporate consumer costs in which the consumer 
household decides on purchase of products in two stages. First the household 
minimizes the full price of a (basket of) good(s) and next chooses the optimal 
(basket of) good(s) given the full price. Implicit in these models is the assumption 
that the implicit shopping cost can be shifted between retailer and consumer. 
Economic analysis of distribution service has generally elaborated on Becker's 
(1965) ideas. The models that were developed have generally be used to analyze 
retail margin or profitability at different levels of aggregation, including 
industry-level or for individual retail outlets, and channel structure. This chapter 
continues with a discussion of economic thinking on distribution service and 
increasingly advanced elaboration of the consequences of Becker's concept of 
implicit shopper cost. 
The concept of full price being the sum of retail price and time costs was used 
by Ehrlich and Fischer (1982) to model retail decisions on provision of time-saving 
informational services, in particular in-store selling effort and advertising. 
Information has been recognized since long as a rationale for consumer search 
(Stigler 1951) and as an input into consumers' decision-making processes (e.g. 
Nelson 1974). Consumers seek information in order to complete a transaction on 
terms that are appropriate to their needs. In Ehrlich and Fischer's (1982) model 
consumers' time costs are mainly costs of information acquisition and reduction of 
uncertainty, caused by buyers' imperfect knowledge, through search, adjustment 
and transaction. Ehrlich and Fischer use a household production model of the 
demand and supply of distribution services. In the model retailers provide retail 
price, advertising, and other sales support (i.e., labor staffing) that minimizes their 
customers' full price, consisting of retail price plus information costs, and 
maximizes retailer profit. Competitive forces subsequently determine optimal price 
and service output. The retailer's margin contains an implicit payment for the 
distribution services he provides. Ehrlich and Fischer showed that when consumers 
are heterogeneous with respect to their acquisition costs, in a competitive market a 
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continuum of retail firms will emerge that differ in terms of service provision. 
Clearly, a retailer's decisions on service provision are not only based on her own 
cost structure, but also on the distribution of consumer acquisition costs in the 
market. See Ratchford and Stoops (1988) for an extension of Ehrlich and Fischer's 
model. They empirically assessed the significance of scale economies and labor 
productivity on retail-level aggregate consumer demand (Ratchford and Stoops 
1992)2. 
Although time costs make up a large part of the implicit costs associated with 
product acquisition and use, other costs categories, in particular costs of 
transportation and storage, have been recognized to play an important role with 
respect to distribution service provision and customer behavior. While economic 
research on distribution service agrees on the exchange-related nature of costs 
associated with service delivery and consumption, the conceptualization of 
distribution-related costs ranges from time costs (e.g., Becker 1965; Ehrlich and 
Fischer 1982), to transaction costs as conceptualized by Williamson (1975, 1979) 
and (Oi 1992), and may even include psychic costs (e.g., Betancourt and Gautschi 
1990, 1992a). 
Bucklin (1966, 1972) was among the first to develop a classification of 
distribution services while recognizing the role of distribution services in reducing 
customers' costs. The four major service outputs he identified are shown in table 
2.4. They are (1) spatial convenience through decentralization of (retail or 
wholesale) outlets, which has led to the emergence of for example neighborhood 
stores, gas stations, and vending machines, (2) lot size, which affects the 
discrepancy between purchasing and consumption patterns, (3) product variety 
through assortment breadth and depth, and (4) waiting time which affects consumer 
convenience through the discrepancy between purchase and consumption and 
relates to the emergence of direct-response channels, such as electronic retailing by 
computer manufacturers through the Internet. These four generic service outputs 
can be viewed broadly to include provision of credit, maintenance of product 
2 The productivity of trading organizations was explained by an additional rationale that was 
developed by Oi (1992). Since services cannot be stored many service suppliers suffer from excess 
capacity in quiet times and shortage in busy times. Large firms have an advantage with respect to 
the coordination and synchronization of service-related activities that differ from economies of 
scale. Economies of massed reserves result in lower unit costs with increasing firm size, due to 
increased occupation rates when the size of retail operations and the number of customers increase. 
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quality, availability of information, stability of supply, availability of personal 
service and attention, and risk reduction. Spatial convenience and product variety 
reduce consumers' transportation and search costs, small lot sizes reduce inventory 
and maintenance costs, and waiting time relates to consumer's cost of time. In 
addition, Bucklin emphasized the linkage between channel service outputs and the 
economic elements of logistical activity by arguing that channel members incur 
costs in service provision, for example through carrying inventory associated with a 
broad assortment. Because of consumer cost reduction and distributor cost increase 
associated with service provision consumers usually have to pay higher prices for 
additional service and are compensated for relatively low service levels through 
lower prices. At a later stage, Bucklin, Ramaswamy, and Rajumdar (1993) refined 
and extended Bucklin's former (1966) classification of channel service outputs into 
two key service bundles. They distinguish among logistics services that are 
associated with time and place utilities - Bucklin's original service outputs -, and 
information services that reduce buyer uncertainty as well as costs associated with 
goods acquisition and consumption. 
Betancourt and Gautschi (1988, 1990, 1992a, 1993a) built on the ideas of 
Bucklin, Ehrlich and Fischer, and others with strong focus on the assortment. They 
start from well-known efficiency rationales for the existence of assortments in 
marketing channels (discussed in detail in chapter 6). These rationales trade off 
costs, for example, associated with consumer search underlying the benefits of 
one-stop shopping against the costs associated with offering an assortment, e.g., 
adding a middleman to the distribution channel. Consumer desire for one-stop 
shopping of a basket of goods resulting from efficiency gains "binds" together the 
items in an assortment for a particular retailer, and thus generates complementarity. 
The same applies to (the items in) the assortments of different retailers that are 
located in the same retail agglomeration. 
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Table 2.3 Economie distribution service conceptualizations. 
No. Author(s): Distribution service definition 
1 Ehrlich & Fischer (1982) - Informational retail services (retail labour and 
advertising) reduce the time price of consumption, i.e., 
search, transaction, and adjustment costs associated 
with acquisition and ultimate use of the market itself. 
2 Betancourt & Gautschi 
(1990) 
- Distribution services are outputs of retail firms that 
create demand by shifting consumers' distribution-
related costs that are inherent in patronage of retail 
establishments to the retailer. 
3 Oi(1992) - Retail services reduce transaction costs. 
In line with the above Betancourt and Gautschi conceptualize distribution 
services as outputs of retailing organizations that create a potential reduction in 
customers' implicit shopping costs, which they renamed into distribution-related 
costs. They explicitly model the shifting of distribution-related costs, inherent in 
consumers' patronage of retail establishments, to the retailer they visit. The model 
treats distribution services as outputs of retail organizations that act as fixed inputs 
into the household production function of consumers. Betancourt and Gautschi 
emphasize that distribution services are so-called nonmarket services that cannot be 
bought or offered at an explicit price, often are consumed together with purchased 
goods, and sometimes are consumed even without purchase, for example through 
comparison shopping. The implicit character of the costs associated with service 
provision are largely reflected in prices charged for products in a an assortment, 
while the cost savings associated with service consumption generally cannot be 
assigned to individual products. 
Using their formalization of consumer demand Betancourt and Gautschi 
explain strategic interactions between retailers and resulting structural 
developments in distribution channels, such as the emergence of retail 
agglomerations. They classify distribution services into five categories - assortment, 
accessibility of location, availability of information, assurance of product delivery 
at desired time and in desired form, and ambience -, that relate to one or more of six 
distribution-related cost categories - costs of direct time, direct transportation, 
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information acquisition, storage, adjustment, and psychic costs - (see table 2.4). 
Betancourt and Gautschi's classification of distribution services relates to the 
previously mentioned classification of channel service output by Bucklin (1966) 
and Bucklin, Ramaswamy, and Rajumdar (1993). Assortment strongly resembles 
product variety, assurance of product delivery at desired time relates to waiting 
time, assurance of product delivery in desired form can be seen as similar to lot 
size, and availability of information relates to the information component of channel 
service output. Oi (1992) mentions five distribution service elements (1) product 
line that relates to assortment and jointly provided information, (2) convenience by 
means of location and opening hours is similar to assurance of product delivery at 
desired time, (3) production involves all activities such as packaging and processing 
to put products in a more suitable form for the consumer, and can be compared to 
assurance of product delivery at desired form, (4) ancillary services that include 
delivery, credit, and implicit warranties, and (5) exchange by which they mean 
completion of transactions through transfer of property rights. 
Betancourt and Gautschi's classification benefits from its connection of 
distribution services to distribution-related costs. In addition, it is more detailed and 
comprehensive than Bucklin's classification and is theoretically as well as 
practically more thought-out than Oi's classification. Betancourt and Gautschi 
explicitly include a classification of distribution- related cost categories that 
encompasses service elements that are not, or not entirely, logistical or economic in 
nature, such as personal attention and ambience. This is particularly so for 
ambience, which is more a generic supplier service output than a physical 
distribution service output, and affects psychic costs. Ambience is affected by store 
layout and assortment, but also by supplier personnel and the other customers that 
are present. 
Betancourt and Gautschi's classification benefits from its connection of 
distribution services to distribution-related costs. In addition, it is more detailed and 
comprehensive than Bucklin's classification and is theoretically as well as 
practically more thought-out than Oi's classification. Betancourt and Gautschi 
explicitly include a classification of distribution-related cost categories that 
encompasses service elements that are not, or not entirely, logistical or economic in 
nature, such as personal attention and ambience. This is particularly so for 
ambience, which is more a generic supplier service output than a physical 
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Table 2.4 Classifications of distribution service elements as channel output. 
No. Author(s): View: Service elements: 
1. Bucklin (1966) Channel output Spatial convenience/ 
market decentralization 
Lot size 
Product variety/ 
assortment depth & 
breadth 
Waiting time 
2. Betancourt & Gautschi Retail output 
(1990) 
Assortment 
Availability of information 
Accessibility of location 
Delivery at right time 
Delivery in right time 
Ambience 
3. Oi (1992) Retail services Exchange 
Product line 
Convenience 
Ancillary services 
Production 
4. Rangan et al. (1992) Channel function 
Performance 
Product information, 
Product customization, 
Lot size, quality, assurance, 
Assortment, avadability, 
after-sales service, logistics 
5. Bucklin et al. (1993) Channel output Logistic services (Bucklin 
1966), information services 
distribution service output, and affects psychic costs. Ambience is affected by store 
layout and assortment, but also by supplier personnel and the other customers that 
are present. 
Even more than is the case with Bucklin's classification of service elements, 
Betancourt and Gautschi's services and cost categories should be interpreted 
broadly. For example, adjustment costs result when a customer encounters an 
out-of-stock situation and must either substitute a different form for the exact form 
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of the product he or she desires, abstain from consuming the product, wait until the 
desired form is available, or patronize another retailer who has the exact form of the 
product he or she desires. Also, adjustment costs refer to cost of money (interest) 
caused by loans and credits, costs of changing money, and costs associated with 
using alternative ways of payment. Psychic costs "stem from what consumers 
consider disagreeable in the retail environment" and therefore do not relate entirely 
to the physical distribution process. 
Betancourt and Gautschi add to understanding of distribution service not only 
by developing separate classifications of distribution-related services and costs, but 
also by mentioning a number of particular characteristics of distribution service. 
They argue for example that every channel member offers a certain level of 
distribution services by its existence alone, and always incur costs in doing so. 
Furthermore, some services are produced jointly, such as assortment and ambience, 
while others are not. Finally, distribution services are either general, i.e., they apply 
to all items in an assortment, such as accessibility of location, or they are specific 
and apply to one specific item in the assortment, such as information, or assurance 
of delivery of the product in the form desired by the final customer. 
Betancourt and Gautschi (1992b, 1993b) analyzed store-level relationships 
between distribution service provision and retail margins for different retail sectors 
in France and in the U.S. They measured accessibility of location by the number of 
establishments in each different retail sector. Average inventory levels indicated 
assurance of product delivery. The measure developed for assortment breadth was 
the percentage of sales for a product line divided by total sales in the sector. The 
advertising expenditures per establishment were used as indicators for the 
availabihty of information, and the expenditures for new construction per 
establishment were used for measuring ambience. Item-specific service was 
indicated by the size of the payroll per establishment, indicating better service 
performance by higher educated personnel. Betancourt and Gautschi found 
convincing evidence for a positive relationship between distribution service level 
and retail margin. They also found that, under the assumption of monopolistic 
competition, the retailers in their study show neither quantity setting nor price 
setting behavior. Based on this finding the authors suggest development of models 
of oligopolistic behavior for retailing, and recognize that the assumption of 
short-run profit maximization may be challenged. 
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Following Betancourt and Gautschi, Nooteboom (1985), Nooteboom and 
Thurik (1987), Nooteboom, Kleijweg, and Thurik (1989), and Bode (1990) 
analyzed relationships between retail service output and retail margins using a 
mark-up model. In their models the retail margin at store level is operationalized as 
the price charged by the store for products offered. Bode discovered among other 
things a negative relationship between sales per store and percentage retail margin 
across all products sold, and a positive relationship between advertising 
expenditures and percentage retail margin. Results for assortment and personnel 
service were ambiguous, possibly because of differential measurement of these 
variables across different models. 
Recently, a number of game-theoretic models have been developed that 
analyze retailer- consumer strategic interactions and discuss service-related 
rationales for the existence of different competing retail formats or positionings and 
are often based on the economic theory of distribution service. For example, the 
emergence of the pricing strategy Everyday Low Pricing (EDLP) compared to 
emphasizing price deals for individual goods (PROMO or Hi-Lo) in a competitive 
market was analyzed by Lai and Rao (1997). The PROMO store offers a higher 
service level than the EDLP store, attracting mainly consumers who value time 
highly in addition to deal-prone consumers who value the price deals. The EDLP 
store attracts largely deal-prone consumers as well as time-constrained consumers 
through advertising its low basket prices. Chapter 6 provides a detailed discussion 
of game-theoretic models of retailer distribution service provision and chapter 7 
presents a new model of retailer service decisions. 
The previous review suggests that research on distribution service focuses 
predominantly on retail and final consumer channel levels. However, the relevance 
of the concept of implicit shopper cost is not limited to consumer marketing and 
applies equally well to industrial purchase, although time cost should be replaced by 
the more comprehensive transaction cost concept. Rangan, Menezes, and Maier 
(1992) investigated the literature on channel outputs in industrial relationships and 
summarized their findings in a classification of distribution services that contains a 
mixture of logistics and economic service elements that have been discussed so far. 
Since the purpose of their research was to identify criteria of channel function 
performance that influence channel selection, no clear conceptualization of 
distribution service was developed. 
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Betancourt and Gautschi (1998) extended their model to industrial markets 
and analyzed service provision by members in a vertical distribution channel. They 
argue that channel power relationships affect the allocation of service efforts. The 
most powerful channel member, i.e., the Stackelberg price leader, can afford to 
provide relatively less service. In addition, given channel price leadership, service 
provision generates channel power. Research on identifying and analyzing the 
determinants of channel structure touches upon the concept of distribution services. 
Channel structure and coordination are therefore important issues with respect to 
service delivery. In chapter 6 the role of distribution service, cost, and other 
determinants of channel structure will be discussed in greater detail. 
Betancourt and Gautschi's solid and comprehensive economic theory of 
distribution services as retail output can be considered as leading in the field. With 
respect to economic analyses of distribution service a number of issues can be 
identified that deserve attention. These concern the exclusive focus on customer 
cost reduction through distribution service provision, and the lack of 
conceptualization and measurement of distribution service with respect to individual 
channel member behavior. The inclusion of service elements that go beyond the 
physical distribution process in Betancourt and Gautscbi's conceptualization of 
distribution service constitutes both a strength and a drawback in this respect. While 
economic research on distribution service generally does not aim at 
conceptualization and measurement of distribution services with respect to behavior 
of individual consumers or organizations, Betancourt and Gautschi's 
conceptualization of distribution service as retail outputs goes one step further and 
allows interpretation with respect to individual consumers. Operationalization of 
their model, however, remains a challenge. 
Several of the measures used in their empirical research are only weak proxies 
for distribution service provision on a less aggregated level. For example, 
advertisement expenditures undoubtedly can be used to convey direct information, 
for example on price and quality (cf. Dorfman and Steiner 1954; Grossman and 
Shapiro 1984; Schmalensee 1972), but this is not always the case and 
advertisements do not necessarily represent all utilitarian information as intended by 
Betancourt and Gautschi. Although advertising expenditures have been extensively 
used in economic research as a measure of information provision, better measures 
should be developed for analysis of customer behavior, even at an aggregate level. 
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Examples are information content of advertisements, information on product 
packaging, information content of brochures that accompany products, the level of 
salesperson education, or toll-free customer service numbers. In addition, average 
inventory levels could indicate differences in efficiency instead of product 
availability. The behavioral approach to distribution service that is discussed next 
offers additional suggestions with respect to conceptualization and measurement of 
distribution service. 
As a second issue, one may argue that the utility created by distribution 
services goes beyond the cost reductions mentioned by Betancourt and Gautschi and 
other economic researchers. The strict utilitarian approach to shopping as the 
conscious pursuit of purchase as an intended consequence that was described in the 
former section foregoes the fact that many consumers value comparison shopping as 
a hedonic experience (e.g., Babin, Darden, and Griffin 1994). It has been 
recognized that experiental and emotional reasons may underlie consumer shopping 
behavior. Holbrook and Hirschman (1982) argued that "The purchase of goods may 
be incidental to the experience of shopping. People buy so they can shop, NOT shop 
so they can buy" and "The activity of shopping is part of the experience of the 
product." Distribution services such as assortment composition, delivery of 
information, store layout, and ambience influence the extent to which a shopping 
experience is entertaining and emotionally rewarding. Presentation of new product 
combinations and salespersons communicating innovative ideas not only reduce 
costs of search and information acquisition, but also assist consumers in making 
better decisions by pointing out important new or unknown attributes and the 
benefits associated with new or unknown attribute-levels. 
2.2.3 Distribution service from a behavioral perspective 
A consumer's motivation to purchase is first and foremost driven by the need, want, 
or desire to acquire certain good(s) and/or service(s), rather than the distribution 
service surrounding these products. Distribution service may be a critical factor 
with respect to product and/or store choice. Distribution service provision adds 
time, place, and form utility, and reduces customers' implicit cost associated with 
shopping, purchase, product use or even product disposal, which causes customers 
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to experience convenience as well as higher product quality. Behavioral research on 
distribution service tries to explain the effects of service provision on consumer 
demand using psychological and possibly sociological processes underlying actual 
behavior of individual customers in the marketplace. 
In services marketing no separate conceptualization has been developed for 
distribution service. Uhl and Upah (1983, p. 236) define a service as "... any task 
(work) performed by another or the provision of any facility, or activity for 
another's use and not ownership, which arises from an exchange transaction. It is 
intangible and incapable of being stored or transported. There may be an 
accompanying sale of a product." From a service marketing perspective distribution 
service elements belong either to the so-called facultative services that are required 
in order to deliver goods or services, for example transportation, or to so-called 
supportive services that are not required for product delivery, but provide additional 
benefits to customers whose perceptions of value are increased accordingly, for 
example a cup of coffee served while waiting, as opposed to so-called core services, 
such as the work done by a bank or a hairdresser (cf. Gronroos 1990). Specific 
elements of distribution service that have been analyzed in behavioral studies 
include store atmosphere and consumers' emotional shopping experience. Perceived 
quality comprises maintenance of form utility, but most studies on perceived quality 
adopted a more general focus and analyzed consumers' pre-purchase expectations 
and/or postpurchase experiences with a good or pure service. Research on perceived 
distribution service quality will be discussed further on in this section. 
Distribution service provision may influence a customer's emotional shopping 
experience. For example, a consumer may enjoy shopping at a particular retail store, 
some of which have especially been designed to entertain consumers (funshopping), 
a store may convey prestige to its customers, or give its customers a sense of 
belonging to a certain social class. In addition, information gathering is not 
necessarily utilitarian in nature, people may find it emotionally rewarding to 
compare different products in order to assure a correct purchase decision, or to 
mirror themselves to other people present in the store. Since shopping involves 
social behavior it may evoke emotions resulting from social interaction, for example 
irritation through waiting or bold personnel. The effect of distribution service on 
shopping behavior has been elaborated in past research for store environment, and 
ambience in particular. Environmental psychologists showed that store environment 
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and atmosphere influence shopping and purchase behavior (i.e., approach or avoid 
the store) (Donovan and Rossiter 1982; Mehrabian 1980; Mehrabian and Russell 
1974; Russell and Pratt 1980) through effects on mood or emotions. For other work 
on store atmosphere see e.g., Grewall and Baker (1994) and McGrath (1989). It is 
hardly speculative to assume similar processes apply to store personnel appearance 
and behavior, store layout, and presentation. 
Conceptualization and operationalization of distribution service requires 
knowledge of the concept's relationships with other behavioral concepts. Customer 
experience with distribution service has a number of behavioral consequences, 
whether distribution service has been conceptualized according to a logistics or to 
an economic perspective. Direct consequences of distribution service provision 
include perceived quality and perceived (monetary and nonmonetary) cost. Through 
perceived quality and perceived cost consumer experience with distribution service 
indirectly affects higher-order behavioral concepts, such as perceived value, 
attitude, satisfaction/dissatisfaction, relationship quality, and choice, including 
supplier selection, purchase incidence, and purchase quantity. From these the 
concepts that are directly related to distribution service provision will be discussed, 
with particular emphasis on perceived quality, while other relevant, but more 
remote, higher order concepts will be touched upon only briefly. 
Perceived quality comprises a customer's perceptions of the benefits obtained 
from a performance of a good or service, relative to a standard formed by this 
consumer's expectations (Parasuraman, Zeithaml, and Berry 1988). According to 
Uhl and Upah's (1983) definition of services mentioned earlier, they are not only 
intangible, but also ephemeral, and experiental in nature (cf. Lovelock 1991, p. 21), 
and possess relatively few search characteristics and relatively many experience and 
possibly credence characteristics compared to goods (Zeithaml 1981). The 
distinction between perceived quality with respect to goods and services centers 
around the intangible and experiental nature of services. Due to the fact that 
services possess few search characteristics consumers generally have difficulty 
forming clear prior expectations and consequently prepurchase quality evaluation is 
much more difficult for services than for goods. In addition, inexperienced 
consumers lack prior expectations and must rely to a greater extent on search 
attributes that serve as extrinsic cues (Zeithaml 1981, 1988), such as price and the 
service environment or servicescapes (Bitner 1992) in order to form expectations. 
40 Chapter 2 
Quality evaluation is especially difficult with respect to services that are high in 
credence attributes, for which consumers find it difficult to evaluate performance as 
such. Due to services' intangibility and resulting simultaneousness of service 
production and consumption perceived service quality has been operationalized as 
post-experience consumer evaluation of a service compared to pre-consumption 
expectations that serve as a standard. For goods perceived quality has been studied 
mainly as a prepurchase concept (e.g., Steenkamp 1989). 
Distribution service is part of an organization's total service offering. 
Different dimensionalities that have been found with respect to perceived service 
quality (e.g., Lovelock 1991; Parasuraman, Zeithaml, and Berry 1985, 1988, 1991, 
1993) show that with respect to evaluation of a retailer's service performance 
consumers do not distinguish service elements originating from the channel's 
physical distribution system performance from other service elements, and that 
performance on certain elements of service delivery may be compensated for by 
performance with respect to other elements (e.g., Gronroos 1990). This justifies 
consideration of service elements that do not only relate to logistics. On the other 
hand, suchlike broad perspective on distribution service complicates investigation 
of the relationship between logistics operations and resulting service output. 
The conceptualization, operationalization, and measurement of perceived 
service quality (Parasuraman, Zeithaml, and Berry 1985, 1988, 1991, 1993, 1994) 
have had an enormous impact in both marketing theory and practice. Perceived 
service quality has been conceptualized as a multidimensional construct consisting 
of five generic dimensions, i.e., tangibles, reliability, responsiveness, empathy, and 
assurance (Parasuraman, Zeithaml, and Berry, 1985). The construct has been 
operationalized as the difference between customers' expectations and perceptions 
regarding service performance and is measured accordingly, using the SERVQUAL 
scale, as the summated difference score between expectations and perceptions on 
twenty-six items (Parasuraman, Zeithaml, and Berry 1988, 1991, 1993, 1994). The 
dimensionality of perceived service quality developed by Parasuraman, Zeithaml, 
and Berry and measurement of the construct using SERVQUAL are generally 
considered valid across service industries. Despite the methodological problems 
associated with the measurement instrument (Brown, Churchill, and Peter 1993) 
SERVQUAL remains widely used across different service sectors. Conjoint 
analysis can be used as a complementary approach to SERVQUAL-based quality 
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measurement for determining quality perceptions associated with service levels 
(DeSarbo et al. 1994; Narasimhan and Sen 1992). Wetzels et al. (1995) used 
conjoint analysis to analyze customer quality perceptions associated with provision 
of different distribution service levels. 
Note that SERVQUAL emphasizes personal interaction as the main 
component of service provision, which does not apply to an equal extent to all 
retailer service provision. For certain types of services straightforward application 
of SERVQUAL is considered insufficiently adequate and specific scales based on 
SERVQUAL have been developed, for goods retailing (e.g., Babakus and Boiler, 
1992; Babakus and Mangold 1992; Carman 1990: Cronin and Taylor 1992; Finn 
and Lamb 1991) resulting in the dimensions personnel, assortment, ambience, and 
complaint handling, for professional services (e.g., Mishra, Singh, and Wood 1991), 
and physical distribution services in an industrial context (Bienstock, Mentzer, and 
Bird 1997; Kasper and Lemmink 1989). Bienstock, Metzer, and Bird (1997) 
developed a SERVQUAL-based 15-item measurement instrument for perceived 
physical distribution service quality based on Mentzer, Gomes and Krapfel's (1989) 
timeliness, availabiUty, and quality dimensions. Betancourt and Gautschi's (1990) 
service elements relate to Parasuraman, Zeithaml, and Berry's rehability and 
assurance (assurance of delivery, assortment, accessibility of location, availabihty 
of information), responsiveness (assurance of delivery, availabihty of information) 
and to a lesser extent empathy (assurance of delivery, availability of information). 
More specific, total order cycle length, mean leadtime or delivery time, and 
flexibility of the distribution system (e.g., rush orders) will affect perceptions of 
responsiveness and assurance, while variation in leadtime or delivery time will 
affect perceptions of rehabihty. 
Perceived quality and perceived service quality are concepts spanned up by 
so-called "get" attributes, they represent the benefits inherent in consumption of a 
good or service. Perceptions of value result from confrontation of perceived benefits 
(i.e., perceived quality) with perceived monetary and nonmonetary sacrifices (e.g., 
Zeithaml 1989). Consumer satisfaction/dissatisfaction is a higher-order concept that 
is generally modeled as the subjective comparison of perceived costs and benefits 
with a standard, such as prior expectations (e.g., Oliver 1980). Perceived 
disconfirmation of expectations has been recognized as a separate concept -
representing consumers' subjective assessment of the discrepancy between 
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performance and expectations - that both intermediates and adds to the effect of 
expectations and perceptions of performance on satisfaction/dissatisfaction. 
Consumer satisfaction/dissatisfaction has been described as cognitive-based affect; 
the concept is not entirely cognitive in nature, nor does it equal affect. Consumer 
satisfaction/dissatisfaction with transactions affects attitude and ultimately choice 
behavior such as store choice, and choice of a particular product. In the long run 
feelings of trust and long-term satisfaction/dissatisfaction underlie relationship 
quality. In the literature it is generally recognized that the customer's subjective 
evaluation of the excellence of the product, including distribution service, offered is 
related to customer satisfaction, purchase intention, loyalty, and ultimately 
profitability. For example, Lemmink, Wetzels, and Koelemeijer (1996) found that 
the quality of physical distribution service is related positively to relationship 
quality. See also Kyj (1987), and Innis and LaLonde (1994). 
Behavioral research on distribution service classifies under the buyer behavior 
school of marketing thought (cf. Sheth, Gardner, and Garrett 1988). This approach 
implies use of for example psychological and sociological theories for explaining 
purchase decisions in addition to economics. Accordingly, the cost concepts used in 
this approach will not be exclusively economic. Time, such as waiting time, has 
psychological as well as economic meaning, and other non-economic cost concepts, 
such as psychic and social costs come into perspective. The behavioral approach to 
distribution service is valuable since it offers possibilities for subjective 
measurement of consequences of distribution service provision that can be linked to 
distribution system output. 
The buyer behavior approach to distribution service is generally noninteractive 
in nature; it analyzes unilaterally how customers react to service provided by 
suppliers. Recent technological developments, such as the Internet require 
development of interactive models of service provision by intermediaries and 
customer decision making (Sheth and Sisodia 1999). A somewhat more interactive 
perspective can be found in research on channel member relationships, including 
concepts such as trust, power, control, conflict, and cooperation, as represented by 
the organizational dynamics school in marketing (cf. Sheth, Gardner, and Garrett 
1988). Although distribution services have been mentioned, behavioral research on 
channel power has only exceptionally considered distribution service as a source of 
power (Etgar 1978a). 
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2.2.4 An integrative conceptualization of distribution service 
Each of the three approaches discussed previously contributes to a better 
understanding of distribution service but each also represents a limited conceptual 
perspective. Logistics research on distribution service is characterized by a practical 
orientation in which it adopts either a system perspective or a behavioral focus and 
analyzes operational as well as strategic problems. It has identified numerous 
logistics performance indicators that communicate distribution system performance 
and have been incorporated into mathematical models that provide decision support. 
It has recognized that channel physical distribution processes create time and place 
utility as well as maintenance of form utility but has failed to develop a solid 
theoretical distribution service conceptualization. Consequently, logistics research 
has not succeeded in relating physical distribution system performance to customer 
demand and ultimately supplier profitability. 
The economic approach distinguishes itself from the logistics approach by its 
emphasis on all economically relevant channel output and its strategic focus. The 
concept of implicit shopping cost has been used to develop a sound 
conceptualization of distribution service and has given rise to high quality, often 
game-theoretic, research on the strategic interrelationships between retail 
distribution service provision, consumer demand, and retail profitability. The major 
drawback with respect to the economic approach is its exclusive focus on retailer 
cost of service provision and customer transaction cost reduction associated with 
service consumption. 
The behavioral approach, although it has hardly devoted any research effort to 
distribution service, offers possibilities for conceptualization of distribution service 
that include both implicit cost and nonmonetary benefits associated with 
distribution service and allows subjective measurement of these benefits. The most 
important nonmonetary benefits associated with service consumption concern 
hedonistic shopping value and improved decision making. Hedonic shopping value 
refers to the pleasure a consumer derives from shopping and purchase. Decision 
making quality refers to the role of distribution service in educating consumers 
concerning product attributes and their instrumental and/or psycho-social benefits 
so that consumers can better match product purchase and use with their needs. The 
behavioral approach to service provision however has resulted in a rather general 
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theory and measurement regarding service performance that emphasizes personal 
interaction, but has not recognized the particular characteristics of distribution 
service. 
The work by Betancourt and Gautschi (1990, 1992, 1993a) forms a first step 
towards integration since it provides a logistics, economic, and behavioral 
cost-related classification of service elements, that can be linked to both strategic 
and tactical channel member behavior, and physical distribution performance. 
Based on Betancourt and Gautschi's conceptualization of distribution service an 
integrative perspective on distribution service has been developed. The following 
definition of distribution service integrates different views on distribution service 
and delimits the focus of the remaining of the book: 
Distribution service is supporting or facilitating service output of a distribution 
channel's physical distribution process that 
- reduces customer cost of product acquisition and/or use, through creation of 
time and place utility and maintenance of form utility, and/or 
- improves consumer decision making effectiveness and/or 
- increases customers' hedonic shopping value. 
The above definition distinguishes three types of benefits resulting from distribution 
service consumption, summarized as convenience, decision effectiveness, and 
pleasure. In this definition a customer is an individual who or an organization which 
considers purchase from a particular supplier and has established some sort of 
contact with that supplier's organization. The distribution service categories or 
elements that fit this definition and will be used in the research reported in this book 
are Betancourt and Gautschi's (1990) assortment, information, delivery at the right 
time and in the right form, accessibility of location, and ambience. These 
distribution service elements all affect to some extent consumers' 
distribution-related cost and also potentially influence emotional experience of the 
shopping trip and product purchase as well as decision making quality. The 
distribution service elements match Bucklin's (1966), Bucklin, Ramaswamy and 
Majumdar's (1993) channel outputs, except for lot size which is production-related, 
as well as other economic and logistics based classifications of distribution service 
elements. 
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Chapter 1 argues that availabihty implies the possibility for buyers to obtain 
products with desired characteristics at an acceptable cost. Distribution services as 
defined here are instrumental in creating availability. Convenience relates to the 
implicit cost of product acquisition and use, while shopping pleasure reduces 
psychological strain and evokes feelings of pleasantness, information provision 
increases the likelihood that the consumer buys the product whose characteristics 
match his or her desires best, maintenance of form utility positively affects physical 
product quality. 
Assortment, or the joint offering of goods and/or services is an important, if 
not the most important distribution service element. The assortment is the one 
distribution service element that is strongly connected with other distribution 
service elements and delivers all three distribution service benefits mentioned in the 
definition. Assortments create convenience through reduction of search costs, they 
assist the consumer in making better decisions (see also chapter 3), and may 
contribute to hedonistic shopping value. Assortment composition even influences 
purchase behavior through the particular combination of items that is presented to a 
store's patrons. Consumer preference for assortments is a force that supports the 
existence of multiple retail outlets that carry to a large extent overlapping 
merchandise. In addition, it justifies and explains the existence of middlemen in 
marketing channels, and the emergence of retail conglomerates. 
Distribution services that are the focus of this book are, although essential to 
the total package offered by a supplier, facilitative or supportive to the physical 
goods or services that an organization offers for sale. Distribution services possess a 
number of typical characteristics. They are nonmarket services that are often not 
offered as a separate service at a market price, but instead are offered mostly as 
extricably linked to a seller's offering of physical goods and/or pure services. A 
change in one or more of the characteristics of distribution service mentioned in the 
definition inevitably alters the nature of this service. For example, when a suppher 
offers a distribution-related service, such as transportation, separately and at an 
explicit price, it falls beyond the scope of the distribution service concept. In this 
case the physical distribution function transportation has been detached from the 
other distribution functions and is no longer exclusively facilitative or supportive to 
the goods and non-distributive services sold by the organization. Distribution 
services can be identified that decrease a customer's cost associated with acquisition 
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and use of this professionalized transportation service, including provision of an 
assortment of differential transportation services and information on these services' 
characteristics. However, while the nature of the service has altered, the logistics 
relevance of professionalized distribution services, such as transportation, remains 
unchanged. Note that the implicit pricing of distribution service is emphasized in 
economic analysis of distribution service. In practice distribution service provision 
is often implicitly priced in the goods and pure services sold by an organization, but 
it can also be sold for example at or below cost price, which is the case for many 
optional services, such as delivery at home. In addition, the concept does not require 
that a selling firm provides all distribution service herself, consider in this respect 
contracting out of technical assistance. 
Figure 2.1 integrates the three different perspectives on distribution service 
and their interrelationships as antecedents and consequences of distribution service 
provision from the perspective of consumer decision making. The figure adopts a 
retail-consumer perspective but can be applied to for example wholesaler-retailers 
relationships as well. Distribution service provision results from strategic channel 
member decisions with respect to marketing which determine distribution strategy, 
location, logistics, and management decisions following from it, and ultimately 
distribution service offered. Underlying these strategic decisions are choices with 
respect to the market segment(s) the channel delivers and the service sensitivities 
thereof. Depending on the organization of the distribution channel these decisions 
are made independently by the consecutive channel members, or in cooperation 
with each other. Strategic decisions with respect to other fields, such as information 
technology, also determine physical distribution system performance. Distribution 
channel physical distribution system performance should be viewed broadly as the 
performance of all logistics efforts undertaken by channel members in order to 
deliver the product. Retailer service output provides diagnostic value on physical 
distribution performance through logistics performance indicators, and can be used 
to adjust logistics operations. 
Direct consequences of distribution service provision include perceived 
product quality, perceived hedonic shopping value, and perceived nonmonetary 
cost. Consumer perceptions of distribution service refer to the five elements shown 
in the figure, based on Betancourt and Gautschi (1990). Convenience resulting from 
distribution service consumption - the first benefit mentioned in the definition of 
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distribution service - is reflected through higher perceived service quality and 
hedonic shopping value is included as a separate consequence in the figure. 
Provision of informational services - the second distribution service benefit - that 
allow consumers to improve their decision making influences consumer desires and 
expectations and consequently affects quality perceptions. Of course the goods and 
services sold by the retailer exert a separate influence on quality perceptions. For 
reasons of clarity the figure does not depict the influence of product offerings and 
consumer expectations. Consumer perceptions of product and service quality and 
costs have affective consequences, and ultimately influence purchase behavior. The 
figure does not show the impact of distribution service provision on postpurchase 
processes for reasons of plainness. Consumer satisfaction/dissatisfaction processes 
are discussed in chapter 5. Finally, distribution services affect retail demand, 
together with price and other aspects of a retailer's offerings. Retailer profits are the 
outcome of retail demand minus retail costs, both of which are affected by service 
provision. 
2.3 Research framework 
Distribution service is an important instrument in the competitive environment in 
which many retailers operate today. The specific characteristics of distribution 
service, in particular their coherence with the goods and pure services that are 
offered for sale, suggest analysis of the role of distribution service in retail 
competition, which is the major purpose of this book. Competition occurs within 
assortments, i.e., between individual items in an assortment, as well as between 
assortments, i.e., between suppliers, and between distribution channels. In order to 
compete successfully retailers should have insight into the relationship between the 
distribution service they provide and consumer behavior. 
The research reported in the following chapters of this book focuses on the 
determinants and consequences of supplier distribution service provision, in 
particular the relationship between supplier distribution service provision and 
customer decision making. The relationship between distribution service and 
channel member behavior can be addressed in a variety of ways, using a variety of 
research methodologies. The remaining chapters of this book focus on the retailer 
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Figure 2.1 An integrated framework of distribution service in consumer marketing. 
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and final consumer channel stages, specifically on retailer decisions concerning 
distribution service provision, and consumer evaluation processes and purchase 
decisions. 
Retailer distribution service provision and consumer choice behavior. 
Chapters 3 and 4 focus on individual consumer choice behavior among and within 
retail assortments. The research reported in these chapters analyzes how assortment 
composition and other retail distribution services influence consumer evaluation and 
ultimately store choice and item selection. Substitution and complementarity 
relationships between products and the degree of complementarity between 
products and distribution service depend on purchase and usage situations in 
addition to individual product characteristics. The approach followed in chapters 3 
and 4 focuses at assortment analysis and optimization as one further step towards 
improvement of channel decisions. 
Retailer distribution service provision and consumer postpurchase evaluation. 
Chapter 5 investigates the role of retailer distribution service provision in consumer 
postpurchase evaluation and satisfaction/dissatisfaction formation. More 
specifically, it relates determinants of retailer distribution service provision and 
actual distribution service performance to consumer evaluation processes of the 
shopping experience and of the products purchased (see figure 2.1). 
Strategic retailer decision making and channel structure. Distribution channel 
structure is the resultant of strategic decision making by all members in the channel. 
Chapters 6 and 7 focus on retailer decision making with respect to distribution 
service and consequences for channel structure. Chapter 6 identifies forces that 
drive channel members' strategic decisions particularly with respect to distribution 
service in a competitive market and discusses implications for channel structure. In 
terms of figure 2.1 retailer decision variables are distribution service provision, that 
brings about costs, and price, that affect consumer demand, which is in turn 
dependent on the level of distribution service and price. Chapter 7 develops a model 
that considers retailer decisions on assortment, other distribution service, and price, 
and explains the co-existence of multiple retailer formats in a competitive consumer 
market. 
The framework shown in figure 2.1 summarizes and integrates the research 
presented in the following chapters of this book. For reasons of clarity the figure has 
been kept static and incomplete in the sense that it concerns only one single 
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exchange episode and does not explicitly show competition between retailers. 
Chapters 3 and 4 analyze the relationships between distribution service, in particular 
assortment and ambience, and store and item choice (the right block in figure 2.1). 
Chapter 5 concerns the relationship between the upper two left blocks of the figure 
and consumer evaluations shown in the ellipses. Chapters 6 and 7 analyze the 
relationships between retailer distribution service provision, consumer demand, cost 
and profits in a competitive environment (the two lower left blocks, the remaining 
two blocks at the bottom of the figure, and the right block in figure 2.1). The 
relationships indicated will be discussed in more detail in the respective chapters. 
Part II 
Consumer Choice Within and Among Retail 
Assortments 
1 
'i 
Chapter 3 
Retail Assortments and Consumer Choice 
3.1 Introduction 
Assortments, in particular retail and wholesale assortments, are among the 
essentials of today's marketplace. It is virtually impossible to think of a situation in 
which a consumer can purchase a product that is not offered together with other 
products in an assortment. Alderson (1957, 1965) was among the first to recognize 
the central role of marketing in the intermediate sortings of goods needed to match 
the collections of goods at the point of production and desired collections of goods 
at the point of consumption. He described the marketing process as the process 
matching heterogeneous supplies with heterogeneous demands where " the basic 
economic process is the gradual differentiation of goods up to the point at which 
they pass into the hands of consumers." In order to bridge the gap between 
production and consumption a sequence of sorts and transformations is done in 
distribution channels, which Alderson called the sorting principle. The sorting 
process and associated assortment formation by channel members implies 
postponement of goods differentiation, a concept that has been elaborated by 
Bucklin (1965) and is still very valuable today. 
Retailers play a key role in the sorting process by composing assortments that 
they offer to consumers, and consequently face important and difficult decisions 
concerning their assortment that are crucial for their long-term survival. These 
decisions all come down to deciding which items should be included or eliminated 
from the assortment. More specifically, will a new item caiinibalize on existing 
items in the assortment, or will it add just enough choice possibilities for consumers 
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to increase retailer profits? Is a new item too different from existing items in the 
assortment or will it draw more customers to the store that value one-stop-shopping 
and consequently increase sales of other items? In addition to assortment decisions, 
a retailer has to decide on provision of the other distribution service elements and 
on price, each affecting the store's positioning. 
In order to be able to answer the questions raised here more fundamental 
insight is needed into the behavior of consumers with respect to assortments. The 
introduction to this book already observed that assortments can be viewed from 
many perspectives and on many levels of aggregation. This chapter focuses 
predominantly on consumer behavior with respect to assortments as collections of 
goods and pure services offered by retailers. Retail assortments have been defined 
in retail textbooks as, e.g., "the number of different items in a merchandise 
category," (Levy and Weitz 1995, p. 30). This chapter as well as the remaining of 
the book adopt a broader view on retail assortments as the size and composition of 
the available choice range offered by a retailer. Assortment size refers to the 
number of different items carried by a retailer. Assortment composition refers to the 
specific set of items of which the choice range consists and their characteristics. 
Given this definition of retail assortments, this chapter tries to gain understanding of 
consumers' motives underlying demand for, evaluation of, and choice from retail 
assortments. Relevant questions include the following. Why do people value 
collections of goods and services, both at home and in stores? Why do people want 
to have the opportunity to choose from multiple shopping centers? Why do 
consumers want to be able to choose from multiple stores whose assortments 
overlap? Why do they want to be able to compare and choose from multiple, more 
or less similar items? Stated more generally, what determinants underlie consumer 
evaluation of and choice from a particular collection of alternatives. 
An important determinant of consumer appreciation of retail assortments 
concerns consumers' preferences with respect to formation of their own 
assortments. Consumers save monetary as well as nonmonetary cost by stocking up 
goods. Alderson (1957) argued that households accumulate goods in order to 
sustain expected patterns of future behavior as well as protection against unpleasant 
surprises. The latter refers to inventory holding as an insurance against unexpected 
and/or unpleasant contingencies, such as strikes and price increases. Many 
purchases are done for the purpose of refilling or maintaining household inventory 
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of fast movers or perishables, e.g., coffee, sugar, milk, bread, or as an addition to 
existing collections of goods, e.g., clothing, furniture. Forward buying is in addition 
done for goods that are occasionally promoted at low prices (see Kahn and 
McAlister 1997). Note that the widespread use of refrigerators and cars has not only 
lead to one-stop shopping, but also to an increase in home inventories. 
Consumer need for assortment represents the need for two essential assortment 
characteristics, namely complementarity and substitutability. Section 3.2 discusses 
psychological and economic determinants of consumer need for retail assortments. 
Retail assortments can be considered both as a derivative from and an influence on 
consumers' own assortments. Three important influences on consumer retail 
assortment evaluation and choice are identified, i.e., the consumption goal, the 
purchase situation, and the decision context. Section 3.3 investigates the 
psychological process of consumers' own assortment formation and retail 
assortment choice. Contextual influences, in particular the composition and 
presentation of retail assortments, constitute and important determinant of consumer 
retail assortment evaluation and choice and are discussed in section 3.4. Section 3.5 
investigates consumer retail assortment evaluation. Finally, section 3.6 presents a 
more complete theoretical framework that explains consumers' choice from and 
among retail assortments by assuming their judgments are first and foremost driven 
by the consumption goals they pursue, given their preference structures, and also 
depend on other situational and contextual influences. The propositions formulated 
in this section are the basis for the empirical research on consumer choice from 
retail assortments reported in the next chapter, as well as for future research. 
3.2 Determinants of consumer need for retail assortments 
Consumers often face an overwhelming number of alternatives to choose from in a 
retail environment, even in light of the various objectives they pursue. From this 
abundance of alternatives a consumer must select the particular alternative that 
matches an existing assortment, either their own, or other people's. Apparently, 
consumers value retailers' prestructured collections of goods and/or services. The 
need for assortment is ubiquitous and touches upon virtually every aspect of human 
behavior, not only with respect to choice of consumption goods, but also with 
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respect to investment decisions, employee choice, even romantic engagement, and 
so on. This section discusses general motives underlying individual consumers' 
appreciation of assortments, with particular emphasis on retail assortments, based 
on economic and psychological theory on consumer decision making1. 
Consumers appreciate retail assortments mainly because demand 
interdependencies exist between products. These demand interdependencies - or 
substitutabihty and complementarity - between items in retail assortments are 
situationally determined subjective concepts that depend not only on individual 
preferences and usage goals, but also on retailer input, particularly provision of 
distribution service other than assortment. By offering collections of items retailers 
create economic, psychic, or social benefits to consumers, many of which are 
closely related to the benefits resulting from distribution service provision that were 
discussed in chapter 2. Section 3.2.1 discusses several important consumer-based 
rationales for the existence of retail assortments. One particularly relevant 
consumer-based economic rationale for the existence of retail assortments, i.e., 
reduction in consumer distribution-related cost while purchasing multiple products 
during one shopping trip, will be discussed in 3.2.2. This rationale has been 
modeled comprehensively by Betancourt and Gautschi (1990, 1992) who analyze 
the role of consumption goals and retailer distribution service provision in 
complementarity and substitutability relationships between the items in a retail 
assortment. 
3.2.1 Consumer-based rationales for the existence of retail assortments 
It is common knowledge that consumers' preferences for products differ. An 
obvious explanation for the need for retail assortments would be that consumers are 
heterogeneous with respect to their intrinsic preferences for products (e.g., Kotler 
1980). By offering an assortment that consists of multiple products a retailer appeals 
to multiple consumer segments. In practice, however, consumers' preferences vary 
over different consumption goals and different purchase situations. Furthermore, 
1 Purely economic rationales underlying the emergence of middlemen in distribution channels will 
be discussed in chapter 6. 
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consumers may be uncertain about their preferences for product characteristics and 
may be imperfectly informed about existing products. 
Individual consumers generally do not have the cognitive capability nor the 
physical opportunity to collect information about and to compare all available 
alternatives. Accordingly, they value prestructured collections of alternatives that 
allow relatively simple comparisons between alternatives (cf. Shugan 1980) many 
of which, at least to a certain extent, meet their needs, wants, or desires, that are 
often associated with the particular consumption goal they pursue. Such a collection 
of goods and services offered by a retailer should contain alternatives that are 
somewhat different, providing the decision maker with enough information to make 
inferences concerning the market offerings and reduce his perception of risk 
induced by the awareness of his own bounded rationality in the presence of many 
alternatives. 
Well-composed assortments enable consumers to make better purchase 
decisions at lower mental and physical cost associated with search and comparison. 
Rationales underlying consumer valuation of assortments can be classified 
according to the benefits resulting from distribution service provision that were 
identified in chapter 2, i.e., lower distribution-related cost of product acquisition 
and/or use (C), improved decision making (D), and increased hedonic shopping 
value (H). Table 3.1 classifies well-recognized rationales underlying consumer 
shopping behavior - i.e., comparison of items in retail assortments as well as 
multiple retail outlets, possibly in multiple shopping centres - that have been 
mentioned in the literature, according to these three distribution service benefits. 
Consumer efficiency with respect to distribution-related costs constitutes an 
important rationale for the existence of retail assortments; assortments offer the 
possibility for one-stop shopping and consequently allow time savings with respect 
to search and transportation. Section 3.2.2 elaborates on Betancourt and Gautschi's 
model that has been developed around this economic motive. The next two 
rationales relate to the quality of consumer decision making. Even if only a small 
number of alternatives exists in the real-world market a decision maker wants to 
compare several options. Retail assortments provide information and may induce a 
consumer to infer information about the available alternatives (Johnson 1984; 
Huber and McCann 1982; Ross and Creyer 1992). The presence of multiple 
alternatives allows a decision maker to compare and learn about products and thus 
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reduce uncertainty about the importance of selection criteria. The availability of 
retail assortments of alternatives thus may provide justification for one's choice. 
Assortments thus form an important context for consumer decision making (e.g., 
Simonson and Tversky 1992) and a retailer can design and present her assortment 
so as to influence consumer choice, as will be discussed in section 4 of this chapter. 
Table 3.1 Consumer-based rationales for the existence of retail assortments. 
Behavioral rationale 
Assortment 
benefit 
1. Consumer efficiency associated with purchasing multiple items (one-stop 
shopping) with respect to distribution-related costs, such as search, 
comparison, travel, time, and adaptation cost of desired item is out-of-stock 
(e.g., Betancourt and Gautschi 1990,1992; see also chapter 2); 
C 
2. Reduction of consumer uncertainty and perception of risk associated with 
purchase (e.g., Jacoby et al. 1994) and facilitation of inferential belief 
formation (e.g., Johnson 1984; Huber and McCann 1982; Ross and Oyer 
1992) through comparison shopping; 
C 
3. Non-purchase reasons for shopping and comparing products. For example, 
seeking social interaction, learning about new trends (e.g., Bellenger and 
Karkaongar 1990; Tauber 1972), novelty seeking (Hirschman 1980); 
C , H 
4. Hedonistic value of shopping to consumers (e.g., Babin, Darden and Griffin 
1994). 
H 
Comparison shopping and search are forms of information seeking, a major 
component of so-called problem-focused coping. Information seeking enhances the 
predictability of a situation and thus helps individuals avoid future difficulties, deal 
with present ones, and increase their sense of control and confidence. Tauber (1972) 
sees shopping as an arena where consumers derive satisfaction from finding exactly 
what they have been looking for, and that satisfaction serves two types of 
motivations, namely a sense of achievement and mastery over the choice 
environment. The motivation to identify with culturally prescribed roles regarding 
the conduct of shopping activity has been referred to as emotion-focused coping. 
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These roles prescribe normative behavior, such as careful product and price 
comparisons, searching for optimum value, etc. Thus, shoppers seek 
ego-enhancement by adding satisfying shopping roles to existing self-concepts 
(Westbrook and Black 1985). 
Non-purchase reasons for shopping can relate to general decision making 
effectiveness, the pleasure derived from shopping as such, and ego-enhancement. 
Other, related non-purchase reasons for shopping that have not been mentioned in 
the table include diversion from routine activities, exercise, sensory stimulation, and 
acquiring interpersonal power (see also Bellenger and Korkaonkar 1990; Tauber 
1972). 
The rationales mentioned in table 3.1 can be seen as differential explanations 
of demand interdependencies that exist within and among retail assortments, in 
particular complementarity and substitutabihty relationships. Two products are 
generally considered substitutes if both can satisfy the same consumer need and two 
products are considered complements if they are consumed jointly in order to 
satisfy a particular need (Henderson and Quandt 1958). More generally, given the 
concept of composite needs, Lattin and McAlister (1985) argue that substitute 
products share so-called want-satisfying features and thus fulfill the same 
component of a consumer's composite need and complementary products have 
differently valued features and thus meet different components of the composite 
need. If the different components of a composite need can only be fulfilled by 
variety-seeking behavior over time substitute products can be complements in time. 
The degree to which consumers value each of the benefits associated with 
retail assortments, and perceive substitutabihty and complementarity relationships, 
depends on a number of factors that combine individual, situational, and contextual 
characteristics. Below a number of these have been described: 
i Consumer mtrinsic need for variety or variety-seeking through composite need 
(e.g., Lattin and McAlister 1985; McAlister 1979, 1982; McAllister and 
Pessemier 1982); 
ii Consumer heterogeneity in preferences due to different consumption goals over 
time (e.g., Barsalou 1983,1985; Bettman 1988); 
iii Consumer heterogeneity in preferences and decision making process due to 
situational variables, such as time pressure (e.g., Isenberg 1981; Park, Iyer, and 
60 Chapter 3 
Smith 1989), and retail environment (e.g., Bitner 1992; Ward, Bitner, and 
Barnes 1992). 
Individuals experience an intrinsic or situation-induced need for variety (e.g., 
McAlister and Pessemier 1982) that motivates them to seek variety in consumption. 
Consistent switching among products in time may be a way of satisfying wants and 
needs that are not fulfilled completely by consuming one product only. In addition, 
many wants and needs are satisfied best by a portfolio of products (McAlister 
1979). Variety seeking is a form of exploratory behavior. The optimum stimulation 
level (OSL) and personality traits such as locus of control have been shown to affect 
consumer exploratory behavior (Joachimsthaler and Lastovicka 1984). Hirschman 
(1980) suggests that novelty seeking serves as a means of self-preservation; the 
individual may find it useful to create a bank of potentially useful knowledge. In 
addition, novelty seeking may function to improve problem-solving skills. 
Individuals with high stimulation ideals may seek information because of a genuine 
desire to explore something unfamiliar, while individuals with low stimulation 
needs may seek information to reduce the risk of trying an unfamiliar product (cf. 
Raju 1980). Consumer need for variety is a force driving consumers to prefer larger 
and more varied assortments, both in their homes and in shopping centres. 
Consumers' shopping goals are both individually and situationally determined 
and affect consumers' preferences for assortment and for individual products. As 
will be illustrated in greater detail in the next sections, the substitutabihty and 
complementarity relationships between items in an assortment depend on 
consumers' consumption goals. Situational variables in general constitute an 
additional important determinant of the degree of external search consumers are 
willing to undertake. For example, time pressure and the difficulty of the choice 
task influence the cost-benefit tradeoffs associated with information seeking. 
Consumers experience continuous tension between limited time, mental capability, 
energy, and money, their information needs, and their consumption goals, that 
differentially impact their desires concerning retail assortment size and 
composition. In addition, individual differences with respect to decision making, 
such as in-store processing vs. prior processing of information, abilities, and 
concern with optimality of the choice, affect the degree of external search (Bettman 
1979) and will consequently influence consumers' need for assortment. 
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Retail assortments are on the one hand a derivative of consumers' desired own 
assortments, and on the other hand facilitate as well as influence formation of these 
own or in-home assortments. Section 3 discusses influences of consumption goals 
on consumer assortment formation and choice; contextual influences of retail 
assortments on consumer decision making are the topic of section 4. First, this 
section continues with a discussion of two consumer-based rationales for the 
existence of retail assortments, i.e., distribution cost efficiency and consumers' 
differing consumption goals, and their implications for substitatability and 
complementarity between items in retail assortments as modeled by Betancourt and 
Gautschi (1990, 1992). 
3.2.2 Distribution service and consumer demand for assortment 
Betancourt and Gautschi (1990, 1992) developed a comprehensive economic model 
that emphasizes the role of distribution service in relationships between retail 
assortments and between items in a retail assortment. They view assortments as 
"collections of market goods and services and nonmarket services" (see also chapter 
2) in which not only goods and services that are offered at an explicit price are 
important in terms of competing for the consumer's monetary and nonmonetary 
means, but also certain nonmarket services, i.e., distribution services. They develop 
a formal model of the interrelationships between the items in a retail assortment, 
and between retail assortment items and other distribution service elements, and 
show that provision of distribution service drives items in an assortment towards 
complementarity. An important concept in their model is the consumption goal, or 
the aim a buyer wants to achieve by using the goods purchased and the distribution 
service consumed. For example, two seemingly unrelated products, such as milk 
and gasoline can be complements because the consumer is on his way to a picnic 
(consumption goal). Another important reason for one-stop shopping concerns 
efficiency. Betancourt and Gautschi argue in their seminal papers that the main 
issue with respect to assortments is that they allow one-stop shopping, i.e., they 
"permit the consumer to purchase a basket of goods that are complements, at least 
in some sense." A consumer saves time in purchasing both products on one 
occasion (distribution service). Below a concise interpretation is given of 
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Betancourt and Gautschi's household production model of retail demand. Then-
analysis has lead to a new and clear definition of product complementarity and 
substitutability, as well as assortment breadth and depth. 
The model assumes a household undertakes consumption activities in order to 
generate outputs or commodities that yield satisfaction or utility. The outputs are 
generated through a household technology that uses as input among other things (1) 
time, (2) capital services from the fixed stock of durables available within the 
household, (3) market goods and services, and (4) distribution service provided by 
the retailers the household patronizes. The shifting of distribution costs between 
households and retailers (see also chapter 2) is captured formally by modeling the 
distribution service provided by a retailer as fixed inputs to the household 
production activities. In addition, various environmental characteristics may be 
relevant to the production process. For example, when baking a cake, which takes a 
certain amount of time, a person will use a food processor, the oven, and the 
refrigerator, and he or she will buy ingredients for the cake, such as butter, flour, 
and sugar, probably from a supermarket, together with other things he or she needs 
for the household. Alternatively, this person may buy a ready-made cake in a 
supermarket or a speciahzed bakery. If it rains heavily or if (s)he expects no visitors 
(s)he may decide to postpone the visit to the store and consequently postpone 
preparation of the cake, or have it delivered at home. 
An essential assumption in the model is that a household optimizes its 
production process in two stages. The first stage represents a direct production 
effect: what quantities of what items should be bought in order to generate certain 
outputs at minimum cost, given household input constraints, prices, distribution 
services, and desired outputs. In the second stage the household decides what levels 
of outputs it will produce in order to maximize utility, given its full income: the 
consumption effect. The direct production effect and the consumption effect are 
central to Betancourt and Gautschi's subsequent reasoning since they decompose 
price-, cross-price, and service elasticities of demand into these two effects. The 
direct production effect represents the change in quantity demanded of a particular 
item as a consequence of a change in the price of the item itself, the price of another 
item (cross-price elasticity), or the level of a particular distribution service provided 
by the retailer (service elasticity), given the desired levels of the household outputs. 
For example, a price increase for gasoline may cause a consumer to drive more 
Retail assortments and consumer choice 63 
carefully or buy an economy car. The consumption effect represents the effect of a 
price change on demand for an item through the effect of this change on the desired 
levels of household outputs. For example, a price increase for gasoline may reduce 
demand for gasoline because families make less weekend trips by car due to this 
price increase. 
Betancourt and Gautschi define relationships between items in an assortment, 
as well as between items and distribution services, in terms of net and gross 
complementarity and substitutabihty. Two items in an assortment are defined to be 
net complements or net substitutes if the production effect is negative or positive, 
respectively2. Two items are gross complements if their cross-price elasticity, or the 
sum of the production effect and the consumption effect, is negative and gross 
substitutes if their cross-price elasticity is positive3. The tendency towards 
negativity of the consumption effect is a force that drives items towards 
complementarity. Gross effects thus take into account the change in desired outputs 
as a consequence of price changes and the change in item demand as a consequence 
of change in desired output; they consider item-relationships over relevant 
consumption activities. Complementarity and substitutabihty are thus subjective 
concepts that are conditional on the consumption activities that are undertaken. 
Even when two items are net substitutes, e.g., lamb chops and hamburger, they can 
be complements, for example for the consumption goal "having a barbecue". 
An item in an assortment and a retailer distribution service will be net 
complements in most situations, e.g., an item is chosen more often as a consequence 
of an increase in retailer distribution service provision over desired outputs and the 
associated decrease in consumer cost of producing the outputs. Net substitalability 
occurs for example, when an assortment is enlarged with respect to a certain 
product category, e.g., meat. As a consequence of the greater range of choice at 
least some items in the assortment will be chosen less. Betancourt and Gautschi 
(1987) show that, because of the consumption effect, distribution services that apply 
to all items in an assortment, such as ambience, tend to be gross complements with 
every item in the retailer's assortment. An increase in distribution service tends to 
increase demand for certain household outputs, which in turn increases demand for 
Two items are net independents if the production effect is zero. 
3 Two items are gross independents if their cross-price elasticity is zero. 
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particular items. Even so-called item-specific distribution service, such as quality 
maintenance or specific information that apply to specific items in an assortment, 
tend to be gross complements with many seemingly unrelated items in a retailer's 
assortment because of a positive consumption effect. 
By explicitly considering the role of consumption goal and distribution service 
provided by retailers Betancourt and Gautschi's work represents a clear contribution 
to economic thinking about assortments. The distinction between production and 
consumption effects on consumer decision making is not new, but its translation to 
net and gross complementarity and substitutabihty provides new insights into the 
role of consumption goals as an important force that affects consumer demand for 
retail assortments. In practice marketers often use rigid and indistinct 
consumption-related definitions of complementarity and substiratability. For 
example, two alternatives from one predefined product category, such as tea and 
coffee, are generally considered substitutes, while alternatives that often are 
consumed together, such as coffee and coffeecreamer, are considered complements. 
According to standard economic theory two items with positive cross-price 
elasticity are considered substitutes and two products with negative cross-price 
elasticity are considered complements. In Betancourt and Gautschi's view 
cross-price elasticities indicate gross substitutabihty or complementarity, since they 
depend on the consumption goals pursued by consumers and associated household 
outputs4. Net substitutabihty and complementarity give a more straightforward 
impression of interitem relationships that can be particularly useful for retail 
management. 
Based on the idea of net complementarity and substitutabihty Betancourt and 
Gautschi have developed unambiguous, albeit very general, definitions for retail 
assortment breadth and depth. They define the depth of an assortment from the 
point of a representative household as "the extent to which items in a retail 
assortment are net substitutes" and the breadth of an assortment as "the extent to 
which items in a retail assortment are net independents." Although these definitions 
4 As a consequence of the significance of household outputs to gross item relationships 
measurement and/or interpretation of cross-price elasticity is problematic. Development of 
conditional elasticities, similar to the cross-consumption response, developed by Lattin and 
McAlister (1985), which defines changes in choice probabilities conditional on previous 
variety-seeking behavior, deserves attention in this respect. 
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apply to entire retail assortments, many retail outlets, such as supermarkets, carry 
very sizeable assortments consisting over 10,000 items, which make consumer 
assessment of assortment breadth and depth virtually impossible. Existing retail 
assortments are generally classified into different categories. Retailing practice 
considers the number of categories indicative of assortment breadth and the number 
of different alternatives within each particular category indicates assortment depth. 
In addition, assortment classification into assortment categories provides cues 
consumers can use for assessment of the degree of item complementarity and 
substitutabihty desired with respect to their particular consumption goals. Examples 
of such cues include the number of available product categories, the number of shelf 
facings, and square meters selling space devoted to one assortment category. 
While Betancourt and Gautschi's definitions of assortment depth and breadth 
adopt a retailer view on assortments, the remaining of this book adopts a consumer 
perspective and elaborates on the view that alternatives within and across product 
categories can be substitutes or complements, depending on the desired household 
outputs and associated consumption activities. Based on their model Betancourt and 
Gautschi derive implications for retail management and retail competitive structure, 
but they ignore the psychological processes underlying consumer choice, including 
the role of distribution services in consumer decision making processes. Despite this 
apparent lack of psychological content Betancourt and Gautschi's approach, in 
particular their conceptualization of consumption activities that are undertaken to 
generate desired levels of household outputs, matches recent psychological insights 
on the predominant role of consumption goals in consumer choice remarkably well. 
3.3 The role of consumption goals in consumer assortment choice 
Consumers buy products for roughly three purposes. Either they purchase the 
product(s) for direct consumption, such as is the case for most pure services, they 
intend to give the product to someone, or they take the product somewhere, often 
home, and consume it there. Home consumption of the product may take a short 
(e.g., fresh food) or longer (e.g., furniture) length of time and generates in-home 
inventories and associated in-home assortments. Several types of consumers' own 
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or in-home assortments can be distinguished, formation of which is driven by 
different rationales. 
In addition to economic and functional rationales underlying in-home 
assortment formation, including reducing distribution-related cost, speculative 
buying, and protecting oneself against contingencies, psychological rationales exist 
that explain consumer formation of collections of complementary goods, so-called 
product constellations. Insight into the process underlying consumers' mental 
representation of complementarity and substitutabihty between different products is 
crucial for understanding consumer evaluation of and choice of and from retail 
assortments. This section discusses the psychological processes underlying 
consumer assortment formation and specifically elaborates on the role of 
consumption goals and situational factors. Contextual influences are the topic of 
section 4. This section briefly mentions relationships with consumer retail 
assortment evaluation and choice, which will be discussed in greater detail in 
sections 5 and 6. 
The organization of product knowledge in memory is considered a critical 
factor in consumer decision making. Several organizing principles for consumer 
knowledge have been identified and labeled by cognitive psychologists, including 
schemata, scripts, explicit rules, and categories (cf. Sujan 1985). These structures 
have in common that they enable the 
consumer to create meaningful representations of information that will enable him 
or her to simplify, to impose order on, and to control decision processes. A popular 
and undisputed way of describing generalized knowledge structures is through 
categories. Classifying nonequivalent stimuli from the environment into categories 
so that they can be treated as equivalent is "one of the most basic functions of all 
organisms" (Rosch et al. 1976). Consumer category structures pertain to the manner 
in which product knowledge is represented and organized in memory so as to permit 
classification and differentiation (e.g., Alba and Hutchinson 1987; Cohen and Basu 
1987). The purpose of categorization is to reduce cognitive and behavioral effort 
needed for storing and retrieving information. Consumers combine cognitive 
concepts into categories at different levels of abstraction and with differing levels of 
hierarchy. Several hierarchical levels of categorization can be distinguished, 
including superordinate, basic, and subordinate categorization (Rosch et al. 1976). 
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Basic categorization represents "the most general and inclusive level at which 
categories can delineate real-world correlational structures." 
Consumers may develop different types of categories for different purposes. 
For example, for judgment and choice, i.e., perceptual judgment and preference 
tasks, consumers may develop different category types. A number of studies found 
that products that are perceived by consumers to be highly similar need not be 
preferred accordingly. For example, Lefkoff-Hagius and Mason (1993) found that 
physical product attributes that can be assessed objectively and represent utilitarian 
value relate to similarity judgments, while so-called beneficial and imagery 
attributes that are more subjective and abstract and represent psychosocial, 
respectively hedonic aspects of product usage relate more to preference judgments 
(see also Creusen and Schoormans 1997). 
A category should be differentiated to a degree that is suited for a certain 
purpose. A large number of categories implies refinement but contains a degree of 
differentiation that is probably irrelevant for respective purposes. A balance has 
thus to be found between refinement and robustness of categories. Expertise, or 
prior knowledge is associated with richer, more complete, and more detailed 
representations of a category in memory (Alba and Hutchinson 1987; Murphy and 
Wright 1984). Experts in a product category should have readily accessible 
knowledge about a wide range of products in that category. Furthermore, experts 
are less likely than novices to rely on less relevant surface features in making 
judgments. Experts' categories are richer and more semantically-based versus more 
syntactically or surface-based for novices (Chi, Glaser and Farr 1988; Celsi and 
Olson 1988). The actual category level used by consumers is very likely to depend 
on their goals as well as on their expertise. 
Most contemporary theories of category structure involve two closely related 
constructs, similarity and prototypicality, that explain category membership (Loken 
and Ward 1990; Murphy and Medin 1985; Smith and Medin 1981). People perceive 
exemplars of a category to vary in the degree to which they are representative, or 
typical, of a category. Typicality is generally defined as "the degree to which an 
item is perceived to represent a category" (Loken and Ward 1990). In order to be 
perceived as substitutes items should possess a certain degree of similarity with 
respect to fulfillment of needs, desires or wants, and in order to be considered items 
should be to some degree typical for the category that is evoked. Item similarity is 
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obviously inadequate as the basic construct for categorical structure; it considers 
object properties only and ignores the relational nature of object concepts in 
category formation (e.g., form vs. function, attributes vs. core meaning), 
relationships with the context in which the objects occur, and variability in relevant 
subject level characteristics such as human interests, needs and goals (Murphy and 
Medin 1985; Ratneshwar and Shocker 1988). Barsalou (1983, 1985) argued that it 
is items' goal-connectedness that determines whether or not they are in the same 
category. In support of this argument Ratneshwar (1987, in Ratneshwar and 
Shocker) found that prototypicality correlated highly with the extent to which a 
product shared usages in common with all other category members. A similar 
emphasis on situation can be found in consumer-oriented approaches to deterniining 
market definition and structure. Srivastava's (1981) usage-situation influence (SIU) 
approach states that the anticipated use, the functions to be served, and the 
consumption context of a product influence consumers' choices among alternatives. 
Consumers' category structures are thus inferred on the basis of their judgments of 
product substitutabiUty across a set of usage contexts (see also Day, Shocker, and 
Srivastava 1979; Srivastava, Alpert and Shocker 1984). 
Goals are generally seen as the most important factor in motivation and 
direction of consumer information acquisition, information encoding and choice 
(Bettman 1979). Barsalou (1983, 1985) distinguished between a "perceptual" class 
of memory structures or common taxonomic categories, based on the consumer's 
general knowledge of a product class, and goal-derived categories or 
representations created in order to make a choice. Goal-derived categories are 
established in memory, or created ad hoc, to fulfill certain goals or ideals, which 
may be prompted by specific situations. Examples of goal-derived categories are, 
"something to make me feel better", "something to drink on a hot day", or "brand 
XYZ nailpolish that matches my new clothes". Such a category may include 
noncomparable alternatives, for example "ways to get a quick food-item" may 
include a visit to the vending machine around the corner, calling a pizza delivery 
service, or a quick walk to the fast-food restaurant across the street (Sindra 1994). 
Product categories that are generally distinguished in retail assortments seem to 
have characteristics of both goal-derived and taxonomic categories (Loken and 
Ward 1990). 
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Common taxonomie categories can be characterized by the central tendency of 
the frequency distribution of features or attribute levels over instances, i.e., the more 
a product's features are similar to a category's modal values the more likely it is 
perceived as an item of that category. The proximity of an item's 
contextually-dependent perceived features to goal-dependent ideal levels predicts its 
likelihood to belong to a certain goal-derived category. Items in goal-derived 
categories may thus share few features and be complements, rather than substitutes 
for one another. Goal-derived categories provide a theoretical foundation for the 
inclusion of alternatives from different product categories or "noncomparable" 
alternatives in consumers' consideration sets (Bettman and Sujan 1987; 
Ratneshwar, Pechmann, and Shocker 1996). 
Schemata represent the organization of knowledge structures, or categories, in 
memory. Like categories, schemata are cognitive tools, based on past experiences, 
that help an individual to cope with new experiences (Bartlett 1932), and have been 
shown to have a profound effect on the processing of new information (Sujan and 
Bettman 1989). A schema is a cognitive structure that represents an individual's 
expectations about a particular domain (Bettman 1979). Expectations may include 
hypotheses about attributes, importance weights, and variability across brands. The 
domain may include, for example with respect to assortment formation, a product 
category, a consumption goal, or a specific product already in the consumer's home 
assortment. Schemata are often conceptualized as complex and dynamic associative 
semantic networks in which related concepts are located closer than more distant 
concepts. A commonly accepted theory holds that activation of a concept, 
represented by a node of the network, results in subsequent activation of other 
concepts along the paths of the network. This notion of spreading activation 
(Collins and Loftins 1975) is useful for understanding the interrelatedness of 
products in consumers' minds and the role of the consumption goal as an important 
determinant of product interrelationships, whether complementarity or 
substitutabiHty. 
A consumption system (Boyd and Levy 1963) refers to the constellation of 
products that are needed by the consumer to perform desired consumption activities 
that lead to certain household outputs. Consumers may develop or acquire cognitive 
structures that refer to these product constellations, so-called consumption schemata 
(Lai 1994). Consumption schemata organize and represent information about 
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interrelationships among complementary products, the sequence of the consumption 
activity in time, the cultural value and meanings of the goods involved, and personal 
preferences and affective associations. The formation of a consumption schema is 
thus driven by a particular consumption goal. The concept of consumption schemata 
implies consumers do not only form expectations with respect to product categories, 
i.e., product types or brands, but they are also likely to form expectations about a 
product constellation with respect to the consumption goal they pursue. 
A consumption schema can be partitioned into several subschemata that refer 
to the functions that are to be fulfilled in the consumption process. A specific 
function in the consumption process can usually be fulfilled in different ways or by 
multiple alternatives (products), e.g., several brands of butter can be used in baking 
a cake. Each alternative is called a mode for the particular subschema. The different 
modes for a particular consumption subschema can be said to represent substitutes. 
If a consumer finds the product collection, or product constellation, in his or her 
home to be out-of-coherence or unsatisfactory, the need to replace the "obsolete" 
items in it, or add to the existing items emerges and one or more criteria are used to 
make the collection more complete. Based on his idea of consumers who select 
according to consumption (sub)schemata Lai (1994) suggests possible dimensions 
of compatibility and complementarity that are critical in product choice: 
1. Functional exhaustivity: products are chosen and combined in such a way that the 
required functions of a consumption activity are completely Mfilled; 
2. Operational connectivity: the operation of a subschema is in coherence with other 
subschemata and facilitates the consumption process; 
3. Aestethic coherence: the consumer's subjective and idiosyncratic preference for a 
product constellation based on sense of beauty or personal expression; 
4. Meaning-role consistency: perceived coherence between the cultural or symbolic 
meanings of complementary products and the social roles which consumers 
assume or global consumption activities; 
5. Hedonistic value of the product combination to the consumer; 
6. Memorial symbolism: the symbolism associated with use of product constellation 
resulting from past experiences; 
7. Affective association with certain product combinations. 
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The importance of the above mentioned dimensions in product choice depends 
on the consumption goal that is pursued and on the consumer's expectations about 
the product constellation. One might argue that consumers evaluate retail 
assortments depending on the composition of their consumption schemata. Whereas 
several of them are highly idiosyncratic, a few criteria relate directly to the 
rationales underlying the existence of retail assortments mentioned in the previous 
subsection. Retail assortments play an important role in facilitating the consumption 
process through increasing operational connectivity and meeting functional 
exhaustivity requirements. The first relates mainly to distribution cost reduction, the 
latter to the quality of consumer decision making. In addition, retailers can offer 
product combinations that increase hedonistic value to consumers. These three 
dimensions underlying consumer choice are particularly relevant with respect to 
consumer purchase of fast moving consumer goods that are relatively low in 
expressive value, such as groceries. Other dimensions, including aesthetic 
coherence, meaning-role consistency, and memorial symbolism become 
increasingly important with increasing expressive value of products and have led to 
the emergence of specific store formats. For example, antique stores may among 
other things appeal to consumers' sense of the past and associated memorial 
symbolism, interior decoration stores selling designer furniture and associated home 
decorations appeal to consumers' desire for aesthetic coherence, and so-called 
ethnic stores may appeal to meaning-role consistency. 
Formation of consumers' in-home assortments obviously relates to the 
composition of their consumption schemata as well. Set aside home storage of 
products for reasons such as insurance, speculation, and convenience, several of the 
dimensions mentioned earlier underly consumer formation of product 
constellations. For example, home furnishing reflects among other things aesthetic 
coherence and memorial symbolism. Belk (1995) mentions several motives 
underlying consumer collecting of non-utilitarian objects, including gaining a 
feeling of mastery, competence, or success; the chance to stand out as being unique 
by virtue of possessing rare, valued, and unique possessions; symbolic self 
completion, including contributing to the collector's sense of past - or memorial 
symbolism -; the thrill of the hunt, which relates back to accomplishment, mastery, 
and success; experiencing sense of community with other collectors; and finally as 
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the perhaps most important rationale, providing contact with self-transcending 
sacredness or magic in collectors' lives. 
Although consumption goals include a situational component, other situational 
variables and contextual variables exist that affect consumer behavior with respect 
to assortment choice. Early experimental research already indicated that a person's 
choice is highly dependent on the situation (e.g., Bishop and Witt 1970; Belk 
1974a,b). Situational variables are commonly conceptualized as being related to the 
situation in which the actual decision making is done, such as time pressure, and 
influence among others the effort a consumer is willing and/or able to devote to 
decision making. Sindra (1994) defines situations as "an agglomeration of 
ecological factors, such as time, place, social setting, and task objectives, that are 
relatively transient both in nature and effect and thus distinct from enduring 
individual and brand characteristics, and that affect subject behavior either by 
themselves or in conjunction with other, personal and object, factors." Belk (1975) 
specifically defined any situation on five constituent factors: (1) a physical context 
consisting of geographic and institutional location, sights, sounds, and aroma; (2) a 
social context defined by interpersonal roles and expectations, (3) a temporal 
context defined by e.g., time of day, day of week, season; (4) a task definition 
described by overall subject intentions; and by (5) the antecedent conditions 
subsuming miscellaneous residual or "carried-over" effects from a prior state, such 
as mood. 
In the remaining of this chapter and in subsequent chapters a distinction is 
made between purchase situation and purchase context. The purchase situation 
refers to Belk's temporal, task, physical, antecedent, and social conditions to the 
extent that they do not concern the retailer's offerings, while the purchase context 
refers to retailer distribution service provision, including assortment provision, other 
customers in the store, etc., i.e., Belk's physical and social context. Consumption 
goals are interpreted broadly henceforth, including the outputs a household aims to 
achieve, given known characteristics of the usage situation and purchase task. The 
purchase situation constitutes a separate factor including external, unforeseen, 
occurrences. 
Both the consumption goal, and other situational and contextual factors 
mentioned here can heavily affect organization and/or activation of consumers' 
knowledge structures. They may lead to highly specific expectations for a product, 
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shift the focus to specific brands, or even reorganize the entire typicality structure 
based upon constraints imposed by the context (Rosch and Shoben 1983). Like 
different consumption goals, different purchase situations will in general lead to 
activation of different modes in consumption (sub)schemata and associated 
goal-derived categories, adaptation of existing categories, or even construction of 
new categories. Different decision making contexts, in particular retail assortments, 
can be designed to as to change consumers' existing knowledge structures. The next 
section discusses retail contextual influences on consumer choice, with particular 
emphasis on retail assortment composition. 
3.4 Retail assortment composition effects on consumer choice 
In the previous section it has already been mentioned that the consumer's decision 
process and its outcomes may differ depending on consumption goal, other 
situational factors, and context factors. In a retail application context factors include 
all elements of distribution service provision by a retailer, including the alternatives 
presented in the assortment, shelf layout, ambience, and personal service. Retailers 
have different possibilities to influence consumer decision making and distribution 
service provision is an important source of possible impacts on product judgment 
and choice. The context effects that are specifically discussed in this section 
concern the influence of assortment composition, including the availability and 
features of the individual items and as their presentation, on consumer preference, 
choice incidence, as well as the actual item chosen from the assortment. For 
example, consumers have higher perceptions of assortment size when the shelf is 
organized congruent to their mental representation of the product category 
(Broniarczyk and McAlister 1995; Broniarczyck, Hoyer, and McAlister 1998). 
Context effects have been found with respect to consideration set formation 
(Ratneshwar, Pechmann, and Shocker 1996) and choice strategies and outcomes 
(e.g., Ariely and Wallsten 1995; Bettman 1988; Dhar and Sherman 1996; Houston 
and Sherman 1995; Huber, Payne and Puto 1982; Huber and Puto 1983; Johnson 
and Meyer 1984; Klein and Yadav 1989; Payne, Bettman and Johnson 1988; 
Simonson and Tversky 1992; Tversky and Simonson 1993). They influence framing 
and the role of reference points on consumer decision-making processes (Klein and 
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Oglethorpe 1987; Monroe and Chapman 1987; Rowe and Puto 1987) and influence 
judgments of similarity, distinctiveness, ad informativeness, and polarization of 
attitudes as found by Sujan and Deklava (1987) who studied the effects of 
comparative versus noncomparative advertising. 
All context effects represent deviations of the theory of rational choice. A 
consumer who makes a so-called rational, or value maximizing, choice will choose 
the most preferred alternative from a choice set or an assortment, independent of the 
presence or absence of other alternatives and the characteristics of those 
alternatives. Consumers' actual choices do not always match the predictions that are 
based on the theory of rational choice. Instead, consumers make seemingly 
irrational choices that violate the basic postulates of rationality in a variety of ways. 
A number of context effects violate the so-called independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (UA) principle, which assumes the decision maker has a complete 
preference order of all options and always selects the alternative that is highest in 
that order from an available product set (Tversky and Simonson 1993). The UA 
axiom or proportionality effect assumes addition of a new item to an assortment 
takes away market share from the other items in proportion to their original shares5. 
The UA principle was applied in early models of aggregate choice, originally 
developed by Luce (1959), that have become the basis for many marketing 
applications (e.g., Batsell and Lodish 1981; Gensch and Recker 1979; Green and 
Srinivasan 1978; Pray and Staelin 1983). Models that assume proportionality 
generally show theoretical elegance and mathematical tractabihty and are successful 
in predicting choice probabilities across different sets of alternatives (Luce 1977). 
Huber and Puto (1983) suggest that the apparent robustness of the Luce model is 
not due to its "universal apphcability" or the primacy of the DA assumption, but 
may be due to two conflicting context effects, similarity (also called substitution) 
and attraction, that cancel out and thus may be well approximated by 
proportionality. Section 3.4.2 discusses these effects. 
One consequence of value maximization implied by the DA axiom is the betweenness equality, as 
suggested by Tversky and Simonson (1993). The betweenness inequality states that when an 
extreme alternative z is added to the set {x,y} the middle alternative y loses relatively more than the 
extreme alternative x from the introduction of another extreme alternative z (for a proof of the 
betweenness inequality the reader is referred to Tversky and Simonson 1993). 
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Context-effects have been extensively argued to be examples of non-rational 
choice. However, recent studies (e.g., Wernerfelt 1995) suggest that context effects 
may be consistent with rational economic behavior, but violate regularity implied 
by random utility models. New developments in psychological theory have 
generated insights in the psychological processes behind context effects. For 
example, Wernerfelt (1995) refers to consumer contingent inferential information 
processing as a rationale for specific context effects. The present section discusses 
both how and when a number of well-known context effects occur with respect to 
consumer choice of and from retail assortments, i.e. it applies context effects to 
in-store decision making, and briefly touches upon the rationales behind these 
effects6. 
3.4.1 Availability of preferred alternatives 
Many final purchase decisions by consumers are made in-store, when facing a 
retailer's assortment. It appears that the availability of alternatives influences 
consumer decision making. The availabihty of a preferred alternative may greatly 
influence assortment evaluation and choice. Broniarczyk, Hoyer, and McAlister 
(1998) showed that both assortment perceptions and choice incidence from an 
assortment are influenced significantly by the availability of a favorite brand in the 
assortment. Ehmination of alternatives from an assortment may have no 
consequences for consumers' perceptions of assortment size and variety as long as 
their favorite brand is available. On the other hand, scarcity may increase or 
decrease product desirability through several behavioral mechanisms (e.g., Cialdini 
1984). The IJA axiom and the associated regularity hypothesis hold that adding or 
deleting an alternative from a choice set or retail assortment should not influence 
choice probabilities. However, manipulation of availabihty can greatly influence 
human decision making processes. 
When one or more of the most preferred alternatives has been removed from 
an assortment, consumers tend to resume their decision process without 
6 For a detailed overview of context effects see e.g., Huber and Puto (1983) and Simonson and 
Tversky (1992). 
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reconsideration of the options they already eliminated. It is certainly possible that 
one of the alternatives a consumer already eliminated is preferred over the 
remaining alternatives and consequently consumer choice is affected and rational 
choice behavior violated. Seidl and Traub (1996) demonstrated this effect using 
so-called irrelevant or phantom alternatives. A phantom alternative is "an option 
that looks real but for some reason is unavailable at the time the decision is made" 
(Farquhar and Pratkanis 1993). 
With respect to retail assortments the availability effect particularly applies to 
situations in which during a consumer's purchase process the consumer finds, or 
salespersonnel claim, that a certain product with desired characteristics, such as 
color or size, is suddenly unavailable. In that case it is likely that the consumer 
continues his or her decision process without consideration of already eliminated 
alternatives, in case he or she may end up with a suboptimal purchase7. Apparently, 
consumers tend to avoid iterative formation of consideration and choice sets. The 
effort they are willing to undertake in order to be informed about existing 
alternatives in the marketplace is limited. Considerations with respect to efficiency 
and risk likely play an important role. For example, one can assume that consumers' 
will be less inclined to resume their decision process without considering changes in 
the choice set for more significant choices. 
3.4.2 Substitution and attraction 
It is a commonly accepted idea that items in a retail assortment cannibalize, i.e., 
they draw market share disproportionally from, similar items. Adding alternatives to 
a retail assortment would decrease the existing items' probability of being chosen. 
An well-known explanation is that consumers buy alternatives with similar 
characteristics for satisfying similar needs and therefore similar alternatives are 
close in the consumer's preference ordering. This substitution or cannibalization 
effect has also been referred to as a negative similarity effect (Huber and Puto 
7 The amount that is chosen from an alternative is influenced by the available quantity of that 
alternative. For example, Wansink (1996) showed that consumers tend to use more of a product 
when relatively more is left of a product in its packaging. This effect is not discussed any further 
here since it does not specifically relate to assortment composition. 
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1993). The opposite effect, i.e., adding a similar item to an existing retail assortment 
enhances preferences for similar items within that assortment, is the attraction or 
asymmetric dominance effect (Huber, Payne and Puto 1982; Huber and Puto 1983; 
Ratneshwar, Shocker and Stewart 1987; Sattath 1989; Simonson 1989; Simonson 
and Tversky 1992; Tversky 1988; Tversky and Simonson 1993). The attraction 
effect has also been referred to as a positive similarity effect. 
The IJA principle, upon which many choice models have been based, assumes 
that a new alternative that is added to a choice set or assortment draws share 
proportionally from the other alternatives. The existence of both positive and 
negative similarity effects provides an explanation for the fact that adding similarity 
judgments to the Luce model resulted in only modest improvements in prediction of 
consumer choice8. Although many context effects have been observed, the 
attraction effect clearly is the most important and counterintuitive violation of the 
UA axiom. Simonson (1989) concludes on the basis of several experiments where 
subjects were confronted with choice sets of highly familiar products and were 
motivated to choose the alternative with highest utility (such as gambles) that "...the 
attraction effect is real, rather than an artefact of any particular experimental stimuli 
or manipulation." 
Based on the regularity property one would say that adding items to a choice 
set cannot increase an existing item's probability of being chosen. Huber, Payne and 
Puto (1982) found that an attraction effect occurs when a third alternative, a 
so-called decoy, that is dominated by only one of the original alternatives, is added 
to an existing assortment of two alternatives. An alternative is dominated by, or 
inferior to, another alternative in the set if this other alternative has an equal or 
greater value on every attribute (Klein and Yadav 1989). As an illustration of the 
attraction effect, consider two alternatives, A and B, that are together in a retail 
assortment, with two relevant attributes, price and quality. Alternative A has 
attribute levels low price, low quality, and B, has attribute levels low price, and high 
quality. Adding an item C, with high price and high quality, that is dominated by B 
Tversky (1972) introduced the similarity hypothesis in the elimination by aspects (EBA) model, 
which models choice as a hierarchical decision process. Other model representations that include 
hierarchical decision making as well as substitutabiUty are generalized PROBIT models, direct 
spatial adjustment to logit type models that generate choice probabilities (e.g., Batsell 1980; Huber 
and Seewall 1982). Extensive discussion of these models is beyond the scope of this chapter. See 
Currim (1982) for more details. 
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but not by A, will increase the attractiveness and choice probability of B, the 
so-called asymmetrically dominating alternative. The attraction effect has clear 
implications for presentation of retail assortments, whether in advertisements or 
during a sale. Presentation of three alternatives, one of which is a decoy, favors 
consumer choice of the superior alternative. 
A generalized version of the attraction effect is Simonson and Tversky's 
trade-off contrast hypothesis. The idea behind trade-off contrast is that consumers' 
evaluations are conditional on previous experiences as well as available information 
with respect to the decision, such as knowledge in memory from previous 
experiences and external information provided during decision making. The 
available information serves as an anchor for future decisions. The alternatives and 
their characteristics observed in previous assortments by consumers, i.e., the 
background context defined by options encountered in the past, influence consumer 
decision making in the local context defined by the offered set, the current 
assortment. 
Assume the decision between two products depends on price and quality 
differences. The consumer's decision is influenced by available information on 
quality-price trade-offs in previous choices as well as available information in the 
current assortment. The local contrast hypothesis is similar to the attraction effect 
mentioned earlier and states that adding a third alternative that is inferior to only 
one of two existing alternatives results in regularity violation. The background 
context effect occurs when a decision maker uses information from a previous 
choice situation to evaluate a current trade-off. For example, when prior 
quality-price tradeoffs involved a relatively high price for an extra "unit" of quality 
and in the current choice situation an additional "unit" of quality is cheaper, the 
trade-off contrast hypothesis predicts that in current choice there will be a tendency 
to prefer the high quality-high price product over the low quality-low price product. 
The background effect explains why retailers benefit from comparisons with other 
retailers' offerings and tend to emphasize improvements in product quality relative 
to price. 
Several other psychological determinants of the attraction effect have been 
suggested, including difficulty of choice, and related uncertainty and inferential 
belief formation. Here the most appealing explanations of the attraction effect are 
briefly referred to. To start with, apparently the contrast effects mentioned above 
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originate from some sort of comparison process that is more or less difficult. Choice 
between two alternatives is relatively easy when one alternative dominates the other 
and relatively difficult when the alternatives are equally attractive, but not identical. 
Tversky and Shafir (1992) argue that choice between two equally attractive, but 
different alternatives evokes conflict. They show that for difficult decisions people 
are more likely to search for other options and defer choice. Although from the 
perspective of value maximization deferring choice is "just another option to be 
selected whenever its subjective value exceeds that of the available alternatives," 
the difficulty of choosing is a determinant of choice deferral and evokes violation of 
regularity. In their experiment, Tversky and Safir ruled out the possibility that the 
tendency to defer the choice was caused by the enlargement of the offered set as 
such. 
It is generally agreed that uncertainty may play a significant role with respect 
to the attraction effect. Uncertainty can be caused by lack of meaningfulness of the 
attributes or attribute values used in the experiment or lack of familiarity with the 
product categories used (Ratneshwar, Shocker, and Stewart 1987). Consumers may 
experience difficulty in choosing due to uncertainty about their own preferences or 
about preferences of others, attributes that are perceived as equally important, or a 
trade-off analysis that does not provide strong support for one item. Consequently, 
they may infer information from the relative characteristics of different items in the 
offered set. Simonson (1989) argues that in case of uncertainty the presence of a 
relatively inferior or asymmetrically dominated alternative can provide an 
additional justification for selecting the dominating alternative. When others are 
involved in evaluating the consumer's choice the uncertainty about other people's 
preferences may be greater than the uncertainty about the consumer's own 
preferences. The superiority of one alternative based on more or less objective 
criteria may be supportive or convincing. In addition, because other people's criteria 
are unknown the salience of the dominance relationship might lead a consumer to 
believe that this aspect will dominate the judgments of others who will evaluate that 
choice set. Tversky and Safir (1992) mention that decision makers might infer from 
the introduction of an equally attractive, but different alternative that other attractive 
products might be available and consequently engage in further search. 
Social judgment theory (Sherif and Hovland 1961) has also used uncertainty 
to explain attraction effects. It states that the extremity of a judgment with respect to 
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a so-called target depends partly on the available reference point or standard of 
comparison. Manipulation of the standard of comparison may change the judgments 
elicited on aspects of a stimulus. Assume each consumer has categorized existing 
knowledge in memory and each category contains a so-called prototype or typical 
exemplar of a category. Different collections of exemplars may differentially 
influence judgments on a specific alternative in a retail assortment. In an assortment 
with items that are more or less typical for a certain goal-derived category a less 
typical item tends to be evaluated as not suitable for the specific usage purpose, 
while the same item can be evaluated as quite suitable for the purpose in an 
assortment containing only items that are even less typical for the category. 
Uncertainty with respect to product characteristics, attribute importance, or 
preference coincides with unstable category structures in memory that are easily 
adapted. Huffman, Loken, and Ward (1990) found results consistent with the 
previous. 
A similar reasoning is provided by adaptation-level theory (e.g., Helson 1964, 
who was among the first to study context effects; Parducci, Calfee, and Marshall 
1960). This theory argues that contrast effects derive from comparison of an 
alternative with the "central tendency" of the individual's internal representation of 
the category under evaluation. Range theory argues that consumer judgments are 
deterrnined by the location of the stimulus to be evaluated within the range that is 
established by the most extremes of the relevant contextual stimuli (Smith, Diener, 
and Wedell 1989; Wernerfelt 1995). 
Mishra, Umesh, and Stem (1993) developed and empirically tested a causal 
model of the antecedents of the attraction effect. They included several concepts 
that relate to characteristics of the task, i.e., uncertainty, task-decision maker 
interactions, and the product-decoy combination. They argue that if the information 
is perceived by the decision maker as relevant, i.e., the product stimulus information 
is useful in distinguishing between objects in the offered set (Ratneshwar, Shocker, 
and Stewart 1987), the decision process is facilitated and it is less likely that 
inferences will be made and a possible attraction effect will be less explicit. 
Strength of preference is related negatively to the extent to which the attraction 
effect occurs. A decision maker's degree of involvement in the task or related 
activities determines the extent to which (s)he is prepared to spend effort into 
decision making and consequently make consistent decisions. Similarity of the 
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added decoy alternative to other alternatives already in the assortment is related 
positively to the attraction effect. Finally, the belief that a decoy is popular increases 
the attraction effect as persons tend to comply to the majority, compare Simonson's 
(1989) "need to justify" explanation. Mishra et al. found that preference strength 
had the strongest influence on the attraction effect. This finding implies introduction 
of a decoy brand is useful to retailers particularly if consumers show uncertainty 
and/or low relative brand preference. 
3.4.3 Extremeness aversion 
Simonson and Tversky (1992) and Tversky and Simonson (1993) elaborated on 
Simonson's (1989) findings and developed the extremeness aversion hypothesis, 
that involves two effects, compromise and polarization. The extremeness aversion 
hypothesis holds that alternatives with extreme values within an offered assortment 
will be relatively less attractive than alternatives with intermediate values. In the 
example that was used to illustrate the attraction effect in the previous subsection, 
alternative B can be seen as a compromise choice between A and the relatively 
inferior alternative C (Simonson 1989). Extremeness aversion can occur with 
respect to one or multiple attributes in choice situations involving at least three 
alternatives. Whereas compromise effects refer to symmetric extremeness aversion 
polarization implies asymmetric extremeness aversion with respect to one of the 
poles of the attribute(s) involved in choice. For example in price-quality trade-offs 
high quality-high price may be less aversive than low quality-low price (see 
Simonson and Tversky 1992, for a more complete discussion and illustration). 
The principle of loss aversion offers an explanation for extremeness aversion. 
It states that losses are weighed more heavily than gains relative to a neutral 
reference point, generally a decision maker's status quo or current aptitude 
(Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1991; Tversky and Kahnemann 1991). Therefore, 
losses are to a greater extent avoided than gains are pursued. Simonson and Tversky 
elaborate on the loss aversion principle and argue that when decision makers 
evaluate alternatives in terms of their relative advantages and disadvantages 
alternatives with intermediate values represent relatively little losses relative to 
more extreme alternatives while extreme alternatives represent relatively high losses 
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relative to each other. The proposed effects have been observed in many 
experiments. Another explanation for extremeness aversion is provided by 
range-frequency theory of perception (Smith, Diener, and Wedell 1989), that states 
that the perceived distance between two ordered objects decreases if a third, more 
extreme object is introduced, and increases if an intermediate object is added. 
Uncertainty has been mentioned as a determinant of extremeness aversion. 
Wernerfelt (1995) claims that uncertain decision makers, who only know the 
relative value of their tastes or needs relative to others' tastes or needs instead of 
absolute values might use information from the offered set of alternatives to infer 
their right choice, assuming the offered set represents the distribution of needs in 
the population. Their position in the ordered set of products determines their choice. 
When this so-called rank-ordered decision rule applies, decision makers may show 
violation of regularity when confronted with different sets of alternatives. 
Wernerfelt gives an example of wine purchasing. Suppose you consider yourself an 
average person when it comes to wines, with poorer than average tasting ability, and 
you are uncertain about the price that corresponds to average preference. If in a 
store you see prices ranging from $4 to $30 and a prominent display that has a $14 
bottle and a $20 bottle, you will be inclined to buy the $14 bottle. If a third bottle of 
$26 is added to the display, the $20 bottle may look more "average" than the $14 
bottle. So, you display a compromise effect if in an experimental setting you select 
the $14 bottle from the ($14, $20) set, and the $20 bottle from the ($14, $20, $26) 
set. Wernerfelt extends his argument to the attraction effect, that was discussed in 
the previous subsection, where inference may concern attribute weights from 
market offerings instead of absolute product utilities. 
3.4.4 Cancellation and focus 
The cancellation and focus, or the feature matching model (Dhar and Sherman 
1996; Houston and Sherman 1995; Houston, Sherman, and Baker 1989, 1991) states 
that in preference formation features that are shared by alternatives cancel out, 
while the decision maker focuses on the remaining (unique) features of the 
alternative that serves as the standard of comparison. The model thus implies that 
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the uniqueness of features can make the choice set more or less attractive, and 
consequently influences choice, given other characteristics of the choice situation. 
The model and the underlying psychological processes can be best illustrated 
with two extreme cases: the case where two products share bad features and have 
unique good features vs. the case where two products share good features and have 
unique bad features. Houston and Sherman (1995) argue that choice between pairs 
with shared bad features and unique good features (unique good pairs) will be 
relatively easy and pleasant because it is psychologically analogous to 
approach-approach conflicts, characterized by attraction to the item focused on, 
finding its unique features appealing, and choosing it for its merits. On the other 
hand, choice between unique bad pairs will be difficult and unpleasant, because it is 
analogous to avoidance-avoidance conflict, and is characterized by elimination of 
one item on the basis of its unique detriments, and choosing the alternative by 
default. Dhar and Sherman (1996) found that in the unique bad context choice 
incidence is lower and, after initial choice, the preference for switching to a new 
alternative with both unique good and unique bad features is greater than in the 
unique good context. They found that the relative preference for an alternative can 
be increased by introducing a new alternative that makes the first alternative's good 
features appear unique and its bad features appear common. The difference between 
the two contexts implies that the very same item is evaluated differently, depending 
on the features it shares with the other alternatives in the offered set. The direction 
of comparison determines which alternative's unique features will be the focus of 
the comparison process. The so-called focusing component increases the influence 
of the unique features of the subject of comparison, while decreasing the influence 
of the unique features of the referent product. A seller can thus influence the buyer's 
decision making process through the particular combination of alternatives and the 
order in which he presents the alternatives. 
The cancellation and focus model adds to existing knowledge because it 
shows that context effects pertain to the set of relevant features that are considered 
in addition to the set of relevant items. With respect to similarity judgment, or in 
decisions about the degree to which an object has changed, both shared and unique 
features play a significant role. In defining characteristics features of a category 
unique features will be cancelled out and only shared features need be considered. 
Note that the model has been based on arguments provided by Tversky (1972) but is 
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not similar to the elixnination by aspects (EBA) model since feature matching does 
not apply to ehmination of alternatives from a large choice set, but to dealing with a 
dichotomous choice. Findings from the model have implications for assortment 
presentation and personal selling efforts. The potential implications for 
post-purchase evaluation processes could be considerable as well. 
3.5 Retail assortment evaluation 
The theory discussed in the preceding section of this chapter provides background 
for understanding consumer assortment evaluation. Retail assortment evaluation 
implies judgment of the degree to which an offered set of alternatives meets the 
consumer's desire for completion of his or her own assortment, i.e., the situational 
need for substitutability and complementarity relative to the products he or she 
already possesses or has experienced. Consumer retail assortment evaluation is 
influenced by the characteristics of the consumer, the purchase situation, and the 
assortment under focus. Composition of the focal assortment in particular refers to 
consumer perceptions of substitutability and complementarity with respect to the 
salient consumption goal and extrinsic cues, such as provided by the store 
environment, including provision of other distribution service elements, and other 
contingencies. 
Not much has been written to date about assortment evaluation and its role in 
consumer decision making. Broniarczyk, Hoyer, and McAhster (1998) investigated 
consumer assortment perceptions of size and composition, not evaluations thereof. 
Broniarczyk, Hoyer, and McAhster (1988) proposed that and tested whether the 
perception of the retail assortment in a particular product category is determined by 
the number of items, or stockkeeping units, in the assortment, the presence or 
absence of the consumer's favorite item, and by the available space for the 
particular product category. They found that consumers perceive larger assortments 
as more varied, and that assortment reduction may not be noticed when their 
favorite alternative is present. Despite its merits, the study provides only a weakly 
elaborated theoretic foundation behind formation of consumer assortment 
perceptions. In addition, the scale used for measuring consumer assortment 
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perceptions is indistinct since it contains a perceptive lower pole ("Very little 
variety") and an evaluative ("Excellent variety") upper pole. 
Assortment evaluations are one step further than assortment perceptions. They 
are the result of stimulus processing, in addition to stimulus perception, which 
implies a judgment task. Evaluation can be a difficult task, especially when an 
assortment consists of many alternatives with overlapping characteristics. 
Consumers try to reduce cognitive effort whenever it is required from them. With 
respect to retail assortment evaluation it is likely that consumers only consider those 
alternatives that potentially meet their needs, i.e., only the alternatives in the 
consumers' consideration set receive further processing (Hauser and Wernerfelt 
1990). Assortment evaluation will therefore depend on the degree that the best 
available alternative meets the category ideal. Accordingly, consumers will scan the 
assortment for the availabihty of a typical or ideal goal-derived category alternative. 
Compare "availabihty of favorite product" as a determinant of assortment 
perception and choice incidence that was used in the study by Broniarczyk, Hoyer, 
and McAlister (1998). From the number of alternatives in the assortment (with an 
upper bound due to the increasing cost of thinking, Shugan 1980) consumers will 
infer the likelihood that a suitable alternative is present in the assortment. With a 
larger number of items the assortment will be more likely to contain items that 
match the consumer's goal-derived category. Retail assortment size has been 
positively related to consumer assortment perceptions (Broniarczyk, Hoyer, and 
McAlister 1998) and consumer choice incidence (Kahn and Lehmann 1991), and is 
extended here to consumer retail assortment evaluation. Other variables that 
correlate with assortment evaluation are individual item preference, and an 
additional item's uniqueness relative to the existing assortment (Kahn and Lehmann 
1991). 
Proposition 1 Consumer retail assortment evaluations are positively related to 
retail assortment size. 
This chapter already argued that consumers categorize products according to 
their potential substitutabihty with respect to attaining salient purchase and 
consumption goals (Barsalou 1983, 1985, 1993; Ratneshwar and Shocker 1991). 
Consumers thus activate or construct different goal-derived categories for different 
86 Chapter 3 
consumption goals, that contain products that are to a certain degree substitutes, 
given the consumption goal. As a consequence, the consumption goal a consumer 
pursues affects product expectations, category structure, and associated typicalities. 
Even in Betancourt and Gautschi's economic model, a focal point is that in order for 
two products to be net substitutes it is essential that a particular consumer perceives 
them as delivering similar benefits for the particular consumption goal the 
consumer pursues. Consumption goals may differ in degree of abstractness and 
detail. Highly detailed consumption goals leave less latitude for alternatives in order 
to satisfy the associated need than less specific consumption goals. The following 
propositions summarize and underline the focal role of consumption goals in 
consumer assortment evaluation. 
Proposition 2 A consumer's perception of retail assortment breadth and depth 
differs depending on the consumption goal that consumer pursues. 
Proposition 3 A consumer's evaluation of a retail assortment differs depending on 
the consumption goal that consumer pursues. 
Given the consumption goal pursued, a higher level of involvement or 
situational self-relevance (e.g., Zaichkowsky 1985) will coincide with greater 
importance of finding an alternative that meets the category ideal. Involvement with 
a product or product category is likely to be enduring, while task involvement is 
more likely to be situational. Experts in a certain product category have more 
detailed categorizations of alternatives in that product category and will also have a 
relatively high level of enduring involvement with the product category. A highly 
involved consumer thinks it more important that an alternative closely meets the 
criteria associated with the goal-derived category ideal than a lowly involved 
consumer. The relevant goal-derived category will therefore include only 
alternatives that are relatively close to ideal levels. Consequently, (s)he will be less 
likely to perceive two products in the category as substitutes and will appreciate 
relatively deep assortments. 
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Proposition 4 A high level of consumer expertise and/or a high level of enduring 
involvement with a product category will be positively correlated with consumer 
preference for deep retail assortments with respect to purchase from that product 
category. 
Finally, in chapter 2 it was argued that distribution services reduce consumers' 
distribution-related costs and/or provide other shopping-related benefits, in 
particular decision support and shopping pleasure. Distribution services offered by 
the retailer may assist the consumer in making an efficient and good choice. These 
services may for example influence consumers' perception of different alternatives' 
features and associated merchandise variety. Retailer provision of distribution 
service other than assortment, such as ambience and information provision, will 
consequently relate positively to consumer evaluations of the assortment. 
Proposition 5 Retailer provision of distribution service other than assortment will 
positively influence consumer evaluation of retail assortment. 
3.6 A model for consumer assortment choice 
The present chapter identified three important types of determinants of consumer 
choice of and from retail assortments, i.e., the consumption goal, purchase situation, 
and decision context. The existence of situationally determined consumption goals, 
defined broadly so as to include usage goal, and several dimensions of purchase 
situation (see section 3.2), through which a consumer activates or constructs 
goal-derived categories provide the starting point for the proposed framework for 
consumer choice from assortments9. Contextual influences include a retailer's effect 
on both the desired household outputs and the household's consumption activities 
through distribution service provision. Advertisements address both consumption 
goals, situational, and contextual characteristics. 
Consumer choice of retail assortment imphes choice of specific distribution 
service and associated benefits that together comprise availability. Item choice 
9 The current investigation of the consumer decision making process does not explicitly consider 
post-purchase processes; these are discussed in chapter 5. 
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cannot be viewed independent from assortment choice. The two choices are 
interdependent to a certain extent, depending on among other things the connection 
between brand and store. As an extreme example, choice of a store's own brand 
implies purchase at the particular store chain that sells it. In general, assortment or 
store choice constitutes an important phase in the consumer's decision process. 
Models of store choice usually consider features of retail outlets that form retail 
image, often including assortment attractiveness and service. They do not in general 
consider the specific characteristics of retail assortments as a distribution service 
element, nor the psychological mechanisms underlying consumer assortment 
choice. Section 4 considered in this respect the influence of assortment composition 
on item choice. Figure 3.1 presents a model of consumer assortment and item 
choice that will be discussed in the following. The model considers several stages in 
the decision making process, including consideration and choice set formation, 
assortment choice, and item choice, in which it considers the influence of 
consumption goals, purchase situation, and specific context factors. Based on the 
model a number of propositions have been developed, several of which will be 
tested in the subsequent chapter. 
Throughout this chapter the role of consumption goals has been emphasized. 
Figure 3.1 starts with the by now familiar relationship between salient consumption 
goals and goal-derived categories. The consumption goals a consumer pursues may 
range from abstract and general to concrete and detailed, or even product-specific 
(compare Betancourt and Gautschi's (1990) consumption goals). Consumption 
goals can be viewed similar to the hierarchy used in the means-end chain model 
(Gutman 1982) which assumes consumers search for product features for the 
purpose of achieving a desired end-state and those features are meaningful in the 
sense that they relate to attributes that differentiate specific products. Specific or 
detailed goals can be conceived of as the benefits for which a consumer searches 
(Park and Smith 1989), or more specifically, "abstract benefits sought by the 
consumer that are available through the features of a product class that offer 
fulfillment of those goals" (Huffman and Houston 1993). 
Consumer decision making is generally modeled as a sequential process which 
is often characterized using conceptualizations of nested sets. In this simplified 
view of decision processes, starting from the universal set or "the totality of all 
alternatives that could be obtained or purchased by any consumer under any 
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circumstance" (Shocker et al. 1991), a decision maker arrives at his ultimate choice 
through a sequence of decisions in which he forms hierarchical or nested sets of 
alternatives10. Phased decision strategies have been found to simplify choice in 
complex situations (Bettman 1979; Wright 1975). In general two stages in decision 
making are considered. The first stage consists of general, non-compensatory 
screening, in the second stage the remaining alternatives are evaluated in detail 
using a compensatory decision model (Gensch 1987). 
The items in the universal set the decision maker is aware of and that he believes 
to be suited for the goal that he pursues form the awareness or knowledge set. From 
the awareness set a decision maker constructs a consideration set. A consideration 
set is defined here as a purposefully constructed set "consisting of those 
goal-satisfying alternatives salient or accessible on a particular occasion" (Shocker 
et al. 1991). Since consideration sets are formed for a purpose they will be affected 
by situational factors such as intended usage (Ratneshwar and Shocker 1991), 
prompted by existing retrieval cues (Nedungadi 1990), and changed as a 
consequence of information from the environment (cf. Coupey 1994). Consideration 
sets may thus include alternatives with different physical characteristics (Srivastava, 
Leone and Shocker 1981; Ratneshwar and Shocker 1991) or even from different 
product categories (Ratneshwar, Pechmann and Shocker 1996), as long as they meet 
the particular usage requirements. Consideration sets in which all items come from 
one nominal product category typically range from 2-8 items (Hauser and 
Wernerfelt 1990). 
Recent studies suggest goal-derived categories play an important role in 
explaining and predicting formation of consideration sets, judgment, and choice. 
Categorization research has focused not only on how consumers mentally represent 
products (e.g., Loken and Ward 1990; Ratneshwar and Shocker 1991), but also on 
how consumers retrieve alternatives from memory while forming consideration sets 
(e.g., Hutchinson, Raman and Mantrala 1994; Nedungadi 1990; Ratneshwar, 
Pechmann and Shocker 1996; Ratneshwar and Shocker 1991), and how consumers 
evaluate products and make choices (e.g., Bettman and Sujan 1987). For example, 
Barsalou's (1985) concept of goal-derived categories has been proposed as 
1 0 Many authors defined sets of alternatives with respect to decision making (e.g., Fotheringham 
1988; Hauser and Wernerfelt 1990; Narayana and MarMn 1975; Roberts and Lattin 1991; Silk and 
Urban 1978). This book adopts the conceptualization of decision hierarchy and its associated 
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mediating the effect of usage context on consideration set formation (Graonic and 
Shocker 1993; Park and Smith 1989; Warlop and Ratneshwar 1993). Since the 
physical environment implies a consumer may encounter new information and 
consequently restructure existing information patterns (Coupey 1994), goal-derived 
category structures may be influenced by the physical choice environment offered, 
eventually leading to context effects that have been discussed in section 4. This 
applies to the characteristics of the assortments offered as well as to extrinsic cues 
in the choice environment, such as store layout, ambience, other distribution 
services, and advertising. The relationships between consideration set formation, 
consumption goal, category construction and activation, and contextual influences 
described here are shown in Figure 3.1. 
As argued before, salient specific consumption goals activate associated 
goal-derived categories in working memory. Salient specific goal-derived categories 
constrain the problem solving process and structure the consumer's problem 
(Barsalou 1991; Warlop and Ratneshwar 1993). Barsalou (1993) claims that 
context-specific relations between levels of goals and goal-derived categories are 
stored in associative networks in memory. Consumers are thus likely to form 
consideration sets "top-down" by comparing the activated goal-derived categories 
with alternatives they perceive in the stimulus environment (cf. Park and Smith 
1989). Alternatives thus do not have to be screened individually using a 
noncompensatory model (cf. Huber and Klein 1991), which is a costly comparison 
procedure (Shugan 1980). 
Sindra (1994) distinguishes between common, i.e., everyday familiar buying, 
situations and ad-hoc situations. In common situations situational factors may 
directly elicit the choice alternatives in the consideration set, without an apparent 
mediation of goals and goal-derived categories. Common situations have been 
frequently encountered earlier, so subjects may already be in possession of 
well-developed categorical structures associated with the specific situations, that are 
also well-established in memory. The specific situation may only serve to cue the 
retrieval of the stored goal-derived category and thus elicit the consideration set. In 
ad-hoc situations the individual must invest much more cognitive resources than 
required in common situations. These situations will lead to the creation of certain 
goals or ideals, and subjects will frame the choice problem in the context of meeting 
nested sets as defined by Shocker et al. (1991). 
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these preset goals. The resulting consideration set will indicate the mediation of the 
corresponding goal-derived categories. In contrast to common situations, goals will 
be highly salient in the choice process for ad-hoc situations. 
Each consideration set is dynamic within and across usage situations. It 
changes as the consumer processes the alternatives and recalls or encounters 
additional elements during the decision process. It is affected by contextual factors -
represented as "assortments" and "other distribution services" in figure 3.1 - and 
their interaction with individual goals and preferences. The "set of alternatives 
considered immediately prior to choice" (Shocker et al. 1991), is called the choice 
set. The choice set is a subset of the consideration set and consists of fewer, more 
highly differentiated alternatives selected from the consideration set. The choice set 
is final in the sense that it represents the result of, instead of being affected by, 
situational and contextual factors with respect to decision making. 
Detennination of consideration sets improves the accuracy of predictions of 
choice models (Silk and Urban 1978; Gensch 1987; Fotheringham 1988), and can 
aid in defining a market and investigating its structure (Ratneshwar and Shocker 
1991; Urban, Johnson, and Hauser 1984). Recognition of the dynamic and 
individual nature of consideration sets and resulting choice sets still represents a 
challenge for choice modeling. Many studies consider only choices based upon 
information in memory. Many real-world decisions combine memory factors with 
information acquired externally. In mixed choice tasks (Lynch, Marmorstein and 
Weingold 1989) a choice task consists of both. Based on external information 
consumers restructure information using operations such as editing information, 
transforming it, or inferring attributes and/or attribute values (cf. Coupey 1994). 
Ratneshwar, Pechmann, and Shocker (1996) found that both goal ambiguity 
and goal conflict make so-called across category consideration sets consisting of 
alternatives from multiple product categories more likely. When a consumer 
perceives a generic need or consumption purpose, but has fuzzy or ambiguous goals 
instead of well-defined, salient goals, (s)he experiences difficulty in evoking 
goal-derived categories in working memory and thus the external choice 
environment will play important role in determining the composition of 
consideration sets, and across category consideration becomes more likely. Goal 
conflict occurs when, as a consequence of a negatively correlated environment, a 
other distribution service 
Figure 3.1 Procedural framework of consumer assortment choice 
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consumer's multiple salient goals cannot be realized by choosing a product in any 
given category. This will also make across category consideration more likely. 
Performance ambiguity refers to an ambiguous relationship between salient 
consumption goal(s) and alternatives in the goal-derived category since the 
consumer is uncertain with respect to evaluation of the product's performance. The 
external choice environment will thus play a greater role in consideration set 
formation. A higher level of performance ambiguity implies more uncertainty with 
respect to the degree to which a product can fulfill category wants and needs and 
thus more uncertainty about the closeness of a product to the category ideal. A 
similar reasoning as followed in the previous section with respect to assortment 
evaluation applies to assortment choice. The previous section proposed a positive 
relationship between consumer expertise or involvement and evaluation of deep 
assortments (proposition 4). Here, this proposition is extended to a positive 
correlation between consumer expertise or involvement and consumer choice from 
deep assortments. Consumers with a high level of expertise and/or a high level of 
enduring involvement with a product category will show a relatively high choice 
incidence from relatively deep retail assortments. 
The effect of consumption goal thus extends to actual choice, through 
formation of goal-derived categories and consideration set formation. Other 
determinants of choice from assortments include variables that have been 
mentioned in previous sections of this chapter, such as preference for 
(characteristics of) items, utilities associated with nonoptimal alternatives, 
perceived cost of choosing an alternative, situational and contextual factors. Choice 
set formation and actual choice will be influenced by contextual factors, such as 
distribution service provision and assortment presentation. The following 
propositions are therefore obvious extensions of the previous. 
Proposition 6 Choice incidence from a retail assortment is dependent on the 
consumption goal. 
Proposition 7 The effects of product features on choice incidence depends on the 
consumption goal. 
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Proposition 8 Choice incidence from an assortment is positively related to 
provision of other distribution service elements. 
Finally, a consumer searches for the ideal alternative in the salient 
goal-derived category. Alternatives that are more similar to this alternative will be 
relatively close to the ideal alternative in the consumer's rnind. They will be more 
likely substitutes for this ideal alternative than alternatives that differ in many 
respects. Attribute values convey information on the benefits associated with 
consumption of an alternative. Alternatives that are similar in many respects will 
therefore be closer in the consumer's mind than alternatives that are less similar. 
Proposition 9 When the salient alternatives in an assortment differ only in one 
feature they are more likely to be substitutes than when they differ on more 
attributes. 
Retail assortments assist consumers in efficiently and effectively fulfilling 
their needs for acquisition of products that complement their own assortment. 
Consumption goals are a central concept with respect to consumer choice of and 
from assortments. This chapter emphasized the significance of consumption goals, 
that determine substitutability and complementarity between items in an assortment 
for consumers. It was argued that substitution and complementarity are subjective 
concepts that are conditional on consumers' salient consumption goals, contextual 
influences, including assortment composition and provision of other distribution 
service, and situational variables. The next chapter empirically investigates the role 
of consumption goals, assortment composition and other distribution service, in 
particular ambience, on consumer choice among and within assortments and tests 
several hypotheses that are based on the theory discussed in the present chapter. 
Chapter 4 
Assessing the Effects of Assortment 
Composition and Store Ambience on 
Consumer Purchase* 
4.1 Introduction 
Assortment composition is a key issue faced by retail store and category managers. 
Given limited shelf space, which items should be added to or deleted from the 
assortment? How will these and competitors' assortment decisions affect total and 
individual item sales? Management of assortment requires knowledge of 
substitution and complementarity patterns among items in the assortment, as well as 
the effects of offerings from competing stores. It also requires knowledge of the 
impacts of other distribution services, such as store ambience and accessibility, on 
these inter-item relationships. 
Though a large literature exists on shopping models and consumer choice 
processes, only a few articles apply to the issue of assortment composition and its 
effects on consumer choice of assortment. Merchandise assortment has been 
consistently present as one of the dimensions that constitute store image (see 
Mazurski and Jacoby, 1986). Also, models of consumer choice of shopping 
destination always seem to include a predictor like choice range, selection, quality 
of the assortment and the like (see Oppewal, Louviere and Timmermans, 1997), and 
typically find that larger assortments are preferred over smaller assortments. 
* This chapter has been published as Koelemeijer, Kitty and Harmen Oppewal (1999), Assessing 
the Effects of Assortment and Ambience: A Choice Experimental Approach," Journal of Retailing, 
75 (Fall), 319-346. 
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Finally, Kahn and Lehmann (1991) found preference for an assortment to be 
positively related to individual item preference, an additional item's uniqueness 
relative to the existing assortment, and the total number of items in the assortment. 
No further empirical work seems to have been done in describing the characteristics 
that make an assortment more or less attractive. 
In contrast, there is an overwhelming amount of literature on how consumers 
choose items from assortments, as essentially the whole literature on choice 
processes and choice models focuses on this issue. Particularly relevant in the 
present context however are studies that have focused on the items in the offered set 
as a source of violation of rationality principles in choice (e.g., Simonson and 
Tversky 1992; Tversky and Simonson 1993; see also chapter 3). From studies in 
this area it has been found that if items are added to or deleted from an assortment, 
or if item characteristics change, choice probabilities of other items change in ways 
that are inconsistent with existing preference structures. One particular so-called 
context effect is asymmetric dominance (Huber, Payne and Puto, 1982). This effect 
involves that the addition of an alternative to the choice set leads to an increase in 
the choice probability of at least one other alternative. This effect is inconsistent 
with the assumptions underlying most choice models but was found to occur in a 
variety of types of consumer behavior. The same phenomenon was observed at the 
aggregate (or sales) level and was used by Bultez et al. (1989) to model optimal 
retail space allocation for products in an assortment (cf. Carpenter et al., 1988). 
However, apart from the latter studies little additional work seems to have been 
done in terms of assessing and predicting the inconsistencies that may appear when 
people choose from assortments. 
This chapter aims to contribute to a better understanding of the issue of retail 
assortment composition and its effects on consumer choice from and among 
assortments, that is, what is the impact of distribution services and inter-item 
relationships on purchase decisions. The theoretical framework underlying the 
research has been presented in chapters 2 and 3. From the propositions in chapter 3 
testable hypotheses are developed that next are tested using the method of choice 
experiments and the extended logit model. Betancourt and Gautschi's (1990, 1992) 
framework restates and formulates what is known as the key problem in retail 
management: how to consistently position a store on all elements of the retail mix. 
Betancourt and Gautschi present a comprehensive formalization of the relationship 
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between heterogeneous consumer needs and inter-item relationships. To our 
knowledge, the framework has never been operationalized with respect to consumer 
choice in the literature. The research reported in this chapter relates the effects of 
assortment composition and other distribution services on purchase decisions. As 
we will demonstrate, this can be efficiently accomplished by using choice 
experiments and extended logit models. 
In choice experiments (Carson et al. 1994; Louviere and Woodworm 1983) 
subjects are presented experimentally designed choice sets of hypothetical 
alternatives. Typically subjects receive multiple choice sets and are requested to 
choose their most preferred alternative from each set. Choice experiments have 
advantages that are particularly relevant to the study of retail assortments, even 
though these advantages have not always been exploited in choice experiment 
applications. They allow the researcher (and hence the manager) to control and 
assess various aspects that remained elusive in much of the earlier work on 
assortments. As we will demonstrate, they allow experimental manipulation of the 
composition of assortments. They also allow control over variations in other 
distribution services by defining a master design and nesting the choice experiment 
under this 'context design' (Oppewal and Timmermans 1991). In the present 
application, we will treat store ambience as a context factor. The extended logit 
model also has particular advantages, mostly because it avoids the proportionality 
assumption that underlies the MNL model and can give mode insight in inter-item 
relationships. The extended logit model is a type of cross effects model (Anderson 
and Wiley 1992; Louviere and Woodworm 1983; McFadden, Train and Tyre 1977). 
There have been applications of cross-effects models based on choice experiments 
in several areas that are relevant to retailing, including new product development, 
financial services, transportation, and urban planning, but they have to our 
knowledge not been directly applied to study retail assortments. Lazari and 
Anderson (1994) illustrate their design approach for cross effects with an example 
concerning frozen entrees but their study is not directly focused on managing 
assortments. The model nevertheless seems a natural for studying retail assortments, 
as we intend to demonstrate. 
Using a choice experimental approach, this chapter thus will address issues 
that are pertinent to managing assortments and will (partly) operationalize 
Betancourt and Gautschi's theoretical framework. Focal questions are: what makes 
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an assortment attractive, what are the relations between items in an assortment, 
what are the relations between assortment composition and other distribution 
services in determining consumer purchase behavior. By presenting a case in which 
we model assortment effects, the chapter will also outline and demonstrate the use 
of choice experiments and extended logit models to build models that support the 
quantification and optimization of assortments. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In 4.2. we will first briefly 
investigate choice experiments and logit models. Next, we will continue our 
discussion of assortment issues in 4.3, following the theory of consumer evaluation 
and choice of assortment outlined in chapter 3. The formulation of the hypotheses 
that we aim to test in our empirical application is described in section 4.4. Then 
follows in 4.5 a description of the application concerning florists' assortments of cut 
flowers. We discuss experimental design in 4.6 and estimation of different models 
in 4.7. We then demonstrate in section 4.8 how the model can be applied for 
evaluating different merchandise assortment strategies. The chapter concludes with 
a discussion of results and implications, including issues for further research. 
4.2 Modeling assortment competition 
Marketing decision making requires analysis of competition between relevant 
products at the level of a market as a whole as the result of individual consumer 
decision making, i.e., assessment of the market structure. A market structure 
consists of the classification of brands into submarkets that have a higher degree of 
competition than the market as a whole (Day, Shocker, and Srivastava 1979). 
Product-market structures can be analyzed using perceptual versus behavioral 
approaches (Day, Shocker, and Srivastava 1979; Fraser and Bradford 1984). 
Perceptual approaches1 are aimed at assessing potential substitutabihty and ask 
1 For example the substitution in use (SIU) approach (Day, Shocker, and Srivastava 1979; 
atneshwar and Shocker 1991; Stefflre 1971). SIU assumes usage situations act as environmental 
constraints that help define consumers' ends or goals and thus limit the nature of the means 
(products) that can achieve those ends. Products are assumed to act as surrogates for "bundles" of 
benefits and are presumed to deliver similar benefit combinations when grouped on the basis of 
appropriateness for similar usages. The method measures consumers' perceptions of usage 
appropriateness of the benefits offered by individual products. Simultaneous clustering of usages 
and products reveals product-market structures. 
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consumers to judge the perceived substitutabihty of alternatives in terms of, e.g., 
similarity ratings or rankings. Behavioral approaches2 use recorded data of 
consumers' actual behaviors, such as diary or scanner data, to identify revealed 
substitution between alternatives by a household. In the present study we are 
interested in the effects of particular variables on consumers' actual, or revealed 
behavior, i.e., choice. Prediction of choice behavior requires prediction of consumer 
preferences that are heterogeneous across individuals and choice situations. Chapter 
3 gives an overview of the consumer choice process with respect to assortments. In 
this section we discuss the adopted approach to modeling the consumer choice 
process that results in estimation of parameters and subsequent prediction of choice 
from the perspective of consumer's consumption goals, retail assortment 
composition, and other context variables. 
4.2.1 Conjoint choice experiments 
Choice experiments are becoming increasingly popular in marketing as a way of 
measuring consumer preferences and building predictive models of consumer 
choice. In conjoint choice experiments (Carson et al., 1994; Louviere and 
Woodworm, 1983) respondents typically choose their preferred alternatives from 
designed sets in which both hypothetical alternatives and currently existing 
multi-attribute alternatives may be present. The alternatives are defined by 
attributes, one of which can be brand name. From each choice set respondents 
choose their most preferred alternative, or allocate a fixed budget among the 
alternatives. Based on the observed frequencies or proportions the parameters of 
discrete choice models can be estimated. Observed choices are mostly analyzed 
assuming the multinomial logit (MNL) model to underlie the choice responses. The 
conjoint choice approach, also known as decompositional choice experiments, 
stated choice experiments, experimental choice analysis, multiple choice 
experiments, or discrete choice experiments (e.g., Louviere and Gaeth 1988; 
2 
An example of a behavioral approach to analyzing product-market structure is Frazier and 
Bradford's (1983,1984) Competitive Market Structure Analysis (CMSA). 
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Oppewal 1995; Oppewal and Tirnmermans 1991), has resulted from an integration 
of conjoint analysis and discrete choice theory. 
Conjoint analysis or "any decompositional method that estimates the structure 
of a consumer's preferences, given his or her overall evaluations of a set of 
alternatives that are prespecified in terms of levels of different attributes" (Green 
and Srinivasan 1990, p. 4), allows us to combine a decompositional approach with 
experimental manipulation of product characteristics. The experimental procedure is 
generally aimed at estimating part-worth utilities, or utility associated with specific 
attribute levels, through analysis of overall preference for experimentally designed, 
hypothetical alternatives or profiles. The use of fractional factorial design 
techniques permits strong reduction in the number of profiles together with 
optimally efficient estimation of main effects only (e.g., Louviere 1988; 
Montgomery 1984). Furthermore, respondents often participate in a complete 
replication of the experimental design which allows for estimation of the parameters 
of individual preference functions. Note that fractional factorial designs assume 
additive utility and negligible interactions. It is beyond the purpose of this chapter 
to give a detailed description of the method. For a more complete overview of 
conjoint analysis the reader is referred to Green and Srinivasan (1978 and 1990) and 
Louviere (1988). 
Conjoint analysis is used to predict choice based on the estimated preference 
functions for a group of respondents that are of interest to the particular market 
under focus. After respondents' utilities are calculated for "new" alternatives, a 
choice rule is applied to determine which alternative is chosen by each individual. 
Examples of choice rules are highest utility equals choice, and choice probabilities 
are equal to the proportion of utility in the total utility across alternatives. 
Aggregation of predicted choices is used to estimate market shares for the new 
market conditions. Despite its obvious appeal, conjoint analysis has several 
drawbacks that are relevant to our study (see also Oppewal 1995), the most 
important of which concern the use of ad hoc decision rules to predict choice, and 
limited rehabihty of parameters estimated due to limited residual degrees of 
freedom. 
The conjoint choice approach combines the advantages of conjoint analysis -
natural and relatively easy tasks, multiple observations per respondent, controlled 
composition of choice sets, and experimental control, - with the advantages of 
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discrete choice analysis - tests of model structure, specification and studying of 
context effects, direct estimation of probabilistic discrete choice models, and 
accommodation of currently available alternatives into the hypothetical framework 
Experimental design plans are used to generate efficient choice sets such that 
the statistical model of interest can be estimated. The selection of proper 
experimental designs for choice experiments requires advanced knowledge and 
skills, and this is even more so if one wants to estimate so-called cross-effects 
models. The study needs to be carefully designed to ensure that all effects of interest 
can be estimated. No general procedures or guidelines exist so far to generate 
optimal designs for choice experiments, though catalogs of efficient designs have 
been developed for special cases (Anderson and Wiley 1992; Lazari and Anderson 
1994). Nowadays there is also commercial software that can generate choice sets 
that allow estimation of MNL models, this software however does not produce the 
most efficient designs and, more importantly, its designs typically do not allow 
estimation of cross effects. 
Choice experiments have advantages that are particularly relevant to the study 
of retail assortments, even though these advantages have not always been exploited 
in choice experiment applications. They allow the researcher (and hence the 
manager) to control and assess various aspects that remained elusive in much of the 
earlier work on assortments. As we will demonstrate, they allow experimental 
manipulation of the composition of assortments. They also allow control over 
variations in other distribution services by defining a master design and nesting the 
choice experiment under this "context design" (Oppewal and Timmermans, 1991). 
Choice experiments can be used to get efficient, independent and easy to interpret 
estimates of inter-item effects of price on item choice. Cross-price effects were 
estimated using the extended logit framework from real market data that was 
collected in uncontrolled circumstances by Krishnamurthi, Raj, and Sivakumar 
(1995), resulting in parameters that were difficult to interpret. Finally, choice 
experiments combine control with the possibility of using real-world alternatives, so 
the choice sets contain no hypothetical alternatives, from which validity will 
benefit. 
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4.2.2 The Extended Multinomial Logit model 
Virtually all approaches to consumer decision making assume a consumer perceives 
alternatives as bundles of attributes that together provide utility. Discrete choice 
theory and conjoint analysis are the two predominant so-called decompositional 
approaches in analyzing consumer preference and choice. Decompositional methods 
decompose responses to total choice alternatives into utility associated with each 
attribute level, according to an assumed underlying preference function. Discrete 
choice theory assumes a consumer chooses the alternative from which bundle of 
features he or she derives highest utility (Lancaster 1966, 1971). Random utility 
theory acknowledges inherent randomness in perceptions and preferences, 
randomness due to the choice situation, as well as measurement error, and is 
therefore suited for modeling and analysis of consumer choice experiments. 
Random utility theory assumes utility decomposition into a systematic or 
deterrninistic component (V}) and a random component (e,): 
u,=vl+Sl 
From a choice set A the alternative, i (Vi.i'e A), with highest utility, U\, is chosen. 
Therefore, 
p(i|A) = />(£/, >£/,.) 
= p(y,+st >Vv+sv) 
= p(yi~Vv>ev-ei). 
When the error terms are assumed to be normally distributed the Luce (1959) 
strict utihty choice model emerges. The Multinomial Logit (MNL) Model assumes 
the error terms are independently and identically double exponential (Gumbel or 
'type I Extreme Value') distributed. This assumption leads to a conveniently closed, 
tractable, model form since it allows integration of a Thurstone type of random 
utility model with independently and identically distributed error terms (Case V, in 
Torgerson 1958) with Luce's (1959) choice axiom (Henscher and Johnson 1981; 
Ben-Akiva and Lerman 1985). Most applications have assumed the MNL model to 
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underlie the choice responses. The MNL model assumes that the probability p that 
alternative i is chosen from set C is: 
p(i\C) = ^ f l ^ i , k . C (1) 
The MNL model can be applied to alternatives for which systematic utility Vi 
depends on multiple characteristics Zy (/=1,..,N) of an alternative i. In that case Vi is 
a function of attributes that is intrinsically linear in the parameters of the attribute 
value of alternative i: V,. = /JKt,, with ¡3 the parameter vector to be estimated and X\ a 
vector of known attribute levels of alternative i. In this formula fi is the scaling 
factor, that is arbitrarily set to unity in single applications. 
An implication of the MNL is the so-called Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives characteristic (UA, see chapter 3, section 4). When using the MNL 
model one assumes that the utility of an alternative, Vi, depends only on the 
characteristics of this alternative, i, and not on the characteristics and availability of 
the remaining alternatives in a set. This assumption can be expressed as that the 
odds ratio of any two alternatives (but not necessarily their choice probabihties) 
remain constant if other alternatives are added to or deleted from the set, or if their 
attributes are changed. 
Consumers almost by definition will violate the IIA characteristic when 
choosing from or among assortments. They tend to combine purchases of 
complements and focus their trade-offs on the subset of most substitutable items. 
Vice versa, one of the major problems in managing assortments is to foresee which 
items will be good complements and which ones will be substitutes. With respect to 
substitutes the problem is twofold. The first question is whether and when the 
addition of (more) substitutes leads to increased cannibalization and diminishing 
returns. The second is whether and when an increase in choice range within the 
category will increase the attractiveness of the category, or assortment as a whole, 
thus leading to increased purchases from the category as a whole. The assessment of 
these effects, the trade-off between increasing and decreasing assortment size and 
the optimization of assortment composition, can be supported by models based on 
choice experiments as illustrated in our florist store case below. 
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One way to overcome the DA hmitation is the extended logit model, also 
called the universal or mother logit model. In this model, firstly proposed by 
McFadden, Train, and Tye (1977; see also Krishnamurthi et al. 1995) the utility 
specification of an alternative is extended with terms that represent the 
characteristics of other alternatives in the choice set as follows: 
Vl=&,+'ZtriJlXl, i,keC, i*k, (2) 
where y & is the parameter vector representing the effects of availability and 
attributes of alternative k on i, and is the vector of attribute indicator variables for 
k, indicating whether k is available or not and, if so, what its attributes are. The 
probability of item i being chosen from choice set C is modeled to be dependent on 
the levels of the attributes of the item itself and the levels of the attributes of the 
other items in the choice set, including the levels of context variables. The model 
includes possible IJA violations by explicitly modeling the effects of other items' 
characteristics on choice of a particular item. The effects of a product's own 
attribute-levels on its choice probability are so-called main effects. The terms that 
represent the availability of other alternatives in the set are called "availabiUty cross 
effects", whereas the terms that represent the attributes of other alternatives are 
called "attribute cross effects" (Anderson and Wiley 1992; Lazari and Anderson 
1994; Louviere and Woodworth 1983; Oppewal and Timmermans 1991). Cross 
effects are effects on utilities and should not be confused with cross elasticities. The 
availability cross effect of, say, alternative A on alternative B captures the extent to 
which the addition of alternative A to a choice set that already contains B leads to a 
larger or smaller decrease in the utility, and hence, choice probability (or share), of 
B than would be predicted from the MNL model. Availability cross effects typically 
are negative, indicating they pick up substitution between alternatives. In some 
cases however a positive cross effect will be found, indicating that two alternatives 
are more complementary than other pairs of alternatives. Attribute cross effects are 
also mostly negative, but in case of a disutUity, such as price, the "own" attribute 
parameter will be negative and the attribute (price) cross effect will be positive if 
substitution occurs. For example, a negative "own" price parameter for product A 
will lead to an increase in the share of A that is equal to the proportional decreases 
in the shares of all competitors. However, if the model in addition contains a 
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positive price cross effect of A on B, this effect predicts an additional decrease in 
the share of B if A decreases its price. This thus indicates that A and B are more 
close substitutes than other pairs of alternatives. Our application will demonstrate 
the use and interpretation of availability and attribute-based cross effects. There 
have been applications of cross-effects models based on choice experiments in 
several areas that are relevant to retailing, including new product development, 
financial services, transportation, and urban planning, but they have to our 
knowledge not been directly applied to study retail assortments. Lazari and 
Anderson (1994) illustrate their design approach for cross effects with an example 
concerning frozen entrees but their study is not directly focused on managing 
assortments. The model nevertheless seems a natural for studying retail assortments, 
as we intend to demonstrate. 
In principle, the extended MNL model can be designed such as to yield 
quantified insights into substitution effects of changes in the marketing mix 
positions of products and the availabihty of products. Extensions of MNL models 
have been developed that account for asymmetric competitive effects that are 
associated with substitution and complementarity (Batsell and Polking 1985; 
Carpenter et al. 1988; Bultez et al. 1989). Since substitution need not be symmetric 
cross-effects are interpreted as asymmetric substitution effects and, hence, allow us 
not only to test for the occurrence of asymmetric competition, but also to model this 
competition. 
Cross effects models are only one of the possible ways to overcome the IIA 
property. Other options discussed in the literature include Probit, Nested Logit, and 
Heteroscedastic Extreme Value models3. Cross effects models however have the 
advantage that they are flexible and relatively easy to interpret and estimate, even 
though they have been criticized as being not completely consistent with random 
utility theory (cf. Carson et al. 1994; Krishnamurthi et al. 1995). An important 
additional advantage is that cross effects models can pick up asymmetric dominance 
whereas the other models mentioned cannot. 
3 Problems may arise with the practical estimation of this type of models because of the number of 
cross-effects parameters to be estimated proliferates with the inclusion of more attributes, 
attribute-levels, or alternatives. The estimation of these cross-effects models requires large numbers 
of observations, that are preferably obtained in controlled conditions. Conjoint choice experiments 
are increasingly used for this purpose (cf. Batsell and Louviere 1991). 
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4.3 Assortment issues in the study 
In the present study we will focus on a subset of four of the assortment issues that 
were brought up in chapter 3 and demonstrate for each how choice experiments 
allow one to investigate and test ideas about these issues: consumption goal, 
purchase context, price effects, and item availabihty. 
4.3.1 Consumption goal 
An assortment allows consumers to fulfiU shopping needs at a lower cost if it 
includes many substitutes and complements. Chapter 3 already mentioned that two 
products that can satisfy the same need are generally considered substitutes and two 
products that satisfy a particular need if consumed jointly are considered 
complements (Henderson and Quandt 1958). Also, the chapter referred to Lattin and 
McAlister's (1985) argument that substitute products folfill the same component of 
a consumer's composite need because they share so-called want-satisfying features 
and that complementary products thus meet different components of the composite 
need. 
Betancourt and Gautschi (1990, 1992) show that these inter-item relationships 
depend on the requirements underlying the activities a consumer or household 
undertakes in order to generate desired outputs. For example, for an everyday 
television evening several types of potato chips may be substitutes, but when 
preparing a party they may be complements. Also the extent to which items are 
substitutes may differ. For example, for an everyday meal veal and pork may be 
almost perfect substitutes, whereas for a special occasion only one particular type of 
meat may suffice. Betancourt and Gautschi argue that retail outlets carry different 
assortments because they cater to customers that have different needs due to 
differing activities and associated 'end-product' requirements. 
The elusiveness of what defines substitutes and complements has made results 
from previous investigations difficult to interpret. Following Betancourt and 
Gautschi, we therefore argue that substitutabihty and complementarity are concepts 
that depend on the consumption goal pursued by a consumer and that, hence, the 
consumption goal should be taken into account when mvestigating substitution and 
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complementarity (cf. Srivastava, Leone and Shocker, 1981; Srivastava, Alpert and 
Shocker, 1984). 
Scanner and survey data that are typically used to study substitution effects 
however not easily allow taking consumers' consumption goals into account, and 
are therefore often difficult to interpret. For example, a purchase of a particular 
brand of soup in a particular store may be explained by an intrinsic need for variety 
(cf. McAlister 1979, 1982), preference heterogeneity due to different consumption 
goals (e.g., Barsalou 1983, 1985), a want for processing new information, social 
interaction processes, learning about new trends (cf. Bellenger and Korgaongar 
1990), or time pressure. Scanner data also typically cover limited price ranges and 
show relatively little variation in item availability. Moreover, observed variations in 
these variables are often colhnear, which may cause estimation problems. To take 
multiple users and multiple usage occasions within the household into account, 
Bucklin and Srinivasan (1991) developed a survey-based approach to determine 
cross-price elasticities and the extent of brand switching. However, as they note, 
there is likely to be substantial error in their choice data, which are based on 
reported recent usage. In addition, they estimate choice model parameters for 
individual households, which due to the small sample sizes will make the choice 
model parameters quite unreliable. Clearly, such approach requires large, 
high-quality datasets in order to obtain reliable estimates at the household level and 
consequently imposes high demands on datacollection. As we will demonstrate, 
choice experiments offer an alternative and efficient way of taking the consumption 
goal into account because they allow the researcher to fix or manipulate the goal in 
the choice task instructions (cf. Carson et al., 1994). This essentially results in a 
separate utility function being specified for each goal. Standard tests can then be 
performed to see whether (parts of) the utility functions should be constrained 
across different goals. 
4.3.2 Decision context 
A second aspect that can be controlled for by designing an assortment choice task is 
the essentially hierarchical and interactive nature of the consumer decision process. 
When planning a shopping trip, a consumer may choose a retail outlet before 
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selecting a specific product, or vice versa, he or she may first select a particular item 
and then select a store for purchasing this item (cf. Ann and Ghosh, 1989). Also, 
once in the store a consumer can decide at any time to walk out and visit another 
store before making a final purchase decision. By exactly specifying and by 
manipulating the task context of the decision-maker, choice experiments allow the 
researcher to focus at a particular stage in the assumed decision process. That is, 
one can specify features of the purchase environment (e.g., store ambience) and the 
nature of the task (e.g., how much time is available to make the purchase). In 
contrast, scanner and other real market data only allow after the fact inferences on 
the different stages of the consumer decision process and need to be supplemented 
by difficult to collect observations, think-aloud-protocols or intercept surveys about 
in-store behavior (cf. Dickson and Sawyer, 1990). The focus in our application is on 
in-store decision making. Similar to the consumption goal effects, the effects of the 
different decision contexts are analyzed by specifying a separate utility function for 
each decision context condition and then testing whether the parameters can be 
constrained across context conditions. 
433 Price effects 
A third relevant characteristic of assortments is that individual items are priced but 
that it is the composite of the individual item prices that conveys the price image of 
the assortment as a whole, regardless of whether the assortment concerns a category 
or a store. Store price image cannot easily be explained from the constituent item 
prices, which in fact is a major reason why retail pricing is one of the most difficult 
aspects of retail management. A retailer will be interested to know the customer's 
price sensitivities for the individual items in the assortment, but at least as important 
to know are the price cross-effects of the items within the assortment, and between 
the own category or store and the competing categories or stores. Price cross effects 
were studied by Krishnamurthi, Raj and Sivakumar (1995), who used the extended 
logit framework advocated in this chapter. They studied inter-brand effects of price 
on brand choice on a panel data set on household coffee purchases. Their model 
thus was estimated from real market data that was collected in uncontrolled 
circumstances, which makes the parameters difficult to interpret. As we will 
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demonstrate in our application, the attribute cross effects as specified in equation (3) 
allow one to get efficient, independent and interpretable estimates of effects such as 
investigated by Krishnamurthi c.s. Note that this approach is not restricted to price 
effects per se. It could in principle also be applied to assess cross effects of the 
qualities of the individual items in the assortment. Since the present experiment was 
not designed to vary the quality of the individual items, we cannot further 
demonstrate or test this in the present study. 
4.3.4 Item availability 
The composition of the assortment in terms of the available items and their 
inter-relations is the fourth relevant issue. Particularly relevant is to look at 
differences in substitution between products. Our experiment will allow inspection 
of the effects of brand or item availabihty and how these effects are affected by 
other own or competing distribution services. This is accomplished by including 
availabihty cross effects as specified in equation (2) in the utility function of the 
choice model to estimate. 
4.4 Hypotheses 
The hypotheses below are based on the propositions that are presented in chapter 3, 
but have been reformulated for the situation where a consumer needs to make an 
in-store purchase decision from a generic category of unbranded products of 
different types or subtypes, such as a florist store. We assume the consumer has 
arrived at a store and hence can observe the available assortment and experience the 
store ambience. The consumer now needs to decide whether and what to buy from 
this store. For details on the propositions underlying the hypotheses presented here, 
the reader is referred to chapter 3. 
Chapter 3 proposed that distribution service provision will positively affect 
consumer choice. With a shorter distance to the store and a larger choice range, the 
respondent will perceive a higher chance of succeeding in finding an acceptable 
product at that store. We also expect that the alternative store is more attractive and 
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hence will draw more customers when it has a good ambience than if it has a poor 
ambience. 
Hypothesis la A competing store will draw more customers away from the present 
store when this store is nearby than when it is further away. 
Hypothesis lb A competing store will draw more customers when its choice range 
is large instead of small. 
Store ambience has been shown to influence customer shopping behavior 
through its effect on mood (cf. Donovan and Rossiter 1982). In addition, all else 
equal, customers will infer the products to be of better quality if the store ambience 
is better. 
Hypothesis 2 Customers are more inclined to purchase at the present store if this 
store has a good ambience than if the ambience is poor. 
Hypothesis 3 The current and the competing store's ambience will interact, such 
that the overall probability of purchase (at the present or in the competing store) is 
largest if the competing store is more unique, that is, if its ambience is different 
from the ambience of the present store. 
Hypothesis 4 Creating variety in the assortment by adding products that differ in 
only one feature will lead to increased substitution relative to adding products that 
differ in more respects. 
These effects will be evidenced by negative availability cross-effects of products 
that are only different on the selected feature. In our application on cut flowers this 
feature is the color of the flowers and we expect that different colors of the same 
flower type act as substitutes. 
Consumers value large assortments, but continued addition of items to an 
assortment will lead to increased substitution. We therefore hypothesize: 
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Hypothesis 5 If the assortment in the present store increases purchase likelihood at 
the present store will increase, but at a decreasing rate. 
Hypothesis 6 Price cross effects between products of the same type will be positive, 
that is, if the price of one product goes up, the purchase probabilities of other 
products of the same type increase more than proportional. 
Hypothesis 7 The store and inter-item relations hypothesized above (HI to H5) will 
differ depending on the consumption goal. 
4.5 The application 
The application concerns consumer choice of fresh cut flowers. This product 
category possesses a number of characteristics, both with respect to the physical 
product and its distribution, that makes it particularly well suited for studying 
distributive services and assortment composition. 
Domestic and foreign producers of cut flowers sell their products, 
predominantly through the Dutch auction system, to a large variety of traders, 
including approximately 250 domestic wholesalers and many more exporters, and 
retailers. The first to develop the cooperative auction system in order to secure a fair 
price were growers of vegetables who used to sell their products to a powerful, at 
that time Hmited, number of traders. Today there are seven flower auctions, where 
the bulk of all Dutch flower growers' products are daily presented before the clock. 
The greater part of Dutch flower production, as well as a large share of 
internationaUy traded foreign produce is sold through Dutch auctions. Due to the 
independent auctioning of large numbers of product lots from many independent 
growers and the presence of many competing buyers, both producers and traders are 
unable to exert any individual influence on price formation. Nowadays the three 
large auctions have mediation agencies that sell growers' products directly to large 
wholesalers and retailers.4 
Recentiy, the auctions face a number of important developments, that are beyond the scope of the 
research presented here, but will have significant implications for the system and thus deserve 
mentioning. An example is purchase of large quantities by e.g., supermarket chains that aim at 
selling homogeneous products and therefore prefer individual contracts with producers in order to 
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In the Netherlands there are over 4,000 registered florists. Many of these 
florists sell through outlets other than specialized flower stores or combine multiple 
outlet types, such as a specialized store and open air market sales. The consumer 
market for flowers is thus rather fragmented and decentralized, with approximately 
40% of flower sales through specialized independent outlets. Until today only a 
small percentage of sales goes through retail chains and supermarkets. Specialized 
retailers add value to the product by providing general and product-specific 
distribution services, and many of them offer creative services, including combining 
flowers into bouquets, often for special occasions, and selling ornamentals such as 
vases. In addition to retailer service provision, retail prices are affected mainly by 
auction prices, which in turn are affected by many factors, such as season of the 
year, product quality, and the presence or absence of specific growers. Product 
advertising is done collectively by all associated Dutch retailers in cooperation with 
the Flower Council of Holland. 
The availability of different flower types varies with the seasons and the 
presence or absence of specific growers' offerings. Prices also vary considerable 
over time and over retail outlets. Cut flowers are typically distributes as unbranded 
products, with standardized protective packaging, and are presented in the stores 
using their generic names. Sales through supermarkets and non-store outlets are still 
small, but growing. Local advertising is exceptional. Because of their 
perishableness, consumers cannot stockpile cut flowers. 
At all levels of the distribution channel some uncertainty remains with respect 
to quality maintenance since neither channel member knows how much time 
elapsed since harvest, nor what treatment the product has received, e.g., cooled 
storage, hygiene measures, antibacterial fluid used. Quality guarantees, e.g. 
concerning vaselife, are generally not given, despite several attempts to 
institutionalized quality5. The only product labels available to the final consumer 
are the name of the flower variety, the retailer's name, and possibly the auction 
name on the flower container. For wholesalers and retailers who purchase at the 
secure a lower price than would be the realized if they purchase large quantities through the 
auction. 
5 Several individual retailers and large supermarket chains are offering a vaselife guarantee (usually 
seven days) for the product sold to their customers. 
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auction, quality information supplied by the auction and the producer's name are the 
only available labels. 
Cut flowers thus are a heterogeneous, perishable, unbranded, and unpackaged 
product with daily varying prices and little advertising. In addition, most consumers 
and retailers are not familiar with specific flower varieties, thousands of which exist 
in the market. Therefore, consumers will need to use other available extrinsic 
quality cues to form quality judgments, such as store prestige and reputation. Store 
prestige refers to distribution services, such as ambience, including presentation, 
and packaging. Retailer reputation depends largely on store type. A specialized 
store is generally considered a quality provider relative to a supermarket or gas 
station. 
This heterogeneity with respect to product, price, and the assortment offered in 
the real-world flower market, and the relative independence of the cut flower 
channel structure from distributive structures for other goods make it possible to 
present consumers with experimental tasks that are very much representative of the 
choice conditions that they encounter in the real market. The cut flower sector thus 
allows unique opportunities to test hypotheses about effects of distribution services, 
including assortment composition, on consumer purchase behavior in experimental 
settings with real consumers. 
Based on consumer behavior theory we may conclude that to consumers only 
a few cues are available from which inferences can be made with respect to product 
and retailer quality (e.g., Broniarczyk and Alba 1994; Ross and Creyer 1992; Sujan 
and Dekleva 1987). Therefore, quality inferences will be made by consumers using 
external cues, such as store reputation, information provided by and behaviors of 
store personnel, and store tangibles, such as decoration, and internal cues, such as 
visible physical product characteristics. Most of these cues used in making quality 
inferences can be simulated in an experimental study. Many relevant cues, with the 
exception of e.g., personnel, are controlled for in the experiment. This reduces the 
probability of consumer inferential belief formation on the basis of missing 
information. Also, brand equity does not exist, and will therefore not influence the 
effects of product availability. 
Complementary products are of limited significance in specialist flower stores. 
With the exception of purchases such as vases, most consumer purchases at 
specialist florists' are limited to cut flowers. Complementarity exists mainly 
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between flower varieties that may be combined into one bouquet when the 
consumer is already in the store. In our analysis these flower compositions will not 
be considered. The heterogeneity with respect to product, price, and the assortment 
offered in the real-world cut flower market, and the relative independence of the cut 
flower channel structure from distributive structures for other goods make it 
possible to present consumers with experimental tasks that are very much 
representative of the choice conditions that they encounter in the real market. The 
cut flower sector thus allows unique opportunities to test hypotheses about the 
effects of distribution services, including assortment composition, on consumer 
purchase behavioral in experimental settings with real consumers. 
4.6 Design of the study 
A consumer experiment was designed using fresh cut flowers as the product 
category under investigation that are purchased at specialized florists' outlets. 
Because analysis of item interrelationships within and among multiproduct 
assortments is the main research purpose, the experiment was designed for analysis 
of consumer in-store choice of cut flowers6. The experimental design explicitly 
incorporates competition within and among assortments. In the experiment 
consumer demand is represented by choices made by consumers from a variety of 
assortments. This section discusses the design of the study. 
6 Research (Koelemeijer 1994) indicates that most consumers do not substitute between buying 
cutflowers at a specialized florist's and other product categories during their shopping trip. The 
majority (80%) of a sample of 1400 consumers indicated choice among product categories and 
choice of florist's to patronize had already been done at home. This will probably not be the case 
for flower purchases at different types of outiets, such as markets and supermarkets, where flower 
purchases may be impulse purchases. 
Retail assortments and consumer choice 115 
4.6.1 Subjects 
The experiment was conducted among members of a large existing consumer panel 
in The Netherlands7. From this panel, 896 members were selected who had bought 
cut flowers at least once a month during the last two years. A total of 448 members 
had mostly bought flowers for use in their own home, the other members usually 
bought flowers as a gift. Individuals who bought flowers equally often for both 
occasions were randomly assigned to one of the two groups. The questionnaires and 
high-quahty photographic material were distributed among the 896 panel members. 
Of the "own use" group, 358 members returned and completely filled out their 
questionnaire, comprising a response rate of 79.9 percent; from the "gift" group we 
obtained 383 completed questionnaires (85.5 percent response rate). Thus, the total 
size of our final sample was 741. 
The consumers participating in the study had ample previous experience with 
choice of florists and flower purchase. We may therefore assume their goal or 
decision criteria are well-developed. Making a goal or decision criteria salient will 
in that case have a limited influence in detenruning what attributes are considered 
important, and on the degree of usage of concrete attributes (Bettman and Sujan 
1987; Barsalou 1983). Because in our experiment the flower purchase goal was 
already salient the participating consumers are in addition likely to have used 
concrete attributes for product evaluation and choice in past purchase decisions. 
4.6.2 The experimental choice scenarios 
Each assortment was a designed choice set consisting of photographs of bunches of 
cut flowers, each bunch carrying a price label. All flowers were equally fresh and 
were photographed in standardized auction barrels, all at the same distance, from an 
angle similar to the way consumers view flowers in stores. The use of pictorial 
stimuli allows a higher degree of realism (Smead, Wilcox and Wilkes 1981) in the 
experiment, which aimed to mimic the real-world in-store purchase environment. 
Datacollection was done among members of the GFK Household panel who have been 
accustomed to reporting monthly purchase data on a variety of consumer durables and nondurables, 
among which cutflowers. 
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Loosschilder et al. (1995) show that consumers are able to evaluate pictorial stimuli 
without use of verbal key words in a conjoint analysis task. 
Participants received a mail-back questionnaire accompanied by photographs 
displaying a store's interior and exterior and several choice sets representing 
possible cut flower assortments. The experiment contained two different stores that 
represented a high and a low ambience store, which was confirmed by pretesting. 
The two stores were randomly allocated to participants in the study and differed on, 
e.g., layout and flower presentation. After asking questions about their last purchase 
of cut flowers, the questionnaire explained respondents that they had to assume they 
were in the store as displayed on the photographs, wanting to buy flowers today for 
the same occasion as when they last bought cut flowers. This meant that panel 
members who mostly buy for their own use had to assume they would buy flowers 
for use in their own home under similar conditions as when they last time bought 
flowers. Members who typically buy flowers as a gift had to assume they would buy 
flowers for a similar occasion as the last time they bought flowers as a gift. Because 
we aimed to make the task as realistic as possible we refrained from randomly 
allocating respondents to different "goal" conditions. Note however that this is a 
trade-off. Random allocation would have been possible, but at the cost of having 
people encountering goal conditions that they were unfamiliar with. Participants 
were then asked to select their preferred bunch of flowers from each of the 
presented assortments of cut flowers, or choose to buy no flowers. In some 
conditions, respondents could also choose to visit a competing store. If this 
competing store option was available, the questionnaire mentioned the travel time to 
this store (one, five, or ten minutes), whether the store ambience had much or little 
appeal, and whether they could expect a large or small choice range. In contrast to 
the present store interior, these competing characteristics were verbally described 
because this would better approximate the real in-store purchase situation than if we 
had used pictures to manipulate the features of the competing store. 
4.63 Experimental design 
The multiple choice experiment involved fifteen different frequently sold flower 
bunches, which were displayed on colored photographs. The flower bunches 
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included eight different flower types, with seven of them in two different colors. 
Preliminary investigations indicated that the distinction between variety and color 
was detailed enough for consumers to choose flowers. Consumers do not, and 
mostly are not able to, distinguish more detailed differences among flowers, for 
example between subvarieties. In order to assure representativeness of the product 
sample and to assure respondent familiarity with the products involved in the 
experiment cut flowers were selected that occurred in the top 10 of quantities sold, 
which has remained rather stable throughout several years. In addition, there was an 
option of visiting a competing store to buy flowers. Figure 4.1 presents the options, 
i.e., flower varieties and competing store, used in the experiment. The presence or 
absence of each of the fifteen flower bunches and of the competing store in the 
choice sets was systematically varied through a 4 1 6 design in 64 treatments (cf. 
Lazari and Anderson 1994). We used four levels for each option to obtain balance 
between the availabihty of the different options and the distribution of sizes of 
choice sets. Of these four levels, the first two received the value "not available", 
whereas the other two levels indicated that the particular flower bunch was 
available in a set, either at low price (level three) or at a high price (level four). 
Figure 4.1 The sixteen alternatives (competing store and fifteen flower bunches) 
for which presence/absence was manipulated. 
l:Competing store 6:Tulips, red 
7:Tulips, yellow 
12:Dianthums, red 
13:Dianthums, white 
2:Roses, large, red 
3:Roses, large, white 
8:Chrysanthemums, pink 
9:Chrysanthemums, yellow 
14:Lillies, red 
15:Iillies, yellow 
4:Roses, small, red 
5:Roses, small, white 
10:Irisses, blue 
ll:Irisses, white 
16:Fresia, white 
Each flower bunch's price was displayed and was the real market price plus 
(high price) or minus (low price) 150 cents. Level one of the competing store 
indicated "not available", levels two to four were used to systematically vary the 
travel distance to the competing store (one, five, or ten minutes travel distance). 
This design thus generated 64 different assortments, containing five to twelve 
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flower bunches of different color and/or variety. In 48 cases, the option of visiting a 
competing store was present. Due to a field error, however, the competing store 
option was not administered to the sample of respondents who mostly buy flowers 
as a gift. Each respondent received a block of eight assortments only; these blocks 
were created by using an independent blocking factor. 
This "availability by price or travel time" design was nested under a 2 3 full 
factorial between subjects master design to vary the following factors: (1) 
Ambience at the current store, that is, the store where the consumer is supposed to 
see the assortment displayed ("Good ambience" versus "Poor ambience", 
manipulated through the pictures of the present store's interior); (2) Ambience at 
the competing store ("Much appeal" versus "Little appeal", manipulated through 
presenting these verbal labels in the questionnaire); and (3) Choice range at the 
competing store ("Large selection" versus "Small selection", manipulated through 
presenting these labels in the questionnaire). The total number of different 
scenario's in the experiment was therefore 512 (i.e., eight times 64). In Table 4.1 an 
overview is given of the attributes and attribute-levels used in the experimental 
design. 
Table 4.1 Attributes and attribute levels used in the experiment. 
Attributes No. levels Description of levels 
Flower types 2 Each of the 15 color-variety 
combinations present or absent 
Price 2 Flower-type specific high, low 
Alternative store 2 Present, absent 
If present: 
distance 3 1, 5,10 minutes to store 
assortment 2 many, few choice possibilities 
ambience 2 good, poor 
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4.6.4 Dependent variables 
Responses collected in the questionnaire concerned the respondent's previous 
flower purchases, impressions of the described hypothetical current store and 
competing store, and the choice responses for each of the eight choice sets, i.e., 
choose flowers, visit competing store or no purchase. Participants in addition rated 
each of the assortments (choice sets) on various characteristics and responded to 
statements intended to measure their task involvement, however these latter 
measures will not be analyzed in the present study. 
Several manipulation checks have been used in the study. Store manipulations 
were checked using a 5-item, 5-point scale described hereafter. Perceptions of 
current store ambience was checked using two items with poles ranging from 
respectively "Not agreeable at all" (1) to "Very agreeable" (5), and "Very bad 
atmosphere" (1) to "Very good atmosphere" (5). Manipulation of the competing 
store was tested using a 3-point scale ranging from "Very unattractive" (1) to "Very 
attractive" (5). 
Validity checks were used to assess whether the choice task and the 
photographic materials used matched real-life in-store decision making context. The 
most important reason for using pictorial stimuli instead of product descriptions was 
the higher degree of selection and choice realism (Smead, Wilcox and Wilkes 1981) 
that would be achieved in the experiment. The degree of realism refers to the 
amount of information in each stimulus, and the manner in which the stimuli are 
presented (De Bont 1992). With respect to the latter reahsm will be enhanced 
because design-related attributes can be included, more attributes can be included 
and each attribute can be manipulated to greater detail by using printed pictorial 
stimuli. With flowers visualization of the product is probably essential for 
preference formation, since in our study consumers have only a limited number of 
other cues to infer quality from, such as price and store reputation. Use of pictorial 
stimuli allows more realistic and detailed manipulation of product attributes that 
concern physical characteristics, such as form, length and color, because reading 
and visualization of the information, which may be difficult, does not have to be 
done by the respondent (Green and Srinivasan 1978). With pictorial stimuli the 
probability of holistic information processing will be enlarged (Paivo 1971). Vriens 
et al. (1994) show that consumers are able to evaluate pictorial stimuli without use 
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of verbal key words in a conjoint analysis task. In our study additional information 
was provided, e.g. price, using short, written attribute descriptions below each 
photograph. 
Respondents were asked to indicate for one particular, randomly assigned, 
choice set they received the degree to which each of the pictures matched real-life 
presentation on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from "The flowers on picture i 
are not at all like you see them in the store" (1) to "The flowers on picture i are very 
much like you see them in the store" (5). The overall degree of realism captured by 
the choice sets was indicated by having the respondents rate a statement concerning 
the choice set as a whole. FinaUy, the choice task was evaluated by rating the degree 
to which the choice task and context described matched reality. 
4.7 Analysis and results 
4.7.1 Manipulation checks 
Of the 741 participants, 375 had been assigned to the high ambience store and 366 
had been assigned to the low ambience store. A t-test on the mean score of a 3-item 
5-point rating scale (a=.84) indicated the photographs we used to frame ambience 
had successfully manipulated respondent perceptions of the current store's 
ambience (t337=12.86, ps.000). 
Manipulation of travel distance, ambience, and choice range resulted in 12 
different competing store profiles. Consumers' perceptions of the competing store 
profiles differed significantly and in the expected direction with respect to the 
factors ambience (Fi)534=22,06, p^.000) and choice range ^ ¿ 3 4 = 7 , 5 3 , p^.002), but 
did not differ with respect to travel distance (F2,534=0.09, p^.892). Manipulation 
checks generated similar results for each of the two purchase goals. 
4.7.2 Base model 
Models were estimated with a maximum likelihood approach from a data matrix 
that contained the choices aggregated into a matrix of 992 different choice sets. We 
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Table 4.2 Base model estimation results. 
121 
Log likelihood with no coefficients -14769.5 
Log likelihood at convergence -10638.5 
PJio-square 0.280 
Rho-square (AIC) 0.278 
Rho-square (BIC) 0.275 
Number of parameters 21 
Variable Coefficient Stand.Err. Asymp.t p-value 
Flower Bunch Constants8: 
V2 Roses, large Red 1452 0.086 16.794 0.000 
V3 White 1.104 0.091 12.085 0.000 
V4 Roses, small Red 1.627 0.085 19.223 0.000 
V5 White 1.535 0.086 17.948 0.000 
V6 Tulips Red 1.281 0.089 14.399 0.000 
V7 Yellow 1.099 0.091 12.022 0.000 
V8 Chrysanthemums Pink 1.108 0.092 12.094 0.000 
V9 Yellow 1.148 0.091 12.674 0.000 
V10 Irises Blue 0.518 0.103 5.029 0.000 
VI1 White 0.248 0.111 2.230 0.026 
V12 Dianthums Red 1.580 0.085 18.564 0.000 
V13 White 0.689 0.099 6.947 0.000 
V14 Lilies Red 0.927 0.094 9.835 0.000 
V15 Yellow 0.203 0.112 1.816 0.069 
VI6 Fresias White 1.500 0.086 17.410 0.000 
Flower bunch generic parameters: 
Price -0.272 0.016 -17.481 0.000 
Ambience of current store -0.070 0.064 -1.082 0.279 
Competing Store parameters (effects on utility of competing store): 
VI (Constant) -0.353 0.158 -2.230 0.026 
Distance 0.110 0.174 0.631 0.528 
Choice range -0.104 0.141 -0.735 0.462 
Ambience of competing store 0.185 0.141 1.313 0.189 
") Numbers correspond to flower types and colors in Figure 4.1. 
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first estimated a main effects MNL model that included a constant for each of the 15 
color-by-type alternatives separately, one price parameter one parameter for current 
store ambience, and in addition parameters for the distance, choice range and 
ambience as described for the other store, if available. The parameter estimates for 
this model are displayed in Table 4.2. Regarding our first hypothesis (HI), the 
observed t-statistics lead us to retain the null hypothesis that the characteristics of 
the competing store have no effect on the choice probability of this alternative. 
The model further shows that the price parameter has the sign as expected, 
higher prices leading to lower purchase likelihood. The constants for each of the 
fifteen color-by-type alternatives reflect the preferences for each and indicate that, 
for example, across all sets 4:Smail Red Roses were most preferred and 15:Yellow 
Lilies were least preferred. These constants in fact are a direct transformation of the 
marginal frequencies of the different color-by-type varieties because in our case a 
completely balanced design was used, this is however not generally true. 
We respecified the model to include a dummy ('main effect') for each flower 
type and separate dummies ('main effects') for red and pink or blue flowers. This 
led to a significant decrease in fit, indicating that preferences are very much 
color-by-variety specific (Likelihood Ratio Chi-2 value is 107.1 at 5 degrees of 
freedom, p^.001). To further test the hypothesized effects we next estimated several 
other models and compared these to this base model. We will now discuss the 
results of these model comparisons for each of the hypothesized types of effects 
separately. 
4.73 Store ambience 
We hypothesized that the ambience at the current store would positively influence 
purchase probabilities (H2). Because current store ambience was a characteristic of 
the choice context and not of a particular alternative, we tested for the effect of 
current store ambience by including a parameter for current store ambience in the 
fifteen utility functions. As shown in Table 4.2, this generic parameter was not 
significant (t=1.08,n.s.). Estimation of a separate current ambience parameter for 
each flower bunch did also not lead to a significant improvement of the model. (LR 
Chi-2 =14.5, d.f.=14, n.s.). 
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We also hypothesized that the ambience effects for the current and competing 
stores would interact, such that if the ambiences are different the probability of 
purchase increases (H3). We thus added the interaction of the current and 
competing stores' ambience to the utility function for the competing store (see 
Table 4.3). We furthermore hypothesized that price sensitivities might be different 
depending on the current store ambience. We therefore also added the interaction of 
price and current store ambience to each of the fifteen utility functions. The model 
including all these additional parameters did not significantly improve the fit of the 
base model however. (LR Chi-2 =23.0, d.f.=18, n.s.). We thus retain our null 
hypothesis that current store ambience does not affect the in-store purchase 
likelihood and choice probabilities, even though the manipulation checks confirmed 
the manipulation of the current store ambience. Worth mentioning is also that we 
found a significant (t=3.03, p^.01) negative interaction of current store ambience 
and distance to the other store, suggesting that in particular if the current store 
ambience is poor and the distance to the competing store is small, there is an 
increased chance that the consumer leaves to visit this other store. 
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Table 4.3 Estimation results for base model extended with cross effects and store 
ambience by competing store interactions. 
Log likelihood with no coefficients -14769.5 
Log likelihood at convergence -10577.8 
Rho-square 0.284 
Rho-square (AIC) 0.280 
Rho-square (BIC) 0.271 
Number of parameters 54 
Variable Coefficient Stand.Err. Asymp.t p-value 
Flower Bunch Constants": 
V2 Roses, large Red 1.747 0.121 14.449 0.000 
V3 White 1.400 0.128 10.941 0.000 
V4 Roses, small Red 1.793 0.118 15.155 0.000 
V5 White 1.690 0.120 14.089 0.000 
V6 Tulips Red 1.551 0.126 12.339 0.000 
V7 Yellow 1.409 0.129 10.958 0.000 
V8 Chrysanthemums Pink 1.113 0.133 8.353 0.000 
V9 Yellow 1.241 0.130 9.539 0.000 
V10 Irises Blue 0.465 0.157 2.956 0.003 
VI1 White 0.596 0.157 3.802 0.000 
V12 Dianthums Red 1.719 0.121 14.253 0.000 
V13 White 0.936 0.140 6.694 0.000 
V14 Lilies Red 1.076 0.135 7.941 0.000 
V15 Yellow 0.376 0.162 2.320 0.020 
V16 Fresias White 1.508 0.113 13.374 0.000 
Flower bunch generic parameters: 
Price -0.271 0.016 -17.427 0.000 
Ambience of current store (CSA) -0.085 0.066 -1.287 0.198 
Competing Store parameters (effects on utility of competing store): 
VI (Constant) -1.083 0.869 -1.246 0.213 
Distance 0.119 0.175 0.683 0.495 
Choice Range -0.119 0.144 -0.829 0.407 
Ambience of Competing Store 0.196 0.141 1.384 0.166 
Interaction effects of Current Store Ambience (CSA) and competing store attributes on Competing 
Store: 
CSA * Distance -0.566 0.188 -3.013 0.003 
CSA * Choice range 0.235 0.146 1.601 0.109 
CSA * Ambience of Competing 0.027 0.141 0.190 0.849 
Store 
Cross effect of Number of Items in Current Store Assortment on utility of Competing Store: 
Items 0.058 0.115 0.510 0.610 
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Variable Coefficient Stand.Err. Asymp.t p-value 
V3_2C -0.126 0.108 -1.167 0.243 
V2_3C -0.229 0.123 -1.865 0.062 
V5_4C -0.044 0.102 -0.435 0.664 
V4 5C -0.060 0.104 -0.579 0.563 
V7 6C -0.298 0.115 -2.584 0.010 
V6_7C -0.452 0.124 -3.641 0.000 
V9_8C -0.218 0.123 -1.772 0.076 
V8 9C -0.160 0.121 -1.320 0.187 
VI1 IOC 0.145 0.154 0.941 0.347 
V10 11C -0.355 0.179 -1.987 0.047 
V13 12C -0.162 0.102 -1.579 0.114 
V12 13C -0.442 0.150 -2.954 0.003 
V15 14C 0.011 0.130 0.083 0.933 
V14_15C -0.197 0.179 -1.102 0.270 
Availability Cross Effects of Competing Store on Flower Bunches0: 
V1_2C -0.724 0.182 -3.969 0.000 
VI 3C -0.549 0.191 -2.874 0.004 
VI 4C -0.417 0.174 -2.399 0.016 
VI 5C -0.254 0.175 -1.451 0.147 
V1_6C -0.386 0.184 -2.101 0.036 
VI 7C -0.272 0.188 -1.448 0.148 
VI 8C 0.239 0.185 1.294 0.196 
V1_9C -0.072 0.184 -0.390 0.697 
VI IOC -0.049 0.209 -0.233 0.816 
VI 11C -0.495 0.238 -2.083 0.037 
V1_12C -0.182 0.174 -1.048 0.295 
V1_13C -0.194 0.203 -0.954 0.340 
VI 14C -0.419 0.196 -2.137 0.033 
V1_15C -0.211 0.230 -0.916 0.360 
VI 16C -0.016 0.175 -0.089 0.929 
a ) Numbers correspond to flower types and colors in Figure 4.1. 
*) V3_2 means: cross effect of flower 3 on flower 2. 
°) V l_2 means: cross effect of competing store(=l) on flower 2. 
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4.7.4 Substitution (cross) effects 
To investigate the substitution patterns among the items in the assortment we next 
added terms to the utility function that pick up the substitution effects between pairs 
of alternatives. We hypothesized that if for some flower type two different colors 
are available, these two products compete more among each other than that they 
compete with other flower types of any color (H4). For each alternative we 
therefore included a term in the utility function that represented the availability of 
this competing alternative in the set. We thus estimated 14 flower-on-flower cross 
effects (the eighth flower type was available in only one color, so we did not 
include a cross effect for this flower). 
The logit model extended with these terms improved the model fit 
significantly relative to the base model (LR Chi-2 =47.4, d.f.=14, p^.001). The 
Adjusted Rho-square value based on the Akaike Information Criterion however 
shows only a very small increase when the cross effects are included. This confirms 
that the model performs better if we include cross effects but that if we take model 
parsimony into account the improvement is only marginal. Indeed, if we use the 
more strict Bayesian (or Schwartz) Information Criterion (see Rust et al. 1995), the 
fit even decreases (see table 4.2 versus 4.3). To make the extended model more 
parsimonious the insignificant parameters could be dropped and the model could be 
re-estimated. We refrain from reporting this model (note however that Table 4.4 
reports more restricted models). 
Inspection of the within flower type cross effect estimates, displayed in Table 
4.3, reveals that the flower types for which we find the strongest and significant 
substitution effects are 6:Red Tulips on 7:Yellow Tulips (cross effect is -0.452), 
12:Red Dianthums on 13:White Dianthums (-0.442), 10:Blue Irises on UrWhite 
Irises (-0.355), and 7:Yellow Tulips on 6:Red Tulips (-0.300), in decreasing order 
of effect size. Note that the substitutions are not symmetric, we interpret them as 
asymmetric dominance effects (Huber, Payne and Puto, 1982): the availability of 
12:Red Dianthums suppresses the choices for 13:White Dianthums more than 
proportional, likewise, 10:Blue Irises dominate ll:White Irises, and 6:Red Tulips 
dominate 7:Yellow Tulips. The interesting observation from this is that there is a 
tendency for red and blue to dominate over yellow and white, but not for all flower 
types. 
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4.7.5 Competing store (cross) effects 
We next tested our ideas about assortment size and the drawing power of a 
competing store (H5). We included a parameter in each alternative's utility function 
to represent the effect of the availability of the other store in the choice set on this 
alternative; hence, there were 15 of these cross effects. All these availabihty 
indicator variables were dummy coded (l=present, 0=absent), their effects are 
therefore interpretable in terms of their magnitudes. We also included a cross effect 
for the number of items in the assortment in the utility specification of the 
competing store option to pick up effects of the assortment size at the present store 
on the likelihood of purchasing at the competing store. The logit model extended 
with these terms improved the model fit significantly relative to the previous model 
(LR Chi-2 =62.10, d.f.=16, p^.001). The Adjusted Rho-square increases to .279, 
corifirrriing that the model performs better if we include these cross effects, even if 
we take model parsimony into account. 
If we look at the effects of the availability of the competing store as 
displayed in Table 4.3, we find that these are significant for six flowers: 2:Large 
Red Roses (-.724), 3:Large White Roses (-0.549), ll:White Irises (-0.494), 14:Red 
Lilies (-0.419), 4:Small Red Roses (-0.417), and 6:Red Tulips (-0.386). The 
negative signs of these estimates indicate that if the competing store is available, 
these flowers are bought relatively less often, indicating that for these flower types 
customers are more willing to go to the competing store. Note that 6:Red Tulips and 
ILWhite Irises are affected by both types of cross effects, which we interpret as 
indicating that people have only weakly developed preferences for these flower 
types and are easily distracted from buying them. 
Increasing the assortment size by adding items increased the likelihood of 
purchasing at the current store proportional to the attractiveness of the items added, 
as assumed in the MNL model. A cross effect captures the extent to which addition 
of an item to an assortment increases purchase likelihood to a larger or smaller 
extent than would be predicted from the MNL model. We consequently find no 
cross effect of assortment size at the current store on the probability of visiting the 
competing store. This suggests that, even though we found substitution effects 
within flower types, there was no significant overall substitution between flower 
types. 
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4.7.6 Price effects 
Allowing a different price parameter for each separate flower type or color-by-type 
did not significantly increase the explanatory power of the base model (LR Chi-2 
=15.4 at 14 d.f., n.s.), so we conclude that price sensitivities are not different for the 
different flower alternatives. To test our hypothesis about price cross effects (H6), 
we included in each alternative's utility function parameters to represent the prices 
of the remaining available alternatives in the set. None of these effects were 
significant however, so we retain our null hypothesis that price cross effects are 
zero. We thus conclude that the price substitution that occurs between different 
flowers is independent of the type of flower bunches involved. 
4.7.7 Purchase goal 
The previous models were all estimated across our two samples, that is, across the 
"own use" and "gift" purchase goals. To test whether the parameters are different 
for these two purchase goals (H6), we applied the test as proposed by Swait and 
Louviere (1993). Using a FIML estimation routine, we first tested whether the scale 
parameter, which is embedded in all MNL parameters, was different between the 
two samples. The estimated ratio of the scales in the own use and gift conditions 
was 1.195 and significantly different from one. This indicates that the error variance 
was largest in the gift condition (the scale value is inversely related to the error 
variance, see Swait and Louviere, 1993). We next tested whether the parameters are 
different after reseating. We estimated our model for each separate sample. Thus 
allowing separate parameter estimates for each sample improved the total model fit 
significantly relative to the above pooled, but reseated, model (LR Chi-2 =83.8, 
d.f.=31,ps.001). 
Table 4.4 displays the model parameters for the two purchase goal conditions 
side by side. The most right-hand column displays the differences between the 
parameters after rescaling the own use model parameters and their significances. It 
appears that, overall, people are more inclined to make a purchase in the gift than in 
the own use condition. The respondents in the gift sample buy red and large roses in 
particular more often. lLWhite Irises and 14:Red Lihes are also bought more often 
Table 4.4 Separate estimation results for "Own Use" and "Use as a Gift" samples. 
Goal = 1: Own Use Goal = 2: Use as a Gift 
Log likelihood with no coefficients -6859.21 Log likelihood with no coefficients -7910.33 
Log likelihood at convergence -5033.41 Log likelihood at convergence -5536.99 
Rho--square 0.266 Rho-square 0.300 
Rho-square (AIC) 0.262 Rho-square (AIC) 0.296 
Rho-square (BIC) 0.252 Rho-square (BIC) 0.288 
Number of parameters 31 Number of parameters 30 
Variable Coefficient Stand.Err. Asymp.t p-value Variable Coefficient Stand.Err. Asymp.t p-value Parameter-
differences0 
Price -0.273 0.023 -11.826 0.000 Price -0.270 0.021 -12.777 0.000 0.042 
Flower Bunch Constants": 
V2 Roses, large Red 0.939 0.152 6.160 0.000 V2 1.994 0.142 14.072 0.000 -1.211 
V3 White 0.725 0.160 4.529 0.000 V3 1.641 0.150 10.962 0.000 -1.037 
V4 Roses, small Red 1.284 0.136 9.454 0.000 V4 1.991 0.139 14.305 0.000 -0.921 
V5 White 1.320 0.135 9.753 0.000 V5 1.857 0.143 13.000 0.000 -0.757 
V6 Tulips Red 1.134 0.146 7.776 0.000 V6 1.712 0.150 11.384 0.000 -0.766 
V7 Yellow 1.053 0.148 7.132 0.000 V7 1.561 0.154 10.147 0.000 -0.683 
V8 Chrysanthemums Pink 1.180 0.141 8.346 0.000 V8 1.247 0.162 7.683 0.000 -0.264 
V9 Yellow 1.020 0.145 7.021 0.000 V9 1.448 0.153 9.456 0.000 -0.597 
V10 Irises Blue 0.415 0.173 2.400 0.016 V10 0.482 0.201 2.403 0.016 -0.136 
V l l White 0.059 0.203 0.290 0.772 V l l 0.781 0.184 4.255 0.000 -0.732 
V12 Dianthums Red 1.427 0.134 10.681 0.000 V12 1.889 0.143 13.166 0.000 -0.700 
V13 White 0.742 0.155 4.773 0.000 V13 1.017 0.167 6.085 0.000 -0.399 
V14 Lilies Red 0.638 0.164 3.888 0.000 V14 1.215 0.163 7.451 0.000 -0.683 
V15 Yellow 0.266 0.182 1.458 0.145 V15 0.342 0.206 1.656 0.098 -0.120 
V16 Fresias White 1.422 0.115 12.398 0.000 V16 1.601 0.131 12.219 0.000 -0.416 
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Table 4.4 Continued 
Goal = 1: Own Use 
Variable Coefficient StandErr. AsympU p-value 
V3_2C -0.119 0.178 -0.667 0.504 
V2_3C -0.106 0.191 -0.553 0.580 
V5_4C -0.049 0.156 -0.318 0.751 
V4_5C -0.198 0.158 -1.255 0.210 
V7_6C -0.194 0.169 -1.150 0.250 
V6_7C -0.331 0.179 -1.849 0.064 
V9_8C -0.346 0.170 -2.038 0.042 
V8_9C -0.214 0.176 -1.210 0.226 
V11_10C -0.067 0.215 -0.311 0.756 
V10_11C -0.436 0.285 -1.533 0.125 
V13_12C -0.193 0.149 -1.292 0.196 
V12_13C -0.603 0.219 -2.757 0.006 
V15_14C -0.058 0.197 -0.296 0.767 
V14_15C -0.509 0.260 -1.960 0.050 
Competing Store Effects: 
Constant -0.573 0.165 -3.464 0.001 
Goal = 2: Use as a Gift 
Variable Coefficient Stand.Err. Asympt.t p-value Parameter 
differences0 
V3_2C -0.139 0.136 -1.022 0.307 0.040 
V2_3C -0.313 0.160 -1.947 0.051 0.224 
V5_4C -0.018 0.136 -0.133 0.894 -0.023 
V4_5C 0.084 0.138 0.605 0.545 -0.249 
V7_6C -0.401 0.158 -2.543 0.011 0.239 
V6_7C -0.546 0.173 -3.166 0.002 0.270 
V9_8C -0.065 0.178 -0.363 0.717 -0.224 
V8_9C -0.134 0.166 -0.809 0.419 -0.044 
V11_10C 0.350 0.225 1.559 0.119 -0.406 
V10_11C -0.324 0.230 -1.409 0.159 -0.040 
V13_12C -0.135 0.140 -0.961 0.336 -0.026 
V12_13C -0.307 0.206 -1.492 0.136 -0.196 
V15_14C 0.064 0.173 0.372 0.710 -0.113 
V 1 4 J 5 C 0.100 0.250 0.402 0.688 -0.524 
a ) Numbers correspond to flower types and colors in Figure 4.1. 
") V3_2 means: cross effect of flower 3 on flower 2. 
°) Difference between own use and gift parameter, after reseating own use parameter (by multiplying with 1/1.20) 
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as a gift than for use in the home. Also note that 12:Red Dianthums are the favorite 
flower for use in the own home. None of the cross effects are significantly different 
between the two purchase conditions and neither is the price parameter. 
4.8 Evaluating different merchandise strategies 
The model that was developed in our application can be used in various ways to 
optimize assortments and to evaluate different possible merchandise strategies. In 
order to demonstrate this, we use the following simplified case. Suppose that for 
reasons such as inventory costs, supply problems, and/or space limitations, a retailer 
has been able to carry only four flower items (SKU's) at a time. The retailer has 
recorded the sales levels of each week and hence can infer what the most popular 
flowers are. She cannot infer from this historical data however what the effect will 
be of increasing the number of SKU's. Also, not all combinations of flower bunches 
will have been observed, for example because the retailer is reluctant to jeopardize 
the store image and therefore always makes sure to have roses in stock. The effect 
of substituting roses with another flower is therefore unknown. 
A choice experiment as reported in this chapter would complement the 
retailer's insights by allowing the retailer to know the effects of different assortment 
compositions and sizes on category purchases and total purchase volumes. This is 
illustrated in Table 4.5. In this table we first use the MNL model that we estimated 
from our experiment (Table 4.2) to predict the shares and total likelihood of 
purchase at this store for different assortments. For the sake of simplicity, we focus 
on the case where the retailer historically observed sales for only two assortments: I: 
{2:Red Roses, 6:Red Tulips, 7:Yellow Tulips and 12:Red Dianthums} and II: 
{2:Red Roses, 6:Red Tulips, 10:Blue Irises and ll:White Irises}. Because these two 
assortments both carry 2:Red Roses and 6:Red Tulips, it is impossible to 
disentangle the effect of the availability of these flowers on purchase likelihoods of 
other flowers in the assortment or on the total likelihood of purchasing at this store. 
Neither is it possible to know the separate effect of carrying 12:Red Dianthum 
versus carrying the two Irises. In contrast, the choice experimental results 
disentangle the contribution of each separate item to the total sales. It furthermore 
allows the prediction of item shares and purchase likelihood from any assortment, 
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as demonstrated for assortments la and lb. If the extended logit model is used 
instead of the regular MNL, different predictions result for item shares and total 
sales volume. For example, in assortment la the predicted total sales is half a 
percent less than if the extended logit model is used. Moreover, the share for 
dianthums is predicted to be higher. The effects observed for assortment lb indicate 
that, though in this case the extended model predicts the same sales volume, the 
retailer should stock less roses and more tulips. 
As another example of an assortment problem we take the case of assortment 
Ha, which is one of the possible assortments that our retailer ponders. Assortment 
Ha carries six items: 2:Red Roses, 3:White Roses, 6:Red Tulips, 10:Blue Irises, 
12:Red Dianthums and 13:White Dianthums. Our retailer* s major worry for this 
assortment is that 3: White Roses substitute with 2:Red Roses and similarly, that 
12:Red and 13:White Dianthums are such close substitutes that the sales effect of 
the assortment size extension is minimal whereas the handling and inventory costs 
may have increased. Furthermore there may be a fear that having only one type of 
Iris will make the Iris flower category go unnoticed. As demonstrated in our 
example, the extended logit model estimated for this application indicates that 
substitution among these flowers does occur, however not to a large extent. As can 
be seen in Table 4.5, the MNL and the extended logit predictions of shares of flower 
items and of total purchase likelihood differ a few percentage points. The difference 
between both models' results may seem small, but it can still have a large impact on 
profits. It should also be noted that in other applications larger deviations easily 
may occur. 
Finally, the model results can be used to select an optimal assortment. As an 
example we again focus on assortments consisting of six items. If we assume ah 
SKU's to have identical margins and cost structures, and hence, (relative) prices, the 
parameters in the simple MNL can be used directly to compose the optimal 
assortment. This assortment (Jib) would consist of the six items with the largest 
constants in the model (2:Red Large Roses, 4:Red Small Roses, 5:White Small 
Roses, 6:Red Tulips, 12:Red Dianthums, 14:Red Lilies, 16:White Freesias). It 
would increase the predicted purchase likelihood from 90 to 94 percent. Though the 
procedure is a little more complex, the extended logit model can be used in a similar 
fashion to derive the optimal assortment. It involves that for each alternative two 
utilities are calculated, one for the case where the alternative is the sole 
Table 4.5 Simulation results for various assortment compositions (Probabilities predicted using the MNL and extended logit models). 
Assortments with four items Assortments with six items 
Category Item IA IB IIA IIB 
MNL Extended MNL Extended MNL Extended MNL Extended 
Roses, large Red V2 .242 .209 .336 .278 .199 .154 .135 .106 
White V3 .141 .117 
Roses, small Red V4 .161 .144 
White V5 .147 .150 
Tulips Red V6 .204 .179 .283 .320 .168 .202 .114 .122 
Yellow V7 .170 .149 
Chrysanthemums Pink V8 
Yellow V9 
Irises Blue V10 .132 .175 .078 .095 
White V l l .101 .078 
Dianthums Red V12 .276 .350 .227 .249 .154 .177 
White V13 .093 .085 
Lilies Red V14 .080 .073 
Yellow V15 
Fresias White V16 .142 .169 
None VO .057 .075 .079 .100 .047 .063 .032 .038 
Alternative store VI .051 .037 .070 .049 .047 .035 .034 .022 
Probability of purchase in this store .893 .888 .851 .851 .906 .902 .934 .940 
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representative of the category and one for the case where both alternatives are 
present in the assortment. In our present application this procedure leads to a similar 
advice regarding the optimal assortment derived from the MNL. This will not be 
true in general however. Note furthermore that our models imply different numbers 
of items to stock for the different items. Finally, if different cost structures and 
margins were allowed, then other optimization techniques, such as linear 
programming, need to be used to derive the optimal design size and composition. In 
general, this will lead to different assortment solutions. 
4.9 Conclusions and discussion 
The assortment forms an important component of the retail mix together with other 
distributive services, such as store ambience. In addition to mere product 
preference, consumer choice of store and item is influenced by distribution services 
that jointly constitute the retail context. This chapter adopted a comprehensive 
formalization of the relationship between consumer need for distribution services 
and retail demand and operationalized distribution services with respect to 
consumer choice using insights from cognitive psychology. It specifically 
investigated the relationships between three retail context variables with respect to 
store and item choice: assortment composition, i.e., the availability of specific items 
and their prices, store ambience, and consumers' consumption goals. 
This chapter argued the usefulness of choice experiments and extended logit 
models for modeling consumer decisions regarding the selection of items and 
assortments. Choice experiments allow the researcher to control the composition of 
the assortments for which responses are collected. In addition, they allow control 
over the decision context in terms of for example purchase goal, store ambience, 
and the availability of competing stores and their characteristics. The extended logit 
model allows the researcher to model and gain insight into the substitution patterns 
within and among the assortments that are studied, which can be either categories or 
total stores. The combined use of choice experiments and the extended logit model 
methods thus allows a full-fledged operationalization of the conceptual framework 
regarding assortments and distributive services that was developed by Betancourt 
and Gautschi (1990,1992). 
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The approach was demonstrated in an apphcation to modehng consumer 
choices from and among cut flower assortments in florist stores. For this product 
category various hypotheses regarding substitution patterns and effects of 
distributive service characteristics were empirically tested. With respect to store 
characteristics it was found that in-store decisions of customers about whether to 
purchase at the present store, at a competing store, or to not purchase at all, are not 
much affected by the ambience or choice range expected for the competing store, 
nor by the travel distance to that store (HI). We also found no evidence that these 
decisions are affected by the ambience of the store in which the decision is made 
(H2), and no interaction between the current and the competing store's ambience 
(H3), even though our manipulation checks the manipulations to be successful. We 
did find however an effect of the size of the assortment in the present store on the 
likelihood of walking out to the other store (H5). That is, the constants for the 
various items were significant whereas the parameter that we included in the model 
to capture overall substitution within the current assortment was not significant. 
Within the model that was used this indicates that an increase in assortment size 
attracts additional purchases proportional to the attractiveness of the items added. 
Once a consumer has entered the store the present assortment, if large enough, thus 
constitutes a powerful force that induces consumers to purchase. A store's drawing 
power is in particular at jeopardy if a competing store is located nearby and the 
store's own ambience is poor. We furthermore found that the availability of a 
competing store differentially affected the purchase likelihood of the items in the 
current store. With respect to the model presented in chapter 3 (figure 3.1), which 
extends beyond the scope of the study reported in this chapter, we conclude that the 
presented retail assortment influences consumers' purchase decisions for cutflowers 
to a large extent. Store ambience as well as store accessibility have only limited 
influence on purchase decisions. 
With respect to assortment composition we found evidence that different color 
flowers of the same variety act like substitutes (H4), but not for all varieties. We 
found for example that different color tulips act very much like substitutes, whereas 
white and red roses are not substitutes at all. We were also able to test for 
differential price cross effects within flower types (H6), but found that none of the 
price cross effects was significant; hence, we conclude that there was no differential 
price substitution within flower types. We finally were able to demonstrate 
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asymmetric dominance effects. In most cases we found that red flowers dominated 
yellow or white flowers, meaning that if a red flower is added to an assortment that 
contains a white flower of the same type, the sales for the white flower go down, 
but that the reverse is not true. Comparison of results for the two consumption goals 
revealed substantial differences in purchase hkelihood and cross effects between 
choices as a gift and for own use (H7, see also figure 3.1). We for example found 
that the own use sample is most likely to buy red dianthums, whereas the gift 
sample most often buys red roses. We readily admit that the test of this last 
hypothesis was only quasi-experimental, we leave it for follow-up research to 
further test for differences in preference arising from differences in purchase goal. 
This chapter at least shows how one in principle can manipulate purchase goal 
through choice experiments. 
There are several possible explanations for not finding an ambience or travel 
time effect. One concerns the nature of our application and consumption goal; we 
analyzed the effects of store characteristics on decisions regarding the intended 
purchase of cut flowers for own use only. Store characteristics may be more 
relevant for impulse purchases and for more deliberate purchases, and also for 
purchase goals that evoke higher levels of involvement, such as gifts. 
Another possible explanation for finding insignificant effects for most store 
characteristics is sample heterogeneity. Capturing heterogeneity is one issue to 
explore in further analyses of this data, for example by including 
socio-demographic or purchase history variables in the model or by estimating 
heteroscedastic extreme value models. Pursuing such types of analysis however was 
not the focus of the present chapter. A final explanation could be that our 
manipulations of ambience and competing store choice range and distance diluted 
over de course of the choice tasks. Note that our manipulation checks confirmed 
that the stores' ambience and the competing store's choice range were perceived as 
assumed. The checks however were not repeated after the choice task had been 
completed, so we cannot be sure that the manipulation was equally effective for all 
the choice sets. In next applications attempts should be made to control for this. 
It needs little explanation that models as developed here are of much interest 
to retail managers. Models like this provide a powerful tool to support the 
optimization of retail assortments. The models allow simulations of assortment 
compositions and store repositionings in varying competitive scenarios. The models 
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can help to predict the effects of changes in retail mix elements on customers' 
purchase behavior. The model parameters give insight into the patterns of 
substitution and asymmetric dominance. Model simulations of different retail 
merchandise strategies can help to investigate the effects of assortment composition 
on category shares and purchase likelihood. If the costs of carrying the different 
product items are known, optimization models could complement the use of the 
proposed approach to determine optimal assortment size and composition, and 
consequently maximize total return and minimize duplication. 
The approach obviously also has its limitations however. Many of these are 
issues to focus on in future research. One is to further conceptualize and 
operationalize the possible purchase conditions, and to develop a refined sampling 
frame of purchase conditions. As demonstrated, an important aspect of the approach 
is that it allows one to specifically define the choice task in terms of the assumed 
purchase conditions. In the end however one will wish to generalize the results and 
use the models to predict for example total sales across all purchase conditions. 
Another issue is preference heterogeneity, which may be accommodated by proper 
segmentation as noted. Third, the external validity might be enhanced, though there 
is accumulating evidence already that experimental choice methods allow very 
precise real market predictions (after reseating the parameters to be in accordance 
with the error level of the model when used to make predictions for the target 
market of interest). Finally, the approach we presented was limited in the respect 
that we analyzed single choices of single components. Designing experiments and 
developing models to study quantities purchased, multiple purchases, or bundles of 
items seems to be a logical next step in this area. 

Part m: 
Retailer Distribution Service Provision and Consumer 
Satisfaction/Dissatisfaction Formation 

Chapter 5 
Supplier Determinants of Consumer Distribution 
Service Evaluation 
5.1 Introduction 
Every firm wants to satisfy and retain its customers. Satisfied customers are likely 
to continue their relationship with the firm, and they require less marketing effort 
than new customers. They are inclined to purchase more and acquire new customers 
through positive word-of-mouth (Reichheld and Sasser 1990). Customer satisfaction 
has a significant impact on profitability; it is central to assessing the past 
performance of firms, and to predicting their future financial success (Anderson and 
Fornell 1994). The present part of this book investigates the role of retailer 
distribution service provision in consumer postpurchase evaluation and satisfaction 
formation. More specifically, it relates determinants of supplier distribution service 
provision and actual distribution service performance indicators to consumer 
evaluations of the shopping experience and of the products purchased. 
Retailers influence their customers' perceptions of product and service quality 
through the physical products they sell, the service they deliver, the prices they 
charge, their promotions, as well as the whole range of physical evidence they show 
in their stores. Retailer distribution service provision often is related to the sale of a 
physical product and consequently influences a consumer's evaluation of an 
exchange episode through experience with both the physical product and the 
associated service, as has already been argued in chapter 2. A retailer should 
therefore ask herself how she influences consumer perceptions of product and 
service quality and what impact her logistics operations have on consumer service 
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perceptions and ultimately on satisfaction/dissatisfaction. Related questions include 
"to what extent are consumers' perceptions of distribution costs affected by retailer 
behavior," and "are retailers able to make up for low service levels provided by 
their supplier?" 
Most studies on consumer satisfaction/dissatisfaction use measures of 
consumer perceptions of, often experimentally manipulated, product performance 
attributes. Research on retailer performance on the other hand concerns mostly 
real-life behavior and is usually assessed through SERVQUAL-related measures 
(Parasuraman, Zeithaml, and Berry 1988), that predominantly consider consumer 
perceptions of contact personnel service performance. During a service encounter 
customers only experience performance of the service provider's front-office, 
whereas a service provider would be interested in the effects of front and 
back-office service performance on customer evaluation. Insight into the causes of 
consumer satisfaction/dissatisfaction with their retailer's offerings and subsequent 
improvement of retailer distribution service provision cannot be obtained from 
consideration of consumer perceptions of specific aspects of retailer service 
encounter performance only. The antecedents of consumer 
satisfaction/dissatisfaction should therefore include other measures of the process 
and outcomes of retailer service provision, such as variables relating to retailer 
decisions, and objective assessments of service performance. 
This chapter adopts a broad perspective on consumer satisfaction/ 
dissatisfaction with retail performance and focuses on supplier, in particular retailer, 
distribution service-related determinants of consumer perceptions of service and 
product performance, and resulting consumer satisfaction/ dissatisfaction. A study 
has been done among retailers and their customers in which the three conceptual 
approaches to distribution service that were discussed in chapter 2, i.e., distribution 
service as logistics system performance, the economic approach, and distribution 
service as a behavioral concept, were brought together as antecedents of consumer 
satisfaction/dissatisfaction. Data collection has been done among retailers and their 
customers in a real-world market. Through decomposition of the data into consumer 
and retailer effects using multilevel regression analysis the research model has been 
estimated and the impact of retailer and consumer variables in consecutive stages of 
consumers' evaluation processes could be assessed. 
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The chapter proceeds as follows. First, in 5.2 the theory on consumer 
satisfaction/dissatisfaction formation as a result of distribution service evaluation, 
including perceived product and service performance as its antecedents, is reviewed 
briefly and the consumer model is developed. The concepts discussed in this section 
represent mainly the behavioral approach to distribution service, as described in 
chapter 2 1. Section 5.3 discusses the retailer model, i.e., determinants of supplier 
distribution service performance and their potential impact on consumer perceptions 
of product and service performance. Next, 5.4 presents the design of the study, 
datacollection, and measurement. Data analysis is done in 5.5. Finally, section 5.6 
discusses and concludes the results of the study. 
5.2 Consumer distribution service evaluation and satisfaction formation 
Studies on consumer satisfaction/dissatisfaction generally adopt the discorifirmation 
of expectations paradigm which describes the psychological process underlying 
consumer satisfaction formation. This section discusses the disconfirmation of 
expectations paradigm and adapts it to fit analysis of the role of distribution service 
provision in consumer satisfaction formation. 
5.2.1 Consumer satisfaction/dissatisfaction 
Satisfaction has been stated to result from "processing the affect in a consumption 
experience" (Hunt 1977; Mano and Oliver 1993; Yi 1990). Spreng, MacKenzie, and 
Olshavsky (1996) argue that overall satisfaction is "an affective state that is the 
emotional reaction to a product or service experience". Accordingly, feeling-related 
items have been included in scales measuring CS/D. Mano and Oliver (1993) 
mention that "...the adjective 'satisfied' has been found in studies that assess 
pleasantness or other positive emotions...". Several empirical studies found 
significant correlations between measures of feelings and satisfaction (e.g., 
Westbrook 1987; Westbrook and Oliver 1991). 
For more details the reader is referred to chapter 4, section 2.3 and chapter 2, figure 2.1. 
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Cognitive judgments on product attributes (e.g., Oliver 1980) or product 
relevance (e.g., Mano and Oliver 1983) precurse consumer satisfaction/ 
dissatisfaction. The dominant paradigm of satisfaction/dissatisfaction (hereafter 
referred to as CS/D) formation - the disconfirmation of expectations model -
specifies that CS/D results from a comparison of expectations concerning the 
quality of consumption, with the actual consumption experiences (Oliver 1980). 
The model assumes expectations are used as a standard against which experiences 
are compared, with satisfaction or dissatisfaction as an outcome. In course of time 
substraction of expectations and experiences as a measure of disconfirmation has 
been replaced by direct measurement of perceived disconfirmation of expectations 
as a separate construct that mediates the effects of expectations and perceptions of 
performance on consumer satisfaction/dissatisfaction. The model has been used 
widely for analysis of CS/D with goods as well as services after a single purchase 
and/or usage experience (cf. Churchill and Surprenant 1982; Oliver 1980), as well 
as for the analysis of CS/D processes over multiple service encounters or 
transactions, for example in a retailing context (Oliver 1981). 
5.2.2 Consumer perceptions of retail performance 
According to the disconfirmation of expectations model of CS/D formation 
perceived product performance is an antecedent of CS/D. With respect to 
distribution service provision and associated retail performance chapter 2 already 
argued that distribution service provision may affect both product and service 
quality. Whether or not a firm considers production and sale of physical products as 
its core business, the service encounter may have a significant impact on total 
customer experience. Since publication of Parasuraman, Zeithaml and Berry's 
(1985) conceptual model of perceived service quality the concept is generally 
considered a customer's attitude or global judgment on service superiority or 
excellence. Perceived quality has been treated in the literature as a cognitive-based 
evaluation of service excellence, resulting from evaluation of the so-called 
get-components or the benefits a consumer receives from consumption of a good or 
a service. The literature on perceived product quality focuses predominantly on 
consumers' prepurchase quality judgments. Due to the characteristics of services, 
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such as intangibility and simultaneity of production and consumption, services 
possess relatively many experience and credence attributes and relatively few 
search attributes and prepurchase evaluation is relatively difficult (cf. Zeithaml 
1981). Accordingly, the literature on perceived service quality has focused almost 
exclusively on postpurchase and postconsumption evaluation. From an operational 
point of view perceived service quality has been defined as the difference between a 
consumer's expectations and perceptions of service performance (e.g., 
Parasuraman, Zeithaml, and Berry 1988), where expectations serve as a benchmark 
against which service performance is evaluated. Note the similarity to the perceived 
disconfirmation of expectations concept. 
The causal relationship between perceived service quality and consumer 
satisfaction/dissatisfaction (CS/D) has caused some confusion among researchers 
and has received considerable attention in literature. Fisk, Brown, and Bitner (1995) 
indicated the ambiguity between CS/D with services and perceived service quality 
by stating that "...researchers do not share common definitions of the terms, nor is 
there clear understanding of how the two relate." However, perceived product 
quality and perceived service quality are equivalent to the product or service 
evaluations used in disconfirmation of expectation models (e.g., Mano and Oliver 
1993; Oliver 1980) as an antecedent of CS/D. Several studies (Woodside, Frey and 
Daly 1989; Iacobucci, et al. 1996; Reidenbach and Sandifer-Smallwood 1990) 
already indicated that perceived quality is an antecedent of CS/D. Consumer 
perceptions of distribution service performance that express itself through 
perceptions of product and service quality will therefore be considered as an 
antecedent of CS/D in the present study. 
5.23 The role of consumer expectations in CS/D formation 
The role of expectations in both quality formation and measurement and consumer 
satisfaction/dissatisfaction is still somewhat ambiguous. Both the dominant 
framework for perceived service quality and the expectation- disconfimation 
framework assume that a customer is both motivated and able to form prior 
expectations, and is motivated and able to compare these with subsequent 
experiences. Several studies did not find a significant effect of expectations on 
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CS/D. Oliver and DeSarbo (1988) found that the most dominant process in CS/D 
formation was based on experiences and disconfmnation of expectations, see also, 
e.g., Churchill and Surprenant 1982, and Oliver and Bearden 1983. Measurement of 
perceived service quality using SERVQUAL has lead to similar results, which 
motivated development of a new instrument, SERVPERF (Cronin and Taylor 1992, 
1994), based solely on measurement of performance perceptions. The 
disconfirmation of expectations model does not take into account the fact that a 
specific firm is competing for the consumer's attention with other firms that exist in 
a market. Rigid application and interpretation of the 1-period, static 
expectation-disconfirmation model would encourage managers to lower customer 
expectations as much as possible, just above the level where customers will decide 
not to enter the service encounter. The implausible result of such actions would be, 
according to the model, maximization of positive expectation-disconfirmation as 
well as satisfaction. Spreng, MacKenzie, and Olshavsky (1996) solve for the 
inconsistencies of the expectation-disconfirmation model by adding desires 
congruency in addition to expectations congruency as a separate intermediate 
concept preceding satisfaction. After all, low expectations together with low 
perceived performance do not lead to satisfied customers when the product does not 
perform as desired. 
One explanation for the changing role of expectations in both quality and 
CS/D measurement is given by the occurrence and nature of assimilation processes 
(e.g., Pieters, Koelemeijer, and Roest 1995). The standard disconfirmation of 
expectations model assumes that expectations and experiences are independent 
constructs that do not mutually influence each other. Expectations thus are not 
assumed to have a direct impact on experiences and vice versa. Expectations act as 
a comparison standard in the formation of CS/D in a direct and negative way, since 
for a certain level of experiences, customers with high expectations will be less 
satisfied than customers with low expectations (Oliver 1980). Assimilation theory 
(Hovland et al. 1957) specifies that people dislike to experience discrepancies from 
their previously held positions or opinions, and therefore assimilate their 
interpretations of events and their experiences in the direction of their previous 
positions. 
Forward assimilation occurs when expectations influence CS/D by affecting 
the level of experiences of customers. The impact of expectations in case of forward 
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assimilation is indirect and positive, since the higher the expectations are, the higher 
the experiences will be. Through forward assimilation, increased expectations will 
lead to increased experiences with the service and consequently putting effort into 
increasing customer expectations would pay off to the point where they become 
credible. Consumers tend to rely on the consumption experience itself when the 
experience is unambiguous, and tend to rely on prior hypotheses when the 
experience is ambiguous (Hoch and Ha 1986). It is therefore likely that forward 
assimilation is stronger for services with many credence attributes, or where the 
experiences are rather ambiguous, than for services with many search attributes and 
where experiences are rather unambiguous. 
The disconfirmation of expectations model implies that people are able to 
recall their prior expectations correctly once the outcomes of an event, for example 
a service encounter, become known. However, people are often unable to remember 
their expectations of the outcomes of an event correctly once the outcomes of the 
event become known (Christensen-Szalanski and Willham 1991). A consumer may 
have no correct recall of his or her prior expectations, for example when he or she 
finds it difficult to form prior expectations, or when the experience deviates largely 
from prior expectations. In those cases recalled expectations may be used as the 
comparison standard instead of, or in addition to, prior expectations, or influence 
CS/D directly. This backward assimilation effect on CS/D is similar to what is 
known as hindsight bias (Fishhoff 1975). 
Several causes can be pointed out for finding an insignificant effect of prior 
quality expectations on CS/D in empirical studies. Consumers may use recalled 
expectations as a basis of comparison instead of prior expectations. In addition, 
when expectations are measured in hindsight, as is done in most SERVQUAL 
apphcations, a significant effect of expectations may be found although prior 
expectations do not relate to the outcome. Expectations may drive experiences, 
resulting in almost equal measurement scores for expectations and perceived 
performance. Finally, continuous adaptation of expectations over time, for example 
as a result of frequent consumption of goods and frequently encountered services 
(Oliver 1981) will lead to strongly reduced disconfirmation of expectations and 
consequently CS/D will be most likely driven dominantly by experiences (Cronin 
and Taylor 1992), with more positive experiences leading to more satisfaction and 
more negative experiences leading to more dissatisfaction. In that case, CS/D is 
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likely to become less extreme with low expectation-disconfirmation, leading to less 
extreme satisfaction in the case of positive disconfirmation, and less extreme 
dissatisfaction in the case of negative disconfirmation. 
5.2.4 The consumer model 
The consumer model of CS/D formation that will be used in the present study is 
presented in figure 5.1. Expectations and perceptions of retailer performance, 
together with perceived disconfirmation of expectations have been modeled as 
antecedents of CS/D. Given the effect of distribution service on reducing 
consumers' cost of product acquisition as mentioned in chapter 2, consumers' 
perceptions of distribution-related cost have been included in the model as an 
antecedent of perceived service performance and perceived disconfirmation of 
expectations. By definition retailer distribution service provision is related 
non-positively to consumers' distribution-related cost. In particular logistical 
service provision by a retailer lowers consumer distribution-related cost. Cost 
reduction, although preceded by actual service provision, is a benefit of service 
provision that is experienced by consumers. Consequently, distribution cost 
perception is an antecedent of consumer perception of distribution service 
performance. In addition, perceived distribution-related cost represents the 
sacrifices consumers make in obtaining the product and are therefore proposed to 
directly affect both disconfirmation of expectations and CS/D. 
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EXP Expected retailer performance 
PERF Perceived retailer performance 
DCOST Perceived distribution-related cost 
DISC Perceived disconfirmatioE of expectations 
CS/D Consumer satisfaction/dissatisfaction 
Figure 5.1. Consumer-level model of CS/D with retail performance 
5.3 Determinants of retailer distribution service performance 
The introduction to this chapter as well as chapter 2 argued that a retailer's and her 
supplier's distribution service provision affect the quality of the goods and pure 
services delivered by the retailer. This section discusses three major sources of a 
retailer's distribution service performance. Following Betancourt and Gautschi 
(1990) each retailer faces a strategic choice with respect to the consumption goals 
and consumer tastes to be catered. Decisions on distribution service provision thus 
result from a retailer's strategic orientation. In addition to the retailer's strategic 
choice two other determinants of distribution service provision deserve attention 
that relate to the retailer's actual provision of adequate distribution service. The 
quality of the relationship between channel members, e.g., a retailer and her 
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supplier, is an important determinant of commitment and cooperation. 
Consequently, it might affect the retailer's service delivery process and ultimately 
the quality of distribution services a retailer provides to her customers. Finally, 
distribution service performance is influenced by the provider's physical 
distribution system according to the logistics system view on distribution service 
that was discussed in chapter 2. Suppher distribution service provision indirectly 
affects retailer distribution service provision through its influence on physical 
product quality and retailer distribution cost, and exerts a direct influence on retailer 
distribution provision through the interrelatedness of suppher and retailer physical 
distribution systems. As a well-known example of the latter, if a suppher does not 
deliver reliably, his customer may in turn not be able to provide reliable delivery or 
only at a high cost. This section discusses the three determinants of retailer 
distribution service performance mentioned above and develops hypotheses 
concerning their effects on consumer satisfaction formation. 
5«3.1 Retailer strategic orientation 
A retailer has to make a strategic choice concerning distribution service she plans to 
provide. Given the consumption activities the retailer caters her decisions on the 
appropriate service package are influenced by factors such as the characteristics of 
the consumption goals aimed at by consumers, consumers' heterogeneous tastes, 
competing retailers' service provision, characteristics of the goods carried, and the 
costs involved in service provision. Distribution service forms an important aspect 
of retailer positioning. For example, a retailer who aims at providing excellent 
service will focus on expertise and communicative skills in personnel selection, 
while a cost-oriented retailer will put a stronger emphasis on efficiency. In the 
research reported in this chapter the retailer's actual strategic choice is considered 
exogenous, as opposed to the research presented in chapters 6 and 7. 
While most strategy typologies have been developed for manufacturing firms 
(e.g., Porter 1980), Wortzel (1987) distinguished three generic retailer competitive 
strategies that seem very useful for the research under focus in this chapter. The 
three strategic dimensions are price leadership, defined as "consistently offering 
lower prices than competitors," merchandise differentiation or "offering an 
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assortment of unique products," and service and personality augmentation or 
"providing convenience, product advice, or an especially attractive setting". Note 
that the two latter strategies match elements of distribution service as defined in 
chapter 2. Smith, Venkatraman, and Wortzel (1995) adopt Wortzel's (1987) 
classification of retailer strategies, with the exception of "service and personality 
augmentation", and argue that retailer competitive strategy drives retailer actions, as 
well as retailer perceptions of manufacturers' supporting activities. They found that 
retailer and manufacturer activities together influence retailer performance relative 
to competition in terms of profitability and sales. 
In the study conducted for this chapter all three strategic dimensions as 
suggested by Wortzel (1987) have been considered. As will be shown in the 
methodology section the specific application under focus - specialized retailing of 
cut flowers - favored joining the merchandise differentiation and service and 
personality augmentation strategies into one distribution service strategy dimension. 
This dimension represents distribution service provision, i.e., assortment vs. 
information provision, location, delivery, and ambience. Retailers following a 
service strategy will be oriented towards consumer service needs and consequently 
perform better on distribution service provision than retailers following a low-price 
strategy. The associated hypothesis is therefore: 
Hypothesis la Retailer strategic service-orientation is related positively to 
consumer perceptions of distribution service performance. 
A consumer's distribution cost is by definition influenced by retailer 
distribution service provision. Retailer strategy will therefore lead to differential 
cost perceptions by consumers: 
Hypothesis lb Retailer strategic service-orientation is related negatively to 
consumers' perceptions of distribution-related cost. 
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5.3.2 Retailer-supplier relationship 
Trust is an important concept pertaining to a firm's attitude towards a specific 
supplier. A channel member trusts another channel member if he firmly beliefs that 
"the trustworthy party is reliable and has high integrity" (Morgan and Hunt 1994). 
When a relationship between two channel members is characterized by high levels 
of trust both parties can allow themselves to focus on the long-term aspects of their 
relationship instead of worrying about the other party's opportunistic behavior 
(Doney and Cannon 1997; Ganesan 1994; Noordewier, John, and Nevin 1990). This 
will lead to lower transaction costs and increased competitiveness. Credibility and 
benevolence are the two determinants of trust (Ganesan 1994), where credibility 
refers to the belief that the trading partner is a rehable expert in conducting 
transactions with, and benevolence reflects the partner's genuine interest and 
motivation in joint business. According to Morgan and Hunt (1994) behavioral 
intentions or the willingness to act are considered an outcome or a potential 
indicator of trust that would be appropriately included in a measure of trust. 
Trust in a supplier influences buyer cooperation (Morhan and Hunt 1994, 
Schurr and Ozanne 1985) and effort (Anderson, Lodish, and Weitz 1987), while it 
reduces conflict and increases channel member satisfaction (Anderson and Narus 
1990). Overall, trust affects a buyer's commitment to a relationship (Anderson and 
Weitz 1992; Geyskens et al. 1996; Moorman, Zaltman, and Despande 1992; 
Morgan and Hunt 1994). For an overview of trust in a distribution channel context 
see for example Doney and Cannon (1997). 
Reve and Stern (1986) developed a broad behavioral concept related to trust, 
i.e., transaction climate, which is defined as "a set of sentiments and behaviors that 
characterize the exchange". Underlying transaction climate are goal compatibility, 
domain consensus, evaluation of accomplishment, and norms of exchange. Reve 
and Stern argue that the less conflictive the climate is, the higher performance is 
likely to be, despite discussion in the literature about the functionahty of conflict. 
Based on Williamson's (1975, 1979) transaction cost theory argument that 
transactions are less costly to complete when exchanges take place in an atmosphere 
of trust and commonality of purpose, they hypothesized that a more favorable 
transaction climate would lead to higher economic performance of the members of 
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retailer-wholesaler mterfirm dyads. Their study did however not generate 
convincing empirical evidence in support of this hypothesis. 
In a close buyer-seller relationship transaction cost benefits can be realized not 
only because less effort is required in order to complete an exchange, but also 
because a supplier will provide distribution service that better fits the retailer's 
needs. A closer relationship implies better communication and cooperation and 
consequently supplier service provision will be better adapted to the retailer's needs 
and likely even the retailer's customers' needs. In addition, a retailer can translate 
her (transaction) cost benefits into improved service provision to her customers. 
This will affect consumers' satisfaction formation through perception of distribution 
service performance and distribution-related cost and can even extend beyond 
service provision and influence disconfirmation of expectations. The associated 
hypotheses are therefore: 
Hypothesis 2a A retailer's trust in her main supplier is related positively to her 
customers' perceptions of distribution service performance. 
Hypothesis 2b A retailer's trust in her main supplier is related negatively to 
customers' perceptions of distribution-related cost. 
Hypothesis 2c The level of retailer trust in her main supplier is related negatively 
to positive disconfirmation of consumer expectations. 
533 Retailer distribution system performance 
A retailer's logistics operations play a crucial role in distribution service provision, 
since logistics operations affect almost every distribution service element, including 
the assortment, through lead times and inventory level, information provision, 
delivery at the right time, and quality maintenance. Chapter 2 argued that logistics 
performance indicators may be important for system control, but give insufficient 
information to gain insight into customer evaluation of distribution service. The 
limited relationship between logistics performance indicators and customer 
perceptions was confirmed by Koelemeijer, I^rnmink and Wetzels (1994). They 
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investigated the causal relationship between two objectively measured logistics 
performance indicators, i.e., fill rate and lead time deviation, and subjective 
measures of service performance, for contact persons of 117 international customers 
of a large, multinational, Dutch-based brewery. The logistics performance 
indicators showed only significant relationships with nonpersonal, "technical" 
dimensions of perceived service performance. The same article mentions that in 
another similar study among customers of a Dutch manufacturer of food products a 
significant relationship was found between fill rate and customer evaluation of 
transportation only, while the percentage of backorders did not have a relationship 
to customer evaluation at all. These studies however were focused on 
manufacturer-distributor relationships and used common logistics performance 
indicators that were related to delivery time and inventory positions. The study that 
was done for this chapter analyzes retailer-consumer relationships, using logistics 
performance indicators that have been designed for the particular study. Given the 
definition of distribution service in chapter 2 and the resulting link with logistics 
operations the hypotheses are: 
Hypothesis 3a Retailer logistics performance relates positively to perceived 
distribution service performance. 
Hypothesis 3b Retailer logistics performance relates negatively to consumer 
perceptions of distribution-related cost. 
5.4 Methodology 
The research application focuses on fresh cut flowers sold through specialized 
florists' outlets in. Both the physical product and distribution channels for fresh cut 
flowers possess a number of characteristics that suit analysis of distribution services 
particularly well. Since chapter 4, section 5 already mentioned the characteristics of 
fresh flower distribution additional relevant characteristics will be discussed very 
briefly here. Flowers are distributed as heterogeneous, perishable, unbranded and 
unpackaged products, whose prices vary daily. The only product labels available to 
the final consumer are the name of the flower variety, the retailer's name, and 
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possibly the auction name on the flower container. For wholesalers and retailers 
who purchase at the auction, quality information supplied by the auction and the 
producer's name are the only available labels. Product and retailer performance will 
therefore be interwoven in the consumer's mind and the retailer plays an active role 
with respect to both product and service performance. This translates into high 
customer loyalty; over 70% of the consumers that were interviewed for purpose of 
the current study had bought for more than three years in succession at that 
particular florist's. 
5.4.1 Datacollection 
The research approach followed used a nested design with multiple customer 
interviews per retailer. Retailer interviews were conducted first. A proportionally 
stratified sample was drawn from a database, consisting of over 8,000 outlets in The 
Netherlands that sell fresh cut flowers, which had been made available by the 
Flower Council of Holland. The retailers in the database differed greatly with 
respect to the outlet through which they operate - e.g., either through a store, on 
open air markets, or even selling from their own home - and the nature of their 
business, e.g., both specialized florists, supermarkets, gasoline stations, and gift 
shops were included in the database. Since the research focuses on specialized 
florist stores and the database did not provide any information on retailer type 
telephone interviews were held with the retailers in the sample. A retailer was 
considered qualified for the research if she operated a store specialized in selling 
flowers and pot plants with regular and fixed opening hours. From a final sample of 
300 florist owners or managers selling through specialized stores 205 (68.3%) were 
interviewed personally. 
When ah interviews with retailers had been completed, their customers were 
interviewed. Interviewers were randomly allocated to four-hour time blocks during 
a three-week period in which no hohdays occurred and that were scheduled 
proportionally to nation-wide flower sales throughout an average week, e.g., far 
more interviews were held on Friday and Saturday than on Monday and Tuesday. 
Central for the study were postpurchase interviews that were conducted with 1197 
consumers who bought cut flowers after leaving a florist's that participated in the 
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study. In addition, 251 consumers were interviewed before entering a store. 
Ninety-five percent of them made a purchase in the store: 207 (82.5%) consumers 
bought fresh cut flowers, 29 (11,6%) bought a houseplant, and 3 (1.2%) bought 
another product. The 207 consumers who bought cut flowers were interviewed once 
again immediately after leaving the store. Accordingly, a total of 1404 postpurchase 
interviews were completed. Since analysis of the data elaborates on the nested 
research design only retailers with three or more interviewed customers were 
retained. In addition, the multilevel regression analysis software package used to 
analyze the data (ML3) does not allow missing values at the retail level. Therefore, 
retailers with one or more missing values with respect to the constructs used in the 
analysis were removed. This lead to a final sample consisting of 154 completed 
retailer interviews and 1210 matching, completed consumer postpurchase 
interviews that were input for statistical analysis. 
5.4.2 Consumer construct measurement 
The consumer constructs that have been measured for the study include consumer 
satisfaction/dissatisfaction, perceived discorrfirmation of expectations, perceived 
distribution service performance, and perceptions of distribution-related cost. Table 
5.1 presents an overview of the characteristics of the consumer constructs measured 
in the postpurchase interviews. 
Perceived distribution service performance. Perceptions of distribution service 
performance were measured on a 16-item 7-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 
"Totally disagree" (1) to 'Totally agree" (7), similar to SERVQUAL (Parasuraman, 
Zeithaml, and Berry 1988). The items referred to the distribution service dimensions 
mentioned in the previous chapter, i.e., assortment, availabihty of information, 
accessibility of location, delivery at the right time and in the right form, and 
ambience, and the personal interaction dimensions represented in the SERVQUAL 
scale. The latter have been modified to suit the particular retail service encounter 
under focus. The final 16 scale items were retained from a pool of 102 items 
generated through literature search and consumer interviews. First, 225 consumers 
who were frequent buyers of fresh cut flowers rated item importance on a 
three-point scale and rated item determinance as the extent to which their regular 
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florist's performance on each service item matched their expectations. The scale 
was purified through ehmination of the items that were unequivocally considered to 
be least important. Factoranalysis revealed five factors, i.e., personal interaction and 
ambience, product quality maintenance, information and expertise, presentation and 
layout, and assortment. Next, a new group of 150 consumers rated their regular 
florist's service performance on the important and determinant items that resulted 
from the previous stage. The results of this datacollection procedure yielded the 
three-factor 16-item scale that was used in the study. The dimensions were labeled 
personal interaction and ambience, product quality and presentation, and 
information. The seven items for the personal interaction and ambience dimension 
include items from the SERVQUAL responsiveness, assurance, and empathy 
dimensions, such as "The salesperson gave personal attention" and "The store had a 
pleasant ambience". The product quality and presentation dimension consisted of 
six items, including for example "I think these flowers are fresh," and "These 
flowers have been wrapped nicely". The information dimension consisted of three 
items, including "The salesperson was knowledgeable," and "I was given much 
information on treatment of cut flowers". A subsample of consumers was 
interviewed immediately before entering the florist's store and answered questions 
on prepurchase expectations using the same 16 items that were rephrased to allow 
expectations ratings. 
Perceived distribution-related cost. Consumers' perceptions of 
distribution-related cost were measured on a 4-item, 7-point Likert-type scale. The 
items covered the distribution-related cost categories presented in chapter 2; the 
effort made to reach the store, search effort made in order to find flowers suited for 
the purchase goal, adjustment costs due to the store's present assortment, and 
psychic costs due to irritation while in the store. 
Perceived disconfirmation of expectations. Expectations disconfirmation was 
measured on a two-item, 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from "Much worse than 
expected" (1) to "Much better than expected" (7). The items concerned the store's 
service and the store's cut flower offerings. Only 51 respondents (4.2%) 
experienced negative disconfirmation of expectations, i.e., had scale values below 4, 
and 595 (49.2%) consumers did not experience any disconfirmation, i.e., their scale 
value was exactly 4. 
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Consumer satisfaction/dissatisfaction. Overall satisfaction/dissatisfaction was 
measured as the overall evaluation of the entire in-store purchase experience for this 
single transaction. One item reflected overall satisfaction on a 5-point scale ranging 
from "Very dissatisfied" (1) to "Very satisfied" (7). The remaining two items 
emphasized affect by asking the consumer for his or her postpurchase feelings on 
5-point scales ranging from "Very Unpleasant" (1) to "Very pleasant" (5) and 
"Very disappointed" (1) to "Very pleased" (5). 
Table 5.1 Overview of postpurchase consumer constructs. 
Consumer construct: Items Mean St. Dev. Cronbach's a 
Consumer satisfaction/dissatisfaction 3 4.50 .63 .886 
Perceived disconfirmation 2 4.86 1.18 .869 
Perceived distribution service 16 .874 
performance 
Personal interaction and ambience 7 6.46 .67 .892 
Product quality and presentation 6 6.45 .59 .724 
Information 3 5.49 1.20 .712 
Perceived distribution-related cost 4 1.45 .76 .516 
5.4.3 Retailer construct measurement 
Retailer constructs that have been measured in the study are strategic orientation, 
trust in retailer's main supplier, and several indicators of the retailer's distribution 
system and activities. Table 5.2 presents an overview of the characteristics of 
retailer constructs that will be discussed consecutively in this section. 
Retailer strategic orientation. Retailer's strategic orientations were measured 
using a slightly modified version of Wortzel and Venkatraman's (1991) scale for 
retailer competitive strategies. The modifications concern mainly product 
differences, i.e., cut flowers are an unbranded product, and addition of items 
concerning retailer service provision. The final scale consisted of 18 items that were 
rated on a 7-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 'Totally disagree" (1) to 'Totally 
agree" (7). Thirteen items related to distribution service, and five related to price 
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leadership. Sample items from the original scale are "We emphasize well-known 
cut flowers and pot plants," "Our salespeople have extensive experience and 
product knowledge and can advise and educate our customers," and "We depend on 
everyday low prices to draw in customers." Modified items include "We are 
generally among the first store to carry new varieties." Factoranalysis yielded two 
factors, one relating to distribution service, including product quality and 
merchandise novelty (a =.828), and the other relating to price orientation (a =0.754, 
total scale a =.840). Only the first factor is hypothesized to affect consumer 
distribution service evaluation and consequently the price leadership dimension of 
retailer strategic orientation is left unconsidered in the remaining of the analysis. 
Retailer trust in supplier. Trust was measured on a 5-item 7-point Likert scale, 
and included items such as "I can rely on this supplier to be honest," and "This 
supplier and I mutually trust each other." Morgan and Hunt (1994) argue that 
behavioral intentions would be appropriately included in a measure of trust. Trust 
and deliberation have therefore been included in the study as two separate 
constructs. Deliberation represents the extent to which the retailer shares important 
decisions with her main supplier. The construct was measured on two items, for 
example, "I try to consult with this supplier as much as possible." 
Distribution system performance indicators. Three distribution system 
indicators have been included in the study. During the retailer interview the 
presence of a cold storage room was investigated. Furthermore, the retailer 
responded to a question on the percentage of flowers that is generally lost due to 
quality problems. Finally, the ratio of the number of weekly hours of salespersonnel 
labour employed, including the retailer's own labour, to the number of square 
meters selling area was calculated as a measure of distribution service intensity. A 
similar measure has been used by Betancourt and Gautschi (1992b, 1993b). 
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Table 5.2 Overview of retailer constructs. 
Retailer construct: Items Mean St. Dev. Cronbach's a 
Retailer strategic orientation: 
Merchandise and service 13 5.74 .76 .828 
Retailer-supplier relationship: 
Trust in supplier 5 5.13 1.52 .870 
Deliberation with supplier 2 1.44 1.44 .662 
Distribution system indicators: 
Labour (hours per m2) 1 .91 .85 n.a. 
Percentage quality loss 1 5.21 5.44 n.a. 
Cooled storage (dummy) 1 .542 n.a. n.a. 
5.5 Analysis and results 
The data have been analyzed in three stages. First, the consumer model of 
satisfaction formation was investigated using the consumer-level data, including 
both prepurchase expectations, and postpurchase perceptions of distribution service 
performance. Based on the results of this analysis the consumer-level model has 
been adapted and the consumer-level and retailer-level models and the associated 
hypotheses are tested jointly using multilevel regression analysis. Finally, a separate 
analysis was done for the retailers who purchase exclusively at a specific supplier 
type, i.e., the flower auction. 
5.5.1 The consumer-level CS/D model 
The 207 consumers who were interviewed just before entering the store and 
immediately after leaving the store answered questions on prior service expectations 
and postpurchase service experiences, in the respective interviews. Regression 
analysis of CS/D was done on expected and perceived distribution service 
performance, and perceived disconfirmation of expectations, using averaged total 
scale measures. Results of the analysis showed that perceived distribution service 
performance and perceived cttsconfirmation have highly significant positive effects 
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(p<.005) on CS/D, while prior expectations of distribution service performance do 
not have a significant effect on CS/D (p>.10,R2=.237). Since the data indicate that 
consumer prior expectations do not play a significant role in the particular 
application under focus they will not be considered in the remaining analysis. 
Below the relevance of the three alternative explanations for the insignificance of 
prior expectations that were mentioned in section 3.2.3 for this result will be 
discussed briefly. 
First, frequent past adjustments of consumers' service expectations based on 
experiences with florists' offerings may have led to prior expectations that are about 
equal to perceptions of service performance across purchases. This would coincide 
with reduced disconfirmation of expectations. This is confirmed by an average 
rating of 4.93 (stdev. 1.20) on the 7-point perceived disconfirmation scale. The 
consumers in the study are regular purchasers of fresh cut flowers and show 
considerable store loyalty. About 50% of the interviewed consumers buy fresh cut 
flowers at only one specialized outlet, over 77% buys cut flowers at one or two 
outlets. Another explanation could be that consumers did not form prior 
expectations due to low involvement with flower purchase. The average 
involvement score of the 175 consumers that completed a mailed questionnaire two 
weeks after their purchase was 4.97 (stdev. 1.65) on a 6-item 7-point scale 
(a=.820), indicating at least a moderate level of involvement with flower purchase, 
which makes this explanation less obvious. Finally, the possibility that recalled 
expectations drive CS/D seems unlikely, since the conditions that favor hindsight 
bias and backward assimilation are not met. It has already been shown that 
disconfirmation of expectations is not large. Furthermore, there is no reason to 
argue that consumers have difficulty in forming expectations. The consumers in the 
study are generally experienced buyers of cut flowers and performance ambiguity is 
not high: the 175 cut flower consumers rated performance ambiguity on average 
3.90 (stdev. 1.91) on a 4-item 7-point scale (a =.545). 
5.5.2 Analysis across multiple supplier-retailer-consumer channels 
The methodology section already indicated that multiple consumer interviews were 
held for each retailer who participated in the study, i.e., the data have a nested 
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structure. Consumer distribution service evaluation, perceived disconfirmation, and 
CS/D undergo influences from both the consumer-level and the retailer-level. Each 
consumer enters a service encounter in a particular state of mind, e.g., mood, and 
forms satisfaction or dissatisfaction using idiosyncratic weighing of attributes. The 
retailer on the other hand influences consumer evaluations through her performance 
with respect to service delivery, etc. Consequently, variance in consumer 
evaluations consists of a separate consumer component and a separate retailer 
component. Data analysis using ordinary regression models implies pooling data 
across retailers, while treating consumers as independent observations. Ignoring the 
relationship between consumers and retailers introduces inefficiency because it 
involves estimating more coefficients, provides no information on the variation in 
retailers, and could generate estimated standard errors that are too small 
(Woodhouse 1993). The hierarchical structure of the data is explicitly considered by 
multilevel regression models (Bryk and Raudenbusch 1992; Goldstein 1995). In this 
section, variance in consumer-level constructs is decomposed into variance within 
retailers and variance within consumers first. Next, consumer distribution service 
evaluation and CS/D formation is explained from both consumer-level and 
retailer-level variables. 
5.5.2.1 Variance decomposition 
Variance in measures of consumer distribution service evaluation is decomposed 
into variance within retailers and variance within consumers, using a multilevel 
random ANOVA model without explanatory variables. This model is denoted as 
(Prosser, Rasbash, and Goldstein 1991): 
Pdi ~ Too + U0j 
with: 
Y9 : the value of the dependent variable, e.g., CS/D, for consumer i who buys at 
retailer j f ; 
X0: the intercept variable (=1); 
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fioj: the wilhin-retailer intercept, representing the score on the dependent variable 
for an average consumer who buys at retailer j ; 
y m : mean value of Yy for an average consumer who buys at an average retailer; 
u0j: level-2 residual, i.e., retailer-level random variable; 
etj : level-1 residual, i.e., consumer-level random variable; 
eiru0j ~N(0,a2) and cov(ev,u0J) = 0. 
The model can be rewritten as: Yi} =y00X0+ (u0JX0 + e t fX0), consisting of a fixed part 
and a random part, the latter shown between brackets. The variance of the random 
part of the model can be written as: Var(YtJ) = cr 2 % + a2e. Here, c r \ is the 
variance of /30j, i.e., the variance between retailers, and a2e is the variance of Yy. 
The systematic consumer and retailer variance components in consumer 
perceptions of distribution service performance, distribution cost, disconfirmation 
of expectations, and CS/D were estimated using a Full Information Maximum 
Likelihood routine. The results of this analysis are presented in table 5.3. The 
proportions of variance accounted for by the consumer-level and the retailer-level 
have been obtained by dividing each variance component by the sum of both 
variance components. The table shows that the proportion of variance due to 
differences between retailers is highly significant for all constructs (p<.001) and 
varies from about 11% for perceived distribution-related cost to almost 60% for 
perceived disconfirmation of expectations. 
A consumer's experience with service provision resulting from 
retailer-customer interaction is influenced largely by the state in which the 
consumer enters the service encounter (mood), and also the employee-customer fit 
and service quality for the specific encounter. The other distribution service 
dimensions, in particular physical product quality and presentation are obviously 
more unilaterally influenced by the retailer. Consumer perceptions of 
distribution-related cost show a significant unique retailer variance, indicating that 
there is systematic retailer influence. In other words, retailers affect consumer 
perceptions of distribution-related cost. On the other hand, consumer perceptions of 
distribution-related cost are to a large extent consumer specific, since cost of 
transportation depends on for example location of consumer's home and means of 
164 Chapter 5 
transportation used, and search and adjustment cost depend on, for example, 
purchase goal. Perception of disconfirmation of expectations involves a consumer's 
subjective comparison of perceived service performance with prior expectations. 
The large systematic retailer influence on perceived disconfirmation indicates that 
florists are far more influential in consumer expectations discontinuation than in 
consumers' performance perceptions. Finally, a consumer's feelings of 
satisfaction/dissatisfaction are highly idiosyncratic although a systematic retailer 
influence has been assessed. In sum, although the affective state in which the 
consumer enters the transaction has shown to exert an important influence on 
service perception, retailer performance significantly influences consumer 
evaluations. Since all systematic retailer variance components are highly significant 
this section continues with an analysis of the effects of retailer variables on 
consumer satisfaction formation. 
5.5.2.2 Model estimation results 
A two-level random-intercept model was specified to explain variance in consumer 
evaluation from variables at the consumer level and at the retailer level: 
Poj= TOO +Zn^r0nZnj+U0j 
PkJ=VkO' k=l,...,K 
Since consumer satisfaction formation is a process that involves multiple 
constructs separate regression analyses were done, one for each construct, in order 
to assess the influence of retailer-level variables. The most elaborate analysis 
concerns the following variables. The Yy represent consumers' ratings on the 
satisfaction/dissatisfaction scale. The five explanatory consumer-level variables 
involved, or the XU}, are: 
- perceived disconfirmation 
- retailer performance on personal interaction and ambience 
- retailer performance on product quality and presentation 
- retailer performance on information, and 
- perceived distribution-related cost. 
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The eight explanatory retailer-level variables, the Z n j , are 
- retailer distribution service strategy, 
- retailer-supplier trust, 
- retailer-supplier deliberation, 
- presence or absence of cooled storage, 
- percentage quality loss, 
- labor intensity, 
- age, and 
- gender. 
The results of the analyses are shown in table 5.4.2 
The discussion of the multilevel regression analysis results starts with the 
effects of consumer- and retailer-level variables on consumer perceptions of 
distribution service performance. The last three columns of table 5.4 show that 
consumer perceptions of distribution-related cost have a highly significant negative 
effect on consumer perceptions of distribution service performance. When a retailer 
succeeds in lowering distribution-related cost, his customers will evaluate her 
service more positively. This is consistent with the definition of distribution service 
in chapter 2 and the consumer-level model presented in section 5.2.4. Retailer 
strategic distribution service orientation has a significantly positive effect on 
consumer evaluation of all three distribution service dimensions, personal 
interaction and ambience, product quality and presentation, and information. This 
finding supports hypothesis Hla. Retailer trust in her main suppher relates 
positively to consumer perceptions of product quality and presentation. This 
provides partial support for H2a. The extent to which a retailer deliberates with her 
main supplier has no effect on consumer perceptions of distribution service 
performance. No effects of distribution system operations on service performance 
were found, except for a weakly significant positive effect of labor intensity on 
personal interaction and ambience evaluations. H3a is therefore not supported. Only 
weak evidence was found that older retailers perform less well than younger 
All analyses reported in sections 5.5.2 and 5.5.3 have been repeated using mean-centered values 
for the independent variables in order to improve numerical estimation of the estimation algorithm 
(Prosser, Rasbash, and Goldstein 1991). An additional benefit of mean-centering is reduction of 
multicollinearity (Aiken and West 1991). Both analyses yielded parameter estimates that were 
practically identical. 
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retailers. Finally, female retailers perform better on the information dimension than 
male retailers. 
In each equation two random variables have been estimated, representing 
residual systematic influence on the consumer and retailer levels. Table 5.4. at the 
bottom shows the percentage of variance accounted for in each level by the 
explanatory variables. This measure equals the ratio of the difference in the variance 
component in the random ANOVA model without explanatory variables and the 
two-level random intercept model to the variance component in the random 
ANOVA model. The results for perceived distribution service performance show 
that 1.10% to 4.74% of the consumer-level variance and 14.39% up to 28.57% of 
the retailer-level variance was explained by the independent variables, where 
product quality and presentation have been explained best by the variables in the 
model. 
The second column of table 5.4 shows the results for perceived 
disconfirmation of expectations. The product quality and presentation performance 
dimension of distribution service performance is related positively to perceived 
discorrfirmation. In addition, a weakly significant positive effect of information 
performance on perceived disconfirmation of expectations has been found. A 
decrease in distribution-related cost not only increases distribution service 
performance perceptions, but also raises positive perceived disconfirmation of 
expectations. With respect to the retailer-level variables, retailer trust in her main 
supplier is related negatively to perceived discorifirmation. Given the virtual 
non-existence of negative disconfirmation of expectations in this study one may 
argue that apparently, a trustful relationship coincides with greater consistency in 
retailer distribution service provision. 
Table 5.3 Estimated variance components for consumer and retailer level. 
Construct: Consumer variance % of total p-value Retailer variance % of total p-value 
(s.e.) variance ( S X . ) variance 
Consumer satisfaction/dissatisfaction .325 (.014) 82.75 <.001 .068 (.013) 17.25 <.001 
Perceived disconfirmation .566 (.025) 40.97 < 0 0 1 .816(.103) 59.03 <.001 
Perceived distribution service 
performance: .227 (.010) 65.50 <.001 .119 (.017) 34.50 <.001 
Personal interaction and ambience .333 (.014) 76.01 <.001 .105 (.017) 23.99 <.001 
Product quality and presentation .211 (.009) 60.15 < 0 0 1 .140 0019) 39.85 <.001 
Information .998 (.043) 70.87 <.001 .410 (.063) 29.13 <.001 
Perceived distribution-related cost .516(.022) 88.57 < 0 0 1 .067 (.016) 11.43 <.001 
Table 5.4 Multilevel regression analysis of CS ID on its antecedents. 
CS/D Perceived disconfirmation Distribution cost 
Coefficient (s.e.) p-value Coefficient (s.e.) p-value Coefficient (s.e.) p-value 
Fixed variables: 
Constant 1.399 (.305) .000 3.738 (.761) .000 2.039 (.295) .000 
Perceived disconfirmation .090 (.017) .000 - - - -
Personal interaction .152 (.031) .000 .046 (.046) .317 - -
Product quality .178 (.036) .000 .218 (.054) .000 - -
Information .063 (.017) .000 .048 (.025) .054 - -
Distribution cost .002 (.022) .917 -.071 (.032) .028 - -
Retailer strategy: 
Distribution service .058 (.031) .065 -.112 (.097) .248 -.071 (.041) .082 
Relationship: 
Trust -.015 (.021) .473 -.126 (.064) .049 -.036 (.027) .187 
Deliberation -.013 (.017) .424 .116(.052) .024 .023 (.022) .286 
Distribution operations: 
Cooled storage .026 (.024) .287 .041 (.077) .598 -.045 (.032) .163 
% Quality loss .001 (.004) .792 .008 (.014) .576 -.002 (.006) .753 
Labour/selling space .029 (.028) .300 -.040 (.089) .650 -.039 (.038) .296 
Retailer characteristics: 
Age -.018 (.022) .417 .069 (.072) .339 .007 (.030) .803 
Gender .012 (.024) .617 -.192 0077) .013 -.001 (.032) .974 
Random variables: 
Consumer level (a2)/%v.e. .281 (.012) /13.54 .545 (.024)/3.71 .515 (.022) / .19 
Retailer level (cr*) / % v . e . .036 (.008)/47.06 .674 (.086) /17.40 .061 (.015)/8.96 
-2 Log Likelihood 2000.689 3054.436 2729.463 
No. parameters 16 15 11 
Table 5.4 Multilevel regression analysis ofCS/D on its antecedents - continued. 
Personal interaction Product quality Information 
Coefficient (s.e.) p-value Coefficient (s.e.) p-value Coefficient (s.e.) p-value 
Fixed variables: 
Constant 5.982 (.289) .000 5.413 (.290) .000 4.282 (.573) .000 
Perceived disconfrrmation - - - - - -
Personal interaction - - - - - -
Product quality - - - - - -
Information - - - - - -
Distribution cost -.157 (.023) .000 -.155 (.019) .000 -.151 (.041) .000 
Retailer strategy: 
Distribution service .121 (.040) .003 .153 (.040) .000 .218 (.079) .006 
Relationship: 
Trust .021 (.026) .430 .062 (.027) .020 .009 (.052) .866 
Deliberation .010 (.021) .642 .020 (.021) .341 .047 (.042) .261 
Distribution operations: 
Cooled storage .000 (.032) .998 .047 (.032) .138 .041 (.063) .514 
% Quality loss .003 (.006) .554 .007 (.006) .238 .007(.011) .499 
Labour/selling space .068 (.036) .062 .025 (.037) .505 .015 (.072) .839 
Retailer characteristics: 
Age -.053 (.029) .069 -.030 (.030) .317 .008 (.058) .893 
Gender .039 (.031) .216 -.028 (.032) .374 .125 (.062) .044 
Random variables: 
Consumer level (cr * ) /%v.e . .321 (.014)/3.60 .201 (.009)/4.74 .987 (.043)/1.10 
Retailer level {a\ ) / % v.e. .079 (.014)/24.76 .100 (.015)/28.57 .351 (.056)/14.39 
-2 Log Likelihood 2220.268 1729.303 3616.771 
No. parameters 12 12 12 
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Retailer deliberation with her main supplier is positively related to consumer 
perceived disconfirmation of expectations. This finding partially supports H2c. 
Consumer perceptions of distribution-related cost (the third column of table 
5.4) are not influenced significantly by the retailer variables in the study, except for 
a weakly significant negative relationship between retailer service orientation and 
perceived distribution-related cost. Therefore, no or weak support has been found 
forHlb,H2b,andH3b. 
Perceived expectations disconfirmation as well as the all perceived 
distribution service performance dimensions have a positive and highly significant 
direct effect on CS/D. Consumer perceptions of distribution-related cost influence 
CS/D only indirectly. With respect to the retailer-level variables, only a weakly 
significant positive effect of retailer distribution service strategy on CS/D was 
found. No significant effect could be assessed for the other retailer-level variables. 
5.53 The auction-retailer-consumer channel 
The retailers in the study can choose to purchase cut flowers from three different 
supplier types, i.e., auctions, cash & carry wholesalers, and wholesalers that deliver 
at the retailer's point of sale. Each retailer answered questions for her major 
supplier, of any type, the analysis results of which have been reported in the 
previous section. The supplier types differ mainly with respect to distribution 
service provision. For example, a retailer who purchases at an auction has to travel 
back and forth with empty containers and fresh products, respectively, and often has 
to wait in the auction building for the products to be distributed. A retailer who 
purchases from a wholesaler who delivers can on the other hand choose only from 
the assortment that was brought to her outlet. Accordingly, retailer perceptions of 
distribution costs, measured on a 6-item, 7-point Likert-type scale which includes 
statements on each of the distribution cost categories mentioned in chapter 2 (a = 
.701), differ significantly between supplier types (F2>15i=31.208, p=.000). Mean 
perceived distribution cost for retailers who purchase predominantly through an 
auction is 3.26 (stdev. 1.02), for retailers who have a cash & carry wholesaler as 
their main supplier mean perceived distribution cost equals 2.08 (.89), and for 
retailers who purchase at a delivering wholesaler perceptions of distribution costs 
Supplier determinants of consumer distribution service evaluation 171 
are on average 2.05 (.98). The significance of the difference between the auction on 
the one hand and both wholesalers types on the other hand was assessed using post 
hoc tests (p<.005). 
A retailer-wholesaler relationship involves more personal interaction than a 
retailer-auction relationship. This is reflected in the values on the trust construct for 
each supplier type. Analysis of variance shows significant differences between 
supplier types with respect to trust (F l j25i=3.311, p=.039) and deliberation 
(F2,isi=5,714, p=.004). Post hoc tests show (p<.005) that mean ratings on 
deliberation are significantly higher for retailers who purchase mainly through 
delivering wholesalers (mean 3.01, stdev. 1.61) or cash & carry wholesalers (mean 
2.57, stdev. 1.47) than for auction-buyers (mean 2.13, stdev. 1.22). Ratings on the 
trust construct are for auction-buyers mean 5.65 (stdev. .99), for retailers who 
purchase through a cash & carry wholesaler mean 6.11 (stdev. 1.14), and for 
retailers who purchase mainly through a wholesaler who delivers 6.08 (stdev. 
1.29). 
The retailer-level model presented in section 5.3 argued that service delivery 
by a retailer's supplier affects the cost incurred by a retailer in her own operations 
and can impact the retailer's service provision. The analysis reported in this section 
focuses on retailers that share the same purchase channel, the auction, and are 
consequently relatively homogeneous with respect to their distribution operations. 
The analysis therefore allows for incorporation of more distribution system 
indicators. The five additional distribution system variables that were included in 
the analysis are the average experienced waiting time at the auction (mean 79.21 
minutes, stdev. 46.98), the range in waiting time, i.e., the ratio between the 
difference between maximum and minimum waiting time and mean waiting time 
(mean .48, stdev. 66), the time elapsed from product receipt at the auction until 
in-store presentation (mean 25.40 minutes, stdev. 101.98), a dummy variable 
representing regular pre-purchase visual inspection of the product by the retailer in 
the auction's cooled storage, which is done by 63.49% of the retailers in the 
subsample, and the percentage of cut flowers purchased using the grower's name as 
the sole quality indicator (mean 32.06%, st.dev. 31.95). The subsample involved 63 
retailers and 533 consumers. 
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5.5.3.1 Variance decomposition 
Results for the random ANOVA model without explanatory variables are shown in 
table 5.5. All systematic retailer-level variance components are highly significant. 
Compared to the results for the sample as a whole, retailer-level variance is 
somewhat higher for consumer perceptions of distribution-related cost (16.75 
compared to 11.43) and to a lesser extent for CS/D (20.24 vs. 17.25), and product 
quality and presentation (41.83 vs. 39.85). Retailer-level variance is somewhat 
lower for perceived disconfirmation (54.99 vs. 59.03) and personal interaction and 
ambience (20.99 vs. 23.99). These results are consistent with the fact that auction 
purchases involve less personal interactions between buyers and sellers. 
5.5.3.2 Model estimation results 
The results of the analysis on perceived distribution service performance for the 
retailers who purchase through an auction are presented in the last three columns of 
table 5.6. According to the proposed model consumer perceptions of distribution-
related costs relate significantly and negatively to their perceptions of retailer 
distribution service performance. Retailers' strategic service orientation has a highly 
significant positive effect on performance with respect to product quality and 
presentation and information, partially supporting Hla. Retailer trust in the auction 
coincides with better performance on the product quality and presentation 
dimension of distribution service. This finding provides some support for H2a. 
Finally, retailer age relates negatively to consumer perception of product quality 
and presentation performance. No support was found for H3b, since distribution 
system indicators did not significantly affect consumer perceptions of service 
performance. The percentage of retailer-level variance explained by the 
retailer-level variables is relatively high, ranging from 33.64 to 44.91, compared 
with results in the previous section, due to the relatively homogeneous subsample 
used in the analysis. The percentages of consumer-level variance explained by the 
variables in the consumer-level model, ranging from 3.21 to 6.03, are somewhat 
higher than for the sample as a whole but remain low. 
Retailer distribution service performance has no indirect effect on CS/D 
through perceived disconfirmation of expectations. The only variable that shows a 
significant, although small, positive effect on perceived discorrfirrnation is "product 
handling time," representing the elapsed time between product receipt at the auction 
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and in-store presentation. Apparently a longer leadtime coincides with a larger 
positive gap between expectations and perceptions of performance. A similar small, 
very weakly significant, effect has been found between leadtime and perceived 
product quality and presentation performance. One possible explanation could be 
that retailers who perform slightly better spend more time on product treatment. 
The consumer-level variables effects on CS/D in the auction-channel are 
similar to the results for the entire sample. Distribution service performance 
perceptions and perceived (^confirmation exert a direct influence on CS/D. 
Perceived distribution cost does not relate directly to CS/D. Visual inspection by 
retailers of the products to be sold at an auction before purchase coincides with 
lower CS/D. The rationale behind this finding is highly ambiguous. Since not 
relationship of this variable with consumers' product quality evaluations has been 
found a daring suggestion might be that retailers who visually inspect the product at 
the auction may be relatively focused on the product they sell and less on their 
customers. 
Contrary to the results for the sample as a whole distribution cost perceptions 
of consumers who buy at retailers with an auction as their main supplier are affected 
by retailer strategic service orientation and retailer trust in the auction. Retailers 
who have a service orientation and have a high level of trust in the auction provide 
better distribution service and reduce consumers' cost perceptions. 
Table 5.5 Estimated variance components for consumer and retailer level, auction as main purchase channel. 
Construct: Consumer variance % of total p-value Retailer variance % of total p-value 
(s.e.) variance (s.e.) variance 
Consumer satisfaction/dissatisfaction .335 (.022) 79.76 <.001 .085 (.023) 20.24 < 0 0 1 
Perceived disconfirmation .594 (.039) 45.01 <.001 .726 (.144) 54.99 < 0 0 1 
Perceived distribution service 
performance: .258 (.017) 66.43 <.001 .131 (.029) 33.57 <.001 
Personal interaction and ambience .405 (.026) 79.01 < 0 0 1 .108 (.029) 20.99 < 0 0 1 
Product quality and presentation .232 (.015) 58.17 <.001 .167 (.035) 41.83 <.001 
Information .953 (.062) 69.01 <.001 .428 (.099) 30.99 < 0 0 1 
Perceived distribution-related cost .458 (.030) 83.25 <.001 .092 (.027) 16.75 < 0 0 1 
Table 5.6 Multilevel regression analysis of CS/D on its antecedents, auction as main purchase channel. 
CS/D Perceived disconfirmation Distribution cost 
Coefficient (s.e.) p-value Coefficient (s.e.) p-value Coefficient (s.e.) p-value 
Fixed variables: 
Constant 1.359 (.477) .006 3.994 (1.189) .002 2.972 (.461) .000 
Perceived disconfirmation .125 (.025) .000 - - - -
Personal interaction .197 (.043) .000 .112 (.065) .091 - -
Product quality .172 (.051) .002 .105 (.081) .199 - -
Information .065 (.026) .017 .029 (.041) .472 - -
Distribution cost .028 (.035) .426 -.011 (.053) .837 - -
Retailer strategy: 
Distribution service .006 (.061) .928 -.218 (.180) .232 -.255 (.075) .005 
Relationship: 
Trust -.022 (.037) .565 -.020 (.113) .858 -.109 (.047) .024 
Deliberation .012 (.034) .729 -.001 (.101) .993 .080 (.043) .072 
Distribution operations: 
Inspect product -.088 (.041) .037 .053 (.122) .663 -.014 (.052) .785 
Purchase name .000 (.001) .857 -.001 (.004) .868 .002 (.002) .230 
Waiting time, avg. -.000 (.001) .595 .002 (.003) .424 .002(.001) .161 
Waiting time, range -.013 (.055) .810 -.132 (.165) .430 -.040 (.069) .563 
Cooled storage .031 (.047) .513 .000 (.139) .998 -.069 (.059) .248 
% Quality loss .005 (.007) .502 -.001 (.021) .960 -.021 (.009) .023 
Labour/selling space .038 (.050) .444 -.102 (.148) .495 -.021 (.063) .746 
Product handling time .000 (.000) .985 .003 (.001) .012 -.000 (.000) .306 
Retailer characteristics: 
Age -.070 (.042) .105 .045 (.126) .721 .068 (.053) .203 
Gender -.040 (.042) .344 -.242 (.126) .059 .039 (.053) .470 
Random variables: 
Consumer level (a2 ) / %v.e. .277 (.018) /17.31 .580 (.038)/2.36 .456 (.030) / .44 
Retailer level (a2) 1 % v.e. .033 (.012)/61.18 .544 (.111)/25.07 .053 (.020)/42.39 
-2 Log Likelihood 871.566 1356.422 1136.328 
No. parameters 21 20 16 
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Table 5.6 Multilevel regression analysis of CS/D on its antecedents, auction as main purchase channel - continued. 
Personal interaction Product quality Information 
Coefficient (s.e.) p-value Coefficient (s.e.) p-value Coefficient (s.e.) p-value 
Fixed variables: 
Constant 5.989 (.492) .000 5.158 (.490) .000 3.848 (.900) .000 
Perceived disconfirmation - - - - - -
Personal interaction - - - - - -
Product quality - - - - - -
Information - - - - - -
Distribution cost -.194 (.041) .000 -.185 (.031) .000 -.239 (.063) .000 
Retailer strategy: 
Distribution service .094 (.079) .238 .172 (.079) .034 .302 (.145) .042 
Relationship: 
Trust .057 (.049) .248 .112 (.050) .029 .092 (.091) .318 
Deliberation .046 (.045) .308 .049 (.045) .281 .077 (.082) .356 
Distribution operations: 
Inspect product .016 (.054) .766 -.030 (.054) .597 .182 (.099) .071 
Purchase name -.002 (.002) .284 .000 (.002) .949 .001 (.003) .772 
Waiting time, avg. -.000 (.001) .955 -.001 (.001) .481 -.000 (.002) .838 
Waiting time, range -.011 (.072) .875 .069 (.073) .348 .088 (.133) .514 
Cooled storage -.016 (.061) .790 .102 (.061) .104 -.035 (.112) .758 
% Quality loss .007 (.009) .450 .015 (.009) .106 .018 (.017) .296 
Latour/selling space .046 (.065) .484 -.036 (.065) .589 -.108 (.120) .371 
Product handling time .000 (.000) .729 .001 (.000) .059 -.000 (.001) 593 
Retailer characteristics: 
Age -.082 (.055) .137 -.128 (.055) .025 -.129 (.101) .208 
Gender .038 (.055) .493 -.056 (.055) .318 .073 (.101) .476 
Random variables: 
Consumer level ( o f ) / % v . e . .392 (.025)/3.21 .218 (.014)/6.03 .922 (.060)/3.25 
Retailer level (a\ ) / % v.e. .068 (.021)/37.04 .092 (.022)/44.91 .284 (.072)/33.64 
-2 Log Likelihood 1068.243 794.878 1547.684 
No. parameters 17 17 17 
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5.6 Conclusions and discussion 
Retailers generally aim at improving or at least maintaining consumer satisfaction 
with the goods sold and services provided. Studies on CS/D formation generally 
yield insight on how product performance translates into consumer experiences. 
However, in practice goods and services are sold as an interrelated package. In this 
chapter the concept of distribution service performance has been used to investigate 
the role of both physical product and service provision on CS/D. The 
disconfirmation of expectations model of consumer satisfaction formation has been 
extended to include three dimensions of perceived distribution service performance 
as antecedents. They were labeled product quahty and presentation, information 
provision, and personal interaction. In addition, perceived distribution cost has been 
included as an antecedent in the model. The results of the analysis show that 
consumer perceptions of retailer performance with respect to product quahty and 
presentation, information, and personal interaction positively influence CS/D, both 
directly and through perceived disconfirmation of expectations. Consumer 
perceptions of distribution-related cost relate negatively to consumer perceptions of 
retailer distribution service performance. The role of prior expectations in CS/D 
formation is negligible in the application under focus. 
A nested research design was used which allows the use of multilevel 
regression analysis for generating insight into the extent to which retailers affect 
consumer evaluations as well as the role of specific retailer variables as 
determinants of consumer satisfaction formation with florists fresh cut flowers 
offerings. The analysis has been done for the sample as a whole and for a subsample 
of florists who purchase cut flowers directly and exclusively at an auction. The 
latter group is relatively homogeneous and allows estimation of the effects of a 
variety of logistics performance indicators on consumer evaluation. 
Variance in the variables in the consumer model has been decomposed into 
systematic consumer variance and systematic retailer variance. A considerable part 
of variance in consumer satisfaction formation constructs can be attributed to 
between-retailer variation. Retailers exert a systematic influence on all variables in 
the extended ^confirmation of expectations model. Despite this, it appears that 
CS/D is a highly idiosyncratic construct; about 80% of variance in CS/D is 
systematic consumer variance. Consumer perceptions of retailer distribution service 
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performance are only slightly less consumer-specific. Perceived disconfirmation of 
expectations, on the other hand, is more illustrative of systematic differences in 
retailer performance across different service encounters. When a firm aims to raise 
consumer satisfaction in time, it should realize that measurements reflect 
differences in consumer mood rather than in the firm's performance. 
The influence of retailer-level variables on consumer satisfaction formation 
has been specifically addressed. Three retailer variables were hypothesized to affect 
consumer evaluations of retailer distribution service provision and perceptions of 
distribution-related cost, i.e., retailer strategic orientation, the quality of 
retailer-supplier relationship, and retailer distribution system performance. In 
addition to the analysis of the entire sample, analysis has been done for the 
auction-retailer-consumer channel. The inherent difference between distribution 
service provision by auctions and wholesalers is reflected through comparison of 
several of the results for the sample as a whole to the results of the subsample 
consisting of the auction-retailer-consumer channel. 
The hypothesized positive relationship between retailer distribution service 
strategy and consumer experiences with distribution service provision (Hla) is 
generally supported. Retailers who are oriented towards service provision generally 
perform better on all three distribution service performance dimensions, i.e., 
personal interaction and ambience, product quality and presentation, and 
information. The relationship between retailer distribution service strategy and 
consumer perceptions of distribution-related cost (Hlb) was supported for retailers 
who purchase mainly through an auction. 
The retailer-supplier relationship was operationalized using the constructs 
retailer trust in her main supplier and retailer deliberation with her main supplier. 
Trust relates positively to one dimension of distribution service performance, 
namely consumer perceptions of product quality and presentation, both for the 
sample as a whole and for the auction sample. This finding partially supports H2a. 
For the auction-retailer channel a significant negative relationship was found 
between trust and distribution cost perceptions (H2b), but the relationship was 
^significant for the sample as a whole. Both trust and deliberation were 
significantly and negatively related to perceived disconfirrnation (H2c), but not for 
the auction-retailer channel. Finally, weak support was found for H3. No significant 
relationship exists between retailer distribution system characteristics and consumer 
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perceptions of distribution service performance (H3a). For the auction-retailer 
channel a significant negative relationship exists between the stated retailer 
percentage of quality loss and perceived consumer distribution cost (H3b). Retailer 
variables explained a sizeable 47% of total variance in CS/D at the retailer level. 
Several methodological issues arise concerning the study. The study 
investigated evaluation processes of consumers who made real purchases and had 
not been instructed beforehand in a real context instead of a laboratory environment. 
Consequently the consumers interviewed in one store may have been served by 
different employees. Also, the consumers bought different cut flowers at different 
points in time. Despite this, sizeable retailer influence could be assessed. One may 
argue that in an experimental study retailer influence would even be larger. Also, 
the number of consumers interviewed per store differed which could cause 
misrepresentation of the findings. The research furthermore assumes that each 
employee acts according to the retailer's strategic orientation, since florists are 
generally small-scale retailers that work in their own store full-time. The same 
applies to the assumption that the retailer's relationship with her supplier is 
powerful enough to affect in-store operations. 
The research reported in this chapter contributes to existing research in the field 
by assessing systematic retailer influence and systematic consumer influence on 
consumer satisfaction/ dissatisfaction and its antecedents. The results suggest how a 
retailer can actually improve the aspects of her offerings that matter most. Product 
quality and personal interaction are the most important variables in CS/D formation. 
By focusing on the retailer variables that affect these distribution service 
dimensions retailers can improve their product package and ultimately enhance 
CS/D. 
Future research should aim at developing measures linking in-store, front as 
well as back-office, operations to consumer evaluations. In addition, the mechanism 
behind the influence of retailer-supplier relationship on service performance 
deserves attention. Other retailer-supplier relationship concepts could be included in 
analysis of retailer influences on CS/D formation. Also, the research could be 
extended to include more distribution channel levels so that insight can be obtained 
into the relationship between channel structure and channel performance. Finally, 
the research could be extended to include multiple product categories, whose 
characteristics may very well influence the relationships investigated. 

Part IV 
Strategic Channel Service Interactions and Retail 
Format Competition 
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Chapter 6 
Distribution Service and Channel Structure 
6.1 Introduction 
The channel decision has been considered "among the most critical marketing 
decisions facing management" (Kotler 1986, Ch.17). This decision involves choice 
of channel structure, which comprises the number of channel levels (length) and 
type and number of middlemen in each level (breadth), and has both strong 
theoretical and practical relevance. One of the most commonly analyzed strategic 
decisions relating to the organization of marketing activities concerns the choice 
between a vertically integrated versus an independent distribution system. 
Competition for customer demand between firms constitutes a major 
important determinant of channel structure. Competition among firms often 
involves price decisions, since price is often the only marketing instrument that can 
be adjusted easily by a firm in the short run (Tirole 1993). Product and store 
differentiation introduce other differences that attract consumers' attention and 
consequently reduce the severity of competition in the longer run. However, 
changing product characteristics, including quality, design, and distribution 
services, as well as changing cost structures or production and distribution capacity, 
generally require much more time and effort and is more difficult than lowering 
prices. Competition in the long run focuses on research and development, in 
particular process innovation and product innovation, which impose even more 
demands on an organization. 
In today's modern marketplaces many consumers are deal-prone and many 
supermarkets offer "Every Day Low Prices" instead of occasional price deals. In 
addition, cheap imports create ample opportunity for price deals. This focus on 
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price competition is not only because most firms can react faster to a competitor's 
move by changing the price for one or more of its products than by changing 
product characteristics, but also because distribution channels tend to become 
shorter, and therefore more competitive, among other things as a consequence of 
technological developments that reduce the costs of coordinating vertical 
distribution systems (Shugan and Jeuland 1988), increase market transparency, and 
reduce costs of search. 
Several developments, such as consumers' increased welfare and the saturation 
of several consumer goods markets, lead consumers to increasingly consider 
product quality and value. In addition to price and quality decisions, distribution 
services form an increasingly important category of decision variables for channel 
members. Changing demographics due to aging populations induce retailers to 
provide services that create convenience, while the increasing labor participation of 
women, among other things, offers possibilities for retailers to meet the needs of 
consumers with high opportunity costs of time through adding time-saving services 
to their offerings and improving the quality of these services1. 
The previous two parts of this book focused on consumer decision making - in 
particular consumer choice - and post-consumption evaluation processes, 
respectively. Chapters 6 and 7 adopt a strategic supply-side perspective; they 
consider channel members' decisions on price and distribution service provision 
resulting from competitive interactions and their consequences for channel 
structure. The present chapter shows how consumer demand, supplier performance, 
and channel structure form an interdependent set of variables. Different distribution 
channel structures and associated retail formats emerge as a consequence of 
competition for consumer demand, and at the same time influence consumer 
demand. Production and distribution cost constitute another influence on channel 
structure; supplier costs influence product prices charged by retailers, which in turn 
influence consumer demand. Distribution service provision impacts customers' and 
suppliers' distribution-related costs and adds value through improved customer 
decision making and enhanced shopping pleasure. Provision of distribution service 
forms a powerful instrument that can be used to reduce the severity of retail 
For a more detailed overview of these and associated developments see the introductory chapter 
of this book. 
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competition. Supplier decisions on distribution service provision play an important, 
often disregarded, role in the emergence and coordination of different channel 
structures. More specifically, distribution service provision constitutes an important 
element of retail format differentiation. Retail format differentiation is driven both 
by consumer demand for specific packages of goods and services and associated 
prices, and by supply-side cost considerations. 
The present chapter continues in 6.2 with a discussion of the major 
determinants of distribution channel structure. Since competition has been found to 
be a major determinant of channel structure, the focus is on studies that consider 
price and non-price competition in horizontally and/or vertically competitive 
distribution channels. With respect to non-price decisions the role of distribution 
services in emergence and coordination of distribution channel structures deserves 
particular interest. Given the structure of a distribution channel, achievement of 
total distribution channel goals, such as profit maximization, cost minimization, or 
service maximization is conditional on coordination of channel members' efforts. 
Many authors have analyzed channel members' decisions relating to optimization 
and coordination of marketing efforts (e.g., Jeuland and Shugan 1983; McGuire and 
Staelin 1983; Coughlan 1985; Lai 1990; Choi 1991; Ingene and Parry 1995a,b). 
Section 6.3 summarizes and discusses recent research on channel coordination. It 
presents an overview of the field that has been based on a selection of the major 
contributions and identifies determinants of channel control problems and the role 
of several channel coordination mechanisms, including distribution service 
provision. The chapter concludes with a brief introduction to the next chapter, 
which presents a model of retail format competition with respect to price and 
service provision and identifies the conditions for coexistence of specific different 
retail formats. 
6.2 Competition and distribution channel structure 
Price and non-price competition for consumer demand and cost efficiency constitute 
among the most important influences on firms' channel decisions. This section 
briefly discusses the role of these and other factors in markets of different 
competitive structures and continues with an overview of recent research on the role 
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of firms' competitive strategies with respect to price and service in oligopolistic 
markets. 
6.2.1 Basic rationales for channel structure 
Many distribution channel structures exist in practice that differ with respect to the 
level of vertical integration of firms and centralization of marketing functions. As 
an extreme, the so-called conventional channel consists of independently owned and 
managed institutions that perform a traditionally defined set of marketing functions 
and pursue their own goals. Coordination in the conventional channel is achieved 
through market transactions that are possibly subject to bargaining and negotiation 
with other channel members. The completely vertically integrated channel 
constitutes another extreme, in which central ownership assures realization of one 
common set of goals. In practice, many so-called vertical marketing systems exist, 
which are voluntary or cooperative groups, such as franchise systems, that pursue 
joint goals with respect to selected marketing activities (Stern and El-Ansary 1992). 
The emergence of different channel systems resulted from each channel member's 
decision whether or not to (de)centralize marketing activities, and if so, what type of 
arrangement to use. The following outlines the major rationales for emergence of 
different channel structures. For a detailed overview of the role and evolution of 
marketing institutions in the agricultural marketing channel the reader is referred to 
Meulenberg (1997). 
Many theories have been developed that focus on a limited number of basic 
factors that explain channel structure or, alternatively stated, the decision whether to 
vertically integrate or decentralize distribution channels. Traditionally, economists 
suggested that vertical integration is motivated by cost efficiency, a drive for market 
power, countervailing power, or structural and behavioral reasons, such as tax 
avoidance and managers' tendency to pursue expansionary and sales maximizing 
goals (e.g., Machlup and Taber 1960). Among other factors influencing channel 
structure are the geographical structure and size of the market, market segmentation, 
existing laws, and social and behavioral variables (see also Frazier, Sawnhey, and 
Shervani 1990). Finally, a variety of other personal and organizational motives may 
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underlie the decision to (de)centralize, including reseller solidarity, entrepreneurial 
values, and organizational rigidity (cf. Stern, El-Ansary, and Coughlan 1996). 
Many contributions emphasized channel members' cost efficiency together 
with consumer demand heterogeneity as causes for the emergence of channel 
intermediaries. For example, cost-related rationales refer to channel members' 
relative efficiency of performing marketing functions, such as bridging the 
discrepancy between assortments in the channel through sorting, routinization, 
searching, and uncertainty reduction through information provision. This section 
briefly discusses important cost and demand-related rationales for channel structure, 
given market structure. Other rationales will come up occasionally in later parts of 
this chapter, in particular as instruments for channel coordination (see section 6.3). 
Market structure, together with technological developments, constitutes an 
important but uncontrollable influence on firms' marketing decisions. Relevant 
competitive market structures that have been considered in the economic literature 
on distribution channels include among others pure competition, monopolistic 
competition, oligopolistic competition, and monopoly. Markets with pure and 
monopolistic competition and monopolist markets will be discussed first. Since the 
oligopolistic market structure is representative of many real-world markets it will be 
discussed separately. 
In a perfectly competitive market, characterized by free entry, complete 
information, and where many suppliers selling identical products face many buyers, 
firms are so-called price takers. Market equihbrium is the result of the simultaneous 
independent decisions by many suppliers who do not know each other's identities 
and many buyers. Price is a decision variable but firms cannot but conform to the 
equihbrium price level in the market that equals both marginal cost and average 
cost, and consequently firms make no profits. Demand is perfectly price-elastic. 
When a firm decides to price her products slightly above marginal cost demand for 
this firm's products will drop to zero, whereas a slight price decrease below 
marginal cost necessitates all other firms to follow, eventually driving all firms out 
of business. Consequently, the only essential decision to be made by a suppher 
concerns quantity. In such a market an individual supplier cannot benefit from 
spinning off one or more marketing functions to an intermediary since 
differentiation, either vertically or horizontally, is not an option. Collectively 
contracting out specific marketing or production functions, such as is done through 
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for example dairy co-operatives, in order to increase suppliers' efficiency and/or 
effectiveness is a possibility on the other hand. 
In practice perfectly competitive markets most likely do not exist and firms 
face price and quantity, as well as product decisions. Firms generally attempt to 
gain control over price levels by differentiating their offerings with respect to e.g., 
physical product characteristics and service. Markets with monopolistic competition 
(Chamberlin 1933) consist of many suppliers selling differentiated products to 
many buyers in a market with other characteristics equal to perfectly competitive 
markets. Suppliers face a downward-sloping demand curve in the absence of 
strategic interaction with other suppliers or buyers. Although some price control can 
be achieved by product differentiation, free entry prevents high long-run profits and 
assures a market in which many close substitute products compete for consumer 
demand. A suppher can only increase her price up to a certain point before 
consumers decide to purchase a close substitute. Increasing product differentiation 
remains the only feasible strategy for reducing price elasticity of demand and 
generating profits, but is limited by the costs involved and immediately attracts new 
entrants. Consequently, long-run equihbrium prices equal average cost. 
At the level of the entire monopolisticaliy competitive market a very simple, 
yet convincing cost-efficiency rationale for channel decentralization is that 
intermediaries reduce the number of contacts that are needed to establish a 
transaction. Mutual interaction between all m manufacturers and n households 
involves more costly contacts, and thus more search effort, than interaction through 
an intermediary (Alderson 1954). When only a few intermediaries emerge, market 
structure might even change into an oligopoly. The minimum transaction criterium 
has been extended by viewing channel intermediaries as active traders in 
information (Etgar and Zusman 1982) who add value to the channel by reducing 
uncertainty. Etgar (1978b) added the counterargument that forward vertical 
integration may be motivated by the desire to achieve product differentiation 
through provision of a high level of distribution services. Note in this respect the 
influence of product characteristics on channel structure as has been illustrated by 
Aspinwall's (1958) classification of red and yellow goods. In the longer run product 
differentiation through distribution service provision evokes imitation and entry of 
new firms. Therefore, the possibilities for profit generation through service 
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provision remain limited and service, just as price, is not a strategic decision 
variable. 
Because each firm has negligible impact on other firms' decisions and actions, 
monopolistic competitive market structures are generally not used to study firms' 
decision making under strategic interaction with respect to variables such as price 
and product quality, but instead are used predominantly for analysis of more 
abstract issues on the level of the market economy (see also Tirole 1993). The 
competition between individual firms and its consequences for channel structure is 
generally modeled in an oligopolistic market. Oligopoly, or competition among a 
few firms is "the predominant structure in the real world..." (Moorthy 1985, p. 268). 
Many real-world markets, particularly those with many suppliers that cater to 
similar needs, such as grocery retailing, could be argued to represent monopolistic 
competition. The key distinction between markets with monopolistic competition 
and oligopolistic markets concerns strategic interaction, which is absent in markets 
with monopolistic competition and present in oligopolistic markets. Strategic 
interaction implies interdependency between firms' actions and the consequences 
thereof. In an oligopolistic market equihbrium prices, product qualities, service 
provision, etc. are the result of firms' strategic decisions based on their cost 
structures, customer demand, and their competitors' reactions to these decisions. 
Consequently, in oligopolistic markets profits dissipate mainly as a consequence of 
price and service competition, while in markets with monopolistic competition 
profits tend to vanish due to the entry of new firms. 
Whether the nature of competition in a market can be considered oligopolistic 
depends on the scope that is adopted. For example, in the Dutch market three firms 
can be important competitors that interact strategically, while at least one of these 
firms is a negligible player from an international perspective. In addition, although 
competition in many consumer markets appears to be monopolistic in nature, 
oligopolistic competition may be better descriptive of such markets. For example, 
consider a market with hundreds or thousands of grocery stores, gasoline stations, 
or other fast-moving consumer goods retail stores that are differentiated from each 
other by brand name, location, and/or other services, such as the assortment of 
goods carried. With respect to price each store's manager probably anticipates and 
reacts to the prices set by other stores in the neighborhood. One reason for this is 
consumers' time, monetary, and information processing restrictions preventing them 
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to consider more than a few different outlets at a shopping trip. The assumption of 
oligopolistic competition is accordingly often more appropriate than monopolistic 
competition and the structure of these markets could be referred to as "local 
oligopoly". 
In oligopolistic markets product differentiation and service provisions are used 
as instruments to "divide" the market. Firms in this market type have many decision 
variables, including price, quality, and distribution service provision. Due to the 
limited number of competing firms, in the long run an equilibrium results in which 
each firm has its own strategic positioning and maximizes its profits, given 
competitors' characteristics. Whenever a change occurs in cost structure, consumer 
preferences, or any other variable that relates to at least one firm's decision making, 
firms' optimal strategic decisions may be different and accordingly the market 
equilibrium may change. Analysis of oligopolistic markets offers insight into the 
dynamics of the effect of competition between individual firms on firms' behavior 
and associated channel structure. 
Finally, in monopolistic markets where only one supplier exists, channel 
differentiation through spinning off marketing functions is an option if the benefits 
thereof exceed the associated costs, for example if an intermediary can more 
efficiently or effectively reach the firm's target customers. In a monopolistic market 
the lack of competition offers the opportunity to skim off the market at relatively 
little effort and consequently the price level is generally higher and the service level 
is generally lower than in a markets where two or more firms compete for consumer 
demand2. Monopolistic markets may exist in practice, but the issues that exist with 
respect to monopolies, such as entry of new suppliers, are less relevant for the 
distribution service issues that are central in this book and therefore will be left 
largely unconsidered in the remaining. The next section presents an overview of 
price and service competition in oligopolistic markets. 
The discussion in this section continues with general rationales for channel 
structure that are more or less independent of the specific channel structure under 
2 
Many results for monopolistic manufacturers are straightforward and consequentiy will not be 
discussed separately. The oligopolistic markets discussed in the next sections include distribution 
channels where either the manufacturer or the retailer is a monopolist. A uni- or bilateral monopoly 
often serves as a standard of comparison for analysis of channel coordination problems as 
discussed in 6.3. 
Distribution service and channel structure 191 
focus, with the exception of perfect competition and monopoly. Many of the 
theories mentioned here imply that cost efficiency and product or service quality 
determine channel structure. A number of theories mention a direct relationship 
between channel structure and cost efficiency, which may concern any marketing 
function. For example, Stigler (1951) developed the concept of vertical 
specialization which suggests a firm may improve its competitive position by 
lowering average and marginal costs through delegating any marketing function to 
specialized, more efficient, intermediaries, a concept similar to Mallen's (1977) 
spin-off rationale. The sorting principle (Alderson and Martin 1965) argues that 
marketing intermediaries justify their existence by efficiently rearranging physical 
flows. In addition, specialization with respect to marketing functions allows 
efficiency through routinization. The minimum transaction criterium (Alderson 
1954) is an example of cost efficiency with respect to service provision, to which 
Etgar and Zusman (1982) added the idea of uncertainty reduction through service 
provision. 
Uncertainty is an important determinant of channel cost. Service provision 
influences channel cost efficiency and channel structure through its role in reducing 
uncertainty and the costs thereof, for example through information provision. A 
well-known example is the postponement principle which was introduced by 
Alderson (1950) and elaborated by Bucklin (1965) into his 
postponement-speculation framework. Postponement implies that costs associated 
with risk and uncertainty, particularly physical distribution costs, are reduced by 
postponing product differentiation with respect to form, identity, and inventory 
location to the latest point in time. On the opposite, a speculative channel carries 
large speculative inventories which involve lower costs due to economies of scale in 
production, less frequent ordering and transportation, and reduced stockouts. These 
speculative inventories are the driving force for the emergence of indirect channels. 
Recently, Bucklin, Ramaswamy, and Majumdar (1996) applied this principle to 
analyze the relationship between service provision and channel structure. They 
argue that a higher service level increases channel costs and reduces end-user costs. 
A direct channel incurs relatively low costs when a low level of logistical services 
such as market decentralization, lot size, waiting time, and product assortment are 
provided, while an indirect channel is relatively efficient in providing a high level 
of logistical service. The optimal channel structure is determined by the point where 
192 Chapter 6 
average total costs are minimum, given the service level required by the end-user. 
With respect to so-called informational services that reduce uncertainty direct 
channels will be relatively more efficient in providing high service levels than 
indirect channels. Note that Bucklin abstracts from market structure and focuses 
entirely on costs associated with service provision in different channels. 
Institutional economics provides comprehensive explanations of the 
conditions under which a strategy of vertical integration prevails and in which 
uncertainty plays an important role3. In marketing, "institutions" may be defined as 
"sets of conditions and rules for transactions and other interactions," (Arndt 1981), 
thus including market actors, such as manufacturers, and intermediaries. The 
institutional approach focuses on interactions between organizations and their 
environment and consequently integrates concepts from political and social science 
into economic theory. Obviously, this approach suits oligopolistic markets better 
than markets with monopohstic competition. The most important representatives of 
this school of thought are transaction cost theory, agency theory and the political 
economy framework. As an extensive discussion of institutional approaches is 
beyond the scope of this chapter, their relevance for distribution channel issues, in 
particular channel structure, will be mentioned briefly. 
Transaction cost theory (Williamson 1975) argues that uncertainty is a major 
determinant of the costs associated with market transactions (costs of search, 
negotiation, and monitoring). The theory assumes that individuals may behave 
opportunistically - they seek self interest at the expense of (many) others - and have 
bounded rationality. Lack of mutual trust and/or environmental uncertainty may 
evoke excessive transaction costs, resulting in lengthy and detailed contracts. Under 
these conditions, vertical integration and the associated administrative costs will be 
preferred instead of market transactions. Stern and El-Ansary (1992) give an 
extensive overview of benefits and costs of vertical integration. Agency theory and 
the political economy framework add the issue of power to the cost arguments put 
forward by transaction cost theory with respect to the decentralization question. 
Consider for example a firm that has made high asset-specific investments that are 
tailored to a specific customer's quality demands and cannot be allocated elsewhere. 
3 Sheth, Gardner, and Garrett (1988) refer to this approach as the organizational dynamics school. 
Since the term institutional economics is common with respect to the distribution channel research 
discussed here, the terms will be used interchangeably. 
Distribution service and channel structure 193 
Negotiation power allows a firm to set prices instead of accepting prices set by 
other firms and/or to influence other channel members' decisions for its own 
benefit. Although approaches based on institutional economics, functionalist school, 
or other theories may yield valuable insight into the forces influencing individual 
channel member behavior, for example through estimation of causal models, they 
do not capture the process of strategic interaction between competing firms in a 
distribution channel, their decision making and associated consequences, that are 
the topic of the next section. 
6.2.2 Vertical differentiation in oligopolistic markets 
The previous section already argued that the nature of competition between firms is 
an important force in shaping distribution channel structure. Research on channel 
structure traditionally addresses a manufacturer's problem of whether to vertically 
integrate or completely decentralize her distribution channel, which will be the 
starting point of this section as well. In oligopolistic markets, which are 
representative for many real-world markets, price and non-price competition are 
common, the latter referring to differentiation with respect to for example product 
quality, service, advertising, and location. Product and store differentiation interfere 
with price competition. Given a consumer's preferences for products and stores he 
or she may be induced to store and/or brand switching when perceiving the 
alternative total offerings, consisting of price, quality and other variables, as more 
attractive. But there is another, less well-known, argument for focusing on 
non-price competition. 
Studies focusing exclusively on price competition generally assume that 
consumers behave perfectly rational and react to any small price difference. In 
reality it is unlikely that any small price change will induce consumers to shift to 
another product variant. This is easy to understand since actual store switching is 
costly, and store and product switching in addition imply a mental cost for the 
consumer. Assuming consumers are non-responsive to small price differences with 
respect to product choice, in equilibrium relative market shares are determined by 
non-price variables only (Fershtman 1982). Of course consumers may be insensitive 
with respect to small changes in non-price variables as well. Research on non-price 
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competition has been done with respect to a variety of variables inducing product 
and store differentiation, in particular store location, advertising, product quality, 
product information, warranty, but also on other service elements. Distribution 
service provision by a manufacturer or retailer concerns both horizontal and vertical 
differentiation since it affects characteristics of both the physical product involved 
and the store that presents and sells it. The current and next sections address the role 
of distribution service provision in vertical differentiation, and store differentiation, 
respectively, and its relationship with channel structure. 
Due to the strategic interdependency of channel members' decisions the 
game-theoretic approach to analysis of distribution channels prevails throughout 
large part of this section. Game theory provides analytical tools that are particularly 
suited to analyze strategic interactions and decision making of competing or 
otherwise interdependent channel members with conflicting interests. The appendix 
to this chapter gives a concise and introductory overview of game theory. The 
models that have been used to analyze channel members' decisions and their 
consequences for channel structure in oligopolistic markets differ with respect to a 
number of structural characteristics of the channel under focus. Most models for 
analyzing channel structure consider channels with a limited number of levels, 
usually two, in which one or two manufacturers distribute their products to one or 
two retailers. Each manufacturer usually produces one product, that is substitutable 
to a certain extent with the other manufacturer's product. Channel members' often 
decide on price, and other decision variables may include service provision, product 
quality, advertising, location, etc. A channel's vertical power structure refers to 
leader-follower relationships. Finally, the nature of consumer demand, as reflected 
by its (non)linearity and variability influences channel members' decisions. Below 
each of the structural elements of distribution channels and their related influence 
on channel member decisions will be discussed further. 
Typical channel structures that have been used in the literature to analyze the 
effects of manufacturer and retailer price and service competition on vertical 
differentiation are the exclusive dealer channel, also referred to as bilateral 
monopoly, and the multiple exclusive dealer channel. The simplest 2-level channel 
structure, the exclusive dealer channel, describes a mutual exclusiveness 
arrangement, in which one retailer sells only one manufacturer's product and in 
return is provided with an exclusive sales territory for the product. It represents the 
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real-life situation in which manufacturers and retailers sell totally differentiated 
products that serve two separate markets. In a channel where no competition exists, 
neither at the manufacturer level, nor at the retail level, retail prices are relatively 
high and quantity sold is relatively low from a consumer welfare perspective. The 
exclusive dealer channel has been studied with respect to the - usually 
manufacturer's - decision either to integrate, or to distribute through independent 
retailers. In addition, this channel type has been used extensively to analyze channel 
coordination problems between the manufacturer and his retailer. The manufacturer 
is generally modeled as the dominant decision maker in the channel who is aimed at 
maximizing his own profit or total channel profits through manipulating transfer 
price and providing incentives - such as side payments -, gaining cooperation or 
implicit understanding, and forming conjectures (e.g., Jeuland and Shugan 1983; 
Shugan 1985; Shugan and Jeuland 1988; Lai and Staelin 1983). 
In the multiple exclusive dealer channel, also called the monopoly 
manufacturer channel, one monopoly manufacturer supphes multiple exclusive 
retailers. Examples of this channel type involve franchise outlets that exclusively 
sell the franchising manufacturer's products. This channel structure is typically used 
to analyze channel coordination with two or more heterogeneous competing 
retailers (cf. Ingene and Parry 1995a,b). The monopoly manufacturer needs to set a 
single wholesale pricing schedule than can be applied to all retailers. A more 
detailed discussion on the coordination problem can be found in section 6.3. In 
addition, this channel type has been used to analyze horizontal differentiation (see 
subsection 6.2.3). In this channel type retail competition will generally lead to 
relatively low retail prices. Retailer collusion, however is a severe threat to the 
manufacturer. 
The monopoly common retailer channel consists of one retailer who sells two 
competing products from two manufacturers (e.g., Choi 1991). Because the two 
manufacturers rely on one retailer only for distribution of their products in this 
channel arrangement retailers can be powerful players that can assume leadership 
positions against the manufacturers, possibly resulting in low manufacturer profits. 
Channel conflict between retailers and manufacturer can easily develop and this 
channel structure may be less stable than the other types. The results for this 
channel type depend on the demand function that is used. For example, when a 
linear demand function is assumed, a manufacturer is better off with an exclusive 
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dealer whereas the retailer has an incentive to deal multiple products (Choi 1996). 
This channel structure is used particularly to study the effects of the retailer's ability 
to coordinate retail prices of multiple products for her profit maximization. 
Competition at the manufacturer level is expected to lower retail prices relative to 
the exclusive dealer channel. However, the relatively powerful retailer may benefit 
from product complementarity in her assortment and may therefore be able to 
charge relatively high prices. 
More complex channel structures, such as the duopoly or tripoly common 
retailer channel, where two retailers carry two or three manufacturers' products have 
been used only to analyze specific problems with respect to retailer competition, 
that will be discussed in section 6.2.3. 
Several alternatives exist with respect to power structure, or leader- follower, 
relationships in distribution channels. Choi (1991) refers to power structure as 
power balance scenarios. Lee and Staelin (1997) conceptualize vertical price 
leadership as "using the foresight of the channel partner's reaction in pricing 
decisions." The most common approach in the hterature to model channel 
relationships is to view the problem from a manufacturer's perspective. The 
manufacturer faces problems such as whether to integrate the distribution function 
and how to coordinate channel strategies using price or other marketing variables, 
such as promotion. When the manufacturer is the channel's price leader and the 
retailer follows, the power structure is modeled by the manufacturer Stackelberg 
game. In this game manufacturers and retailers choose their prices consecutively. 
Each manufacturer chooses his wholesale price using the retailers' reaction 
functions, conditional on the observed wholesale price of the competitor's product. 
Given these wholesale prices, each retailer determines her margin as in the Nash 
game. 
A channel where the retailer is the leader and the manufacturer follows is 
modeled by the Retailer Stackelberg game. In the Retailer Stackelberg game each 
retailer chooses her margin using the manufacturers' reaction functions, conditional 
on the other retailer's margin or retail prices. Each manufacturer sets his wholesale 
price, conditional on these retailer margins and the competing product's retail price. 
This game is essentially different from the Manufacturer Stackelberg game since it 
assumes consumer demand is directly influenced by retailers' decisions instead of 
being conditional on manufacturer decisions. The Retailer Stackelberg game may 
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lack stability since a retailer may deviate from her announced retail price or margin 
once she owns the product, unless the retailers freedom is restricted by "some 
precornmitment mechanism", such as a formal contract or government regulation 
(Lee and Staelin 1997). In the vertical Nash game both manufacturer and retailer 
are followers, and players decide simultaneously on prices: each manufacturer 
chooses his wholesale price conditional on the retailers' margin and the observed 
retail price of the competing brand. Given these wholesale prices, each retailer sets 
her margin so as to maximize combined profits from both products. 
There are many reasons to believe that several distribution channels show a 
shift of power from the manufacturers to the retailers (e.g., Ailawadi, Borin and 
Farris 1995; Messinger and Narashimhan 1997), such as growing concentration 
among retailers, consolidation into fewer, bigger stores, improved scanner 
information systems, fragmentation of consumer markets, improved quality of retail 
management personnel, and a decline in advertising. Little (1973) was among the 
first to argue that retailers as multi-level merchandisers are entitled to channel 
leadership. In many product categories, in particular fast moving consumer goods, 
large retailers sell their own brands in addition to manufacturer brands. These recent 
developments diminish the possibilities for vertical price binding and the decision 
of setting final consumer price rests more and more on the retailers, several of 
whom even influence wholesale prices. In addition, retailers choose the level of 
distribution service they offer their customers through for example assortment 
composition, ambience, information provision, and other services a manufacturer 
cannot easily provide. 
Studies that focus on the manufacturer's decision whether or not to vertically 
integrate in multiple exclusive dealer channels found price competition between 
multiple channels to be the major force in shaping distribution channel structure 
(e.g., Coughlan 1985; Coughlan and Wernerfelt 1989; McGuire and Staelin 1983, 
1986; Moorthy 1988). Price is a major decision variable for most channel members 
in an ohgopohstic market and generally takes the form of a one-part tariff, or a 
linear transfer price (e.g., McGuire and Staelin 1983; Coughlan 1985; Lai 1990a) or 
a two-part tariff, consisting of a linear transfer price plus a franchise fee. Unless 
stated otherwise it is assumed throughout the text that prices are one-part tariffs. 
Other pricing systems, such as quantity discount schemes and royalty payments will 
be discussed in the section on channel coordination, insofar relevant. This chapter 
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focuses on short-term and medium-term competition and therefore assumes that 
capacity constraints do not exist. 
The intensity of price competition depends on the degree of substitutability 
between products. One key finding is that the decision whether or not to vertically 
integrate depends to a large degree on the substitutabOity of manufacturers' 
products. Highly substitutable products tend to be sold through a direct channel, i.e., 
independent retailers in a centralized system (e.g., McGuire and Staelin 1983), 
while products that are only weak substitutes tend to be sold through decentralized 
channels. Since highly substitutable products imply little differentiation this finding 
indicates that low-quality products, or products for which a low level of distribution 
service is provided will be sold through centralized channels. It is a standard and 
obvious result in competitive retail pricing models that retail prices decrease with an 
increase in product substimtability in the absence of intermediaries. Several studies 
(Coughlan 1985; Coughlan and Wernerfelt 1989; Shugan and Jeuland 1988) found 
that addition of a distributor (i.e., retailer) level to a competitive duopoly, i.e., 
introducing an exclusive retailer for each manufacturer, decreases the channel's 
reactivity to competition and thus shields the manufacturer from competition. This 
finding was extended and the underlying mechanism elaborated by Coughlan and 
Lai (1992) who analyzed the consequences of increasing channel length beyond 2 
levels for manufacturer profitability in ever more competing markets. Apparently, 
for low-service or low-quality products providing service through the use of 
middlemen, which could be referred to as "channel differentiation," is profitable to 
a manufacturer. 
A closer look at mechanism underlying the proposed relationship between 
price competition, product substitutabihty, and channel length shows that the 
decrease in channel reactivity is caused by a phenomenon called double (for a 
two-level channel), triple (in a three-level channel), and so on marginalization (see 
6.3 for a detailed explanation of this so-called basic externality). In a market with 
duopolistic manufacturers who make substitutable products longer distribution 
channels coincide with a higher retail price. Each consecutive independent channel 
member purchases the product at a higher price and thus contributes to an increase 
in the final retail price because of maximization of his own profits. In a two-level 
channel double marginalization already causes an increase in retail price and a 
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decrease in quantity sold compared to a one-level channel with centralized 
distribution. 
Increased product substitotability intensifies competition and thus has a direct 
negative impact on retail prices. The associated increase in the number of channel 
levels restrains this fall in retail prices, and indirectly exerts a positive impact on 
retail prices. When demand is inelastic total channel profits even increase. When the 
number of channel levels increases, the decrease in channel margin due to 
competition is relatively low for each channel level, including the manufacturer, 
because of the higher retail price. Therefore, although increased price competition 
lowers channel margins, increasing the number of channel intermediaries reduces 
price competition between manufacturers, particularly when the products show little 
differentiation. With increasing substitotability the indirect effect, i.e., a decrease in 
manufacturer competition through channel lengthening, is overshadowed by the 
direct effect, i.e., increasing product competition, leading overall to a decrease in 
retail prices. When channel intermediaries provide high quality distribution service 
marginalization increases even more with each channel level due to the cost 
associated with service provision, favoring centralized distribution. On the other 
hand, product differentiation increases, which leads to a decrease in substitotability, 
favoring decentralized distribution. 
When transfer prices take the form of two-part tariffs, i.e., a fixed fee plus a 
per-unit price, channel structure does not depend on the degree of substitotability 
anymore (Coughlan and Wernerfelt 1989), and the equilibrium channel structure 
consists of an infinite number of middlemen. The rationale behind this is that in a 
one-level channel delegation to a retailer makes the manufacturer a Stackelberg 
leader. This is profitable for the manufacturer, because in doing so he is able to 
motivate the middleman to charge a price which maximizes the manufacturer's 
profits but is not equal to the Nash equihbrium price in a one-level channel. In this 
delegated channel the manufacturer therefore has a further, but smaller, incentive to 
become Stackelberg leader relative to additional channel levels and thus set up 
another intermediary level. 
Theoretically, for infinitely substitutable products an infinite number of 
middleman layers is optimal. It may be clear that if the manufacturer aims to 
maximize his own profits only, he will tend to have no more middleman levels than 
if he seeks to maximize total channel profits. Coughlan and Lai (1992) found their 
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result that more channel levels are optimal the more competitive the products in the 
market, to be consistent with institutional knowledge concerning the length of 
Japanese distribution channels. In practice, however, very few middlemen layers 
can be observed. Several explanations have been found for this. The previously 
mentioned studies assume all that intra-channel agreements or contracts are 
observable to competitors. However, firms have an incentive to reduce the 
observability of their agreements. Coughlan and Wernerfelt (1989) show that, 
regardless of the number of levels that exists in the channel, when observability 
cannot be assured channel profits are equal to zero-middlemen channel profits (see 
also 6.3). 
In addition, various institutional factors can be distinguished that impose 
boundaries on the number of middlemen. Several of these factors were mentioned 
by Coughlan and Lai (1992), in particular middleman's opportunity cost associated 
with providing distribution services, the industry power structure, and channel 
members' profit orientations. A middleman's opportunity cost of distributing a 
product comprises the attractiveness of alternative opportunities and the costs of 
carrying and marketing the product, e.g., for servicing it or educating customers in 
its use. The middleman's opportunity cost thus hmits the manufacturer's earnings 
per unit in a certain channel and consequently diminishes the attractiveness of a 
many-middlemen channel system. On the other hand, if a manufacturer provides 
distribution services that effectively reduce the middleman's costs of distributing the 
product that manufacturer's earnings per unit may increase, and thus increases the 
benefits of using a many-middlemen channel system. Another factor concerns the 
power structure in the industry. When middlemen power over manufacturers 
increases, the middlemen tend to extract greater shares of total channel profits, and 
manufacturers will find a channel with fewer middlemen more attractive. Finally, 
channel members' profit orientation influences the use of middlemen by 
manufacturers. For example, Japanese industries have more joint profit goals than 
American or Western European firms, and they consequently may find it more 
profitable to increase the length of their distribution channels relative to their 
American or European counterparts (cf. Coughlan and Lai 1992). 
Shugan and Jeuland (1988) analyze price decisions for two competing 
exclusive dealer channels, whose products are substitutable, for three different 
power structures: the conventional channel where retailer and manufacturer take 
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independent but interdependent price decisions, a channel where the manufacturer is 
the Stackelberg channel leader, and a vertically integrated channel. They used a 
linear demand function with associated downward sloping reaction function. They 
found that in the leader-follower channel retail price is higher than in the 
follower-follower channel because the manufacturer demands a larger margin while 
the retailer cannot completely compensate for the price increase. The integrated 
channel yields lower retail prices than the other two channels because it reacts 
directly to the environment and is thus more competitive. Because total channel 
profits are highest for the integrated channel Shugan and Jeuland conclude that this 
channel type may be more enduring than other channel types, provided cost 
structures of the channels do not differ too much, a finding consistent with the 
predominance of vertical systems in the U.S. When the two products are strongly 
differentiated two competing vertically integrated channels yield highest profits. 
When the two products are highly substitutable, leader-follower channels are so 
profitable that they are stable, despite each individual channel's incentive to 
reorganize into a vertical system. Once again research findings point at 
decentralized channels for highly substitutable, often low-quality or low-service, 
products. Compare the channel structures for fast-moving consumer goods, such as 
groceries that are sold through low-service discount supermarkets. 
Results obtained from a model of channel pricing may differ with the form of 
the demand function used. In the simple exclusive dealer channel it pays to be the 
vertical price leader in the associated Stackelberg game if the demand function is 
downward sloping (Gal-Or 1985). This was confirmed for linear demand by 
Moorthy and Fader (1990), but not for multiplicative demand that causes an upward 
sloping reaction function. Moorthy (1988) considered the effect of channel 
intermediaries on direct competition between two manufacturers in a channel with 
one common retailer who sells both manufacturers' products. With a linear demand 
function retailers will prefer to distribute multiple manufacturers' products, while 
manufacturers prefer exclusive dealers. With a nonlinear demand function all actors 
prefer an exclusive dealer channel. Moorthy found also that when the demand 
function is nonlinear more differentiated products generate higher manufacturer 
profits in an exclusive dealer channel and lower manufacturer profits in a common 
retailer channel. This can only be partly explained by the common retailer's ability 
to manipulate the retail price. Lee and Staelin (1997) elaborated Moorthy and 
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Fader's (1990) findings and argue that the distinction between linearity and 
nonlinearity of the demand function is not very important. Instead, it is the 
relationship between demand function and type of vertical strategic interaction, i.e., 
a channel member's optimal response to the other channel member's move, that 
matters. 
The emergence of middlemen in a distribution channel is also dependent on 
another characteristic of consumer demand, i.e., uncertainty. When demand is 
uncertain, risk-averse middlemen will demand a risk-premium for undertaking sales 
activities (Lai 1990a). Greater uncertainty in the selling environment has an effect 
similar to that of higher costs facing the middleman, causing him to demand a 
higher payoff for carrying the product, all other things equal. In very uncertain 
situations the risk premia required to make the intermediaries willing to carry the 
product would severely reduce any increased profitability associated with putting 
them into service. 
Many models of strategic interaction in distribution channels assume full 
information, i.e., actors have perfect knowledge about each others' motives. 
However, in practice many actors possess only limited information about their 
rivals' motivations and behaviors. Information incompleteness is assumed in for 
example Shugan (1985) and Coughlan and Mantrala (1992, 1994). The latter 
authors developed a dynamic pricing model and concluded that in a duopoly 
manufacturers' prices converge over time, and found that the time required for 
convergence increased, the more interrelated in demand the products are. 
The research mentioned here illustrates how the introduction of intermediaries 
whose existence is justified solely by the fact that manufacturers spin off service 
provision, reduces the intensity of price competition without any actual product 
differentiation or specific consideration of the service provided. Studies that 
specifically addresses the relationship between distribution service provision and 
distribution channel structure are scarce. Betancourt and Gautschi (1998) extended 
their theoretical framework (Betancourt and Gautschi 1990, 1992) into a 
game-theoretic model of channel relationships and analyzed distribution service as a 
mechanism for exercise of economic power in a channel. They found that with 
higher price elasticity of demand the level of distribution service provision is likely 
to be higher in a decentralized channel than in a vertically integrated channel. 
Similarly to the phenomenon of double marginalization each subsequent channel 
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member will try to add value by providing distribution service, leading to both a 
higher retail price and a higher service level. Furthermore, whoever controls 
distribution service provision, the manufacturer or the retailer, enjoys a higher share 
of profit margin in a decentralized channel. This result is consistent with the 
previous in that a high level of distribution service provision favors a decentralized 
distribution channel. 
It is apparent that most models of distribution channel dynamics refer to 
symmetric channels with one or two actors at each channel level. In practice 
channels with few manufacturers and many retailers are common for many 
consumer goods and may be sustainable because of fixed cost thresholds that block 
entry. Channels with many manufacturers and few retailers are found in for example 
mass retailer markets. The scale of operations of these retailers may effectively 
prevent potential new entrants (cf. Coughlan and Wernerfelt 1989). Increasing 
channel breadth, i.e., considering more than two or three firms at each channel 
level, however generally offers little additional insight. An exception forms 
Shugan's (1985) analysis of product assortments carried by three competing retailers 
(see 6.4). From a theoretical perspective most asymmetric channels, including 
so-called dual distribution, are unstable (Shugan and Jeuland 1988; McGuire and 
Staelin 1985). Additional consideration of competition with respect to distribution 
service may lead to new insights in this respect. 
623 Retail format competition 
Several chapters in this book argued that retailers' strategic decisions are driven by 
consumer demand for retail services (Betancourt and Gautschi 1990, 1992; 
Ratchford and Stoops 1988, 1992). For example, consumers who economize on 
time by relying on branded products with known, consistent quality, can also 
achieve time savings by relying on stores with consistent assortments. It has been 
widely acknowledged that the structure of retail industry is shaped more by 
competition than by any other factor. This section illustrates competition as a strong 
influence on retailers' strategic choices with respect to distribution service 
provision. 
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Among the oldest and probably the best-known models of distribution service 
differentiation is Hotelling's (1929) model of geographical or so-called horizontal 
differentiation between retailers. Hotelling's model, which still continues to be 
extended by several researchers, analyzes division of a homogeneous consumer 
market of size 1 among two retail outlets that sell the same undifferentiated good 
and can decide on location only. In equilibrium, both firms are located next to each 
other at the center of the market, and they each face half of total demand. Lai and 
Matutes (1989) elaborated and extended Hotelling's model to two retailers carrying 
one or two independent goods in a heterogeneous market where consumers differ in 
reference prices and transportation cost. Two possible equilibria result, one in which 
consumers with low reference prices can afford one good only, and one in which 
each retailer takes advantage of the consumer segment with high reference prices 
combined with high transportation cost and offers the two products as a bundle. In 
another variant of Hotelling's model Winter (1993) includes retailer service 
provision as a means to reduce consumer opportunity costs of shopping. 
The previous section already mentioned that retailer competition usually is 
analyzed through modeling a channel with two retailers and one or two 
manufacturers - the multiple exclusive dealer channel, and the duopoly common 
retailers channel, respectively -. While the number of studies that deal with service 
competition among retailers is hmited a relatively large part of them has considered 
retail assortment. Retailer assortment decisions that have been analyzed in the few 
studies addressing this subject include the number of items carried in the 
assortment, prices of these items, and associated other service elements. 
Shugan (1988) analyzed the effect of differently composed assortments on 
retail prices. He distinguished between low-end and high-end products carried by 
single, dual, and multi-product outlets. Given consumer differences with respect to 
price sensitivity he concluded that the dual product outlet trades down low-end 
items and trades up high-end items, and consequently charges a lower price for the 
low-end product, and charges a higher price for high-end products than single 
product outlets. Shugan found that for thirteen product categories, retailers' 
assortments in a large shopping mall were differentiated to the extent that retailers 
shared hardly more than two variants for any product category. This finding can be 
interpreted as evidence that competing retailers tend to carry "partially 
differentiated assortments," in the sense that the assortment of each retailer consists 
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of a few common variants (i.e., those that are carried by all the retailers) and the rest 
being unique to the retailer. Another example concerns clothing stores' whose 
assortments may share a few similar variants, but many of the variants carried are 
usually different. 
In another study Shugan (1989) investigated price and assortment decisions 
for three competing manufacturers who distribute their products direcdy to a 
heterogeneous consumer market. High quality products coincide with higher unit 
variable production costs while the market segment for high-quality products is 
generally relatively small. In the presence of economy producers this leads to higher 
prices, less sales, and lower marginal profitability for high-quality producers. 
Shugan found that quality and assortment size will therefore be negatively 
correlated. No attempt has been made to empirically support this finding. 
Increasing the number of similar items in an assortment will increase 
consumers' cost of shopping across stores. The mere availabihty of multitude of 
variants actually confuses the consumers to such an extent that their tendency to 
"shop around" reduces. Less comparison shopping leads to less retail competition, 
reduced price sensitivity, and consequently higher profits for both manufacturers 
and retailers. This argument was used by Bergen, Dutta, and Shugan (1996) to 
model retailers' decisions concerning price, service, and whether or not to carry an 
additional brand in their assortment. A larger fraction of so-called nonshoppers, 
who do not value shopping around, leads to higher prices, higher service, and a 
larger number of stores carrying a new brand. 
Recently, research has been done on the rationales behind the coexistence of 
two different retail formats that differ with respect to assortment composition and 
provision of other services. Messinger and Narasimhan (1997) model consumer 
store choice as a tradeoff between time-saving shopping convenience depending on 
assortment size, represented by the number of categories carried, average price, and 
other retail services that serve as a substitute for the consumer's shopping time. 
Based on time-series testing of their model they concluded that the increase 
one-stop shopping resulted from increased consumer valuation of time. A 
comprehensive analysis of the relationship between price, promotions and service 
has been given by Lai and Rao (1997). They argue that supermarkets that engage in 
promotional pricing (PROMO) will offer higher service levels than supermarkets 
that follow the Every Day Low Pricing (EDLP) strategy. The combination of higher 
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relative basket price and higher service level at the PROMO store draws in 
particular time-constrained consumers in addition to bargain-hunters, while the low 
basket price at the EDLP store draws mainly price-sensitive consumers in addition 
to time-constrained consumers. Overall, industry profits benefit from this 
store-format equilibrium. 
One of the few studies that simultaneously consider retailer service provision 
and channel structure was done by Bell and Padmanabhan (1996). They analyze the 
role of horizontal service competition in asymmetric distribution channels in which 
the monopolist manufacturer integrates one retailer while the other retailer remains 
independent. They suggest as a rationale for dual distribution channel structure, that 
service differentiation, i.e., high-service integrated versus low-service independent 
retailers, reduces price competition, resulting in higher equihbrium retail prices and 
higher manufacturer profits. Consequently, a manufacturer may find it optimal to 
use a dual structure when an independent channel cannot support investment in 
service. 
6.3 Channel coordination 
In oligopolistic markets the primary goal of each distribution channel member, i.e., 
provision of desired time, place, possession, and form utilities for its customers at 
maximum profit, often cannot be assured unless the other channel members 
cooperate. Achievement of maximum channel output requires independent channel 
members coordinate their strategies as well as the functions they perform (Stern and 
El-Ansary 1992) with respect to price as well as service provision. Since 
distribution channels often consist of multiple independent suppliers and 
distributors who have differing objectives (Eliashberg and Micbie 1984) it is 
difficult for manufacturers, or suppliers in general, to motivate distributors to 
behave according to their objectives. This section focuses on channel coordination 
given a decentralized multi-level distribution channel. It discusses the antecedents 
of channel control problems followed by several types of control mechanisms and 
their theoretical and practical significance. 
Distribution service and channel structure 207 
63.1 Determinants of channel control problems 
A decentralized distribution channel consists of multiple interdependent firms 
whose decisions are interrelated while their goals are only partially overlapping, at 
best. Consequently, each firm aims at realization of its own goals while its actions 
influence other firms' profits. The pursuit of individual firms' goals almost by 
definition results in suboptimal performance viewed from the perspective of the 
total distribution channel. In practice, virtually every channel member recognizes 
the desirabihty of total distribution channel performance optimization, for example 
in terms of profits. However, it is the allocation of the revenues associated with 
optimization of total channel performance that causes problems. Choice of channel 
structure is therefore often guided by the extent to which a firm desires to control 
the channel. Centralized distribution allows a firm to exercise control over the 
channel and skim channel profits, while a firm will choose decentralized 
distribution if it trusts the market will function at its best interest. Channel structure 
and channel control therefore represent interrelated problems. 
Goal incongruence, which is implicitly present in decentralized distribution 
channels, is one of the major determinants of suboptimal total channel performance. 
The individual pursuit of their own goals by independent firms who do not take into 
consideration the effect of their actions on previous or subsequent firms in the 
channel, results in externalities. An externality arises "when the consumption of a 
good by a consumer directly affects the welfare of another consumer, or when a 
firm's production affects other economic agents" (Tirole 1993, p.7). The concept of 
externalities originated in transaction cost analysis (cf. Williamson 1975). Due to 
the existence of externalities maximization of total channel profits requires channel 
coordination4. 
The existence of externalities does not necessarily lead to inefficiency. The Coase theorem 
"Regardless of the specific initial assignment of property rights, in market equilibrium the final 
outcome will be efficient - provided the initial legal assessment is well-defined and that 
transactions involving exchange are cosfless," (Coase 1960) implies that well-defined rights 
determine channel structure and eliminate the externality problem provided incentives called side 
payments can be made if necessary. Several regulations, such as vertical restrictions can be seen as 
definition of property rights. For an application of the Coase Theorem to market channels see 
Norton (1987). 
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The most simple example of the occurrence of externality, the so-called basic 
vertical externality (Tirole 1993, p. 174), has been the object of early research on 
channel coordination (e.g., Jeuland and Shugan 1983, 1988; Moorthy 1987a,b; 
Shugan 1985), and reads as follows. Assume a distribution channel with a 
monopolist manufacturer and an exclusive dealer where, under linear pricing, price 
is the only decision variable. The manufacturer charges a wholesale price, p w , to the 
retailer, who in turn determines his retail price, p . Assume furthermore that the 
manufacturer incurs a variable cost c per unit. Any decision made by the retailer 
that increases his demand for the intermediate good by one unit generates an 
incremental profit of (pw - c) for the manufacturer. However, the retailer who 
maximizes his own profit does not take into account the manufacturer's incremental 
profit, and therefore tends to make decisions that lead to a quantity sold that can be 
considered too low from both a total channel and a consumer welfare perspective. 
In a multiple-level channel, each intermediary adds its own price-cost margin, 
resulting in an excessive margin for the entire channel that can exclude consumers 
who would be profitable clients for an integrated channel. 
The control problem here consists in knowing how to reach the desired values 
of the decision variables so as to maximize the channel's aggregate, or vertically 
integrated, profit. The problem is that the retailer's marginal cost for the good (pw) 
differs from the marginal cost that would be incurred by the centralized channel (c). 
The aggregate profit of the two-member independent channel is lower than the 
profit of the vertically integrated channel, due to relatively high price and low 
quantity sold, which gives the manufacturer an incentive to impose vertical 
restraints that ehminate this externality. Note that this externality is simply caused 
by the fact that two independent but interdependent channel members pursue then-
own economic goals, and not by power imbalance or irrational behavior. In this 
example it is the interdependence of channel members pursuing different goals that 
causes the need for coordination. 
Moral hazard or "hidden action" is a concept from agency theory which 
captures the idea that a firm is able to take some action that is unobservable to 
another firm. Unobservability induces a firm to behave opportunistically, since it 
facilitates a firm's pursuit of it's own interest at the expense of other firms. 
Opportunistic behavior induces various externalities that affect organizations at 
different levels of the distribution channel. Moral hazard and unobservability are 
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particularly relevant concepts with respect to distribution service provision. 
Services possess characteristics, such as intangibihty, simultaneity of production 
and consumption, and heterogeneity. Consequently, they possess a relatively low 
level of search attributes and high a level of experience attributes (Nelson 1974), 
and in some cases even credence attributes. Service performance therefore is often 
difficult, if not impossible, to assess with certainty and implies difficult or high-cost 
monitoring. Distribution service elements that are particularly vulnerable to moral 
hazard are quality maintenance and information. Horizontal moral hazard occurs for 
example with respect to the level of service provided by franchisees (cf. Lai 1990). 
When monitoring is costly or impossible franchisees may be tempted to behave 
opportunistically and provide less service than required. A franchisee offering better 
service than other franchisees of the same franchisor exerts a positive horizontal 
externality on these other retailers (spillover) because his service may positively 
influence the demand for the organization as a whole. A franchisee who cuts down 
on service exerts a negative horizontal externality on his fellow franchisees. 
In a simple two-level manufacturer-and-retailer channel the basic vertical 
externality, also called downstream moral hazard, generally exists also for the 
retailer's choice of decision variables other than price, such as distribution service 
provision and promotional efforts. To the extent that these efforts increase final 
demand the manufacturer wants to encourage the retailer to supply them. In order to 
prevent the retailer from underprovision of services or promotional efforts the 
manufacturer induces the retailer to behave as desired by the manufacturer. Channel 
members, including consumers, are often uncertain about the service level actually 
provided. Even high-quahty suppliers may not make the required service effort with 
respect to a specific buyer-seller relationship. Moral hazard applies less to several 
specific service elements, such as accessibility of location, which is relatively easy 
to monitor. Although assortment can be assessed objectively, consumers will 
experience difficulty in assessing large assortments. 
Unobservability and associated moral hazard have been specifically addressed 
with respect to product quality problems, using signaling theory. A well-known 
example of the significance of quality uncertainty has been given by Akerlof 
(1970), who showed what happens if the neoclassical assumption of perfect 
information is relaxed. Assume buyers of used cars know only the average quality 
of cars sold, while retailers know the exact quality of a car they are selling. Buyers 
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consequently bid what they consider a fair price for a car, while sellers accept the 
average-quality price only for a car that is below average quality. If buyers knew 
beforehand that this would happen, they would lower their bid and only cars with 
quality just below the quality appropriate for this price would be sold. As a result 
only cars of the lowest quality would be sold at the lowest price. This downward 
bias on average quality is called the adverse selection or lemons problem. 
The previous indicated that an important cause underlying channel 
coordination problems concerns conflicting interests of interdependent channel 
actors. Concepts that indicate the degree of goal-congruence are trust (e.g., 
Anderson and Narus 1990, Moorman, Zaltman, and Despande" 1992; Kumar, 
Scheer, and Steenkamp 1996), credible commitment (e.g., Anderson and Weitz 
1992), satisfaction, and relationship quality. Transaction cost theory and agency 
theory view partner opportunism as a basic problem of channel control (John 1984). 
Variables that increase transaction costs, such as unobservability, complexity, 
performance ambiguity due to high complexity, a high degree of credence 
attributes, or a lack of trust, encourage opportunistic behavior by channel members. 
This intensifies all types of moral hazard and associated externalities, resulting in 
lower performance by other channel members and eventually lower total 
distribution channel performance. For example, technical complexity induces 
channel miscoordination caused by downstream moral hazard and associated 
vertical externality. Consider the case of a manufacturer who uses low quality 
technology and consequently enforces the retailer to pay for costly repairs. 
Opportunism can occur with respect to a variety of other situations. A firm 
that has made transaction-specific investments in a certain relationship depends on 
continuation of that relationship because switching is costly and therefore is 
extremely vulnerable to opportunism, the so-called safeguarding problem (e.g., 
Heide and John 1990). A manufacturer takes a so-caUed hostage from a supplier 
who invests in relationship-specific goods or procedures (Smitka 1991). The 
manufacturer's credible threat to end the relationship reduces the likelihood that the 
dependent suppher will show opportunistic behavior. Agency theory refers to 
information asymmetries and differences in risk preferences as environmental 
uncertainty. Information asymmetries between retailers and manufacturers may 
cause retailers to take "wrong" decisions from a channel perspective (Gerstner and 
Hess 1995). This so-called environmental uncertainty causes control problems even 
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when channel members are willing to take a channel perspective (Dwyer and Oh 
1987). 
A variety of control mechanisms has been suggested in literature, that can be 
classified broadly as structural or incentive-based. Table 6.1 gives an illustrative 
overview of these coordination mechanisms that will be discussed in the next 
sections. Since the role of distribution service provision in channel coordination has 
remained largely underexposed many examples refer to price coordination only, but 
may generate useful insight into service coordination problems. 
6.3.2 Structural coordination mechanisms 
The institutional approach in marketing considers channel organization or more 
generally, relationship organization, as a distribution channel coordination 
mechanism. The three basic structures are (cf. Arndt 1981): markets, that are 
coordinated ex post through the price mechanism; politics, in which bargaining and 
voting can be used as means to achieve power, and hierarchies or bureaucracies that 
are coordinated ex ante by direct assignments, administrative rules and regulations. 
Given so-called market failure, the divergence between interests can be 
reduced through bargaining or eventually through the use of other sources of power. 
Power is the main instrument that can be used to achieve channel coordination 
(Stern, El-Ansary, and Coughlan 1996). The resources that are possessed and 
controlled by a firm, such as assets, attributes and conditions within a relationship, 
generate dependence of another firm that values these resources but does not 
possess them. Social exchange theory (Anderson and Narus 1984; Kelly and 
Thibaut 1978; Thibaut and KeUey 1959) and resource dependency theory (Pfeffer 
and Salancik 1978) use power as a behavioral base for channel coordination 
problems. The latter theory argues that a firm has power over another firm to the 
extent that it controls resources that cannot or at a substantial higher cost be 
obtained elsewhere by the dependent firm. Social exchange theory argues that firms 
act according to two comparison levels: the quality of outcomes expected from past 
experiences with relationships with channel members (CL) and the quality of 
outcomes of the best alternative relationship available (CL^). The degree to which a 
channel member can affect the quality of other firms' outcomes is a source of 
Table 6.1 Instances of distribution channel coordination mechanisms. 
Generic mechanism Moral hazard type Specific coordination mechanisms 
1. Structural 
2. Behavioral 
3. Informal 
4. Incentive-based 
unilateral vertical 
unilateral vertical 
horizontal 
unilateral vertical 
unilateral vertical 
unilateral vertical 
unilateral vertical 
unilateral vertical 
horizontal + vertical 
horizontal + vertical 
unilateral vertical 
unilateral vertical 
unilateral vertical 
unilateral vertical 
unilateral vertical 
unilateral vertical 
unilateral vertical 
unilateral vertical 
unilateral vertical 
unilateral vertical 
unilateral vertical 
bilateral vertical 
horizontal 
- Vertical coordination (e.g., Arndt '81; Williamson '75). 
- Channel decentralization (e.g., Coughlan & Lai '92). 
- Collusion (e.g., Coughlan '85). 
- Emphasizing tasks & activities (e.g., Celly & Frazier '96). 
- Monitoring (e.g., Lai '90). 
- Power-dependence (e.g., Anderson & Narus '84). 
• Social control (e.g., Coleman '90; Jaworski '88; Bergen et al. '92). 
- Selection procedures (e.g., Spekman '88). 
• Learning (e.g., Shugan '88; Coughlan & Mantrala '92, '94) 
- Punishment strategies (e.g., Abreu '88; Lai '90) 
- Unobservability (e.g., Coughlan & Wernerfelt '89). 
- Two-part tariffs (e.g., Oi '71 ; Zusman & Etgar '81 ; Lai '90; Ingene & Parry '95a,b). 
- Royalty payments (e.g., Moorthy '90). 
- Quantity discounts (e.g., Jeuland & Shugan '83; Moorthy '87). 
- Side payments (e.g., Norton '87). 
- Resale price maintenance (e.g., Winter '93) 
- Price floors. 
- Pull discounts (Gerstner & Hess '95). 
- Transaction-specific investment (Williamson '75). 
- Customer satisfaction bonus & mnfr. assistance (Chu & Desai '95). 
- Service provision (Betancourt & Gautschi '96). 
- Marginal source (Holstrom '82). 
- Service provision (Bell & Padmanabhan '96). 
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power. Transaction cost analysis adds another perspective on the same argument: 
high switehing costs caused by idiosyncratic investment and associated asset 
specificity represent the power one firm has over the other. 
The political economy framework (Zald 1970) adopted the concept of power 
as a force driving channel members. The framework links two central concepts, 
polity, which refers to the system and/or actors influencing decision making within 
an organization or society, and economy, which refers to the productive exchange 
system of an organization or society. For an overview of the political economy 
framework in marketing the reader is referred to Arndt (1981), Achrol, Reve, Stern 
(1983), and Stern and Reve (1980) who were the first to apply the framework to 
marketing channels. Distributors may exert considerable power due to their 
specialized market information and their taking title to products (Cespedes 1988), 
which make coordination all the more difficult. 
Vertical integration is probably the best-known way to achieve channel 
coordination from a power perspective. By taking title of multiple consecutive firms 
in the distribution channel the company who owns the vertical system assures itself 
of the power necessary to coordinate the actions by the firms that have been 
acquired. The most obvious solution for many coordination problems is thus 
structural in nature. The basic vertical externality can, for example, be resolved by 
vertical integration. Vertical integration avoids the price distortion, due to double or 
triple, etc. marginalization (see also Gerstner and Hess 1995; Moorthy 1988; Bolton 
and Bonanno 1988; Lilien, Kotler and Moorthy 1992, p.419; Spengler 1950). 
However, like other coordination mechanisms vertical integration should be 
considered in terms such as efficiency and flexibility (Malone 1987; Niman 1992). 
Note that vertically integrated channels or hierarchies imply increased costs of 
bureaucracy. Hierarchies are more efficient when goal congruence and performance 
ambiguity are moderately high, while markets are more efficient when goal 
incongruence is low and performance ambiguity is high, i.e., the cost of monitoring 
is high (Ouchi 1980). 
In practice, markets may function and coordinated behavior in noncooperative 
environments without formal (contractual) agreements, financial commitment, overt 
exercise of power, or close personal relationships can be observed. For example, 
coordination can be achieved through monitoring (Lai 1990a), which reduces 
information asymmetry and enables detection and subsequent reduction or 
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prevention of opportunism. The monitored party may however feel the monitoring 
indicates a lack of trust, which can damage the relationship (John 1984). If 
monitoring is difficult or even impossible and costly, selection procedures 
(Spekman 1988) can assist in reducing uncertainty with respect to partner 
capabilities, but they do not prevent the occurrence of opportunism. Social control 
(e.g., Bergen, Dutta, and Walker 1992; Coleman 1990, Jaworski 1988) may 
encourage relationship continuance and/or reduce opportunistic behaviors. 
Monitoring and social control are however overt behaviors that imply the use of 
power. 
As an example of an informal coordination mechanism, implicit 
understanding assumes channel members are so smart to recognize that, although 
they have an incentive to seek their own short-term interests, they may be better off 
in the long run if they consider the other channel members' interests as well. 
Implicit understanding may involve the recognition of another channel member's 
potential power, as will be discussed below, but power does not have to be 
exercized in order to achieve channel coordination. 
One rationale behind implicit understanding is channel member learning over 
time (Coughlan and Mantrala 1992, 1994; Shugan 1985). When over time channel 
members, e.g., a manufacturer and a retailer, learn each other's reaction functions, 
they have some control over each other's behavior and realize each other's 
recognition of control. Firms' understanding of their mutual influence over each 
other's margins eventually leads to higher total channel profits. Even when only one 
of two firms learns both firms are better off, in particular the firm that does not learn 
("ignorance is bliss", Lee and Staelin 1997). Because mutual influence is not the 
same as complete control implicit understandings are not a perfect substitute for 
perfect coordination resulting from formal agreements and they generally result in 
relatively higher retail price and lower channel profits. Although the analysis does 
not take into account the effect of channel member's power on the division of 
channel profits this will not affect channel members' actual learning. In the 
real-world the level of channel profits will be somewhere in between profits in a 
channel with independent firms and a perfectly coordinated channel's profits. 
Shugan (1985) argues that this incomplete coordination may form an incentive to 
possibly illegal, explicit collusion. 
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When channel pricing agreements are not necessarily observable channel 
members have an incentive to cheat other channel members. This argument has 
been elaborated by Coughlan and Wernerfelt (1989). For example, assume two 
channels, each with one manufacturer and one retailer. In each channel the 
manufacturer can announce a transfer price and then secretly renegotiate a new 
agreement with the retailer that, given the other channel's transfer price, leads to 
much higher profits for both channel members. However, in symmetric channels, 
the other manufacturer has an incentive to do the same. The only possible outcome 
in the end thus consist of prices and quantities that are equal to those in a 
centralized channel, and consequently channel length becomes irrelevant. The 
actual degree of observability depends on legal restrictions, i.e., antitrust laws, and 
the number of parties involved in deal-making. 
Recent economic theory offers another rationale for informal coordination, 
based on the use of punishment strategies (e.g., Abreu 1988). Punishment strategies 
imply that if any firm shows noncollusive behavior it is punished by a competing 
firm such that the losses incurred by this punishment prevent the firm from 
deviating from both firms' collective interest. Many punishment strategies have 
been formulated in game theory. Of course, a punishment threat has to be credible 
in order to work and will therefore never be implemented in equihbrium. A 
threatening firm thus has to be perceived as powerful. Not every firm will be 
capable of exerting a credible threat, since it may involve substantial costs. Lai 
(1990a) uses one of Abreu's punishment strategies, Mutually Assured Destruction 
(MAD), to explain alternating price promotions by competing firms carrying 
national brands, which he observed in mature consumer goods markets. He 
interprets these alternating price promotions as a long run strategy that is pursued 
by these firms to defend their market shares from a third, local brand. Since there 
exist switchers in the market it is in the two national firms' best interest to collude 
implicitly. Over a discounted infinite horizon alternate promotions yield future 
discounted profits that are as high as they would be with exphcit collusion. The 
most severe punishment strategy for deviation is when the punishing firm lowers its 
price to zero or to marginal cost for a Umited period of time. The deviating firm has 
to follow this price change to prevent even greater losses. Lai shows that this 
punishment strategy is credible, and will therefore never be implemented, since it 
leads to a perfect Nash equihbrium. 
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Distribution service provision can play an important role as an informal 
instrument for channel coordination. Referring to the definition of distribution 
service in chapter 2, distribution service can improve customers' decision making. 
Particularly information increases understanding of other channel members' 
performance, and reduces perceptions of uncertainty and complexity. Availabihty of 
desired products reduces uncertainty as well. Ultimately, this may lead to decreased 
goal incongruence. Consider in this respect standardization of products and 
procedures, that reduce complexity (cf. Mintzberg and Quinn 1996). The hedonistic 
shopping value generated by distribution service provision, such as a pleasant 
ambience, creates an atmosphere that favors mutual understanding and supports 
mutual trust. Finally, distribution service provision can reduce customers' 
distribution-related cost and as such it can be an incentive-based coordination 
instrument, which will be illustrated in the next section. 
6.3.3 Incentive-based channel coordination mechanisms 
Incentives are typically designed rewards to change channel members' behavioral 
orientation into a direction desired by the coordinating firm. Specific investments 
can be considered incentives, and there are many other ways of designing 
self-enforcing contracts (Telser 1980) which prevent channel members to 
opportunistically pursue short-term profits. In the marketing science literature the 
coordination of distribution channels when channel members are independent, 
profit-maximizing businesses is an important topic and focuses on channel structure 
in relation to incentive-based coordination efforts, mainly in the form of tariffs (e.g. 
Jeuland and Shugan 1983; Shugan and Jeuland 1988; Moorlhy 1987a; Shugan 
1985). Although one could argue that incentives for achieving channel coordination 
can be made in the form of service provision, only few studies have considered this. 
For example, Chu and Desai (1995) consider the problem of a manufacturer who 
wants to motivate retailers to increase their customers' satisfaction. The 
coordination mechanisms the manufacturer uses consists of a combination of 
providing rewards based on consumer satisfaction (bonus) together with providing 
retailers with investment assistance to improve consumer satisfaction (assistance). 
Manufacturer assistance consists of employee training and provision, free 
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consulting, parts availability, etc. The effect of both mechanisms depends on the 
retailer's short-term vs. long-term orientation. Among short-term retailer efforts are 
promotions, spot advertisements, and high-pressure selling. Long-term retailer 
efforts include providing adequate information about use and maintenance, quick 
and safe delivery, and quick response to problems. Manufacturer long-term efforts 
consist of high quality, brand-building advertising expenditures. The authors found, 
not surprisingly, that short-term oriented retailers can be coordinated better using 
relatively more bonus, while long-term oriented retailers need relatively more 
manufacturer assistance. 
Incentive-based channel coordination mechanisms are particularly suited for 
analysis from a game-theoretic perspective. Game-theoretic research on channel 
coordination has focused almost exclusively on channels with monopoly in 
production. This section will therefore illustrate the main findings for the monopoly 
exclusive dealer channel and channels with competing retailers. The examples 
include mainly coordination in channels where price is the only decision variable 
and consequently unilateral, upstream or downstream, moral hazard exists. 
Research on coordination in channels with bilateral moral hazard, which 
particularly applies to channels with more than one service provider, is scarce but 
will be mentioned wherever appropriate. Finally, unless stated otherwise, the 
studies mentioned here consider channels in which the manufacturer is the channel 
price leader and the retailer(s) are followers. 
Starting with price as the only decision variable, the essential problem 
underlying the basic vertical externality is the discrepancy between marginal cost of 
a centralized distribution channel and the retailers' marginal cost for the good -
which is based on the wholesale price -, for a given channel structure. Several 
incentive schemes for achieving channel coordination in case of an unilateral 
vertical externality have been mentioned, mainly with price as the decision variable. 
Central to most of these approaches, which will be discussed subsequently, is for 
the manufacturer to set a wholesale price that causes the retailer's total marginal 
cost to equal the total channel's marginal cost if it were perfectly coordinated, 
thereby inducing the retailer to set a price that maximizes total channel profits. 
A manufacturer can realize the integrated-channel profit without actual 
vertical integration by using a two-part tariff, instead of a one-part tariff or linear 
transfer price (Gal-Or 1987; McGuire and Staelin 1986; Moorthy 1987; Oi 1971; 
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Tirole 1993; Zusman and Etgar 1981), T(q) = A + p w q , where A is the franchise 
fee. The distortion caused by the inequality of retailer marginal cost and channel 
marginal cost can be eliminated by taking p w = c. In that case the retailer sets her 
final price as desired from a total channel perspective, so there is no externality. The 
retailer maximizes (p-c)D(p)- A, with D(p) denoting consumer demand, and 
thus chooses p = p m , the channel optimal, vertically integrated retail price. The 
retailer's profit equals TV — A, where IT" = (pm -c)D(pm). The manufacturer can 
then appropriate the retailer's profit by imposing a franchise fee equal to the channel 
profit (A = lT m ). If the unilateral externality involves another input factor instead of 
price, such as promotional effort and observable service elements, a two-part tariff 
could also solve the coordination problem. In that case the retailer is also made the 
so-called "residual claimant" because he receives any marginal profit. In general, a 
two-part tariff can take into account the service efforts a supplier makes during his 
interactions with a retailer. 
Jeuland and Shugan (1983) assume an exclusive dealer channel in which 
neither retailer nor manufacturer have control over the price decision and show that 
a jointly negotiated quantity discount schedule may also lead to cooperative 
behavior due to the profit-sharing mechanism underlying it. However, Moorthy 
(1987a) proved that quantity discounts are not necessary to achieve coordination in 
the particular channel modeled by Jeuland and Shugan. He argued that "... a wide 
variety of pricing schemes, including pricing schemes with quantity surcharges, can 
do the job" (p 375). A two-part tariff with a constant per unit charge is a special, 
more simple, case of the quantity discount schedule: T(q) = A + (pw - vq)q, where 
v = 0. Quantity discounts seem particularly justified with respect to distribution 
service provision, since each transaction requires a certain amount of service. 
Franchise fees may have serious drawbacks (Tirole 1993). For example when 
the retailer possesses information about the retail cost or retail demand that the 
manufacturer does not have and cannot obtain at reasonable cost through 
monitoring. In addition, a franchisor cannot assess with certainty, unless at very 
high cost, how much service each of his franchisees provides. This makes it 
difficult for the manufacturer to determine the franchise fee so as to appropriate the 
retailer's profit and necessitates the use of reliable screening devices by the 
manufacturer. Furthermore, when the retailer is risk-averse and the residual cost or 
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the final demand is random, the retailer may feel he bears too much risk. The 
retailer is given some insurance when the franchise fee is reduced and the wholesale 
price is increased above marginal cost. Finally, when there are several retailers, the 
total channel marginal cost may differ across retail outlets and a retailer buying at 
total channel marginal cost is not necessarily made a residual claimant. 
Two-part tariffs and other forms of profit sharing should avoid price 
discrimination among retailers, since this violates the 1936 Robinson-Patman Act 
effective in the U.S. The violation of this Act, as well as the situation in which a 
retailer does not pass the discount to his customers, so-called channel pricing 
breakdown, can be avoided through the use of pull discounts (Gerstner and Hess 
1995). Pull discounts are a mechanism for channel coordination through price 
discounts to consumers instead of retailers. Targeted pull discounts create a 
transaction cost differential between the targeted (high price conscious) and 
nontargeted (low price conscious) consumers and thus make demand more elastic, 
which makes price reductions and selling to the price conscious consumer segment 
more profitable for the retailer. This mechanism is even more effective when 
combined with wholesale discounts. Major drawbacks associated with the use of 
pull discounts are the assumption of manufacturer leadership and the necessity to 
accurately target the discount to price-conscious consumers and make it hard for 
other consumers to obtain the discount, which limits practical implementation in 
competitive markets. Finally, the manufacturer incurs a high cost of targeting and 
distributing the discounts directly to consumers. 
A last mechanism for achieving channel coordination in the monopolist 
channel mentioned here involves resale price maintenance (RPM) (e.g., Tirole 
1993). The manufacturer can sell the intermediate good to the retailer at a price 
equal to the vertically integrated optimal retail price (pw= pm) and then impose 
resale-price maintenance (,p = pm). The retailer makes zero profit and the 
manufacturer's profit equals the channel's aggregate profit, Iim. A price ceiling 
(p< pm) or quantity forcing (q>qm) would suffice for the manufacturer's purpose 
as well, but a price floor would not. Once uncertainty is introduced RPM is not 
sufficient. When a retailer is risk-averse and faces retail-cost uncertainty with RPM 
he is not able to pass through retail-cost variations into the final, fixed, price and 
consequently bears all the risk associated with such variations. RPM induces 
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excessive monopolist manufacturer power, such as may be the case for goods with 
high brand equity, and its use is therefore prohibited as well by U.S. as by European 
legislation. Use of RPM could go with manufacturer requirements with respect to 
distribution service provision only if service provision can be monitored by the 
manufacturer at relatively low cost. 
The discussion of channel coordination mechanisms sofar has restricted to 
bilateral monopoly or exclusive dealer channels. In competitive distribution 
channels the coordination problem is more complex and therefore more difficult to 
solve. In a channel with competing, nonidentical retailers total channel marginal 
costs will differ across retailers. Consequently, the channel-coordinating wholesale 
price will vary across retailers. In addition, the Robinson-Patman Act precludes 
sellers "from giving different terms to different resellers in the same reseller class" 
unless cost differences in serving those sellers can be shown, or a few other 
conditions apply (Jeuland and Shugan 1983, p. 256). Also, by U.S. and European 
law manufacturers cannot dictate prices to retailers. Because of the requirement to 
treat retailers comparably the manufacturer can extract profit from the retailers -
using a fixed franchise fee - only to the extent that the least profitable retailer is able 
to meet. 
In general, practical considerations are predominant in research on 
coordination of competing channels. Ingene and Parry (1995a) analyze channel 
coordination in a channel with one manufacturer selling an identical product to two 
competing retailers. Among the coordination mechanisms that are valid the authors 
focus on three simple wholesale pricing strategies. They justify their consideration 
of simple pricing strategies by stating that more complex wholesaling tariffs 
introduce "administrative, bargaining, and contract development costs" and may 
cause retailers to believe they are being "taken advantage of (p.361). In addition, 
the difficulty of obtaining the information required in order to design an optimal 
policy increases with the complexity of the wholesale pricing policy (McGuire and 
Staelin 1983). The analysis showed that the optimal manufacturer pricing policy 
depends on differences in retailers' fixed costs. The required simplicity of the 
coordination mechanisms together with the restrictions on differential contracting 
inhibit the attainment of channel coordination in all circumstances. Because of the 
strict conditions that must be met - the difference between fixed fees charged to 
each retailer must fall between certain bounds and the absolute value of fixed fees is 
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limited due to minimum retail profitability constraints - a manufacturer may even 
prefer a noncoordinating price strategy to a channel coordinating menu of tariffs. In 
another, related, study Ingene and Parry (1995b) found that a single two-part tariff 
with fixed per unit wholesale cost equal to constant marginal production cost fully 
coordinates a multiple retailer channel when retailers have exclusive territories. 
They conclude that "the optimal two-part tariff wholesale pricing policy, consisting 
of an optimal unit fee (W) and an optimal fixed fee (w)" generates greater 
manufacturer profits than "a wholesale pricing policy that coordinates retailer 
behavior." 
When service provision is included in the analysis as a decision variable and 
multiple subsequent channel members, for example manufacturer and retailer, 
provide service that affects consumer demand so-called bilateral moral hazard 
exists. The familiar incentive-based coordination mechanisms do not suffice in that 
case because both channel members have to be made residual claimants. This 
problem was solved first by Holstrom (1982) who showed channel coordination in 
an exclusive dealer channel can be achieved by introducing a third party, a so-called 
marginal source, who is willing to sign any contract that generates non-negative 
profit. The marginal source pays the manufacturer the market price charged by the 
retailer, i.e., the retail price. The retailer pays the marginal source according to a 
two-part tariff consisting of marginal cost per unit plus a fee that is determined such 
that the source's profit is zero. Accordingly, in practice middlemen can be observed 
that earn very small margins. For competing channels the coordination problem in 
case of multilateral moral hazard becomes a very complex one. 
Wernerfelt (1994) developed a game-theoretical approach to decisions 
concerning allocation of service provision among vertical channel members. Both 
manufacturing and information exchange tasks can in theory be performed by 
different channel members. Wernerfelt's efficiency criterion states that in a bilateral 
channel the alternative for which both parties are better off, or maximization of joint 
payoff, should and usually will be preferred. In case joint payoff maximization 
implies inefficiency because gains for one player are lower than in another 
equihbrium that does not maximize joint payoffs, Wernerfelt argues that joint 
payoff maximization is more efficient than any other alternative equilibrium when 
players agree to share the gains through side payments by one player to the other, an 
argument similar to Norton's (1987). Although theoretically justified the efficiency 
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criterion has not yet proven applicable in practice since the actual side payments 
that should be made by channel members are difficult to determine. For obvious 
reasons independent firms in a distribution channel are not always prepared to make 
side payments in order to improve total channel performance. For example, a 
powerful channel member benefits from distribution service provision through an 
increase in his share of profits (Betancourt and Gautschi 1998). 
A way of resolving the adverse selection problem mentioned in 6.3.1 is 
through warranty contracts or guarantees (cf. Lutz and Padmanabhan 1995, 
Moorthy and Srinivasan 1995, Padmanabhan and Rao 1993). Warranties assure 
compensation in case of product failure and therefore serve as a credible signal of 
product quality1. Consumers generally rely on inferential belief formation to assess 
the value of variables that are difficult to assess with certainty, such as quality and 
service. Inferential belief formation rests on assumed cue-attribute relationships. For 
example, multiple studies found a price-quality relationship (e.g., Gabor and 
Granger 1966; Gardner 1971; Shapiro 1973). Other variables that are thought to 
give information about the quality of a product are advertising (e.g., Nelson 1974; 
Schmalensee 1978), and the size of a firm. 
Service competition between retailers evokes also horizontal externalities. 
Many retailer and manufacturer activities, such as personal selling and other service 
provision, and advertising, have a "public good nature" (Gerstner and Hess 1995) 
and are provided to all patrons of an outlet. Betancourt and Gautschi (1990) 
formally derived that provision of distribution services at no explicit prices evokes 
free-riding behavior by consumers in some cases. Consumers may have an incentive 
to visit a retailer who provides services that can be consumed prior to purchase, 
such as pre-sale information and advice, in order to obtain information, and then 
buy from a cheaper retailer who sells the same product but does not provide these 
services. This discourages retailers to provide service. In practice consumers are not 
completely informed, and products are differentiated to some extent at least, 
although this may not be enough to warrant provision of a minimum level of 
service. 
A signal is a manipulable attribute or activity that conveys information at some cost to the 
revealer (Spence 1974). In order for a signal to be effective it should be observable and alterable, 
the underlying economic variable should differ between individuals or firms as well as differ in 
cost of revealing the differences in this variable (Devinney 1988). 
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One way to ensure an adequate provision of services by retailers is reduction 
or elimination of competition. A manufacturer can give retailers a property right on 
their services by protecting them against unfair competition, by restraints such as 
resale price maintenance and exclusive territories (Winter 1993). Resale price 
maintenance encourages consumers to buy at retailers that provide services because 
a better price is not found elsewhere. Exclusive territories grant a monopoly 
position to retailers and effectively eliminate consumer moral hazard and horizontal 
externality, provided consumers are not so mobile and electronic markets are 
insignificant. Retailers belonging to a franchise organization or a vertically 
integrated chain have an incentive to free-ride on other retailers who belong to the 
same organization. The problem of coordinating franchisees who have an incentive 
to free-ride has been analyzed by Lai (1990a). He found that monitoring is always 
necessary to improve coordination of competing franchisees and in some cases 
royalties are needed too. 
Distribution service provision may also be a coordinating device in 
distribution channels where horizontal externality exists. The study by Bell and 
Padmanabhan (1996) in which they show that service provision serves as a rationale 
for dual distribution has already been mentioned. In distribution channels both 
unilateral (price) and multilateral horizontal and vertical (service) moral hazard may 
occur simultaneously. The decision how to motivate multiple channel members to 
allocate their service efforts so as to optimize total channel output or consumer 
satisfaction is essentially a coordination problem that is difficult to solve, let alone 
to achieve in real-world markets. Instead, the results mentioned here clearly show 
that channel members may be better off striving for channel power. 
In addition to the control mechanisms mentioned in this chapter, many other 
approaches exist. For example, Celly and Frazier (1996) transfer the concepts of 
outcome-based coordination efforts and behavior-based coordination efforts from 
intraorganizational research to interorganizational channel relationships. A 
supplier's personnel exerts outcome-based coordination efforts to the extent that 
their personal communications with a distributor's personnel focus solely on 
economic results, such as sales growth and market share. To the extent that the 
supplier's personnel emphasizes "tasks and activities" that are expected to relate to 
economic results in their communications with distributor personnel their 
coordination efforts are behavior-based. Celly and Frazier develop a causal model 
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in which they explain the use of the two types of coordination effort from 
environmental, supplier, and distributor characteristics. They found that 
environmental uncertainty, suppher famiharity and distributor value added have a 
strong positive relationship with behavior-based coordination efforts, mainly 
because these efforts may reduce the distributor's cause-effect ambiguity and reduce 
perceived risk or increase payoffs for both parties. Suppher replaceability and 
suppher resource constraints relate negatively to behavior-based coordination 
efforts. Suppher replaceability and suppher resource constraints relate negatively to 
outcome-based coordination efforts and environmental uncertainty and distributor 
experience relate positively to outcome-based coordination efforts. 
When the environment is extremely uncertain suppliers may tend to focus on 
outcome-based control because they are uncertain about the behavior-performance 
relationship, which is consistent with the study's findings. Stump and Heide (1996) 
further analyzed the antecedents of and interdependencies between different explicit 
control mechanisms for the specific investment control problem. They found among 
other things that relationship-specific investments induce qualification procedures 
as well as specific investments by the other party. The extent to which different 
control mechanisms are substitutes remains unclear. 
6.4 Conclusions and research question 
Despite the extensive body of research on distribution channel organization only 
few analytical studies address the role of distribution service provision in channel 
structure and coordination. The organizational dynamics theory, in Sheth, Gardner 
and Garrett's (1988) terminology, generally adopts an integrated perspective on 
explaining important channel practices and relationships while the analytical or 
game-theoretic approach identifies optimal channel coordination mechanisms or 
solves for the equihbrium form of contract, often from a microeconomic 
perspective. Although service provision is a basic function of intermediaries in 
distribution channels both approaches prefer mostly to focus on firms' pricing 
decisions and the vertical differentiation of distribution channels and largely 
overlooked the role of service provision in channel competition. Given the focus on 
price, service provision has been recognized as a constraint and as an instrument 
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that powerful channel members, in these studies usually the manufacturer, can use 
for achieving channel coordination. 
Competition, together with channel members' cost structures, has been 
recognized as a major determinant of channel structure. Intense competition is very 
often not advantageous to individual channel members, and therefore favors all 
sorts of differentiation. This chapter mentions three categories of differentiation, 
namely channel differentiation, i.e., the addition of channel levels through the use of 
intermediaries, vertical product or service differentiation which reduces product 
substitotability, and horizontal or store differentiation which reduces price 
competition between stores. For manufacturers of highly substitutable products with 
low quality or low service, the use of channel intermediaries decreases competition 
and leads to higher prices and profits. Generally the use of channel intermediaries 
implies spinning off marketing functions that relate to service provision. 
Distribution service decisions consequently play a particularly important role with 
respect to store differentiation. 
Channel coordination has remained a theoretical issue with strong practical 
relevance. This chapter identified several important sources of channel 
miscoordination, that all relate more or less to goal incongruence and uncertainty. 
The chapter identified three structural coordination forms; markets, power, or 
vertical integration. In practice, many channels are not exphcitly coordinated (cf. 
Lee and Staelin 1997), for example due to exclusive technology, spatial barriers, or 
the complexity of channel structure. Mechanisms of informal coordination rest on 
the assumption that firms recognize, through experience, common sense or threat, 
that they may benefit in the long run from considering other firms' interests. New 
explanations for informal collusion should come from related fields, such as 
psychology and biology, since parallels exist with yet unresolved issues with 
respect to human or animal altruistic behavior. The role of distribution service 
provision in channel coordination has however remained largely uninvestigated. 
Service provision can function as an incentive for channel coordination. In addition, 
service provision can reduce uncertainty and information asymmetries and as such 
reduce the opportunism underlying channel miscoordination. 
Several studies clearly show that powerful manufacturers in uncoordinated 
channels may be better off than in coordinated channels, for example when products 
are highly substitutable (McGuire and Staelin 1983, 1986), or when channel 
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coordination requires differential contracting of retailers which is restricted by law 
(Ingene and Parry 1995a, 1995b). Betancourt and Gautschi (1996) showed that the 
channel member conttolling distribution service provision enjoys a higher share of 
profit margin in a decentralized channel. In certain channels, such as those 
involving perishable consumer goods, every member's service decisions affect the 
total product obtained by the consumer. The multilateral moral hazard problem 
involved renders the analysis very complex and will be the topic of future research. 
More generally, several psychological motivations for channel member behavior, 
such as personal commitment to a relationship, involving concepts like trust, 
relationship quality, and satisfaction have been recently uncovered as coordination 
mechanisms. Incorporation of these concepts into analytical, or game theory models 
of channel structure and coordination remains a future challenge. 
A lot of questions remain with respect to service competition between 
distribution channels and allocation of service provision within channels. One of the 
most promising areas for research concerns retail format competition. A large part 
of service efforts in a channel is done in order to create availability for the final 
consumer. One could therefore assume that service competition will be most intense 
on the retail level. Analysis of competition between retail outlets serves to gain 
insight into the emergence of differentiated retail formats, in particular with respect 
to distribution service provision, and the relationship thereof with channel structure. 
Based on promising initial work done by early researchers who considered service 
provision a core task of distributive firms, such as Baumol and Ide (1956) and 
Bucklin (1966), recently a few analytical studies have been done on the role of 
retailer service and price decisions in channel competition and the consequences for 
the developments of differentiated retail formats. The next chapter develops a 
game-theoretic model of retail competition with respect to price, assortment, and 
other service. The model yields insight into the conditions with respect to channel 
cost structure and consumer preferences that encourage retailers to differentiate 
with respect to service provision. 
Appendix: Game theory 
The dominant conceptual paradigm employed in economics and marketing for 
examining the conduct of firms operating in oligopolistic markets is game theory 
(Moorthy 1985, 1993). For many industries today's competition involves a few 
competitors whose interests are interdependent, meaning that the consequences of 
the actions undertaken by one competitor depend on the other competitors' actions 
as well. Game theory applies to situations where actors are not only interdependent 
but have (partially) conflicting interests as well. Many real-world situations exist in 
which both strategic interdependence and conflict of interest occur simultaneously. 
For example, horizontal competition exists with respect to price, product quality, 
product line development, strategic entry decisions, and advertising spending (for 
an overview of applications, see Moorthy 1985, 1993). Vertical and horizontal 
competition in distribution channels among, respectively between manufacturers, 
retailers and other intermediaries has been modeled and analyzed predominantly 
using game theory. With respect to the channel decision, assume, for example, a 
monopohst manufacturer who distributes his products through an independent 
retailer. Both channel members act according to their own goals, e.g., profit 
maximization, which conflict with respect to for example quantity and selling price. 
These conflicting interests prevent optimization of total channel goals unless some 
form of coordination is achieved. Should the manufacturer vertically integrate the 
retailer, or is there a way for Mm to behave so that their actions are coordinated, 
despite their conflicting interests? Related problems include allocation of sales force 
compensation, and media scheduling. 
This appendix gives a brief introduction to some important basic concepts in 
noncooperative game theory. For a detailed overview of game theoretic models for 
competitive marketing strategies the reader is referred to Moorthy (1985, 1993), a 
general overview of game theory is given in e.g., Gibbons (1992) and Osborne and 
Rubinstein (1996). 
Game theory comprises noncooperative and cooperative or coalitional games. 
Noncooperative game theory examines the behavior of independent but 
interdependent individual actors (e.g., individuals or firms) that experience a 
conflict of interest and do not collude explicitly. Cooperative game theory examines 
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the formation and joint behavior of groups of actors (coalitions), independent from 
remaining players. The two major differences between noncooperative and 
cooperative game theory are a focus on individual players, respectively groups of 
players, and, although cooperative game theory is based on the individuals' 
preferences, it does not consider the details of how groups of players function 
internally, i.e. how coalitions form, and how their members choose joint actions. 
Noncooperative game theory seems most appropriate for the analysis of 
distribution channel structures consisting of multiple interdependent actors. 
However, while noncooperative game theory is used to compare results for 
decentralized channels and vertically integrated or collusive channels, the formation 
of coalitions between several (but not all) firms in complex distribution channels 
could be modeled and analyzed using cooperative games. Since this goes beyond 
the scope of this book the discussion in this appendix is restricted to noncooperative 
game theory. 
Game theory can be viewed as normative, descriptive or prescriptive, or a 
combination of these (Van Damme 1995). With descriptive game theory one 
documents how people make decisions in game situations, and prescriptive game 
theory results in advise aiming at improving players' decisions in game situations. 
Normative game theory, which has received most attention in literature, analyzes 
the consequences of strategic behavior by superrational players. This introduction 
proceeds with a discussion of normative game theoretic models. With respect to 
distribution channels normative game theoretic models analytically derive eventual 
equiHbrium strategies with respect to marketing variables set by firms in the market, 
as well as the consequences thereof for market structure. Underlying these models 
are a set of assumptions about the behavior of competing firms and the information 
available to them. 
Two central assumptions are that firms are both rational and intelligent. 
Rationality imphes that firms make decisions by maximizing their subjective 
expected utility (Savage 1954). Assuming that firms are aimed at profit 
maximization their utihty functions are linear in profits in an environment that is 
certain. In case of uncertainty, e.g., about the actions other firms will undertake, 
rational firms will compute expected utilities from different actions based on 
subjective estimates of the probability of uncertain events. Intelligence imphes that 
firms recognize other firms as rational. A complete description of the game, i.e., 
Game Theory 229 
rules of the game, includes the number of firms, their feasible sets of actions at 
every juncture in the game and their utilities for each combination of moves, the 
sequence of moves and the structure of information about the moves (Moorthy 
1985). When the rules of the game are common knowledge among the players, and 
every player knows that every other player knows the rules, and every player knows 
that every other player knows that he knows the rules etc., the game is a game of 
complete information. When the rules of the game are not common knowledge, in 
particular when firms possess asymmetric information, the game is a game of 
incomplete information. Complete information does not imply perfect information. 
In a game with perfect information each player who is to move knows the full 
history of the play of the game thus far. Although most real-world games are games 
of incomplete and often imperfect information, many game-theoretic models 
assume complete and perfect information. 
Noncooperative game theory predicts how rational and intelligent firms will 
compete. A strong solution concept that provides tight predictions in a broad class 
of games is the Nash equilibrium (Nash 1950). A Nash equihbrium (NE) is defined 
as: "a list of strategies, one for each firm, with the property that no firm would like 
unilaterally to change its strategy", where a strategy is a complete specification of 
the firm's actions in all the contingencies it might find itself in. In the Nash 
equilibrium no single player wants to deviate from his or her predicted strategy. In 
the equihbrium each firm's strategy is a so-called best-response to the other firms' 
strategies. More formally (Gibbons 1992), consider a game with n players, 
G = {Sl,...,Sn;u1,...,un}, withS,. being the set of strategies for player i, and u, the 
payoff function to player i, ut (^ ,...,sn) if the players choose the strategies (^ ,...,sn). 
The strategies (**,...,**) are a Nash equilibrium if, for each player i, s* is (at least 
tied for) player i's best response to the strategies specified for the n -1 other players, 
for every feasible strategys. in S,, that is, s* solves m a x M , . ^ * s*hl,s,,s*M,..,s"n). 
S ^ ) > M , . ( S * , . . . , 5 * _ '1 S H ^ , - ) ^ ! J , 
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A rational firm would choose its strategy as a best response to the strategies it 
assumes for others. An intelligent firm must assume strategies for other firms that 
are themselves best responses to the best-response strategy of the firm. Or, as 
Moorthy (1985) puts it: "A firm will not be comfortable with its strategy choice 
unless it believes that its assumptions about the others' behavior are shared by the 
others. And a necessary condition for rational and intelligent firms to share a 
common view of how the game will be played is that that view be an equilibrium." 
A Nash equilibrium is a so-called pure-strategy Nash equilibrium if each firm's 
equihbrium strategy is a pure strategy, i.e., chosen with probability one. A 
mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium involves randomization among pure strategies. 
The equilibrium concept can easily be misunderstood. Three essentials matter 
here (Moorthy 1985). First, an equilibrium is defined in terms of strategies, not 
moves. Furthermore, strategies are played simultaneously in any game. A 
simultaneous-move game cannot be explained by a dynamic process. Dynamics of 
the competitive situation can be part of the rules of the game (i.e., dynamic vs. static 
games), the rules determine the strategies and the strategies determine the 
equilibrium. Finally, the equilibrium that is obtained depends on how the game is 
modeled. Games with a finite number of strategies always have an equihbrium, be it 
pure or mixed (Nash 1950). For games with an infinite number of strategies the 
existence of equilibria is sometimes difficult to prove, and even more difficult to 
find. These games will be left unconsidered here. 
A distinction is generally made among static games, where firms "meet only 
once" (Tirole 1993) and players simultaneously choose actions, and dynamic 
games, where players move sequentially. Well-known examples of static games of 
complete information are the Bertrand (1883) and Cournot (1838) models of 
competition in price and quantity, respectively among two firms. The Stackelberg 
model of duopoly (1934), in which a leader firm moves first and a follower firm 
moves second, represents a dynamic game of complete and perfect information. 
One might question the usefulness and validity of normative game theory 
approaches for analyzing distribution channel structures. Game theory consists of "a 
bag of analytical tools that help understand the phenomena observed when decision 
makers interact", and game theoretic models are "highly abstract representations of 
classes of real-life situations" (Osborne and Rubinstein 1996). This abstractness 
makes these models relevant for the study of a wide variety of phenomena and gives 
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the opportunity to obtain clear insight into the processes and consequences of 
strategic interaction, but it obviously also has its drawbacks. Comparison of the 
game-theoretic approach to the institutional approaches that were illustrated in 
chapter 6, leads to the conclusion that the two types of approaches obviously reflect 
different kinds of strategic considerations. The solutions of a game theoretic model 
depend heavily on the assumptions (i.e., rules) underlying the particular game that 
is modeled. Therefore these solutions should be formulated and interpreted as 
conditions under which a certain equilibrium results. As "human players are not 
mental giants with nerves of steel...," make mistakes and therefore violate the 
perfect rationahty assumption the major hmitation of game theory involves its lack 
of predictive power as well as its questionable empirical relevance (Van Damme 
1995, referring to Harsanyi 1977 and Raiffa 1982). 
With respect to the intelligence assumption van Damme mentions that recent 
experiments (Plott 1987, Smith 1990) suggest that the equilibrium obtained in 
games with incomplete information may equal the equilibrium of the associated 
game with common knowledge of the rules. Van Damme also mentions research 
that considers hmited rationality or learning, absence of rationality (as in evolution 
theory), and recent research that assumes bounded rationality and takes into account 
human cognitive limits as possible answers to the rationahty problem. With respect 
to the latter category relevant research within the context of distribution channels 
has been done by e.g., Fershtman and Kalai (1993) who study attention allocation 
by a multimarket oligopolist with limited information handling capacity, and 
Rubinstein (1993) who analyzes the consequences of heterogeneity in information 
processing ability for a monopohst retailer. Since game theoretic models allow 
enormous flexibility, balancing a model's richness towards its robustness remains a 
challenge. 

Chapter 7 
Retail Assortment Provision and Service 
Competition* 
7.1 Introduction 
In the past three decades, retailers have been introducing many innovative retail 
concepts to possibly avoid head on price competition with other retailers and/or to 
attract a new segment of the market. The U.S. grocery industry has been witnessing 
many such retail innovations, such as warehouse clubs, category killers, EDLP 
grocery stores and of course mass merchandising by Wal-Mart. These retail formats 
differ from one another with respect to price, promotional strategy, depth and width 
of assortment, and other distribution services. In The Netherlands, similar retail 
formulas have emerged in the grocery industry, although the relatively small 
domestic market permits less variety in retail formats. These retail innovations 
exploit both segmentation and positioning strategies which in turn have 
dramatically changed consumer shopping behavior. As a consequence we see the 
emergence of new retail strategic dimensions resulting in alternative retail formats 
that successfully compete in the same product categories. 
The research presented in this chapter explores one competitive dimension 
driven by the commitment to a consistent assortment within product categories. 
Extant research on retail strategies is concerned largely with three dimensions, 
namely, price, service and assortment depth and width. Recent research by 
* This chapter has been based on Krishnan, Trichy V., Kitty Koelemeijer, and Ram Rao (1999), 
"Consistent Assortment Provision in a Retail Environment," in review for Marketing Science. 
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Broniarczyk et al. (1998) has found that apart from the size of assortment there 
exists one more assortment related factor that affects consumers' choice. Their 
research shows that the availabihty of consumers' most preferred alternative in an 
assortment positively influences their perceptions of assortment size. Specifically, 
the presence of consumers' favorite alternative in an assortment was found to 
substantially reduce the impact of item reductions that in some cases even go 
unnoticed. We define a retailer's commitment to a consistent assortment as the 
consistency of assortment of brands/items carried within a product category. Note 
that this is different from a consistency of assortment across product categories. It is 
useful to understand exactly what the role of a consistent assortment in a product 
category is. 
Consumers planning to visit a retailer who offers a consistent assortment know 
what assortment of brands they can expect to find once they are in the store. In 
contrast, when planning to visit a retailer who does not offer a consistent 
assortment, consumers cannot form rational expectations on the availabihty of 
specific brands. For example, a consumer planning to visit Ross Dress for Less, an 
apparel store, can expect to find name brands but not be certain about a specific 
brand because the store does not commit itself to a consistent assortment. On the 
other hand, the same consumer planning to visit a department store such as Foleys 
can rationally expect to find a specific brand which is part of the assortment that 
Foleys is committed to. Indeed, it is common to see the advertisements of Ross 
Dress for Less making the claim that it carries name brands at a lower price but 
without naming specific brands. In contrast, advertisements by Foleys explicitly 
name the brands carried. A similar observation can be made in other retail 
situations. For example, warehouse clubs such as Sam's Choice often carry 
merchandise across many categories including grocery items that are not 
consistently available at the store, while the grocery retailers such as Kroger 
consistently carry in almost each category the set of brands they are committed to. 
In The Netherlands, Albert Heijn represents a grocery chain that carries a highly 
committed assortment of 10,000 to 15,000 items, while grocery chains such as Aldi 
carry a much smaller and less committed assortment. Low-end top-selling products 
of well-known A-brands can be found in both supermarkets. However, consumers 
cannot be sure if Aldi carries the high-end products of that same A-brand that 
appeal to a smaller market segment and that Albert Heijn consistently carries. 
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Supermarkets such as Aldi draw customers and avoid intense competition with 
other chains through carrying a low-priced less consistent assortment together with 
a relatively large, but extremely inconsistent, assortment of non-food items. 
The finding of Broniarczyk et al. (1998) implies that when a retailer commits 
to a consistent assortment consumers start forming expectations. This impact is 
similar to the positioning image induced in consumers by the commitment that 
EDLP retailers make with respect to prices as discussed in Lai and Rao (1997, see 
also the previous chapter). Thus, in both these situations the key factor is the 
expectations that these commitment strategies induce in consumers. It is important 
to note that Lai and Rao (1997) relate this commitment to EDLP to the retail 
positioning strategy under competition with a Hi-Lo store, particularly with respect 
to service. This prompts one to ponder whether an analogous relationship between 
commitment to consistent assortment and service strategy exists under competition 
between two retailers one of whom makes the commitment and the other does not. 
The commitment to a consistent assortment is likely to entail higher costs. As 
we will argue later, and show empirically, the higher cost is primarily in the form of 
higher (variable) cost of goods. Although there are obvious advantages to the 
consumer if a retailer offers a consistent assortment, it is less obvious how a retailer 
committed to a consistent assortment who competes with another retailer who does 
not commit to a consistent assortment should compete on other dimensions such as 
price and service. Given competition between two asymmetric retailers one of 
whom has made a commitment to a consistent assortment and has a higher cost 
while the other has just the opposite, who would offer higher service in 
equilibrium? What would be their pricing strategies? In this chapter we identify the 
conditions under which the higher service goes with one or other type of retailer. 
We obtain sharper insights into this issue through an empirical examination of the 
Dutch domestic retail flower market. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section we develop 
a theoretical model and derive the conditions under which which of the two types of 
retailers would offer service in equilibrium. Specifically, we show when would the 
retailer committed to a consistent assortment alone offer service and when would 
the other retailer alone offer service. Following that, we provide an empirical 
illustration by fitting our model to the Dutch retail flower market. In the final 
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section, we conclude by explaining our results and giving directions for further 
research in this area. 
7.2 Modeling retailer competition 
We first state and describe the assumptions that provide the framework for the 
model. Following that we develop the model and derive the results. We make four 
assumptions, the first three of which describe the retail market of interest as related 
to cornmitment to a consistent assortment, cost of goods and service, while the 
fourth assumption describes the consumer segments in the market. 
Assumption 1: The market is served by two retailers, Rl and R2 who carry a 
single identical product category. However, they differ in their assortment 
decisions. Retailer Rl is committed to a consistent assortment of goods in the 
category. In other words, consumers planning to visit Rl know what assortment 
they can expect to find in the store. In contrast, R2 is not committed to a consistent 
assortment of goods in the category. As a result, consumers planning to visit R2 do 
not know what assortment they can expect to find in the store. 
Note that the assumption of a single product category reflects our interest in 
retail competition as it affects assortment decisions within a product category. As 
already remarked, in a store such as Sam's Choice, or Aldi, a consumer might not 
find, for example, the same set of brands of cereals over time. A similar situation 
exists with respect to apparel at Ross Dress for Less. Clearly, in practice these 
stores carry many product categories. Our assumption abstracts away from the 
decision of which categories a store might carry. Rather, we focus on whether the 
retailer is committed to a consistent assortment or not. The strategy of assortment 
consistency, being part of the positioning strategy, can be expected to apply to all 
categories carried by the store. To keep our analysis tractable and focussed we make 
the simplifying assumption that each retailer carries just one category. 
Assumption 2: The cost of goods is lower for the retailer who is not 
committed to a consistent assortment, i.e. R2. This reflects the fact that a retailer 
could take advantage of lower prices that may become available on various brands 
(items) from time to time and buy only those brands for most part of their 
assortment if (s)he were not committed to carrying any specific set of brands. One 
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way this can occur in practice is through buying largely brands that are 
accompanied by trade deals. Indeed, it is believed that warehouse clubs such as 
Sam's Choice, or supermarkets such as Aldi, follow this type of buying strategy. 
Another example is in the apparel industry where retailers like Ross Dress for Less 
buy only those designer brands that are available at low prices at any given time. 
Assumption 3: A retailer can provide service at one of two levels. Without 
loss of generality assume that a retailer can either provide service or not. Moreover, 
the cost of providing service is a fixed cost, denoted by F. This assumption of fixed 
cost of service reflects the fact that service cost does not vary with sales. For 
example, training salespersons or providing a better store ambience would entail a 
fixed cost. 
Assumption 4: The market consists of three consumer types. The first type 
seeks consistency in assortment. It is best to think of this segment as wanting to be 
assured of finding certain brands in the store they plan to visit. In other words, for 
this consumer type the cost of visiting a store and not finding the desired set of 
brands is sufficiently large. We define consumers as belonging to segment 1 if they 
are of the foregoing type and desire a subset of the brands that Rl is committed to. 
Thus, segment 1 consumers are loyal to Rl. Let x denote the fraction of the market 
that belongs to segment 1. The aggregate demand for this segment is therefore x. 
Type 1 consumers who do not desire the set of brands carried by Rl belong to a 
different segment. Without loss of generality we assume the size of this segment to 
be zero. 
There is a fraction (1-x) of consumers not belonging to segment 1. This 
fraction does not value consistent assortment. The aggregate demand of this set of 
consumers for each retailer is assumed to be a function of price and possibly 
service. We view service as encompassing such features as courteous salespersons, 
store ambience, etc. We assume that there is a type of consumers, denoted as 
segment 2, which values service. Let h(l-x) be the fraction of consumers belonging 
to segment 2. The demand for this segment is based on both price and service at the 
two stores. We further assume that their valuation of service is sufficiently high that 
if only one store offers service they patronize that store. If both stores offer service, 
or neither offers service, then demand of segment 2 consumers depends on prices at 
the two stores. In order to maintain a clear distinction between the assortment 
commitment consumer segment and the service-prone segment, we argue that the 
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former values time-saving services, while the latter values labor-intensive services, 
such as provided by store-personnel (see also Pashigian and Bowen 1994). Finally, 
for type 3 consumers, belonging to segment 3, aggregate demand is only a function 
of prices at the two retailers. 
Having stated the four assumptions that describe the market we are interested 
in, we are now in a position to formulate and solve the retailers problems with 
respect to price and service. Through analyzing retail competition, we want to 
determine the price at each store and whether either, both or neither retailer will 
offer service. It is important to note that we have specified only the decision on 
assortment consistency to be exogenous; i.e. Rl has and R2 has not made the 
commitment to consistency in assortment. We have however incorporated the 
institutional reality that by not committing to a consistent assortment, the retailer R2 
keeps his/her cost of goods low. Thus, we are modeling a market in which one 
retailer follows a consistent assortment and higher cost strategy relative to a 
competitor who has a lower cost but not a consistent assortment. We are set to 
derive the equihbrium service levels and prices in the market 
7.2.1 Solving the retailers' problems 
Each retailer must make two decisions: whether to offer service or not, and what 
price to charge. Thus there are four possible situations: neither Rl nor R2 offers 
service, only Rl offers service, only R2 offers service, and both offer service. The 
pricing and hence the profit margin in each situation will vary accordingly. By 
analyzing the profits accruing to the retailers in all the four situations, we can 
determine which retailer(s) would offer service. We assume that each retailer 
maximizes profits and seek a Nash equilibrium to the competitive interaction. We 
first derive the profit functions of the retailers associated with each of the four 
possible situations. 
7.2.1.1 Scenario 1: Neither Rl nor R2 offers service 
By Assumption 4, a fraction x of consumers will choose retailer Rl. The demand of 
the remaining fraction (1-x) at each retail store is a function of the retail prices in 
the two stores. Specifically, let pi and p2 be the prices at retailers Rl and R2 
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For expositional ease, we will assume that the value of P is chosen such that the max or min 
function does not come into force. Hence, we drop these two function operators for the rest of the 
paper. 
respectively. Then we assume that the market shares of the two retailers are given 
by: 
ml = max{x+]-^-[l-fi(pl-p2)],x} (1) 
m2 = mm{^[l + j3(pl-P2)ll-x}, (2) 
where ml and m2 are the market shares of Rl and R2, J3 is the aggregate price 
sensitivity parameter, and the max and the min functions ensure the correct 
boundary conditions1. Note that /} is positive in our formulation. A high P implies 
that even for a small drop in price almost all the consumers in the price sensitive 
segment will prefer the lower priced retailer, and a P close to 0 implies that a 
retailer has to decrease the price substantially to attract the price sensitive segment. 
Note that in absence of any price difference, each retailer obtains half the price 
sensitive segment. 
Note that we have assumed the demand function to be linear in price 
difference following past research (e.g., McGuire and Staelin (1985), Krishnan and 
Rao (1995)). This makes the mathematical results tractable. Further, with a linear 
function the market share equations 1 and 2 are continuous implying that (pl-p2) 
can take any value, positive or negative. 
From equation 7.2 we can derive R2's profit function as follows. 
U2(p2) = (p2-c2)m2 
= (p2-c2)^{l + p(pl-p2)}, 
where pi is the price at Rl, c2 is the acquisition cost of goods for R2, and p2 is the 
price at R2. To arrive at the optimal p2, we differentiate R2's profit function with 
respect to p2 (treating pi as a constant): 
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m\p2) = -(p2-c2)]^/3 + l-jt{l + j3(pl-p2)}. 
Setting this equal to 0 and simplifying the resulting expression, we get that for a 
given pi, 
p2' =-{p\ + c2) +—. 
2 2P 
(3) 
The profit to Rl is given by: 
m = (pl -c l ) x + ^ {l + /3(pl-P2)} 
where cl is the acquisition cost of goods for Rl. To derive the optimal price at Rl, 
we differentiate Rl's profit function with respect to pi (treating p2 as a constant). 
n r = - ( l , l - c l ) i - ^ . (4) 
Setting this equal to 0 and simplifying the resulting expression, we get that for a 
given p2, 
Pl'=-(p2 + cl)+ l + X - . 2 2{l-x)P 
(5) 
Solving equations 5 and 3 simultaneously for pi and p2, we get: 
, 1 1 3 - x 
P2 = - (c l + 2c2) + — . 3 P3(l-x) 
(6) 
pi' =-(2cl + c2) + - ^ ^ . 
3 y5 3(l-x) 
(7) 
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Expressions 6 and 7 give us the optimal retail prices at R2 and Rl respectively 
when neither retailer offers service. By subtracting 6 from 7 we get: 
1 1 9 T 
pl'-p2'=-(cl-c2) + — . (8) 
3 £3(1-*) 
Since by construction ci-c2 is positive, it is easy to see that the optimal price at R2 
is lower than at Rl. Further, the bigger the R2's cost advantage, the lower the price 
at R2, and the larger the segment that seeks reliable assortment in Rl, the lower the 
price at R2. It is useful to use equations 5 and 8 and express the optimal profit 
margin at Rl in terms of the price difference between the two retail stores: 
p r _ c i = i ± f l _ ( p l * _ p 2 ' ) . (9) 
l~x p 
{pi ,p2 } as given by expressions 7 and 6 are the Nash optimal prices in the sense 
that neither Rl would like to deviate from pf given that R2 would price at p2* nor 
would R2 deviate from p2* given that Rl would price at pf. However, these 
equilibrium prices are under the condition that neither retailer offers service, hi 
other words, {pf,p2*} are sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium prices. 
Using the optimal prices and the corresponding market shares it is 
straightforward to evaluate the optimal profits as follows: 
n f = 7 ^ T — - V H x { l + J3(cl~c2)}-f3(cl-c2)]f. (10) 18p(l-x) 
m * -[3-W + J3(cl-c2)}~ J3(cl-c2)]f. (11) 
18/7(1-x) 
Expressions 10 and 11 are the optimal operating profits of Rl and R2 
respectively when neither offers service. Note that cl-c2 is positive and x is the 
segment that is loyal to Rl. 
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7.2.1.2 Scenario 2: Rl offers service but R2 does not 
Recall that when only one retailer offers service, by Assumption 4 the fraction 
h(l-x) of consumers will choose Rl, the retailer offering service. Thus Rl's loyal 
segment consists of two sets of consumers: those who seek consistent assortment, x, 
and those who seek service, h(l-x). The price sensitive segment is of size (l-x)(l-h). 
Scenario 2 is very similar to scenario 1 except that the Rl's loyal segment is x in 
scenario 1 while it is x+h(l-x) in scenario 2, the price sensitive segment is (1-x) in 
scenario 1 while it is (l-x)(l-h) in scenario 2, and Rl's profits are decreased by F, 
the fixed cost of offering service. Going along the same lines as in scenario 1, it is 
easy to show that the optimal operating profits of Rl and R2 in scenario 2 are: 
18/7(1-xl) 
U r = 18/7(1- xl) P " + m " C2)}" m " C2)]]2' ( 1 3 > 
where xl - x + h(l - x). Note that by Assumption 3, the net profits to Rl are less by 
a fixed cost, F. In other words, 
Net profits of Rl = Operating profits - F = ill** - F. 
We make the distinction between the operating profits and the net profits for 
expositional ease. 
7.2.1.3 Scenario 3: Both Rl and R2 offer service 
In this scenario both Rl and R2 offer service. As a result, the service seeking 
segment will base its choice on price as stated in Assumption 4. In effect, if both 
retailers offer service the price sensitive segment is 1-x , which is same as in 
scenario 1 in which neither retailer offers service. Thus, scenario 3 is identical to 
scenario 1 except that in Scenario 3 both retailers incur an additional fixed cost F. 
Hence the retailers optimal operating profits are simply as given by equations 7.10 
and 7.11. That is, 
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ni*** = m * = [3 + [JC{1 + P(cl - c2)} - BifA - c2)]f 
18,0(1-x) 
n 2 w = IT2* = [3 - [JC{1 + B(cl - c2)} - P(cl - c2)]f 
18/7(1-x) 
(14) 
(15) 
Since their net profits are less by a fixed cost, F, 
net profits of R l = Operating profits - F = m * - F. 
net profits of R2 = Operating profits - F = fl2* - F. 
7.2.1.4 Scenario 4: Rl does not offer service but R2 offers service 
By Assumption 4, the fraction h(l-x) of consumers will choose R2. The price 
sensitive segment is of size (l-h)(l-x). We will determine the equhibrium prices at 
the two retailers. Proceeding as in Scenario 1 we first derive the profit function for 
R2 which is as follows: 
T12(p2) = [p2-c2]m2 
= [P2 - c2][M - x) + P-*)(*-*> { i + p(pi _ p2)}], 
where the notations are as discussed in scenario 1. Differentiating R2's profit 
function with respect to p2 and setting the resulting expression to zero and 
simplifying, we get that for a given pi, 
„«« I, , „ x 1 1 + h p2 =-(pl + c2) + . 
2 y Ifil-h 
(16) 
The profit to Rl is given by: 
m = [p\-c\] x + ^ - h \ l - p i p l - p 2 ) } 
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where the notations are as discussed in scenario 1. Differentiating Rl's profit 
function with respect to pi, setting to zero and simplifying the resulting expression, 
we get that for a given p2, 
,~~ 1, _ 1 X l + x-h(l-x) 1 
pi =—(p2 + cl) + -—. (17) 
2 2(1-JC)(1-/Z) ß 
Simultaneously solving equations 17 and 16 for pi and p2, we get: 
2 - = l [ c l + 2 c 2 ] + j_ ( l -x) (2 + A) + (l + x) 
3 £ 3(1-*)(!-*) 
P l - = I ^ i + c 2] + l ^ ^ ± f f i 2 0 ( 1 9 ) 
3 £ 3(1-*)(1-A) 
As explained before, {pT** ,p2****} form the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium 
prices, i.e., the Nash equihbrium prices under the condition that R2 alone offers 
service. Subtracting p2**** from pf*** w e get: 
pl~-p2~ = k c l - c 2 ) + 2 { x - K l - x ) ] . (20) 3 3ßQ.-x)(l-h) 
If his zero, it is easy to see that expression 20 reduces to its equivalent expression 8 
of scenario 1. Expression 8 implies that if neither retailer offers service, R2 will 
always have a price lower than Rl. In contrast, by expression 20 if R2 alone offers 
service, however, R2's optimal retail price can be higher than that of Rl if the 
fraction of consumers seeking service, i.e., h(l-x), is sufficiently larger than the 
fraction of consumers who seek consistent assortment, i.e., x. Looking at the 
expression 20, we get an intuitively appealing result that if R2 does not have any 
cost advantage over Rl and if the fraction of consumers loyal to Rl and R2 are 
equal (i.e., if x is equal to h(l-x)), then the retail prices at Rl and R2 will be equal. 
We can derive the optimal operating profits of Rl and R2 as follows: 
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18/5(1-x)(l-/z) 
(21) 
U2*-* = 1 [3 + [/5(cl - c2) - x{l + /?(cl - cT)} + ¿(1 - x){l - /5(cl - c2) }]]2. 
18y8(l-x)(l-«) 
(22) 
Note that the net profits of R2 is less by the fixed cost, F. In other words, 
Net profits of R2 = Operating profits - F = 112**** - F. 
Having derived the profits of both the retailers in the four situations, namely, 
neither Rl nor R2 offering service, Rl alone offering service, R2 alone offering 
service, and both Rl and R2 offering service, we will now find out what would Rl 
and R2 do and under what conditions. For convenience we give below the notations 
we have used for the various profit functions. 
Scenario Operating Profits Net Profits 
Rl R2 Rl R2 
Neither R l nor R2 provides service m* IT2* m* n.2* 
Only R l provides service n r 112** m~-F n2~ 
Both R l and R2 provide service in*** m*** m***-F n2***~F 
Only R2 provides service 112**** m**** n2****-F 
Since there are eight profit functions and five parameters, namely, x, /5, cl-c2, 
h and F, looking for all the possible equilibrium market situations is very likely to 
lead to complicated results that would be difficult to interpret. Hence, we explore 
the sufficient conditions that favor an equihbrium in which only Rl will offer 
service and the conditions that favor an equilibrium in which only R2 will offer 
service. These two sets of conditions are formally provided in the following two 
propositions. 
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7.2.2 Proposition 1: When does Rl alone offer service? 
If h > maxfhl,h2J then for all F in (F1,F2) the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium 
consists ofRl offering service and R2 not offering service, where 22 
M , 10 
«1 = 1 ; T , 
[1 + /7(cl-c2)] 2 (l-x) 2 
A2 = l x{^-x) a n d 
f3(c\-c2){l-xf 
Fl = max{n2'~* -TL2",112*** - J12~} < m" - m* = F2. 
Proof: We have to show three subresults to prove Proposition 1. First, we have to 
show that if Rl alone offers service the operating profits (s)he would get will be 
greater than the fixed cost of offering the service, F. In other words, 
F < nT - m* => Rl will offer service if R2 does not. (23) 
Secondly, when Rl offers service, R2 should it find it less profitable to offer 
service. Given that Rl offers service, the operating profit to R2 when offering 
service is 112***, and the operating profit to R2 when not offering service is 112**. 
Since offering service involves a fixed cost of F, we need to have F greater than the 
increased operating profit R2 gets by offering service. That means, 
F > 1T2*** - III" => R2 will not offer service if Rl does. (24) 
The conditions 23 and 24 together imply that 
112*** -112** < F < m** - m* => Rl wiU but R2 will not offer service (25) 
Substituting the profit expressions 10,12,13, and 15 respectively for 
n f .m**, 112**and 112***, it can be shown that 
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h>\- — - = h\ ^ n2***-n2"<nr-m* 
H + f3(cl-c2)](l~x)2 
Now, as the third subresult we have to prove that R2 will not offer service 
unilaterally. Noting that R2's operating profits when (s)he alone offers service is 
IK**** and that his/her operating profits when neither retailer offers service is 112*, 
we need to satisfy the condition that F, the fixed cost of offering service, is greater 
than the additional operating profits R2 gets by offering service alone, 
n2*'*'-n2 '.Thatis, 
F > 112"" -112* => R2 will not offer service if Rl does not (26) 
Equations 23 and 26 together imply that 
1X2**** - m * <F<m~ - m * => 
Rl will but R2 will not unilaterally offer service. 
Substituting from the profit equations 10, 12, 11, and 22 respectively for 
EH* ,111** ,112* and 112****, it can be shown that 
h>i —- = h2 nr-ni*>ri2****-n2\ (27) 
(3(cl-c2){l-x)2 
Combining the second and the third subresults, we get Proposition 1. • 
Discussion: Whether Rl alone will offer service depends on whether the fraction of 
price sensitive consumers which seeks service, h, is greater than certain minimum 
value, indicated by hi and «2 in Proposition 1. Both the limits hi and h2 are 
functions of x and/?(cl - c2), which are respectively the retailer Rl's advantage 
(due to his/her commitment to consistent assortment) and disadvantage (due to 
his/her higher acquisition cost of goods) with respect to R2. 
Looking at the function hi, it can be readily seen that dhl/dx < 0 for all x, i.e., 
with increase in x the value of hi decreases monotonically. As x moves from 0 to 1, 
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hi moves from 1 to -<». Hence, there exists some x beyond 
[l + /?(cl-c2)] 2 
which hi is always less than 0 and hence will be less than any h. Since h can take 
values between 0 and 1, this implies that for a given h and /3{cl - cl), there exists a 
xl such that for all x > xl, the value of h will be greater than hi. 
Differentiating hi with respect to x, it can be shown that 8h2/dx < 0 for all x, 
implying that with increase in x, the value of h2 decreases monotonicaUy. As x 
moves from 0 to 1, hi moves from 1 to - o o . Hence, there exists some x beyond 
which hi is always less than 0 and hence will be less than any /t.In other words, for 
a given h and/?(cl-c2), there exists a xl such that for all values of x > xl, the 
value of h will be greater than hi. 
Putting these two results together and noting that the segment that seeks 
consistent assortment is loyal to Rl, we get: 
The bigger the Rl's loyal segment the more likely Rl alone offers service. 
This is the most interesting result of our theory. The intuitive explanation is as 
follows. Consider Rl and R2 when neither offers service to start with. If Rl has a 
higher loyal segment, (s)he is less likely to fight with R2 on price to avoid "free 
riding" by the loyal segment. This in turn implies that most of the price sensitive 
segment, which includes the segment that seeks service as well (see Assumption 4), 
choose R2 due to low price. Thus most of the service seeking segment chooses R2 
when Rl has a bigger loyal segment. Hence, with the offering of service, Rl can 
expect to substantially increase his/her hold in the service seeking segment and thus 
has a lot more to gain. On the same token it is easy to see that in this situation R2 
will have a lot less to gain by unilaterally offering service. The reason why R2 does 
not offer service if Rl offers service is that Rl, who now has a much bigger loyal 
segment (i.e., x+h(l-x)), will have a higher price difference (see equation 6) which 
would drive more and more of the price sensitive segment to choose R2. This 
increases the profits of R2 which, along with the need to incur cost to offer service, 
will more than offset the possible gains (s)he could make by offering service. 
Having discussed the result pertaining to the conditions favoring the 
equihbrium where Rl alone offers service, we now evaluate the conditions that 
favor the equihbrium where R2 alone offers service. 
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7.23 Proposition 2: When does R2 alone offer service? 
If h3 <h<h4 then for all F in (F3,F4) it would be profitable for R2 to offer service 
and Rl not to offer service, where 
h 3 _ P(cl ~ c 2 ) ( A c l ~ c2) - 2)(1 - x)2 - [9 + 3x2 - 2s] 
( l -x) 2 ( l - /? (c l -c2)) 2 
M = l - , and 
/?(cl-c2)(l-jc) 2 
F 3 = m a x { n r - m * ,ni*** - m*~*} < m * * " - n * = FA. 
Proof: Proof is along the lines of the proof provided for Proposition 1. First, we 
have to show that if R2 alone offers service the profits (s)he would get will be 
greater than the cost of offering the service, F. In other words, 
F<1T2****~1T2* => R2 will offer service if Rl does not. (28) 
Secondly, when R2 offers service, Rl should it find it less profitable to offer 
service. Given that R2 offers service, the operating profits to Rl when offering 
service is 171***, and the operating profits to Rl when not offering service is 111****. 
Since offering service involves a fixed cost of F, we need to have F greater than the 
increased operating profits Rl gets by offering service. That means, 
F>ni***-m****^> Rl will not offer service if R2 does. (29) 
The conditions 28 and 29 together imply that 
III*** - HI**** < F < II2**** - H.2* => R2 will but Rl will not offer service. (30) 
Substimting the profit expressions 11, 22, 14, and 21 respectively for 
I12*,n2**",ni*** and 111****, it can be shown that 
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h ^ P(cl-c2)(P(c\-c2)-2)Q.-x)2-[9 + 3x2-2x] _ ^ ^ 
(l-x)2(l-/3(cl-c2))2 
ni***-m~" <n2*~*-n2'. 
Now, as the third subresult we have to prove that Rl will not offer service 
unilaterally. Noting that Rl's operating profits when (s)he alone offers service is 
112"' and that his/her operating profits when neither retailer offers service is 111*, 
we need to satisfy the condition that F, the fixed cost of offering service, is greater 
than the additional operating profits Rl gets by offering service alone, m** -111*. 
That is, 
F > 111" - 111* => Rl will not offer service if R2 does not. (31) 
Equations 28 and 31 together imply that 
m" - n f < F < U2mm -m' => 
R2 will but Rl will not unilaterally offer service. 
Substituting from the profit equations 10, 12, 11, and 22 respectively for 
n r ,n r ,n2* and n.2****, it can shown that 
h < i - — — - = «4 m " " - r j 2 * < n r - n r . (32) 
/9(cl-c2)(l-x) 2 
Combining the second and the third subresults, we get Proposition 2. • 
Discussion: Whether R2 alone will offer service depends on whether the fraction of 
price sensitive consumers that seeks service, h, should be greater than h3 but less 
than M. Let us analyze what these bounds are. Both h3 and h4 are functions of x 
and/?(cl-c2), which are respectively the retailer R2's disadvantage and advantage 
with respect to Rl. 
Consider the function h3. It can be derived that 
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dh3 <0 if P{cl-c2)<\, 
dp{c\-c2) 
>0 if P(cl-c2)>l. 
As/?(cl-c2) increases from 0 to 1, A3 moves from -
9 + 3x2-2x 
(l-xf 
, a negative 
valued number, to close to - oo . And, as J3(cl - c2) increases beyond 1, h3 increases 
monotonically from - o o , becoming zero at some value of/?(cl-c2), say, at 
P(c\-c2). So, as long asy#(cl~c2) is less thanP(cl-c2), h3 is less than zero 
which in turn implies that any h will be greater than h3. Let us closely look 
at P(cl - c2), the root of the equation h3 = 0. By solving h3 = 0, we get its positive 
root as follows. 
At x = 0, the root isl + VlO, which is 4.16. It can be shown that the first derivative 
of this root P(c\ - c2) with respect to x is positive, indicating that as x increases, so 
does the value of the root. This imphes that the root of the equation h3 = 0 is always 
greater than 4.16. Further, in our numerical simulation2, we found that empirically if 
P(cl - c2) exceed values around 2, the whole price sensitive segment of the market 
switches from one retailer to the other and hence a high value for the root P(cl - c2) 
does not come into picture in reality, implying in turn that h3 < 0 for all practical 
purposes. Since h is always positive, the condition that h has to be greater than h3 is 
always satisfied. 
Looking at the function h4 it is readily seen that as/?(cl-c2) increases «4 
increases monotonically. At/?(cl-c2) close to 0, h4 is close t o -co . 
2 We did the simulation with x ranging from 0 to 1 in steps of 0.05, h ranging from 0 to 1 in steps 
of 0.05 and P(cl - c2) ranging from close to 0 to 4 in steps of 0.05. 
P(cl-c2) = \ + 
V 4 x 2 - 4 x + 10 
1-x 
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x(4 — x) 
When/?(cl~c2) r e a c h e s - ^ — h A becomes 0, and let this value of/?(cl-c2) 
be /?(cl - c2) 0 . Hence, for all values of fi(cl - c2) greater than /?(cl -c2)0, we have 
a positive valued hA that increases monotonically with /3(cl - c2). Note that if such 
a (3(c\ - c2)0 does not exist, then h will always be greater than hA implying that the 
conditions favoring the equihbrium where R2 alone offers service do not exist. The 
existence of /?(cl-c2) 0 depends on the value of x, the consistent assortment 
seeking segment that is loyal to Rl. It is readily seen that the higher the x, the lower 
the chances for the existence of/?(cl-c2) 0. In other words, a lower x and a 
sufficiently higher /?(cl - c2) will enable the existence of a hA that would be greater 
than a given h. Put it differently, for a given h and x, there exists a/?(cl - c2) such 
that for all values of /3(cl - c2) > /?(cl - c2), the value of h will be less than hA. 
Putting these two results together and noting that cl - c2 is the R2's cost 
advantage over Rl thanks to his/her not cornmitting to a consistent assortment, we 
get: 
The greater the R2's cost advantage the more likely R2 alone offers service. 
The intuitive explanation for this result is as follows. Consider Rl and R2 
when neither offers service to start with. If R2 has a high cost advantage, R2's price 
will be much lower than Rl's with the result that most of the price sensitive 
segment, which includes the segment that seeks service (see Assumption 4), will 
choose R2. By offering service R2 will get now a loyal segment to serve, which will 
have two main effects. On one hand, this will enable R2 to have a higher profit 
margin through a higher price which is possible thanks to the higher reservation 
price of the loyal segment. On the other hand, the increase in price will make R2 
lose some of the purely price sensitive segment to Rl. However, if the cost 
advantage is high enough the loss of customers will be rninimal compared to the 
higher profit margin since R2's price will still be much lower than Rl's price. In 
other words, R2 can afford to lose some purely price sensitive customers to Rl if 
his/her cost advantage is high. This makes it profitable for R2 to alone offer service. 
The reason why Rl does not offer service if R2 offers is that Rl, who now has a 
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less price based competition from R2, will have his/her profit margin higher. 
Moreover, in terms of market share loss (s)he didn't lose much to R2 since most of 
these customers were anyway shopping at R2 to start with. Hence, Rl will find it 
more profitable not to offer service if R2's cost advantage is high enough that R2 
offers one. 
At this juncture, it is worthwhile to mention that Lai and Rao (1997) derive a 
similar result. They show that if the cost advantage of the EDLP retailer is very 
high, (s)he is more likely to offer service. In this sense, our theory finds support 
with the previously established results. 
Propositions 1 and 2 together give us a very interesting outcome: the retailer 
whose advantage is relatively stronger with respect to the other retailer's is more 
likely to offer service alone. The intuition is as follows. Each retailer serves the 
price sensitive segment of the market, although to a different degree. Offering of 
service by a retailer results in a higher price level which will increase the profit 
margin but will repel some of the price sensitive customers. If the repulsive force is 
large enough then offering of service is not profitable. But, how large it should be is 
determined by how strong the retailer currently is. If the retailer has a strong 
advantage (either in reliable assortment or in cost advantage) then the repulsive 
force will be comparatively negligible. Thus, in a market where there is a large 
segment that seeks consistent assortment and where the cost advantage of R2 is 
limited we will find the retailer committing to a consistent assortment providing the 
service as well. 
We next set out to explore empirically whether in a real market the conditions 
and the corresponding equilibriums we have theorized hold good or not. 
Specifically, we are interested in the conditions that favor the equilibrium where Rl 
alone offers service, a very commonly observed phenomenon in many markets. 
7.3 Empirical illustration 
One way to validate a theoretical model is to see how stylized facts in a market may 
be reconciled with the model predictions. This approach is used by, for example, 
Lai (1990b). At the other extreme, model prediction may be tested against the 
empirical data through statistical analyses. An example of this approach for a game 
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theoretic model is Krishnan and Rao (1995). Between these two extremes, one 
approach is to make measurements of a particular market in order to fix the 
parameters of the theoretical model. Then, based on these parameter values, the 
theoretical predictions of the model can be evaluated and compared with the 
empirical observations of the same market. 
What is a good way to fix the parameter of a particular model? Our approach 
is to directly measure them for a given market3. Where possible we use more than 
one method. And finally, we could estimate the robustness of the prediction around 
the measured values of the parameters. 
Empirical support for a theoretic proposition is usually inhibited by the 
presence of other relevant, although independent, factors in a real market. For 
example, in the theory proposed in this chapter, we are interested in two retail 
formats, but there exist more formats in an actual retail market. The Dutch domestic 
flower market closely meets our theoretical market and can therefore be used to 
empirically validate our model findings. Although this market is taken as an 
example for illustrative purposes, the important institutional features we have 
modeled in this chapter, particularly, the product acquisition process, consumer 
segments (deal-prone, consistent assortment seeking, and personal service sensitive) 
and retail attributes including assortment and its consistency, price, and service, 
resemble closely other retail markets in Europe and the U.S.A. 
This section is organized as follows. First, we describe relevant characteristics 
of the Dutch retail flower market, explaining in detail the two types of retailers 
existing in the market, with respect to their levels of assortment commitment and 
their acquisition costs, cl and c2. We measure the level of comrnitment to 
consistent assortment in two ways; one from a survey of retailers (hereinafter called 
Retailer Survey) and the other from a survey of in-store customers shopping at these 
retail stores (hereinafter called Customer survey). A detailed description of these 
surveys has been given in chapters 4 and 5. We use the annual records and 
databases of various flower associations such as the Dutch Association of Flower 
Auctions and the Dutch Floricultural Wholesale Board to measure the acquisition 
costs. 
3 Shankar (1997) uses time series data on sales and advertising in a pharmaceutical industry to 
estimate the parameters in his model. 
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Second, we measure the model parameters. Note that we have six parameters 
in the model, which are as follows, x is the size of the segment that seeks consistent 
assortment, h represents the segment that seeks service, J3 is the price sensitivity 
parameter, F is the fixed cost of service, and cl and c2 are the acquisition costs of 
Rl and R2, the two retail types modeled. We have already mentioned our source for 
measuring the acquisition costs. For the other four parameters, we use three sources: 
experts in florists association, a household panel survey of sample size 1453 
(hereinafter called Household Panel Survey, for a detailed description see chapter 5) 
and a survey conducted specifically for this chapter. 
Third, we use the measured parameter values to obtain the equilibrium for our 
model. In particular, we are interested in finding out which of the four possible 
outcomes would be predicted by the model based on the observed parameter values, 
Recall that the four possible outcomes are: neither Rl nor R2 offers service, Rl 
alone offers service, both offer service, and R2 alone offers service. Finally, we 
compare the predicted outcome with our empirical observation of service provision 
in the market, which we measure from the Retailer Survey and the Customer 
Survey. 
7.3.1 Dutch domestic retail flower market 
This section briefly describes the Dutch retail flower market insofar this has not 
been done in previous chapter and explains how the two types of retailers serving 
this market differ with respect to offering consistent assortments (Assumption 1 in 
the model) and acquisition cost (Assumption 2). Consumers in this market spend 
yearly the equivalent of over 600 mil. dollars on fresh cut flowers4. Fresh cut 
flowers are a frequently purchased product that is bought by over 70% of the Dutch 
households, 25% of who buy cut flowers at least once every two weeks. The three 
consumer segments assumed in the model, namely, those who seek consistent 
assortment, those who seek service and those who are price sensitive, apply to the 
Dutch flower market as follows. Consumers buy cut flowers for different purposes, 
4 It is interesting to note that the global consumption of flowers is estimated around 45 billion U.S. 
dollars and that the Netherlands, Columbia, Israel, Italy and Kenya export the major requirements 
of the world flower market. 
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e.g., as a gift, for a special occasion, or for their own home's ambience, and will 
accordingly seek service, particular flower variants, or low prices. Thus the 
segments are based on both purchase occasion and type of consumer. 
Cut flowers are distributed by over 4,000 independent retailers, who specialize 
in flowers and other related items5. The retailers can acquire cut flowers either 
through a wholesaler who in turn purchases the product at a flower auction, or 
directly at a flower auction. Auctions are held every day and the prices depend on 
varying supply and demand and fluctuate accordingly. Retailers who purchase 
through a wholesaler can only to a hmited extent take advantage of the price 
variations, but they can select for most part what they want to carry in their 
assortments. They pay a higher price than what one can get at auction because of 
the added wholesaler margin. These are the Rl type retailer mentioned in the model. 
These are very similar in spirit to the U.S. department stores such as Foley's and the 
grocery stores such as Kroger. 
Retailers who buy at the flower auction match R2 in our model. They can wait 
for a lower price at the auction and can acquire their flowers at low prices. 
However, they can not be choosy for a major part of their assortment. They are sure 
to buy some of the important flowers (i.e., the traffic builders) but in general are 
likely to choose whatever flowers are available at low prices at the auction. These 
retailers are very similar in spirit to the U.S. apparel stores such as Ross and the 
warehouse clubs such as Sam's Choice. According to the Dutch Florist Association, 
50 to 60% of retailers are of the R2 type with an average annual turnover of 200,000 
to 350,000 Dfl (equivalent to approximately 175,000 U.S. $ as of 1998). The Rl 
type retailers are less common and generally have a higher annual turnover. Note 
that wherever Rl retailers are located, they face severe competition from R2 type 
retailers. 
In our model, Rl is assumed to offer a more consistent assortment compared 
to R2. To see if this is true in the Dutch retail flower market we use results from the 
Retailer Survey and the Customer Survey. For the Retailer Survey, we identified 
from a random sample of retail flower specialists 61 retailers who purchased cut 
flowers exclusively at an auction (R2 type) and 99 retailers who purchased cut 
s Although several grocery chains also sell cutflowers their market share is small, about 15%. 
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flowers exclusively from wholesalers (Rl) 6. Each of these retailers was asked to 
mention the cut flowers (s)he consistently carried in his(her) assortment. They did 
this by choosing a maximum of 12 flowers from the top 15 flower types sold in The 
Netherlands. Note that Rose, Chrysanthemum, Tulip and Lily are the top four 
selling flower types. Based on the retailers' responses we found that the Rl type 
retailers carried the top 4 flowers more often and/or in more different varieties (i.e., 
more consistently) than the R2 retailers. Specifically, with respect to Rose 64.6% of 
the Rl type retailers said they carried them consistenfly while only 50% of the R2 
type retailers said they did. The corresponding figures for Chrysanthemum are 
83.8% and 72.1%, for Tulip 88.9% and 68.9%, and for Lily 69.7% and 52.5%. 
For the Customer survey we interviewed a sample of 494 customers at Rl type 
stores and 376 customers at R2 type stores. Customers were asked to rate their 
retailer on a 7-point Likert-type scale on product quality, freshness, and appearance. 
The customers rated Rl significanüy higher (p<001) than R2. We thus find that in 
the Dutch flower market there are two types of retailers, Rl and R2, where Rl 
carries a more consistent assortment and retailer R2 has a lower acquisition cost. 
We next measure in this market the parameters of our theoretical model. 
7.3.2 Determining model parameters 
We measure the model parameters from four sources, namely, experts in the Dutch 
Florist Association, a Household Panel Survey, the annual record of various flower 
associations and an additional survey. Recall that the parameters x and h reflect the 
size of the consumer segments, the parameters cl and c2 reflect the Rl type 
retailer's and the R2 type retailer's acquisition costs respectively, the parameter 0 
reflects price sensitivity, and the parameter F reflects the fixed cost of service 
provision. To measure the segments' sizes, we made parallel use of the household 
panel data and the experts' opinion. The annual records of various associations 
helped us obtain information on the retailers' acquisition costs. The fixed cost of 
service was obtained from the experts. Finally, we carried out a survey specifically 
6 The two retailers types in the sample do not differ significantly in size-related measures, such as 
annual turnover and store selling space, nor differ significanüy with respect to consumer 
perceptions of assortment size. 
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to evaluate the price sensitivity parameter. We now explain the measurement 
process in detail. 
Consumer segments sizes: We measured this from two sources: experts in 
the florists association and consumer survey. In our model, x is the size of the 
segment that seeks consistent assortment, h(l-x) is the size of the segment that seeks 
service, and (l-x)(l-h) is the size of the price sensitive segment. The experts are of 
the opinion that x = 0.3 to 0.4 and h(l-x) = 0.15 to 0.2. Thus, it is estimated that the 
price sensitive segment makes up 50 to 60% of the market. Next, we used the 
results from the Household Panel Survey where the panel members (of size 1453) 
were asked to rate in order of importance some of the aspects of their flower 
purchasing process7. The attributes related to consistent assortment (the attributes 
were: specific flower, color and stem length, and quality) were marked to be 
important by almost 40% of the panel members. This coincides with the experts 
opinion on the value of x. Thus, x is set at 0.3 (to be conservative) and h at 0.175 / 
0.7 = 0.25. 
Cost advantage of R2 (auction buyers) over Rl (wholesaler buyers): Based 
on an annual investigation by the Dutch Floricultural Wholesale Board we learned 
that the average domestic wholesaler gross margins for cut flowers were 15.5 to 
16.5%. In addition, because of their experience in auction buying, the R2-type 
retailers usually achieve a further 6.5% saving. In total, the R2 type retailers enjoy a 
21% to 23% cost advantage over those retailers who buy from wholesalers. Note 
that this corresponds to (cl-c2)/cl in the model. As per the Dutch Flower Auction 
Association, the yearly average auction price of a cut flower is around 0.50 Dfl, the 
monthly average price varying from 0.28 Dfl in August to 0.55 Dfl in December. 
Thus, it can be calculated that cl is around 0.60 Dfl while c2 is around 0.47 Dfl. 
Fixed cost of service: Based on the experts' input, we estimated that after 
adjusting for size related expenses, for a store with a turnover of 375000 units of 
flowers, it would cost 147000 Dfl (40000 for rent, 100000 Dfl for employees, and 
7000 Dfl for interior decoration) annually to provide a superior service. Note that 
since each retailer type is certain to provide some sort of service, what we are 
interested in is the 'additional' service to be offered by a retailer in order to attract 
The data reported here were collected prior to the conjoint choice experiment datacollection 
procedure that has been described in chapter 5. 
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the service seeking segment. The additional service includes features such as 
employing better trained and more personnel, better store ambience, offering 
various types of bouquets, etc. In order to calculate the cost of this additional 
service, we obtained information on the cost of the minimum amount of service 
needed in this business, which came to 73500 Dfl to 83500 Dfl. Moreover, we 
found that 36750 Dfl to 41750 Dfl, or half of the minimum service costs, would 
account for the unique needs of being a Rl or R2 retailer type. Thus, in total 105250 
(or 147000 - 41750) Dfl to 110250 (or 147000 - 36750) Dfl needs to be spent 
annually if a retailer (be it Rl or R2) wants to provide the additional service that is 
needed to attract the service seeking segment of the market. In other words, in a 
market whose size is 750000 units ("average turnover of a retailer" times "the 
number of retailers serving a market"), it costs 105250 Dfl to 110250 to provide the 
additional service that is needed to attract the service seeking segment of the 
population. For convenience, we normalize the cost of service with respect to the 
market size. Thus F is estimated to be 0.140 to 0.147 for a market of size 1. 
Price sensitivity parameter: We carried out a small-scale survey to 
specifically measure the price sensitivity parameter. Our survey on consumer's 
tendency to choose stores based on price indicated that the market is in general 
price sensitive. In particular, we found that a 20% price difference between the two 
retailer types would cause 10% of the customers to switch and a 30% price 
difference would cause 25% of the customers to switch8. Note that the price 
sensitivity we measured is the market average in the sense that the survey group 
included both the loyal segment and the price sensitive segment. Since in our model 
the price sensitivity of the loyal group is set at 0, the price sensitivity of the 
price-sensitive segment (which is jB) will be higher than the market average. In other 
words, the market level switching fractions have to be rescaled to estimate the price 
sensitive segment's switching fractions. This is done by dividing the measured 
switching fractions by the size of the potential switchers in the price sensitive 
segment, which is (l-x)(l-«)/2 (see equation 1). Thus, noting that x is 0.3 and h is 
0.23, the survey results indicate that 40% of the customers in the potential price 
switching segment are likely to switch for a 20% discount and almost the whole 
This way of measuring price sensitivity has been suggested by many researchers (e.g., Dolan and 
Simon 1996). 
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segment is likely to switch for a 30% discount. Since the average retail price is 
around 1.0 Dfl, the price sensitivity parameter 0 is estimated to be between 2 and 3, 
which is averaged to 2.5 for our purposes. 
Having measured the model parameters from the market characteristics we 
next apply them in the proposed model and solve for the equilibrium. 
733 Predicting the model equilibrium 
We are interested in predicting which retailer type(s) would offer service in 
equilibrium given the specific values of the parameters measured in this market. 
Since four outcomes are possible (which are Scenario 1 where neither retailer offers 
service, Scenario 2 where Rl alone offers service, Scenario 3 where both offer 
service and Scenario 4 where R2 alone offers service) in the entire parameter space, 
strictly speaking we have to fit the measured values of the parameters to the four 
scenarios and keep evaluating them one after another till we hit the right scenario. 
Somewhat foreseeing what will come later, we start off with Scenario 2, i.e., we 
first see whether the measured parameter subspace favors the outcome where only 
retailer type Rl offers service. 
We proceed as follows. Recall from proposition 1 that the subgame perfect 
Nash equihbrium of Rl alone offering service will be favored if h > max {hi,hi] 
and F is in (F1,F2), where hi and hi are functions of x, J3, and cl - c2, and Fl and 
Fl are functions of profits of Rl and R2. As a first step we make use of the 
measured values of x, 0, and cl - c2 and calculate hi and hi. Next, we check 
whether the measured value of h is greater than the maximum of hi and hi. If it is 
found to be so, next we evaluate Fl and Fl. Following that we check whether the 
measured value of F is within these two bounds. If it is found to be so, then we 
conclude that the measured parameter subspace does favor the subgame perfect 
Nash equilibrium of Rl alone offering service. 
First we use the three parameters, namely, cl = 0.60 and c2 = 0.47 (i.e., cl -
c2 = 0.13), ¡5 = 2.5, and x = 0.3 to calculate the two bounds stated in Proposition 1: 
This coincides with an expert's opinion that it is difficult to maintain a price difference of more 
than 20% in this retail flower market. 
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«1 = 1 r = -12.48 
[l + /3(cl-c2)f(l-x)2 
«2 = 1 = -8.304. 
J3(cl-c2)(l-xy 
The bounds hi and «2 are negative as a consequence of the size of the consistent 
assortment seeking segment (x) being larger relative to the cost advantage of the R2 
type retailer (cl - c2). Since h is positive it is obviously greater than the maximum 
of «1 and «2. 
We next calculate the bounds for the fixed cost of service, Fl and F2, as 
apphcable to Proposition 1. Replacing x by x + h(l-x) in equations 7 and 6 so as to 
modify these two equations to enable evaluation of Scenario 2, and using equations 
10, 12, 11, 13, 15, and 22 to calculate the profits to the two retailers under various 
relevant conditions, we get: 
1. Retail price at Rl, pi** = -(2cl + c2) + - 3 + ( x + / ? ( 1 x ) ) = 1.439. 
3 p 3(1-*)(1-A) 
2. Retail price at R2, pi** = -(cl + 2 c 2 ) + - 3 { X + k { l X ) ) =1.155. 
3 p 3(l-x)(l-«) 
3. Additional profits to Rl by offering service alone =111** -111* = 0.1624. 
4. Additional profits to R2 by offering service alone =112**** -112* = 0.1206. 
5. Additional profits to R2 by offering service along with Rl 
=112*** -H2** =-0.15. 
Referring back to Proposition 1, we find thatF2 = 111** -111* = 0.1624, and that 
Fl = max{112**** -112*, 112*** -112**} = max{0.1206,-0.15} = 0.1206. 
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Given the bounds Fl and F2 and having estimated the fixed cost of service, F, 
from the experts opinion (which is 0.140 to 0.147) for this market, we see that 
0.126 = F 2 < F < F 1 = 0.1624 
Then, by Proposition 1, the equihbrium predicted by our model given these 
parameter values if that Rl alone will offer service. The model also predicts that 
retail price at Rl is higher than that at R2. 
Thus, we have fixed the parameters and calculated the equihbrium outcome in 
the Dutch retail flower market. Next, we want to verify whether in this market Rl 
really offers higher service as compared to R2. 
73.4 Service provision in the Dutch retail flower market 
We found that the retailers who buy cut flowers at a wholesaler (i.e., Rl type) 
provide more product-related services than their counterparts. We measure this from 
two surveys, the Retailer Survey and the Customer Survey. From the first, we found 
that Rl type retailers sell a larger share of mixed flower bouquets and special work 
(72.40%) than R2 type retailers (55.82%) (t158=4.605, p<.001). From the second 
survey, with 494 customers of Rl and 376 customers of R2, we found that the Rl 
outlets scored significantly (p<.001) and consistently higher with respect to service, 
including store ambience, personal attention by salesperson, salesperson's 
responsiveness, politeness, salesperson knowledge and skills, and even on pleasure 
associated with visiting the store. From the Customer Survey we also found that 
perceptions of price paid were higher at Rl (t864=2.525, p=.012). 
Thus we find that the equilibrium in our model is validated with respect to 
which retailer(s) would offer service on the Dutch retail flower market. In the next 
section we check for the robustness of our results. 
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73.5 Robustness of results and caveats 
Note that the parameters were measured from surveys, annual records of various 
flower associations and expert opinion. One way to account for sampling and 
measurement errors is to check the robustness of our results with respect to possible 
deviations in the parameters. To check the robustness with respect to JC, we fixed the 
other parameters, namely h, j3 and cl - c2 at their measured values and varied the 
value of x to see within what range of x the equilibrium of Rl alone offering service 
is predicted by the model. We found that as long as x is greater than 0.23, the model 
predicts the equihbrium of Rl alone offering service. Similar exercise yielded a 
robustness range of 0.23 to 0.28 for h, and a robustness range of 0.29 to 0.40 
for (3{c\ - c2)10. Since we had carried out an extensive measurement process and 
since the experts we consulted are the best in the business, we are of the opinion 
that the 'true' market situation is less likely to be outside the robustness range we 
have obtained. 
There are three caveats. The first caveat, which is actually apphcable to all 
game theoretical models is that the equihbrium observed in the Dutch retail flower 
market, i.e., the retailer offering consistent assortment also offering service, may be 
entirely due to a different set of reasons. One way to investigate the proposed theory 
is to observe and see in many markets whether the proposed theory is confirmed. 
The second caveat is that we did not consider intra-retail type competition in our 
model. It is easy to conjecture that competition among Rl type retailers would 
result in further higher service and competition among R2 type retailers would 
result in further lower price. However, we leave this open for future research. 
Thirdly, in this paper we assumed that the consistent assortment seeking segment 
and the service seeking segment are independent of each other. One may wonder 
whether the consistent assortment seekers are likely to be service seekers too, which 
may explain the higher service level observed with the Rl type retailers. However, 
in that case, Rl type need not offer service at all because these customers will prefer 
Rl anyway because of its consistent assortment offering. Moreover, there do exist 
Since in the model the parameters /3 and cl - c2 tend to act mostiy as a composite variable, we 
decided to test them as a single parameter. 
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retailers (such as Home Depot and Lowes) who not only claim low price but offer 
excellent service as well (Stern, El-Ansary and Coughlan 1996). 
7.4 Conclusions 
Betancourt and Gautschi (1990) in their seminal paper provided a comprehensive 
framework to look at how retailers decide on what to offer as assortment, price and 
service. Broniarczyk et al. (1998) added one more dimension to this list, what we 
call as the commitment to assortment consistency, which is the consistency a 
retailer provides in his/her assortment items. Coir focus in this chapter is on this new 
dimension and its relationship to provision of other distribution service elements. 
Specifically, we analyze the market served by two types of retailers one of whom 
provides consistent assortment (Rl type) and the other enjoying a lower acquisition 
cost (R2 type). Examples of the former include department stores such as Foley's 
and grocery stores such as Kroger and Albert Heijn, while examples of the latter 
include stores such as Ross Dress for Less, warehouse clubs such as Sam's Choice, 
and discounters such as Aldi. Our interest in this market is to find out which retailer 
type(s) would offer service in equihbrium. Will it be the retailer enjoying the loyal 
patronage of consistent assortment seeking consumers, will it be the retailer who 
has lower acquisition cost, will it be both, or will it be neither? We used the game 
theoretic approach and employed the sub-game perfect Nash equihbrium concept to 
solve this problem. We found that the retailer who has a relatively stronger 
advantage will offer service in equilibrium. For example, if the Rl type retailer's 
advantage is relatively strong with respect to the R2 type retailer's advantage then 
Rl alone would offer service. In other words, in a market characterized by a retailer 
who has a large segment seeking consistent assortment and a retailer having an 
average cost advantage, only the former type will be in a position to offer service. In 
addition, we show that stable asymmetric distribution channel structures can emerge 
as a result of service competition, following Bell and Padmanabhan (1996). 
We empirically validated our model by examining the Dutch retail flower 
market. In this market we observed two types of retailers, Rl and R2, where Rl 
carries an assortment that is more consistent than what R2 carries, while R2 has a 
lower acquisition cost. We carefully measured our model's various parameters in 
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this market and evaluated whether the outcome predicted by our model for the 
measured parameters is consistent with the observed retailer behavior with respect 
to service provision. Indeed we found that only the retailer offering consistent 
assortment is offering service in this market, an outcome that is in agreement with 
the model prediction for the given parameter values. This validates our proposed 
theory. The result implies that the cost advantage enjoyed by the R2 type retailer is 
not sufficiently high while at the same time the consumers exhibit a strong demand 
for consistent assortment. 
Corr theory adds one more piece to solving the puzzle of what types of 
conditions lead a retailer to offer service. Another contribution is that this is the first 
study that, to our knowledge, analyzes the impact of the assortment consistency on 
retail strategy and the ensuing retail structure. 

Part V 
Conclusions and Discussion 

Chapter 8 
Summary, Conclusions, and Directions for 
Future Research 
8.1 Summary and conclusions 
The creation of availabihty constitutes the core of marketing. This book focuses on 
an important instrument with which availabihty is created, distribution service. The 
concept of distribution service has received little, often fragmented, attention in 
multiple fields, including marketing, logistics, economics, operations research, and 
organizational behavior. The minor attention for distribution service as a concept is 
amazing considering the variety in retail formats that has emerged over time and the 
large price surcharges consumer segments are willing to pay for high levels of 
distribution service. The reader is challenged to compare the prices of unbranded 
products, such as clothing, drapes, and cut flowers, sold in outdoor markets with the 
prices of (exactly) the same products sold in specialized stores. Apparently, 
consumers are willing to pay much more for products when presented in attractive 
stores where they can shop around and compare alternatives in a nice atmosphere 
and get personal advice. 
Chapter two identifies three different approaches with respect to 
conceptualization and analysis of distribution service. The logistics approach to 
distribution service emphasizes generation of service outputs by physical 
distribution systems that provide customers, and ultimately end-users, with time, 
place, and possession utilities, as well as maintenance of form utility. It focuses on 
the performance of an organization's or a distribution channel's physical distribution 
system, which is often reflected in so-called logistics performance indicators that 
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are subsequently used in models for logistics system optimization. The logistics 
approach to distribution service predominantly follows the institutional school of 
marketing theory. From an economic perspective distribution service provision 
results in reduced imphcit costs associated with product acquisition and use. The 
economic focus is generally on channel members' strategic decision making with 
respect to service provision and consumption, and the consequences of these 
strategic interactions, in particular with respect to distribution costs and channel 
structure. Finally, behavioral approaches to distribution service focus on the 
behavior of individual organizations and consumers in a distribution channel and 
analyze relationships between channel actors and their consequences for channel 
structure by means of psychological, sociological, as well as other behavioral 
theories. 
This book has adopted an integrative approach to distribution service. On the 
basis of all previously identified approaches a new definition has been formulated 
of distribution service as "supporting or facilitating service output of a distribution 
channel's physical distribution process that (1) reduces customer cost of product 
acquisition and/or use through creation of time and place utility and maintenance of 
form utility, and/or (2) improves consumer decision making effectiveness, and/or 
(3) increases customers' hedonic shopping value". This definition of distribution 
service differs from other definitions in that it is more comprehensive and as such 
provides a better starting point for analysis of distribution service. It integrates 
perspectives from logistics, economics, and behavioral science and in addition 
highhghts the significance of distribution service provision for marketing processes. 
Many other definitions of distribution service can be considered special cases of this 
definition. On the basis of the definition five general distribution service elements 
have been distinguished, matching Betancourt and Gautschi's (1990) classification 
of distribution service elements, i.e., assortment, information, delivery at the right 
time and in the right form, accessibility of location, and ambience. 
The concept of distribution service as defined in chapter two relates to a 
number of issues that deserve further attention. Parts n, in, and IV of this book 
each address such an issue through theoretical and empirical modeling and analysis. 
The research on which each part has been based has in common a focus on 
individual channel member decision making in a competitive retailing environment. 
The three empirical studies that have been done differ with respect to (a) their 
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scope, which ranges from operational to strategic; (b) the particular channel 
member under consideration, i.e., consumer, retailer, or both; (c) the particular 
distribution service elements that are emphasized, and (d) the specific behavioral 
variables analyzed, i.e., assortment choice, post-purchase evaluation processes, and 
retail format decisions. The empirical apphcations in chapters four, five, and seven 
all concern the Dutch domestic cut flower market. 
In the second part of the book retail assortment stands out as an essential 
distribution service element. Chapter three addresses the theory underlying 
consumer evaluation of and choice from assortments. Starting with analysis of 
consumer need for assortments, it provides a theoretical framework in which 
consumption goals, situational, and contextual variables, including retailer 
distribution service provision, are determinants of consumer evaluation of and 
choice from assortments. The interaction between assortment composition and 
consumer choice is explicitly recognized. The chapter results in a model of 
consumer assortment choice and presents a number of propositions with respect to 
the role of consumption goal and purchase context on consumer choice of and from 
assortments. Several of these hypotheses are tested in the subsequent chapter. 
Chapter four empirically analyzes the influences of assortment composition, 
consumption goal, the competitive environment, and distribution service provision 
on consumer store and item choice. An experimental research design was used and 
associated multiple choice tasks were presented to members of a household consu-
mer panel. It has been shown in chapter four that extended multinomial logit 
modeling of the experimental choice data provides a tool for optimization of retail 
assortments. Using quantification of substitution, complementarity, and asymmetric 
dominance effects, assortment simulations were done that give insight into the 
effects of retailer assortment composition on sales. It appeared that other 
distribution service elements, such as ambience and location, play a subordinate role 
in consumer choice relative to assortment composition and price. 
The third part of the book investigates the role of retail distribution service 
provision in consumer post-purchase evaluation processes, resulting in feelings of 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Chapter five extends existing research on consumer 
post-purchase evaluation. Distribution service provision and evaluation refer to the 
creation of availability through suppher-customer interactions. Therefore, suppher 
variables have to be included in the analysis as determinants of consumer evaluation 
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of exchange episodes, in addition to consumer variables. The retailer-level variables 
that have been hypothesized to influence consumer satisfaction include retailer 
strategic orientation, retailer-supplier trust, and retailer distribution system 
performance indicators. Datacollection was done in two stages. A sample of 
specialized cut flower retailers was interviewed first, followed by pre- and 
postpurchase interviews with their customers. Multilevel random ANOVA showed 
that a significant part of measure variance can be attributed to unique and 
systematic retailer influences. However, consumer perceptions of retailer 
distribution service performance and consumer satisfaction/dissatisfaction appear to 
be highly idiosyncratic. Consumer perceptions of distribution service performance 
appeared to have a positive direct as well as a positive indirect effect on consumer 
satisfaction/ dissatisfaction. Multilevel regression analysis using a two-level 
random-intercept model showed that customers of service oriented retailers 
generally have higher perceptions of distribution service performance and 
experience lower distribution-related cost. In addition, higher retailer trust in her 
supplier coincides with higher consumer perceptions of product quality and 
presentation. For a subsample consisting of retailers who purchase at the same 
supplier type - the flower auction - retailer-supplier trust also related negatively to 
consumer perceptions of distribution cost. Retailer assessed values of distribution 
system indicators were not or only weakly significantly related to consumer 
perceptions of distribution service provision. 
The fourth part of the book focuses on the role of distribution service in 
vertical and horizontal strategic interactions between channel members, particularly 
between manufacturers and retailers, and its consequences for the emergence of 
different channel structures and retail formats. Chapter six starts with an overview 
of rationales for vertical differentiation of distribution channels in markets with 
different competitive structures. It appears that competition, more specifically 
channel members' cost efficiency and distribution service effectiveness, is a major 
determinant of channel structure. The strategic interactive nature of channel mem-
bers' decision making in oligopolistic markets favors game-theoretic analysis and 
modeling of channel member price and non-price decisions as determinants and 
consequences of channel structure. The chapter identifies several findings that point 
out the relevance of distribution service provision for reducing price competition 
and thereby achieving some form of channel coordination. However, the dynamics 
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associated with distribution service competition and the consequences thereof for 
channel structure have been included in many distribution channel models only 
implicitly. The importance of distribution service as a decision variable deserves 
particular attention with respect to retail format competition. 
Chapter seven analyzes retail competition with respect to price and 
distribution service and its consequences for the emergence of differentiated retail 
formats. The study adds another dimension to breadth and depth of assortments by 
addressing the issue of retailer commitment to carrying a consistent assortment 
within a product category, i.e., the consistency with which a retailer carries specific 
brands and items within a product category, and its relationship to retailer price and 
service decisions. A game-theoretic model was developed of a market with two 
retailers, one who commits to offering a consistent assortment and consequently 
incurs higher cost of goods, while the other does not. The model identifies the 
conditions under which an equilibrium results in which either one or both of the 
retailers will offer additional service and what would be their pricing strategies. In 
addition to model development a contribution of this chapter is an empirical test of 
the proposed theory on the basis of data from the Dutch retail flower market. The 
equUibrium predicted by the model i.e., only the retailer offering consistent 
assortment is offering additional service, was found to be consistent with observed 
and empirically assessed retailer and consumer behavior. 
8.2 Research implications 
This book argued that distribution service is a complex multidimensional concept 
which can be provided by a trader to his customers, but also can be incorporated in 
and transferred through physical products. Examples of the latter are abundant and 
concern mostly so-called convenience products, such as ready-to-eat foods, vending 
machines, etcetera. Distribution service introduces many research issues with 
relevance for many fields of interest. This book identified and integrated three 
different approaches to distribution service that relate to different stages of customer 
and supplier decision making. The research that was subsequently done has 
competition as its central issue. In this section the research presented in this book is 
discussed in a broader perspective. 
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8.2.1 Consumer choice and retail structure 
The assortment is a dominant element of distribution service because it refers to all 
three functions of distribution service mentioned in the definition presented in 
chapter 2. Assortments facilitate shopping and as such reduce shopping costs, they 
assist consumer decision making through simple comparison of different products, 
and may provide hedonic shopping value. Consumer store and item choice behavior 
depends on a number of situational and personal factors, including the particular 
consumption goal pursued, the characteristics of specific items that are present in 
the assortment, competing assortments, and other distribution service provision by 
the retailer and competing stores. 
Retailers exert influence on both desired outputs and the consumption 
activities performed by consumers, largely through advertising, and distribution 
service provision. More specifically, context effects play a role throughout the 
consumer's decision making process. Once the consumer has entered the store, he or 
she encounters product presentation and experiences personal selling efforts, as weU 
as other distribution service, all of which may induce context effects and 
consequently influence decision making. Retailers thus have significant opportunity 
to alter consumers' consideration and choice sets and consequently influence choice. 
Ample examples exist of salespersons who allow for consumers' tendency for 
extremeness aversion and asymmetric dominance by offering three alternatives, one 
of which is a decoy. Retailers thus can exert considerable influence on consumer 
behavior through their in-store presentation of products, advertising, and personal 
selling. The role of retailers in satisfying and creating consumer demand, that is 
improving consumer decision making effectiveness, increasing shopping value, and 
decreasing shopping cost, has been illustrated in several parts of this book. 
Hopefully, the research reported contributes to an increased awareness among 
retailers of the possibihties that exist to improve their profitability through 
improved service provision. 
Given her knowledge of customers and competitors each retailer should 
determine her own assortment. The approach that was followed in chapter four 
allows retailers to simulate and subsequently evaluate different assortment 
compositions with respect to consumer demand. In addition, the estimation results 
give clear guidelines with respect to the number of each item to hold in stock. When 
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inventory costs and product margins are known the estimated parameters from the 
extended multinomial logit model can be input to profit optimization using 
mathematical programming techniques. Quantification of the effects of distribution 
services, including possible trade-offs between the various service aspects, on 
customer preference formation and choice can provide valuable input to distribution 
channel models. The results of the studies presented in chapters four and five form a 
starting point in this respect. Worth mentioning is the enormous increase in 
Efficient Consumer Response (ECR, Coopers and Lybrand 1996) implementations 
in which channel inventories are driven by end-consumer demand. In ECR systems 
assortment optimization will soon be considered necessary in order to increase 
merchandise effectiveness and channel efficiency. The results of the choice experi-
ment reported in chapter four are a step towards this direction. 
In addition to affecting consumer choice behavior retailer distribution service 
provision influences consumer postpurchase evaluation of their shopping 
experience. The results presented in chapter five showed that retailer distribution 
service provision has considerable influence on consumer postpurchase evaluations. 
The adopted approach enables quantification of distinctive retailer effects on 
consumer behavioral variables. Consumers' quality evaluations and perceptions of 
disconfirmation of expectations appear to be less idiosyncratic than consumer 
feehngs of satisfaction/dissatisfaction. Retailers should therefore carefully select the 
behavioral variables they monitor with respect to their distribution service 
performance. 
Distribution service provision by retailers constitutes a powerful force driving 
developments in channel structure and retail formats. The different types of retail 
outlets that exist in a particular market are the result of the simultaneous decisions 
made by many retailers concerning assortment composition, other distribution 
service provision, and price. Consumer demand for distribution service constitutes 
an important factor underlying the emergence of retail assortments. The model 
presented in chapter seven gives insight into the dynamics of intertype retail 
competition. It shows the interrelationships between price and service competition 
and identifies conditions under which specific retailers will carry consistent 
assortments and provide additional distribution service. The model was validated 
using real-world data and, despite its restrictive assumptions, proves to be 
predictive of a specific market structure. Similar models can be used to gain insight 
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into the effect of structural developments in certain markets, such as the one 
described below. 
8.2.2 A special application 
It has generally been recognized that there exists a specific market for supermarkets 
that allow consumers to purchase a basket of products in one shopping trip. With 
respect to non-food department stores1 exist that offer similar opportunities for 
one-stop shopping. Virtually all aspects of distribution service that have been 
discussed in this book apply in particular to the considerations concerning approval 
of a recent merger between two department stores in the Netherlands. In a recent 
case - 166/Vendex-KBB - the Netherlands Competition Authority (NCA) states 
that, based on qualitative arguments, department stores do not meet a specific 
consumer need for one-stop shopping for non-food products and consequently no 
specific market exists for department stores. The Competition Authorities in Great 
Britain and Germany have concluded similarly with respect to recent mergers. In 
the United States the proper authority has decided otherwise in several cases. In the 
reflections underlying the NCA's decision the specific distribution service package 
provided by department stores and the consequences thereof for market definition 
have been exphcitly recognized. The NCA argues, however, that a hypothetical 
department store monopolist would not be able to sustain a small but significant and 
profitable price increase because of competition from specialty stores. Based on 
this, one can wonder what rationales underhe the existence of department stores. 
Given a consumer's need for one-stop shopping for goods and/or pure 
services, the large and varied assortment carried by a department store provides an 
additional, contextual factor that influences consumer purchase decisions. The NCA 
resolution mentions that department stores offer large and varied assortments that 
encourage impulse purchases and create shopping value to consumers. This has in 
fact been mentioned as one of the strongest competitive advantages of department 
stores, and is in agreement with the theory in chapter 3 and the results of the 
1 According to the Netherlands Competition Authority a department store is a store which 
continuously and simultaneously carries at least eight different, more or less unrelated product 
assortments (NCA 1998). 
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research presented in chapter 4. In addition, the resolution states that the large and 
varied assortment carried by a department store provides information to consumers 
that can be easily collected and used for improvement of their decision making . 
These seem plausible rationales for the existence of department stores only when 
they lead to increased purchases relative to more specialized assortments, which is 
not the case according to the NCA. Scale advantages incurred by department stores 
would favor large stores with large assortments but should have lead to the 
emergence of category killers instead of department stores when the need for 
one-stop shopping of non-food products is insignificant. 
Chapter 3 argued that consumer need for one-stop shopping and associated 
choice of assortment is dependent on the specific consumption goal, as well as other 
situational and contextual factors. As such, consumer need for one-stop shopping 
varies across time and occasions and accordingly substitutability and 
complementarity are subjective concepts. Department stores may therefore cater a 
different market segment, in terms of consumption goals, than specialized stores. 
Alternatively, department stores may compete with specialized stores for a specific 
consumer segment. This issue deserves additional examination. 
The NCA argues that quantification of competition between department stores 
and specialized stores is troublesome and consequently relies on qualitative 
arguments with respect to the decision whether or not to approve concentration of 
specific retailers. The research reported in chapter 4 offers possibilities for 
quantification of the existence of complementarity between seemingly unrelated 
items in an assortment. Such analysis will shed light on the question whether 
consumers value one-stop shopping for specific non-food products and can support 
decision making with respect to merger approval. Similarly, multiple choice experi-
ments and cross-effects models can be used to quantify substitutabihty between 
department stores and specialty stores, which might very well be asymmetric. 
A high threshold of entering the "department store market" exists due to high 
costs associated with establishment and operation of a department store. One could 
therefore argue that through merger department stores monopolize certain 
distribution service elements, particularly assortment. It remains unclear whether a 
large monopolist department store that operates in a market with competition from 
Note in this respect that many specialized stores offer personal expert advice. 
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many specialized retailers may either not be able to sustain a higher price for 
individual items in the assortment due to competition, or will decide to maintain a 
competitive price level for other reasons, such as price elasticity of demand or 
maximization of market share instead of maximization of profits. Game-theoretical 
models, such as discussed in chapter 6 and developed in chapter 7, of competition 
between department stores and between a department store and specialized stores 
can generate insight into the conditions under which a department store will or will 
not show undesirable behavior. 
8.3 Future research challenges 
Distribution service is a multidimensional concept, its provision affects many types 
of consumer and organizational behavior and underlying needs, wants, and desires. 
The research reported in this book discussed a number of questions with respect to 
the relationship between distribution service provision and competition between 
retail formats. In particular, it considered the role of distribution service in 
consumer evaluation of products and stores and in retailer decision making. The 
new definition of distribution service that has been developed in chapter two 
mentions the role of distribution service in reducing consumers' distribution- related 
cost, improving the effectiveness of decision making, and increasing hedonistic 
shopping value. The book has addressed each of these consumer benefits associated 
with distribution service provision. However, many more research questions that 
deserve further analysis can be formulated in this respect. These concern among 
other things the relationship between distribution service provision and consumer 
behavior, the role of distribution service with respect to the development of new 
retail formats, and the role of distribution service in distribution channel 
optimization. 
With respect to consumer behavior specific questions that can be asked 
include for example the determinants of consumer need for convenience and the 
relationship between distribution service elements and consumers' emotional 
shopping experience. The influence of information provision, being an important 
distribution service element, on consumer decision making processes is another 
issue that deserves attention. Technological developments, in particular new media 
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such as the Internet and electronic retelling bring about structural changes in the 
costs and benefits associated with consumer shopping behavior (cf. Alba et al. 
1997). In the near future comparison of alternative products and outlets may involve 
a first stage in which the personalized software preselects items on detailed criteria 
such as price, color, and size, followed by a final selection by the individual 
consumer. Search engines and so-called personal assistants will allow consumers to 
comprehend larger assortments and distinguish item differences at a more detailed 
level at lower cost. The rapidly increasing adoption of new media, in particular the 
Internet, will thus change consumers' existing cognitive structures and probably 
shake existing competitive relations and ultimately distribution channel structures. 
Consumer pre- and post-purchase evaluation processes generally result from 
interactions with the store and its personnel. Distribution service provision is part of 
these interactions. New retailing formats involve new ways of suppher-customer 
interactions. Examples of research themes in this respect include, "How does 
electronic retailing influence consumer choice behavior," "What are the 
mechanisms behind retailer-consumer interactions," and "What is the specific role 
of individual distribution service elements, such as personal advice, in these 
interactions?" In addition, since electronic retailing does not allow consumers to 
evaluate a number of experience attributes, consumers need cues for inferential 
belief formation, such as strong brand names (including store names) and 
guarantees (as with postal ordering). These issues require detailed investigation into 
the role of individual distribution service elements and their interrelationships in 
consumer decision making. 
Future research on distribution service provision relates to development of 
new products and retail formats. The increased need for convenience and other time 
and effort-saving service outcomes has already lead to many new product 
introductions and new retail formulas in which distribution service plays an 
important role. In particular products in which service has been incorporated, such 
as fast food and TV-dinners, deserve more attention. Given the multitude of existing 
store formats and branded products one might argue that innovation challenge 
concerns distribution service in particular. Research could therefore consider the 
relationships between specific consumer service needs and distribution service 
provision by different types of retail outlets. 
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Channel optimization requires careful assessment of channel performance. 
This book's definition of distribution service and its role in distribution channel 
competition aims among other things at broadening the perspective on channel 
performance. The retail stage forms a natural starting point for analysis of the role 
of distribution service provision in distribution channel structure and coordination. 
Assortment decisions are generally among the most difficult and important 
decisions faced by retailers. Recent interest in ECR has led to an increased focus on 
assortment management, both from the perspective of cost reduction, and from the 
perspective of demand management. "Efficient Assortment" has been recognized as 
a critical element of ECR and imphes careful assortment design, balancing the total 
distribution channel costs of carrying specific items against their role in creating 
and satisfying final consumer demand. The research in this book focused on the 
multilateral influences between assortment composition and consumer choice. 
Decisions on shelf space allocation of items in the assortment are interrelated to 
assortment decisions. In the introduction to a recent special issue of the Journal of 
Retailing on Assortment Planning Kahn (1999) argues that since shelf space is 
among the scarcest resources in retailing most research on retailing has focused on 
optimization of shelf space allocation (e.g., Corstjens and Doyle 1981; Bultez and 
Naert 1988; Bultez, Gijsbrechts, Naert, and Vanden Abeele 1989; Chiang and 
Wilcox 1997; Urban 1998). One might argue that shelf space and assortment 
decisions are interdependent. Research on retail assortment composition should be 
extended to include the interactions between assortment composition and shelf 
space allocation with respect to consumer preferences and choice. 
In practice, ECR can be considered a driving force behind cooperation within 
and among distribution channels, even when they consist of independent actors, and 
as such becomes an instrument for achieving channel coordination. Since it is very 
difficult to develop and realize a simple coordination mechanism for a complex 
real-life distribution channel, organizations that participate on the same channel 
level in different channels, such as grocery retailers, focus increasingly on channel 
optimization through cooperation and information exchange. Distribution service 
provision has thereby been recognized as important instrument for achieving better 
channel performance. Consider for example recent information sharing by large 
supermarket organizations in order to increase the benefits resulting from 
implementation of ECR. Improvement of channel performance by not merely 
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reacting to in-store consumer demand but by management of consumer demand 
requires detailed knowledge of consumer decision making with respect to products 
and assortments. Likewise, successful implementation of an integrated perspective 
on channel optimization requires insight into the behavioral mechanisms underlying 
strategic interactions between channel actors at different channel stages, including 
competitors dynamics as well as supplier-buyer relationships. The development of 
new game-theoretic models is required to yield insight into the role of distribution 
service in structural developments with respect to retail formats, channel structure, 
and channel coordination. 
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Samenvatting 
De essentie van marketing betreft het creëren van verkrijgbaarheid. De creatie van 
verkrijgbaarheid betreft het overbruggen van verschillen tussen hoeveelheid en 
kwaliteit van producten op het tijdstip van productie en de door de finale consument 
gewenste tijd en plaats van consumptie, hoeveelheid en kwaliteit van het product. 
Dit boek richt zich op een belangrijk instrument voor het realiseren van 
verkrijgbaarheid, namelijk dienstverlening met betrekking tot de distributie van 
producten. 
Hoofdstuk 1 geeft een overzicht van het begrip distributie service, de 
theoretische en praktische relevantie en ontwikkelingen in de tijd. Aan distributie 
service als concept is in de verschillende relevante aandachtsgebieden, zoals 
marketing, logistiek, economie en operationele analyse, slechts weinig aandacht 
besteed. Diverse ontwikkelingen aan de vraag- en aanbodzijde van de markt 
benadrukken de noodzaak tot aandacht voor deze vorm van dienstverlening. 
Distributie service is een complex multidimensionaal concept. Een producent 
of tussenpersoon kan deze service aan haar klanten leveren, maar de service kan 
ook ingebed zijn in en overgedragen worden door het fysieke product. Teneinde tot 
een duidelijke conceptualisering van distributie service te komen analyseert 
hoofdstuk 2 drie verschillende theoretische benaderingen met betrekking tot de 
definitie en analyse van distributie service. 
De logistieke benadering beschouwt distributie service als de uitkomst van de 
fysieke distributie operatie. Vanuit deze optiek creëert distributie service nut naar 
tijd en plaats alsmede behoud van nut van vorm voor actoren in een 
distributiekanaal en uiteindelijk voor de finale consument. De prestatie van het 
fysieke distributie systeem van een organisatie of een distributiekanaal wordt 
weergegeven door middel van logistieke prestatie-indicatoren. Volgens de 
economische benadering resulteert het verlenen van distributie service in een 
verlaging van de impliciete kosten met betrekking tot productverwerving en 
productgebruik voor de klant. Centraal in deze benadering staat de strategische 
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beslmtvorming met betrekking tot het verlenen van service door ondernemingen in 
relatie tot de structuur van distributiekanalen. De gedragsbenadering tenslotte richt 
zich op het gedrag van individuele actoren in distributiekanalen met betrekking tot 
de productie en consumptie van dienstverlening en beschouwt de gevolgen daarvan 
voor consumentengedrag en ketenstructuur door middel van voornamelijk 
psychologische en sociologische theorieën. 
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt een nieuwe definitie van distributie service geformuleerd 
op basis van de eerder beschreven benaderingen die als basis dient voor de rest van 
het boek. Onder distributie service wordt in het vervolg verstaan "de 
dienstverlening die voortvloeit uit het fysieke distributie proces in een 
distributiekanaal en die (1) de kosten van productverwerving en/of gebruik door 
consumenten reduceert door middel van het creëren van nut naar tijd en plaats en 
behoud van nut van vorm, en/of (2) de effectiviteit van de besluilvorrning door 
consumenten verbetert, en/of (3) de hedonistische waarde die consumenten aan het 
winkelen toekennen doet toenemen". Deze definitie integreert de visie van de drie 
bovengenoemde aandachtsgebieden op distributie service en benadrukt de 
relevantie voor de marketing. Er zijn vijf verschillende elementen van distributie 
service onderscheiden, nl. assortiment, informatie, levering op de juiste tijd en in de 
juiste vorm, toegankelijkheid van de locatie en sfeer. 
In de delen II, IJJ en IV van dit proefschrift worden verschillende 
aandachtspunten betreffende distributie service belicht door middel van theoretische 
en empirische modelvorming en analyse. De delen hebben gemeenschappelijk een 
gerichtheid op besluitvorming door individuele actoren in distributiekanalen waarin 
sprake is van concurrerende op detailhandelsniveau. In het empirische gedeelte van 
elk onderzoek wordt gebruik gemaakt van gegevens die betrekking hebben op de 
binnenlandse markt voor snijbloemen in Nederland. 
Het assortiment is een belangrijk distributie service element omdat het 
betrekking heeft op elk van de in bovenstaande definitie genoemde drie functies van 
distributie service. De voorkeur van de consument voor one-stop-shopping is een 
drijvende kracht achter winkelkeuze en is een belangrijke factor voor de 
structurering van distributiekanalen en het ontstaan van nieuwe winkelformules. In 
deel IJ staat het detailhandelsassortiment centraal. Hoofdstuk 3 behandelt de theorie 
betreffende de vraag naar, evaluatie van en de keuze uit assortimenten door 
consumenten. De analyse resulteert in een theoretisch kader waarin de door de 
consument nagestreefde consumptie doelen, de kenmerken van specifieke artikelen 
in het assortiment, kenmerken van concurrerende assortimenten en andere 
situationele en contextuele variabelen optreden als determinanten van 
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consumentenkeuze van en uit assortimenten. Aandacht wordt besteed aan zg. 
context effecten, die betrekking hebben op de interactie tussen assortiments-
samenstelling en consumentenkeuze. Op basis van de theorie worden proposities 
geformuleerd. Een aantal van deze proposities wordt getoetst in hoofstuk 4. 
In hoofdstuk 4 worden de invloeden van assortimentssamenstelling, 
consumptie doel, de concurrentie omgeving en andere elementen van distributie 
service op consumenten winkel- en productkeuze gekwantificeerd. Voor de 
empirische toepassing wordt gebruik gemaakt van een experimenteel 
onderzoeksontwerp en zijn daarmee samenhangende keuzetaken aan consumenten 
voorgelegd. Door middel van multinomiale logitmodellen zijn substitutie, 
complementariteits-, en asymmetrische dominantie effecten van de individuele 
items in het assortiment op de consumentenkeuze vastgesteld. De service elementen 
sfeer en locatie blijken een ondergeschikte invloed te hebben op de 
consumentenkeuze in vergelijking met de samenstelling van assortimenten en de 
prijs van producten daarin. Op basis van de resultaten zijn assortimentssimulaties 
gedaan die inzicht geven in de effecten van de assortimentssamenstelling op de 
verkopen. De in dit hoofdstuk gepresenteerde modellen en technieken zijn bij 
uitstek geschikt voor het optimaliseren van detailhandelsassortimenten. 
De rol van dienstverlening door de detailhandel in evaluatieprocessen na 
aankoop door consumenten vormt het onderwerp van hoofdstuk 5. Een model is 
ontwikkeld waarin, naast consumentenvariabelen, de leveranciers-specifieke 
variabelen strategische oriëntatie, vertrouwen van de detaillist in zijn toeleverancier 
en de prestatie van het fysieke distributie systeem van de detaillist zijn opgenomen 
als determinanten van consumententevredenheid. De geformuleerde hypotheses zijn 
getoetst door middel van een empirisch onderzoek onder detaillisten en hun klanten, 
die zowel voor als na aankoop zijn geïnterviewd. 
Er zijn drie dimensies geïdentificeerd die de perceptie door consumenten van 
de service prestatie van hun detaillist opspannen, te weten persoonhjke interactie en 
sfeer, productkwaliteit en presentatie, en informatieverschaffing. De data zijn 
geanalyseerd met behulp van multilevel regressieanalyse. Door middel van deze 
techniek worden de unieke systematische variantie zowel op het niveau van de 
detailhandel als op het niveau van de consument vastgesteld. De resultaten van het 
onderzoek laten zien dat een zeer groot deel van de variatie in de 
consumentenbeoordeling van de afzonderlijke dimensies van de dienstverlening en 
de consumententevredenheid door individuele factoren wordt bepaald. Analyse 
toont verder aan op welke wijze individuele detaillisten invloed kunnen uitoefenen 
op de consumentenevaluatie na de aankoop. 
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Het vierde deel van dit proefschrift beschouwt de rol van distributie service in 
verticale en horizontale strategische interacties tussen actoren in het 
distributiekanaal, voornamelijk tussen producenten en detaillisten, tussen 
detaillisten en consumenten, en tassen detaillisten onderling, en behandelt de 
gevolgen daarvan voor ketenstructuren en winkelformules. Hoofdstuk 6 behandelt 
de oorzaken van verticale differentiatie van distributiekanalen in markten met 
verschillende concurrentiestructuren. Concurrentie, meer specifiek met betrekking 
tot kostenefficiëntie en de effectiviteit van de dienstverlening, is een belangrijke 
determinant van ketenstructuur. De analyse resulteert in verschillende bevindingen 
die inzicht geven in de relevantie van distributie service voor het reduceren van 
prijsconcurrentie en het bewerkstelligen van ketencoördinatie. 
De strategische interactieve aard van besluitvorming door actoren in de keten 
is bij uitstek geschikt voor speltheoretische analyse. Hoofdstuk 7 modelleert 
concurrentie tassen detaillisten met betrekking tot prijs en distributie service en 
analyseert de gevolgen daarvan voor het ontstaan van verschillende winkelformules. 
Het onderzoek voegt een dimensie toe aan de breedte en diepte van het assortiment 
en beschouwt de consistentie waarmee een detaillist specifieke merken en artikelen 
binnen een productcategorie aanbiedt in zijn assortiment in relatie tot prijs- en 
service beslissingen. Een speltheoretisch model is ontwikkeld voor een markt met 
twee detaillisten, die verschillen in de mate waarin zij een consistent assortiment 
voeren en derhalve in de daarmee samenhangende kosten. Het model identificeert 
de voorwaarden waaronder een evenwicht resulteert waarin geen, één of beide 
detaillisten een hoog service niveau bieden en analyseert hun prijsvorming. Het 
model wordt getoetst door middel van een empirische toepassing op basis van 
gegevens uit de Nederlandse snijbloemenmarkt. Het door het model voorspelde 
evenwicht - de detaillist die een consistent assortiment aanbiedt levert tevens een 
hoog serviceniveau - is in overeenstemming met waargenomen en empirisch 
vastgesteld detaillisten- en consumentengedrag. 
Ter afsluiting van het proefschrift worden implicaties van de 
onderzoeksresultaten besproken alsmede suggesties voor verder onderzoek. De 
relevantie van de bevindingen en de gebruikte methodologie wordt toegelicht aan de 
hand van een recente beslissing door de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit inzake 
een fusie tussen twee grootwinkelbedrijven. 
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